

L'ANALISI LINGUISTICA E LETTERARIA

FACOLTÀ DI LINGUE E LETTERATURE STRANIERE
UNIVERSITÀ CATTOLICA DEL SACRO CUORE

1

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Proceedings of the IADA Workshop
Word Meaning in Argumentative Dialogue

Homage to Sorin Stati

VOLUME 1

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FOREWORD

It is with great pleasure that I present the Proceedings of the Workshop of the International Association for Dialogue Analysis, held in the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, in Milan, in 2008. The Workshop, that attained a notable success, registered the presence of prestigious speakers who brought the richness of their scientific and research competence to the topic of argumentation, articulated in a wide variety of aspects. These two elegant volumes now allow this successful event to acquire its lasting form, rendering the scholarly contributions available in print.

The importance and growing centrality of argumentation in our daily lives, from the sophisticated forms in cultural, socio-economic, professional and political contexts, to the recurrent manifestations in everyday linguistic interaction, render this theme of great actuality and pertinence. The Congress addressed the issue with papers that document a constant and profitable dialogue among diverse cultural sectors, carried out with consistent attention to the multifarious forms in which argumentation articulates itself.

The various considerations to which argumentation lends itself are testified by the different sectors of the two volumes. Each volume introduces its specific contents with an opening presentation of the linguistic structures and the pragmatic functions in argumentation, and each concludes with a final evaluation of the theoretical issues confronted in the volume itself. Within the two volumes such features as argumentative discourse in German, linguistic devices and cross-linguistic perspectives in argumentation, reasonable emotions and argumentation, argumentation in diverse professional contexts, and argumentative dialogue in literature and communication constitute the thematic bases for the numerous single contributions.

The two volumes are rich in argumentative proposals and, with their fundamental multi-disciplinarity, furnish a notable and precious contribution to the state-of-the-art, underlining the scientific attention that the topic of argumentation attracts, and bear witness to the valuable and on-going research on the question. The contributors are Italian and foreign scholars who present the results of their work in Italian, French, English and German, thus conferring the added value of an international connotation to the high-level contents. A strong international trait appears to be the common de-

nominator of the IADA in general and of this Congress in particular. This feature should allow these Proceedings to leave their mark in the scientific community.

As Dean of the Faculty of Linguistic Sciences and Foreign Literatures, it is gratifying to signal the presence of professors of the Faculty as authors of papers in the Proceedings. This testifies the fact that the Faculty collocates itself in a foremost position as an institution of applied research, a competence that is paralleled by its didactic commitment and by its particular care in developing in its students dialogical skills and abilities functional to the promotion of tolerance between different cultural entities.

In expressing my great appreciation for the entire work, I wish to thank the editors of the volumes, professors Giovanni Gobber, Maria Cristina Gatti, Sara Cigada, Sibilla Cantarini and Silvia Gilardoni, for their fundamental contribution in making these volumes available.

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EDITORS' INTRODUCTION

The publication of the Proceedings of the I.A.D.A. Workshop 2008 *Word Meaning in Argumentative Dialogue* aims at contributing in a relevant way to the understanding of lexical phenomena from an interactional and textual point of view. In fact the conference topic covers an important crossing between three research lines at least, first of all *dialogue* as the specific interest of the Association.

Dialogue is meant in a polysemic way for referring to effective interaction analysis but also to its representations in literature and in the media, including polyphony effects in any communicative event, even in written ones. As Luisa Camaiora highlighted in her Foreword to these Proceedings, dialogue is a key-word in our multicultural social context, while “dialogue” analysis as a practice comes out to be more and more meaningful in nowadays professional, public and institutional contexts. Therefore it is also especially meaningful in the context of a modern languages Faculty as ours.

The second research line mentioned in the conference title is *argumentation*. The intersection between dialogue and argumentation selects specific practices of dialogue as a reasonable and shared application of communicative activities. As outlined by the model of critical discussion in recent years, these practices obey to general inferential rules, in spite of relevant context-boundedness. In this perspective, a considerable number of participants developed various aspects of emotional and emotive argumentation.

Third and last, the workshop title pointed to *word meaning* as the specific linguistic structure to be analyzed. This hint has been variously interpreted in the papers, as attention to be devoted to discourse markers, to specific lexical items or to translation aspects. For this last area, German and English received a specific attention during the workshop and this relevant topic appears frequently throughout the proceedings.

The perspective adopted cannot be but a pragmatic and functionalist one. Nonetheless, each scholar contributed to the conference topic with peculiar methodological and theoretical sensitivity, as is a longstanding tradition in the history of our International Association. That is the cause of great variety and so to say heterogeneity in approach and in focusing. Contributions are also collocated at very diverse scientific levels, according to the different ages and scientific experience of the participants.

As it is a tradition in I.A.D.A. working style, a rich range of natural languages is represented, as a concrete instrument of dialogue in a multicultural scientific community: English and French first of all, German as the scientific research domain of the conveners Giovanni Gobber and Sibilla Cantarini, Italian as the language spoken in the hosting region. But the specific topic of the workshop encouraged many participants to take into account specific linguistic aspects, contrastive perspectives, or translation dynamics, focusing on Russian, Spanish (also in its Latin-American varieties), Portuguese, Romanian, Persian and out of Indo-European languages, Japanese, thus contributing to deepening our knowledge of particular linguistic phenomena.

As far as research methodologies are concerned, some authors adopt a normative perspective describing so to say "how argumentation should be". Some others start from the description of actual linguistic facts and they apply interpretation models and categories without discussing them. In general, many contributions use an assorted technique, starting from a model, comparing it with data and studying relevant implications.

Faced with this situation, the editors tried to put some (mostly arbitrary) order among the almost seventy papers they received, dividing them in ten sections all along the two volumes. Each volume opens with a series of papers presented during the conference plenary sessions. This section has been named in both volumes *Linguistic Structures and Pragmatic Functions in Argumentation*. The contributions that follow refer to the papers discussed in the parallel sessions. In the first volume, these contributions have been divided in the following sections: *Considering Argumentative Discourse in German*; *Linguistic Devices in Argumentative Dialogues*, gathering papers about micro-phenomena in different languages, and *Cross-Linguistic Perspectives*, with papers oriented towards contrastive analysis; *Theoretical Issues in Argumentation* closes the first volume offering contributions to a better understanding of methodological and theoretical problems.

The second volume opens with the second group of key-note speakers contributions (*Linguistic Structures and Pragmatic Functions in Argumentation*) followed by four sections, i.e.: *Reasonable Emotions and Argumentation*; *Argumentation in Professional Contexts* in some specific domains (politic and legal discourse; classroom discourse; economic discourse; scientific discourse). The following section gathers texts about *Argumentative Dialogue in Literature and Communication*, while the last part covers studies about argumentative strategies from a functionalist point of view with the section-title *Theoretical Issues in Argumentation*.

Book reviews, covering aspects of general linguistics as well as English, French, German and Russian linguistics, appear in the final section of each volume, as is customary in each issue of «L'analisi linguistica e letteraria» (available online at <http://www.unicatt.it/librario/all/indexUK.asp>).

The three days of the workshop represented an interesting occasion to meet colleagues from all over Europe but also from Argentina, Canada, Iran, Israel, Mexico and Russia, and to spend time together listening to each other in the enjoyable environment of our University.

The workshop was partially organized with the financial support of a National Research Project PRIN 2007, but we wish to thank all those who made the workshop possible both by economic support and by self-involvement in the conference organization: the Milan Campus Administration, in particular its international network; the Organizing Committee, with Sarah Bigi, Fabrizio Macagno and Lucia Salvato; the Scientific Committee composed by, together with the Editors, Marina Bondi, Anna Bonola, Christian Plantin, Marcello Soffritti and Margherita Ulrych.

At the end of these opening pages, we wish to remember the Founder and first President of I.A.D.A. Sorin Stati, who departed in January 2008, just a few months before the workshop took place. Apart from the important scientific role he played in the international context with his studies in the fields of philology, linguistics and argumentation theory, and apart from his irreplaceable foundational role in the International Association for Dialogue Analysis, we wish to remember him here in a very personal way, as a teacher and as a friend. Each of the Editors retains a grateful memory of his paternal encouraging approach, frank in explaining, in giving advice and even in correcting, generous in his friendship, relevant in judging and in decision making. Many thanks to Marcelo Dascal who offered his paper as a homage for Sorin Stati in the name of us all.

Giovanni Gobber

Sibilla Cantarini

Sara Cigada

Maria Cristina Gatti

& Silvia Gilardoni

LINGUISTICS STRUCTURES AND PRAGMATIC FUNCTIONS
IN ARGUMENTATION

IDENTIFYING INDICATORS OF ARGUMENTATIVE MOVES

FRANS H. VAN EEMEREN

& PETER HOUTLOSSER & FRANCISCA SNOECK HENKEMANS

1. *A pragma-dialectical perspective on argumentative discourse*

The study of argumentation is prospering. After its brilliant start in Antiquity, highlighted in the classical works of Aristotle, after an alternation of ups and downs during the following millennia, in the post-Renaissance period its gradual decline set in. Revitalization took place only after Toulmin and Perelman published in the same year (1958) their landmark works *The Uses of Argument* and *La nouvelle rhétorique* (co-authored by Olbrechts-Tyteca and translated into English in 1969). The model of argumentation presented by Toulmin and Perelman's inventory of argumentation techniques inspired a great many scholars in various ways to take up the study of argumentation in a serious manner. Nowadays there are well-established (formal as well as informal) logical approaches to argumentation, but also social and socio-psychological, linguistic, juridical and other approaches. In most of these approaches traces can be found of the influence of the classical and neo-classical argumentation theories just mentioned (van Eemeren *et al.* 1996; van Eemeren 2002).

The most important characteristic of the pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation that we represent is that argumentation is studied from a communicative perspective. Argumentation is viewed as a type of communication aimed at resolving a difference of opinion by critically testing the acceptability of the standpoints at issue. Generally, this communication will take place by verbal means, whether oral or written, but non-verbal elements (such as gestures and images) may also play a part. In practice, the term *argumentation* is used in two ways at the same time: it refers to a process ("I am still in the middle of my argumentation") as well as to its result ("Let's examine what her argumentation amounts to"). Because argumentation is not just part of reality, but can, and should, also be judged for its quality, the study of argumentation has not only a descriptive but also a normative dimension. According to pragma-dialecticians, the quality of argumentation and its possible flaws are to be measured against norms of reasonableness that are suited to its purpose.

Logicians, whether they are in favor of a formal or an informal approach, tend to concentrate on the problems involved in the regimentation of reasoning. Social scientists and linguists, particularly discourse and conversation analysts, generally focus on empirical observation of argumentative discourse and its effects. In the pragma-dialectical view, however, these two approaches must be closely interwoven. Both the limitations of non-empirical regimentation and those of non-critical observation need to be systematically transcended. Pragma-dialecticians make it their business to clarify

how the gap between normative and descriptive insight can be methodically bridged. This objective can only be achieved with the help of a coherent research program in which a systematic connection – a *trait d'union* – is created between well-considered regimentation and careful observation.

Following a classical tradition, the study of the regimentation of critical exchanges is called *dialectics*. The study of language use in actual communication, which belonged in the past largely to the domain of rhetoric, is nowadays generally called *pragmatics*. Hence the choice of the name *pragma-dialectics* for the approach to argumentation that aims for a sound integration of insight from these two studies. Pragma-dialectics combines a dialectical view of argumentative reasonableness with a pragmatic view of the verbal moves made in argumentative discourse¹.

Pragma-dialectics starts from four meta-theoretical principles, functionalization, socialization, externalization, and dialectification of argumentation, in which pragmatic and dialectical insights are systematically combined. Functionalization is achieved by making use of the fact that argumentative discourse occurs through – and in response to – speech act performances. Identifying the complex speech act of argumentation and the other speech acts involved in resolving a difference of opinion makes it possible to specify the relevant ‘identity conditions’ and ‘correctness conditions’ of these speech acts². In this way, for instance, a specification can be given of what is “at stake” in advancing a certain “standpoint”, so that it becomes clear what the “disagreement space” is and how the argumentative discourse is organized around this context of disagreement (Jackson 1992: 261). Socialization is achieved by identifying who exactly takes on the discussion roles of protagonist and antagonist in the collaborative context of argumentative discourse. By extending the speech act perspective to the level of interaction, it can be shown in which ways positions and argumentation in support of positions are developed. Externalization is achieved by identifying the specific commitments that are created by the speech acts performed in a context of argumentative interaction³. Rather than being treated as internal states of mind, in a speech act perspective notions such as ‘disagreement’ and ‘acceptance’ can be defined in terms

¹ The dialectical conception of reasonableness is inspired by critical rationalists and analytic philosophers, such as Popper (1972, 1974), Albert (1975), and Naess (1966), and by formal dialecticians and logicians, such as Hamblin (1970), Lorenzen and Lorenz (1978), and Barth and Krabbe (1982). The pragmatic conception of argumentative discourse as consisting of making regulated communicative moves is rooted in Austin (1962) and Searle’s (1969, 1979) ordinary language philosophy, Grice’s (1989) theory of rationality in discourse, and other studies of communication by discourse and conversation analysts. It is in the first place the combination of dialectical and pragmatic insight that distinguishes pragma-dialectics from “formal dialectics” as developed by Barth and Krabbe (1982) that incorporates dialectical insight in a formal (logical) approach.

² For a definition of argumentation as a complex speech act, see van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984: 39-46, 1992a: 30-33). For the speech act of advancing a standpoint, see Houtlosser (1994). And for the distinction between identity conditions and correctness conditions, see van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992a: 30-31).

³ A kindred approach to argumentation in which commitments as well as other basic concepts of pragma-dialectics also play a crucial role is Walton and Krabbe (1995).

of discursive activities. 'Acceptance', for instance, can be externalized as giving a preferred response to an arguable act. Finally, dialectification is achieved by regimenting the exchange of speech acts aimed at resolving a difference of opinion in a model of a perfect critical discussion. Such an idealized modeling of the systematic exchanges of resolution-oriented verbal moves, defines the nature and distribution of the speech acts that play a part in resolving a difference of opinion.

The pragma-dialectical model of a critical discussion is a theoretically motivated system for resolution-oriented discourse. In a critical discussion, the parties attempt to reach agreement about the acceptability of the standpoints at issue by finding out whether or not these standpoints are defensible against doubt or criticism. The dialectical procedure for conducting a critical discussion is in the first place a method for exploring the acceptability of standpoints. In a critical discussion, the protagonist and the antagonist of a particular standpoint try to establish whether this standpoint, given the point of departure acknowledged by the parties, is tenable in the light of critical responses⁴. To be able to achieve this purpose, the dialectical procedure for conducting a critical discussion should not deal only with inference relations between premises and conclusions (or 'concessions' and 'standpoints'), but cover all speech acts that play a part in examining the acceptability of standpoints. In pragma-dialectics, the concept of a critical discussion is therefore given shape in a model that specifies all the various stages the resolution process has to pass and all the types of speech acts instrumental in any of these stages. When pointing out the roles that various types of speech acts can fulfill in resolving a difference of opinion it is important to emphasize, right from the start, that in argumentative discourse a great many speech acts are performed implicitly or indirectly, so that a certain role in a critical discussion may be fulfilled by different speech acts.

In pragma-dialectics, the critical norms of reasonableness authorizing the speech acts performed in the various stages of a critical discussion are accounted for in a set of dialectical rules. Taken together, the model and the rules constitute a theoretical definition of a critical discussion. In a critical discussion⁵, the protagonists and the antagonists of the standpoints at issue not only go through all stages of the resolution

⁴ In accordance with their critical rationalist philosophy, dialecticians place great emphasis on the consequence of the fact that a proposition and its negation cannot both be acceptable at the same time. The testing of standpoints is thus equated with the detection of inconsistencies (Albert 1975: 44).

⁵ If the rules of the pragma-dialectical discussion procedure are regarded as first order conditions for having a critical discussion, the internal conditions for a reasonable discussion attitude can be viewed as 'second order' conditions relating to the state of mind the discussants are assumed to be in. In practice, people's freedom to satisfy the second order conditions is sometimes limited by psychological factors beyond their control, such as emotional restraint and personal pressure. There are also external, 'third order' conditions that need to be fulfilled in order to be able to conduct a critical discussion properly. They relate to the social circumstances in which the discussion takes place and pertain, for instance, to the power or authority relations between the participants and to the discussion situation. Together, the second and third order conditions for conducting a critical discussion in the ideal sense are higher order conditions for resolving differences of opinion. Only if these conditions are satisfied critical reasonableness can be fully realized in practice.

process, but they must also observe in every stage all the rules that are instrumental in resolving a difference of opinion. The dialectical procedure proposed by van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984, 2004) states the rules that are constitutive for a critical discussion in terms of the performance of speech acts⁶. They cover the entire argumentative discourse by stating all the norms that are pertinent to resolving a difference of opinion, ranging from the prohibition to prevent each other from expressing any position one wishes to assume in the confrontation stage, to the prohibition to unduly generalize the result of the discussion in the concluding stage.

In principle, each of the pragma-dialectical discussion rules constitutes a distinct standard or norm for critical discussion. Any move constituting an infringement of any of the rules, whichever party performs it and at whatever stage in the discussion, is a possible threat to the resolution of a difference of opinion and must therefore (in this particular sense) be regarded as fallacious⁷. The use of the term *fallacy* is then systematically connected with the rules for critical discussion and a fallacy is defined as a discussion move that violates in some specific way a rule for critical discussion applying to a particular discussion stage.

For various reasons, argumentative reality does not always resemble the ideal of a critical discussion. In order to be able to give a sound evaluation of argumentative discourse with the help of the model of a critical discussion, an analysis is needed that makes it clear which elements in the discourse can be considered potentially relevant for the resolution of the dispute. According to the ideal model, for example, in the confrontation stage antagonists of a standpoint must state their doubts clearly and unambiguously, but in practice doing so can be ‘face-threatening’ for both parties so that they have to operate circumspectly⁸. Analyzing argumentative discourse pragma-dialectically amounts to interpreting the discourse from the theoretical perspective of a critical discussion. Such an analysis is pragmatic in viewing the discourse as essentially an exchange of speech acts; and dialectical in viewing this exchange as a methodical attempt to resolve a difference of opinion. A pragma-dialectical analysis is aimed at reconstructing all those, and only those, speech acts that play a potential part in bringing a difference of opinion to a conclusion. In accomplishing a systematic analysis the ideal model of a critical discussion is a valuable tool. By pointing out which speech acts are relevant in the various stages of the resolution process the model has the heuristic function of indicating which speech acts need to be considered in the reconstruction.

Van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson and Jacobs further developed the analytical component of pragma-dialectics in *Reconstructing Argumentative Discourse* (1993).

⁶ An improved version of the pragma-dialectical rules for critical discussion is to be found in van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004: chapter 6).

⁷ The pragma-dialectical identification of fallacies is always conditional. An argumentative move may be regarded as a fallacy only if the discourse is correctly viewed as aimed at resolving a difference of opinion.

⁸ Expressing doubt may also create a potential violation of the “preference for agreement” that governs normal conversation. See Heritage (1984: 265–280), Levinson (1983: 332–336), and van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson, and Jacobs (1993: chapter 3).

They emphasize that it is crucial that the reconstructions proposed in the analysis are indeed justified. The reconstructions should be faithful to the commitments that may be ascribed to the participants on the basis of their contributions to the discourse⁹. In order not to ‘over-interpret’ what seems implicit in the discourse, the analyst must be sensitive to the rules of language use¹⁰, the details of the presentation, and the contextual constraints inherent in the speech event concerned. So as to go beyond a naïve reading of the discourse, empirical insight concerning the way in which oral and written discourse are conducted will be beneficial¹¹. The analyst’s intuitions can thus be augmented by the results of (qualitative and quantitative) empirical research¹².

In the analysis of argumentative discourse linguistic indicators of the various moves that are potentially relevant for the resolution of a dispute play a crucial role. During the past decade we have carried out a research project that we dubbed the “indicator project.” The central question of the indicator project was what verbal means arguers use to indicate the functions of the various moves that are made in an argumentative discussion or text. The aim of the research was to identify these words and expressions, to classify them in accordance with the argumentative function they can have in argumentative discourse and to determine under which conditions they will fulfill a certain function. In this paper, we intend to explain the main theoretical and methodological premises of the indicator project. Starting from these premises we also want to illustrate by means of some examples how we conducted our research (van Eemeren, Houtlosser and Snoeck Henkemans 2000, 2005; Houtlosser 1997, 2002; Snoeck Henkemans 2001, 2003a, 2003b).

2. Argumentative indicators and the model of a critical discussion

For three reasons the pragma-dialectical model of a critical discussion constitutes an appropriate starting point for the description of argumentative indicators. First, starting from the assumption that argumentative discussions and texts are always – at least to some extent – aimed at resolving a difference of opinion on the merits, the model of a critical discussion can be considered a blue-print of the crucial tasks that the participants have to carry out in order to resolve a difference of opinion in a critical testing process. All the tasks specified in the model are functional in a critical testing process and should ideally be carried out in some way or other, even if in practice they are sometimes only fulfilled in an implicit or incomplete way, or even not at all. It is in fact

⁹ Only in exceptional cases, when interpreting a move as a potential contribution to the resolution process is the only charitable option left, an unsupported reconstruction may be warranted “for reason’s sake”. See van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004: chapter 5).

¹⁰ An integration of the Searlean speech act conditions and the Gricean conversational maxims in a set of “rules of language use” is proposed in van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992a: 49-55, 2003: chapter 4).

¹¹ See, e.g., Jackson and Jacobs (1980) and Jacobs and Jackson (1981, 1982, 1983).

¹² For a brief survey of the various approaches to the analysis of discourse and their empirical basis, see van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson, and Jacobs (1993: 50–59).

precisely in those cases where the fulfillment of these tasks is not explicitly or completely manifest in the discourse that the model has a special function. Second, precisely because the model provides a specification of all speech acts that can play a constructive role in the various stages of resolving a difference of opinion on the merits, apart from indicators of standpoints and arguments, such as “therefore” and “because,” also indicators of other moves that play a part in critically testing the acceptability of the standpoint at issue can thus be included in the research. Which linguistic indicators signal, for example, that an arguer accepts the burden of proof for a standpoint or tries to evade the burden of proof? Which indicators refer to the point of departure of the discourse? And which indicators point to the result of the discussion? Third, the ideal model of a critical discussion enables the analyst to classify the various kinds of indicators in a systematic way, because the argumentative moves they refer to are systematically connected with the various stages in the resolution process.

Methodologically, we take the model of a critical discussion as our point of departure in identifying argumentative moves in argumentative practice, even in cases in which the moves concerned are potentially or actually fallacious. The model can be used as a frame of reference in identifying argumentative moves that are analytically relevant but may be irrelevant from an evaluative perspective, i.e., fallacious¹³. As we explained earlier (e.g., van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2002), arguers who aim to resolve a difference of opinion make use of “strategic manoeuvring”: the rhetorical exploitation of the margins for verbal action left by the arguers’ dialectical obligations in the various stages of a critical discussion. The strategic manoeuvring is sound as long as it remains in agreement with the rules for critical discussion, but it may also derail and become fallacious. In practice it can, of course, not always be predicted in advance whether a particular instance of strategic manoeuvring will be sound or fallacious.

How do we envisage the process of identifying moves that are analytically relevant for resolving a difference by way of a critical discussion to take place? In the various overviews of the model of a critical discussion that have been given, the tasks a critical discussion requires the participants to perform are presented in a general way; not every potential contribution to the critical testing process is specified¹⁴. In the overview of the opening stage, for example, the participants in a critical discussion have to come to an agreement about their mutual material and procedural starting points, but it is not specified which moves exactly they have to make to come to such an agreement. For our present purposes, however, a specification of these moves is needed, because it is not possible to identify the indicators of the various moves if their dialectical function has not been fully defined.

¹³ For the conceptual distinction between analytical relevance and evaluative relevance, see van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992b).

¹⁴ In van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984, 1992a, 2004) and van Eemeren *et al.* (1996), the stages are specified that the critical testing process has to go through and the crucial obligatory moves are represented. Snoeck Henkemans (1992) gives a specification of the first round of moves in the argumentation stage.

Instead of specifying *all* the moves a critical discussion could possibly consist of, out of necessity, we opt for a piecemeal approach and start specifying – in an exemplary way – those moves that can be instrumental in realizing some particular tasks the discussants have to perform at some particular stages or sub-stages of the discussion. In order to be able to do so, we have developed a heuristics consisting in the application of *dialectical profiles*. Our dialectical profiles are inspired by the idea of *profiles of dialogue* developed by Walton and Krabbe and presented in several publications (Walton 1989; Walton and Krabbe 1995; Krabbe 1992, 1999). Walton and Krabbe describe a profile of dialogue as “a connected sequence of moves and countermoves in a conversational exchange of a type that is goal-directed and can be represented in a normative model of dialogue” (Walton 1999: 53; Krabbe 1999: 2). Our *dialectical* profile is from the outset a purely normative concept and can be defined as a sequential pattern of the moves that the participants in a critical discussion are entitled – and in some sense obliged – to make to realize a particular dialectical aim in a particular stage or sub-stage of the discussion. In the next section we shall further explain what we mean by dialectical profiles by showing how they can be used as a design for capturing the moves that are instrumental at a particular stage or sub-stage of a critical discussion. Our next step is to illustrate how we exploit the dialectical profiles methodically for identifying the verbal expressions that can be indicative of any of these moves in argumentative practice.

3. *Dialectical profiles of sequences of moves in a critical discussion*

To get to a first example of a dialectical profile, we focus on the way in which in the opening stage of a critical discussion agreement is reached as to who will assume the burden of proof. In the simplest case, i.e., that of a single non-mixed dispute with one standpoint that meets with doubt¹⁵, agreement about who will assume the burden of proof may consist in either a confirmation or a disconfirmation of the conditional obligation of the party that advanced the standpoint to defend this standpoint. In order to determine which of these two results has been achieved, it is helpful to have an understanding of the kind of deliberation that can lead to either of these results, and the moves that are made to achieve it¹⁶. Such an understanding can be achieved with the help of a dialectical profile of the deliberation process.

In designing this dialectical profile, the first issue we have to deal with is which party is to start the deliberation and what kind of move this party must make. According to the pragma-dialectical procedure for conducting a critical discussion the party

¹⁵ See van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984, 2004) for the distinction between non-mixed disputes, in which the other party merely doubts the first party's standpoint but has no standpoint of his own, and mixed disputes, in which the other party counters the first party's standpoint by advancing an opposite standpoint.

¹⁶ We use the (non-technical) term deliberation to refer to the parties' (sub-) discussion about the point of departure for the discussion. Some authors prefer to label such deliberations “meta-dialogues” (Krabbe 2003; Finocchiaro 2005; Mackenzie 1981).

(let's say P) that has advanced a standpoint in the confrontation stage of the discussion may in the opening stage be challenged by the other party (let's say A) to defend this standpoint (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004). Once the challenging move has been made, it is up to P to respond. This response can consist of one of the following alternatives: P may either accept the challenge or refuse to accept it. If P accepts the challenge, this particular deliberation is over: it is agreed that in the argumentation stage of the discussion P will defend his standpoint. If P refuses to accept the challenge, A may react to this refusal in two ways. A's first option is to claim his right to maintain his doubt. Then, again, the deliberation is in fact over. A's second option is to ask P why he does not want to defend his standpoint. Then P must either retract his standpoint or initiate a procedural discussion in which he explains his reasons for not defending his standpoint here and now. The deliberation may then still go on with a discussion of P's reason-giving. As a reason for not wanting to defend his standpoint here and now, P can for instance say that A is such a well-skilled arguer that it might be a good idea if he played the devil's advocate and made an attempt to defend P's standpoint. A should, in turn, react to this proposal, etc. For now, we leave it at the "starting profile" pictured in figure I:




Figure I. Starting profile of a discussion

In this way, the design of the profile provides the analyst with a systematic sequential representation of the moves that are analytically pertinent to the process of coming to an agreement about whether or not to accept a burden of proof for the standpoint at issue in the opening stage of the discussion.

4. *Determining the material point of departure for the discussion*

With the help of three extended examples we shall now explain how we make use of dialectical profiles for identifying indicators of argumentative moves. In this section we concentrate on indicators of moves that can – or have to – be made in the opening stage of a critical discussion to determine the material point of departure for the discussion.

Just as deliberations on the division of the burden of proof, deliberations aimed at achieving a material point of departure for the discussion that is shared by both parties need a beginning. Who has to make the first move and what kind of move should this be? Unlike the deliberation on accepting the burden of proof, the deliberation on the material point of departure for the discussion does not have a procedural rule that prescribes which party is to initiate the deliberation. This decision is left to the parties concerned. Let us assume that the party (P) that advanced the standpoint initiates the deliberation. How can he proceed? If we imagine the material point of departure for the discussion to consist of a set of mutually accepted propositions that comes about in a step-wise process in which all the propositions are in turn negotiated by the participants in the discussion, then the initial move in the deliberation on determining the point of departure consists in making a proposal to treat a certain proposition (X) during the discussion as a common point of departure.

How can A respond to P's proposal to treat proposition X as a point of departure for the discussion? Given that it is in the interest of both parties to have a joint point of departure for the discussion, A's response to P's proposal would be most efficient if it consisted in acceptance. It will be clear, however, that A may have all kinds of reasons not to accept X as a joint starting point. To be sure, A is under no obligation to give such a 'preferred' response. The alternative response for A is to refuse P's proposal. There is, however, still a third possibility. Instead of accepting P's proposal or refusing it, A can accept P's proposal *conditionally*. By 'accepting P's proposal conditionally' we mean that A is prepared to accept proposition X as a starting point for the discussion on the condition that P will do something in return – for instance, adopt yet another proposition, say Y, as a starting point. There can be all kinds of reasons why the acceptance of Y by P would be expedient for A, the most obvious reason being that A can use Y to counterbalance X. The latter is, for example, the case if Y can serve to impose restrictions on the argumentative use that P can make of proposition X in defending his standpoint or, in a mixed dispute, if Y can be used by A to defend the opposite standpoint¹⁷.

The initiating proposal and the three possible reactions we have just discussed form together the first round of the deliberation concerning the material starting point for the discussion. In a dialectical profile this first round can be represented as in figure II:

¹⁷ The rationale for not including party A's questioning P's proposal ("Why X?") as a fourth possible response is that asking such a question would initiate a sub-discussion and for practical reasons we would like to restrict ourselves here to the discussion at the main level. For the distinction between discussions at the main level and discussions at a sub-level, see van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984, 1992a, 2004).




Figure II. Profile of first round of determining the material point of departure for the discussion

This profile of this first round of moves provides the analyst with a set of theoretically motivated options for the critical reconstruction of deliberations about the material starting point in a piece of argumentative discourse. In order to exploit this theoretical guidance, the analyst must, of course, be able to identify the manifestations of these moves when they occur and to provide an empirical, i.e., linguistic, justification for his analysis. This is where the examination of possible indicators of argumentative moves becomes important. Rather than discussing all potential indicators of the moves represented in the dialectical profile, we concentrate on making some general observations that are pertinent to all of them.

Our first observation concerning the expressions that are potential indicators of the moves in the profile – and argumentative moves in general – is that in argumentative practice not every move is necessarily accompanied by an indicator, let alone an unambiguous one. Imagine a scale that runs from linguistic indicators that are fully straightforward (e.g., “I hereby pronounce the standpoint that...”) through implicit linguistic indicators (e.g., “by my book”) and functional and grammatical indicators (force of the speech act and mood of the sentence) to a complete lack of indicators.

A good example of the type of move that is as a rule not accompanied by a straightforward or even an implicit linguistic indicator is the first move in the profile: P’s proposal to adopt proposition X as a starting point for the discussion. Explicit proposals to adopt a particular proposition as a starting point are in practice hardly ever made. A more likely way of suggesting one’s interlocutor to adopt a proposition as a starting point would be to ask him whether he agrees that something is the case or is not the case, or that something should be done or should not be done. The only feature of the type of move that is indicative is then the interrogative mood. The interrogative mood, however, is a very weak indicator: it can also be used for a great variety of other types of moves, so that some very specific contextual information is required to justify the reconstruction as a proposal to adopt a proposition as a starting point for the discussion¹⁸. A case in point are the questions asked by the doctor in dialogue (1), which is taken from van Eemeren *et al.* (1993):

¹⁸ For the analyst, the degree of implicitness of the communicative ‘force’ of a speech act corresponds conversely to the degree of contextual information that is needed to justify the reconstruction of the communicative function of that speech act (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992a).

- (1) Patient: I don't want them ((my parents)) to have anything to do with my life, except (...) security
 Doctor: You live at home?
 Patient: Yes.
 Doctor: They pay your bills?
 Patient: Yeah.
 Doctor: How could they not have anything to do with your life?

The doctor's first two moves are both questions; that is all the interrogative form of these moves tells us. The idea that these questions are asked to elicit concessions from the patient that enable the doctor to refute the patient's initial claim cannot be justified by merely referring to the interrogative mood. Because any straightforward or implicit linguistic indicators are lacking, this reconstruction can only be justified with the help of other sources, such as pragmatic insight in the standard patterns of such kinds of (critical) exchanges, in this case the pattern of punch-line refutation, as provided by discourse analysis.

There are, of course, also cases in which an implicit proposal to adopt a proposition as a starting point is functionally indicated in a more outspoken way. This is, for instance, the case when the proposal is presented as a rhetorical question, as in example (2), which is taken from Houtlosser (1995):

- (2) Is it my fault that my looks are better than Ellen van Langen's?
 (Stella Jongmans, *de Volkskrant*, January 10, 1994)

Asking a rhetorical question is a quite common means of proposing to adopt a proposition as a starting point. The problem with rhetorical questions, however, is that they are also used for other purposes, for instance to advance standpoints. The last question in the dialogue between the doctor and the patient is a case in point. There the standpoint is that the patient cannot afford to have nothing to do with his parents. (3) is another example, taken from a conversation about going on holiday that we recently overheard:

- (3) How should Hank know? He's never been there ...

In this example it is decisive for the interpretation of the rhetorical question as a standpoint that the statement following the rhetorical question can be plausibly viewed as an argument in favor of the assertion that is indirectly conveyed by the rhetorical question, i.e., that Hank does not know anything about the place concerned (van Eemeren 1986; Slot 1993; Houtlosser 1995).

Asking a rhetorical question is in fact already halfway between making a proposal to adopt a proposition as a starting point and *attributing* this status, without any ado, to a proposition. A party P that does the latter is in fact ahead of events and acts as if his proposal to treat proposition X as a starting point for the discussion was already accepted by A without P having made any such proposal. Roughly speaking, two kinds of cases can be distinguished: (a) the proposition concerned is just *used* by P as an argument in the argumentation stage without any sign that it would not be acceptable to

the other party; (b) the proposition is explicitly *presented* by P as if it were an already accepted starting point that can therefore be used as an argument. In case (a), the fact that X is used as an argument is in fact the only indicator that – at least according to P – X was already accepted by A as a starting point. Case (b) can also be indicated explicitly. The funny thing is, however, that these indications are pre-eminently used in a perverted way: more often than not, they make it clear that what was presented as a common starting point is in reality not a common starting point at all: “There is no doubt that...,” “It will be clear that...” and “Everybody knows that...” If it would indeed be the case that everyone, including A, agreed that X is the case, why then ‘propose’ the interlocutor to accept X as a starting point (Houtlosser 1995)?

What about the indicators of reactions to a proposal to adopt a proposition as a starting point for the discussion? Unlike the proposal itself, the reactions to the proposal specified in the dialectical profile regularly contain verbal elements that – under certain conditions – can be regarded as indicators of these moves. Of the three kinds of reactions that we specified, those of acceptance can be accompanied by markers such as “OK,” “sure,” “I agree” and “that is true” and those of refusal by markers such as “I don’t think so” and “no.” However simple these markers may seem, they are certainly not simple in the sense that the analyst can always rely on them. Obviously, expressions such as “OK” and “no” are used for a lot of other purposes than accepting or refusing a proposal to treat a certain proposition as a common starting point for a discussion.

The indicators accompanying reactions of conditional acceptance are more reliable. In the dialectical profile the move of conditional acceptance is specified as combining the adoption of one proposition (X) with a proposal to adopt simultaneously another proposition (Y). Odd as it may seem, in argumentative practice this combined move is not only often made but, on top of that, usually explicitly indicated. The indicator that is used (examples are the connectives “although,” “nevertheless,” and “but”) indicates in such cases that there exists a conditional relationship between the propositions that the move combines.

The connective “but” is a word that has been subjected to a host of linguistic analyses; the most well known of these is probably Ducrot’s (1980) standard analysis, which supports our description¹⁹. In the construction “X but Y,” “but” (in Ducrot’s analysis “mais”) connects a pro-argument, X, that, from a certain viewpoint, favors a certain type of conclusion and a counter-argument, Y, that, from a different viewpoint, tells against that same type of conclusion; in addition, “but” conveys that the counter-argument Y overrules the pro-argument X. This analysis applies to the combined move of conditional acceptance that is represented in our dialectical profile. After all, the main reason why party A only agrees to accept party P’s proposal to adopt proposition X as a starting point on the condition that proposition Y is adopted as a starting point as well, is that Y can be used to overrule – or at least neutralize (Snoeck Henkemans

¹⁹ A difference with the situation envisioned in Ducrot’s analysis is that in Ducrot’s analysis Y is not first proposed but simply used.

1995) – the argumentative use that P can make of X. Thus, if “but” is employed in the way described in Ducrot’s analysis, it indicates the move that in our profile is labeled a conditional adoption of a starting point.

Our analysis of “X but Y” as an indication of a move in which a proposition is conditionally adopted as a starting point has the interesting spin-off that it sheds more light on Ducrot’s analysis of “X but Y” in at least six ways. First, it explains how it is possible for a speaker to accept both X and Y, in spite of their contradictory argumentative “orientation” (as Ducrot puts it) – in our analysis X and Y are not accepted *as arguments* but simply as propositions. Second, our analysis explains why the use of “but” is needed to “reconcile” two propositions that are content-wise not contradictory – although X and Y are accepted as propositions in the opening stage of the discussion, they are not accepted for their propositional content, but for their *argumentative potential*, which is to be exploited in the argumentation stage. Third, our analysis explains why in Ducrot’s analysis the argument X and the counter-argument Y presuppose different viewpoints – X is in our analysis proposed by one party and Y by the other party. Fourth, our analysis makes it clear that there exists a specific *relationship* between the viewpoints – the parties that represent these viewpoints are opponents in one and the same dispute. Fifth, as a consequence, Y can be said to be not only argumentatively relevant to X, as it is in Ducrot’s analysis, but also *interactionally* relevant – the party who proposes Y *responds*, after all, to the other party’s proposal to accept X. Sixth, our analysis explains why counter-argument Y in Ducrot’s analysis is supposed to overrule pro-argument X – or at least to neutralize it: because X is accepted while having a certain argumentative potential in favor of the other party’s standpoint, it must be assumed that the condition to accept Y as well is set because Y is supposed to have at least an equally large argumentative potential in favor of the party’s own standpoint as X has in favor of the other party’s standpoint. It would, after all, be useless to propose a starting point that has *less* argumentative potential than the starting point responded to²⁰.

5. Indicators of causal arguments and critical reactions to causal arguments

Our next observations pertain to indicators of moves that play a part in the actual testing procedure. First, we focus on moves in the procedure that applies when causal argumentation is presented and reacted to. The type of causal argumentation we are concerned with here consists of cause-consequence argumentation. In this type of argumentation, it is claimed that an event mentioned in the argument has led, leads, or will lead, to the event represented in the standpoint. The first move in the procedure is the presentation of such an argument by the protagonist of the standpoint that is to be

²⁰ “But” can also play a part in rejecting a proposal to adopt a proposition as a starting point. When “but” is used in a dialogue to introduce a direct reaction to such a proposal in a dialogue, it indicates without any exception that an objection to this proposal is about to be advanced.

defended. In response to this move, the antagonist can (1) accept the argument, (2) question whether the proclaimed cause of the event really causes that event, (3) question whether the proclaimed cause does not cause a different event than the one referred to in the standpoint, or (4) question whether the event that is supposedly caused by the proclaimed cause is not caused by something completely different²¹.

Figure III pictures the dialectical profile of cause-consequence argumentation, where “A” is the argument, whose content consists of an accepted starting point “X,” “S” is the standpoint that represents the caused event, “T” represents a different event, and “U” represents a different cause, “=>” means “leads to,” “?/” preceding a proposition means “I doubt whether” and “?” following a proposition refers to the interrogative mood:




Figure III. Profile of cause-consequence argumentation

There are a great many expressions referring to a causal relation that can serve as linguistic indicators of the move presenting a cause-consequence argument (Snoeck Henkemans 2001). Some expressions, such as “cause,” “effect,” “means,” “end,” “makes that,” and “leads to,” mention the causal relation explicitly. Other expressions refer only implicitly to the causal connection, mentioning just an aspect of the causal relation-

²¹ These questions were earlier formulated and accounted for in the pragma-dialectical theory (van Eemeren and Kruiger 1985). (2) questions the supposed causal relation as such (“How on earth could you believe that smoking (automatically) causes lung cancer?”), while (3) and (4) can be viewed as specifications of (2). In (3) the antagonist suggests that the cause that is mentioned is not a sufficient cause to effectuate the consequence represented in the standpoint: there could be consequences that are different from, and perhaps even incompatible with, the one that is mentioned (as in “Couldn’t it be the case that people like you precisely because you are sometimes a bit unfriendly to them?” in response to “I am sure they hate me, because I’m so unfriendly sometimes”). In (4), the antagonist suggests that the supposed cause is not necessary to effectuate the consequence mentioned in the standpoint: apart from the cause that is mentioned in the argument, there could be, or there are, only other causes that have this consequence (as in “You become schizophrenic because of genetic features, not because of having had a cold-hearted mother, don’t you?” in critical reaction to “That one will become a schizophrenic, having the cold-hearted mother he has!”). (3) and (4) may, of course, subsume more specific critical reactions in which particular nuances of the mentioned aspects of the supposed causal relation are questioned.

ship. Among the latter are expressions such as “cultivate” that represent a process that produces a particular effect or result, expressions such as “suddenly” and “in one blow” that refer to the sudden way in which something has happened or come about, expressions such as “will yield” and “is a guarantee for” that allude to a future result, and expressions such as “necessarily” that emphasize the inevitability of an event. One example, (4), suffices to make it clear that such an indicator can be implicit and strong at the same time:

- (4) [It is no small wonder that X was expelled. His approach was not subtle enough.] In Chinese politics, based as it is on prudence and strictness, a less-than-subtle approach is almost a guarantee for a rapid downfall.
(*de Volkskrant*, March 18, 1998)

The next moves in the profile we need to discuss are the critical questions that can be asked in response to cause-consequence argumentation. It is noteworthy that it is not always the critical questions that are represented in the discourse, but the critic’s *negative answers* to these questions. Apparently, critics have a hard time keeping the difference non-mixed at the sub-level. A likely negative answer to the first critical question associated with cause-consequence argumentation would be that the cause mentioned in the argument did not cause or will not cause the event referred to in the standpoint. Among the expressions that – straightforward or implicitly – indicate such an answer are “does not lead to,” “you don’t get ... from/by,” “it has not been proven that,” and “has nothing to do with.” (5) is a – self-invented – example:

- (5) Don’t you know that it has never been proven that smoking kills, son?

Expressions that indicate a negative answer to the second critical question are “leads rather to,” “is rather the cause of,” and “has on the contrary everything to do with.” Expressions that indicate a negative answer to the third critical question are “has a different cause,” and “is rather caused by.”

In our dialectical profile we have left the protagonist’s reply to the antagonist’s critical questions unspecified. One obvious substantiation of this move is, of course, the protagonist’s refutation of the antagonist’s criticism. In practice, the protagonist’s refutation of such criticism is generally anticipated in the argumentation. In written texts this will even be the standard procedure, because then there is no antagonist available to ask critical questions.

6. *Indicators of complementary coordinative argumentation*

In an argument scheme, an individual argument is related to the standpoint it is supposed to support or refute. As a rule arguments also have a certain relationship with other arguments that are adduced to support or refute the same standpoint. Together, the arguments are then characterized by a certain more or less complex argumentation structure. The complexity of the argumentation structure depends to a large extent on

the reactions that arguers get (or expect to get) to their argumentation (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984, 1992a, 2004; Snoeck Henkemans 1992). What structure the resulting complex of arguments will have, depends on the criticism and on the way in which the protagonist defends himself against this criticism (Snoeck Henkemans 1992).

Complex argumentation can take several forms. When the antagonist does not accept the propositional content of an argument advanced by the protagonist, the protagonist can support this argument by advancing another argument. Then the argumentation structure becomes *subordinate*²². The argumentation structure becomes *coordinative* when the protagonist's argument is not doubted as such but deemed insufficient, or when the antagonist makes a specific objection to the protagonist's argument. In the first case, the protagonist may supply an additional argument in response, which makes the coordinative structure of his argumentation *cumulative*. In the second case, the protagonist may attempt to meet the objection, which makes his coordinative argumentation *complementary*. Finally, the argumentation structure may also become *multiple*. This happens when the antagonist rejected the protagonist's argument or the defense it is supposed to give of his standpoint and the protagonist decides not to defend this argument, but to defend his standpoint with a completely different argument.

The various possible ways of not accepting a protagonist's argumentation are represented in the dialectical profile pictured in figure IV, where "A1," "A2" and "A1.1" are the protagonist's arguments or sub-arguments, "->" means "supports" or "refutes," "S" is the protagonist's standpoint, "?/" means "I have doubts with respect to," "&" means "and," "[A1=A1a &]" means that the antagonist considers A1 only as a beginning of a defense of S, "C" is an objection or counterargument, "/" means "pleads against," "|" means "or," "~" means "it is not the case that," "+" means that the arguments must be taken together, and "DS!" means that a renewed challenge is made with regard to the initial standpoint.

²² Strictly speaking, the content of the argument that the protagonist has advanced can at this stage of a critical discussion no longer be subjected to critical scrutiny because, if all has gone well, it has been accepted (or not accepted) by both parties as a common starting point at the opening stage of the discussion. In practice, however, starting points are not always proposed as such, but simply used as arguments in the argumentation stage of the discussion. We therefore include the questioning of the content of a starting point that is used in an argument in the argumentation stage in our dialectical profiles.




Figure IV. Profile of ways of not accepting a protagonist’s argumentation

We here shall concentrate on some indicators of complementary coordinative argumentation. First we give an example of the way in which complementary coordinative argumentation emerges in a dialogical situation, then we focus on indicators of complementary coordinative argumentation in implicit discussions or monologues.

In dialogue (6), overheard at Paula’s place at lunch, Anton regards Paula’s argument that the last bus had already left an inadequate argument for Paula’s staying the night at Eric’s. He counters this argument by saying that Paula could have asked Anton to come and pick her up. Paula refutes Anton’s counterargument by saying that she did not want to wake him up. In this way, a complementary coordinative argumentation is brought about:

- (6) Paula: I had no choice but to stay the night at Eric’s because the last bus had already left.
- Anton: But you could have asked me to come and pick you up.
- Paula: But I didn’t want to wake you up.

In monologues, complementary coordinative argumentation is put forward by the protagonist if he anticipates that an objection against one of his arguments may be advanced that attacks the justificatory potential of this argument. Anticipating this criticism, the protagonist adds another argument that is supposed to parry the criticism. In combination, the argument that supports the standpoint directly and the refutation of a possible objection to this argument constitute, again, a complementary coordinative argumentation.

There are a number of expressions that an arguer can use to indicate that a possible objection against an earlier argument will be refuted. Among these are “while,” “whereas,” “whereas normally,” “whereas otherwise,” “not even” and “and yet.” Express-

sions such as “whereas,” “while” and “and yet” can be used by the protagonist to signal a contrast between the views or criticism of a potential opponent and the way he thinks things are in reality. Argument (7) is an example of this use of “whereas”:

- (7) I wrote a letter to the administrative council, saying I can't tell you how much I appreciate the stipend. It has allowed me to dedicate so much of my time to SG, whereas otherwise I would have worked a campus job to pay the bills. (*www.studentleader.com/sal_r.htm*)

In this example, a student defends the standpoint that his stipend has been a great help because it has allowed him to dedicate a lot of time to student government. A critical opponent might wonder: but couldn't you have devoted that time to student government without the stipend? The arguer makes clear that this criticism does not hold, because then he would have had to take a campus job to pay the bills and that would have interfered with his involvement in extracurricular activities.

Just like happens in the student example, “whereas” or “while” can be easily combined with expressions such as “otherwise” or “normally.” This is in particular so in cases where the arguer is defending a positive or negative judgment or qualification and needs to take into account that his opponent might come up with criticisms such as “But does your argument really justify that judgment?” “Is the situation or event that you mention in your argument not something that is always or normally the case, so that the judgment that there is something special about the case (i.e. something negative or positive) cannot be justified?” By indicating that otherwise things would have gone differently, or that normally something would not have been the case, the arguer can make it clear that the potential objections against the first argument do not hold and that the positive or negative judgment is therefore indeed justified. In example (8) “and yet” is used to make it clear that a possible objection does not hold:

- (8) We, at Breton Bikes, are based in Brittany. This is the Celtic homeland of France, and having cycle toured all over France we can say that this is the best bit. Why? Because here the countryside is small scale, perfect for cycling, and yet within easy reach of us you will find beautiful unspoiled countryside, two different and quite stunning coasts and a heartland of forests and lakes, canals and chateaux (*www.bicycletouring.biz*).

The protagonist first claims that Brittany is the best part of France for cycling, because the countryside there is small scale and then anticipates the objection that if the countryside is small-scale, it will probably not be very interesting. The anticipated objection is signaled by “and yet” and the protagonist counters this objection by mentioning examples of interesting scenery and culture in Brittany, thus giving a complementary coordinative structure to his arguments in the process.

7. Conclusion

In this article, we have shown how the use of dialectical profiles can be instrumental in determining which moves can be made in a particular stage of a critical discussion and in identifying the expressions that are indicative of these moves. We conclude by mentioning some other applications of dialectical profiles. In addition to their heuristic function in the identification of indicators of argumentative moves, dialectical profiles also have an important heuristic role in the analysis of strategic manoeuvring. Because strategic manoeuvring may be sound but can also derail, it is necessary to determine the soundness conditions that apply to the various ways of strategic manoeuvring the arguers may resort to. In this endeavor the design of dialectical profiles can be of help. Because every dialectical move specified in a dialectical profile allows for rhetorical exploitation, every move in the dialectical profile can be an occasion for strategic manoeuvring. This makes the dialectical profile not only the best source for identifying the dialectical moves that the parties must make in conducting a critical discussion but also for identifying the ways of strategic manoeuvring the arguers can deploy to steer the critical resolution process into their own direction.

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DIALOGUE-SPECIFIC ILLOCUTION INDICATORS

FRANZ HUNDSNURSCHER

Introductory remarks

The title of this conference (*Word Meaning in Argumentative Dialogue*) brings into contact two rather distant fields of linguistic investigation; the relation between the two has during the last century been under constant discussion in the philosophy of language as well as in linguistics. In my contribution here I can present only a few aspects of the problems involved.

I shall begin with a short discussion of the state of the art in lexical semantics; I will then give a sketch of the general dialogical background of argumentation and at last point to some examples of a class of 'argumentation words'.

1. *The problem of word meaning*

To begin with, the term 'word' itself is an intuitive concept that evades exact definition, and the various efforts to find better terms for characterising the basic meaningful units of language – 'morphemes', 'lexemes', 'formatives' and so on – are, of course, dependent on their respective methodological frameworks, and these will vary and change quite frequently over the years, especially in linguistics. So the concepts of word and word meaning are floating ones, and in some contexts they are even used as metaphors for language itself. In German for instance we make a distinction, using different plural forms, between 'Wörter' – which means 'single words in isolation' (e.g. die Wörter im Lexikon) and 'Worte' – which means 'sections of coherent speech', in fact sometimes even whole texts (e.g. die Worte der Dichter).

In grammatical and semantic description there arises the crucial problem of how to isolate in a sensible way individual words within phrasal expressions, for instance in order to count and arrange and to classify them and to allot to each one a clear-cut meaning (e.g. Er drückte sich *klipp* und klar *aus*) (He told them plump and plain), where *klipp* is obsolete and kept up for alliteration, and *aus* is a separable particle that goes with the verb in specific functions).

F. de Saussure (1948) stressed the priority of words in 'la langue' regarding them as signs for our ideas of things that are expressed and combined in a coherent and meaningful 'chaîne parlée' of spoken discourse.

The picture changed when Noam Chomsky (1957; 1965) pointed out the central position of sentences within language – that in speaking we do in fact not just arrange words in linear order, but we generate sentences, i.e. syntactically organized configurations of words.

By the way, the problems with the term 'sentence' are somehow parallel to the problems connected with the term 'word'; it is also an intuitive concept, only vaguely determinable. Lexical meanings of words compounded together with the contributions of different types of grammatical and syntactical functions are supposed to somehow make up some sort of 'sentence meaning'.

Jerrold J. Katz (1966) imagined 'amalgamation processes' that combine the lexical meanings of 'formatives', and 'projection processes' that incorporate these compound meanings into syntactic constituents to yield 'sentence meaning' as the interpretative result. Yet it still did not become quite clear what exactly is being 'amalgamated' and 'projected' and how 'interpretation' actually works.

In another line of thought, John L. Austin (1962) suggested that in verbal communication we make regular use of words and sentences and in uttering them perform various verbal actions; John R. Searle (1969) called these 'speech acts', a form of rule-governed verbal behaviour.

According to Austin, an utterance is endowed with what he dubbed an 'illocutionary force'; this somewhat mysterious concept of 'force' determines the specific action quality of an utterance and brings about specific communicative effects. This 'force' is supposed to pervade the ordinary sentence, and it can be made explicit to a certain degree by so-called 'illocutionary-force-indicating-devices', of which the 'performative verbs' are the most prominent examples.

If, for instance, we know the meaning of these verbs as used in a certain way (first person present tense active) we can understand what kind of verbal action the speaker aims at performing and we can see what he means, that is, we can understand him (e.g. I hereby plead guilty – Ich bekenne mich schuldig).

As it is, this 'illocutionary force' brings still another level of meaning into focus which, as I see it, is often lumped together with traditional meaning – in a new general concept of 'sentence meaning'.

There are utterances without explicit indicators of illocutionary force and others well equipped with such indicating devices. Austin tackles this problem by talking of 'implicit' or 'primary utterances' and 'explicit performatives' respectively.

Both types of utterance are being used effectively in communication, but explicit performatives are less prone to ambiguity and thus to eventual misunderstanding. Austin gives a list of such clarifying devices – 'mode', 'tone of voice', 'adverbs' and 'adverbial phrases', 'connecting particles', 'headings', but also others, of a non-verbal type, like 'accompanying gestures and grimaces' or – a rather comprehensive but vague category – 'the circumstances of the utterance'.

At the end we are again confronted with the question of where to draw the line: which part of the language and consequently of the vocabulary is to be allotted a distinctive meaning of its own (as Austin sometimes says, its 'descriptive meaning') and which part is the domain of force and of illocutionary force made explicit. Searle (1979) makes a distinction between the propositional content of a sentence and the (intended) illocutionary and perlocutionary effects of the utterance – between just

‘saying something’ and ‘meaning something in uttering the sentence under specific circumstances’.

Just as sentence meaning often cannot be neatly derived from more or less determinable word meanings, the sentences and their meanings are in turn to some extent parts of higher forms of verbal organisation; they are in actual communication embedded in an interactive setting and are integrated in textual relations, and to fully understand them we are dependent on knowledge about these settings and relations.

And there again we have problems with the concept of ‘text’, how to determine it. Obviously during the 20th century the descriptive and explanatory perspectives of language have by and by been reversed in a way: instead of trying to explain language understanding starting from words’ meanings (the lexicon perspective) it now seems we have to start from communicative procedures (the use or interaction perspective).

We find hints of this reversal in the works of eminent philosophers of language:

Wittgenstein (1953: 43): “Die Bedeutung eines Wortes ist sein Gebrauch in der Sprache”.

Austin (1970: 56): “What alone has meaning is a sentence”.

Alston (2000: 312): “Sentence meaning is the illocutionary act potential of a sentence”.

Higginbotham (2003: 266): “Coming to satisfy conventional standards regarding the use of sentences depends upon coming to know about reference”.

2. *The dialogical basis of communication*

The present situation in linguistics, as I see it, is characterised on the one hand by insufficient knowledge about the ways of words (Wittgenstein: 122): “[...] dass wir den Gebrauch unserer Wörter nicht übersehen”) – and on the other hand by an urgent need for a workable and discriminating determination of the concept of ‘language use’, as a reliable starting point for linguistic analysis and explanation.

To cut matters short, I think that as theorists of dialogue we might postulate that the basic and general form of verbal communication – and this would mean of all kinds of texts and language use – is dialogue: *quod omnis lingua vel oratio procedit ex dialogo*. We share this conviction with the founder of our Society IADA, Professor Sorin Stati.

Monological speech and texts can in principle be derived from underlying dialogical structures, and even the apparent monology in the media can be reconstructed on a dialogical basis; but this would be another wide field of investigation.

In analysing the set-up of all forms of dialogue and their conditions for successful performance we will by the way get acquainted with all types of argumentation.

A basic model of dialogue structure is characterised by two instances – Speaker 1 and Speaker 2 – and a sequence of alternately addressed verbal utterances (moves).


This constellation is situated within a frame of certain action conditions and a

general communicative purpose which one might call ‘knowing about’ (Am. ‘to be in the knowing’; Germ. ‘Bescheid wissen’); the point of verbal communication is giving and getting relevant information in order ‘to know what is at stake’ (‘Bescheid zu wissen, worum es geht und was auf dem Spiel steht’).

So our starting point is similar to Austin’s – an inquiry into the overall mode and purpose of speaking. Austin initially criticised the traditional standard opinion that the only and proper way of language use was to tell the truth and to talk about truth conditions, and all this ought to be aimed at instructing and convincing others and showing them the way to find truth mainly by argumentation. All other talk was deemed rather idle and not worth considering seriously. But Austin has successfully shown that language does have other uses as well and that these are of interest, too. So, if we go by Austin’s and Searle’s fundamental types of language use, we have five domains of argumentation:

- Representative – saying what one thinks is the case
- Directive – saying what one wants to be done by others
- Commissive – saying what one intends to do oneself
- Expressive – saying how one feels
- Declarative – saying what is to be in force

Here is a very simple model for the first two moves in a dialogical sequence:




In performing the initial speech act, Speaker 1 lays open his communicative interest to Speaker 2, and, if Sp 2 gives a positive reply, then the communicative purpose of the verbal interaction is attained, that is, Sp 1 and Sp 2 'have come to an understanding'; by giving a positive reply, Sp 2 – according to the initial speech act's illocution – signals back to Sp 1

- that he is of the same opinion as Sp 1,
- that he is willing to do what Sp 1 wants him to do,
- that he trusts Sp 1 to carry out his intention,
- that he is in sympathy with Sp 1's feelings,
- that he validates Sp 1's speech act.


With a negative reply, Sp 2 signals back to Sp 1 that he does not comply, and this also is relevant information for Sp 1 – that he meets with resistance and that they have not come to an understanding. The initial speech act determines to some extent the illocutionary character of the ensuing dialogical sequence; its force is mirrored in the quality of the positive and the negative reply respectively. Although the conventional utterance forms for replication are, trivially enough, 'Yes' or 'No', their specific act quality will vary according to the illocution type of the initial speech act.

So, if we run through the illocutionary types, we will discern illocutionary subtypes accordingly, accompanied by differing utterance forms:



What I want to show by these examples is that both the initial and the reactive moves do have a great variety of sequence-specific utterance forms, most of them idioms, not easily translatable word by word.


If an initial speech act by Sp 1 is met with a positive reply by Sp 2, the dialogical sequence seemingly comes to an end – both speakers having reached their respective communicative goals – they have come to an understanding and are d'accord (sie wissen gegenseitig Bescheid und sind damit einverstanden); Sp 2 knows what Sp 1 is interested in, and Sp 1 knows that Sp 2 at least does not object. There may sometimes be a third move by Sp 1 explicitly expressing satisfaction at Sp 2's reply and in a way acknowledging and confirming it:



The negative branch of the minimal dialogue is even more interesting:

If Sp 1 meets with a negative reply by Sp 2, he is in fact confronted with a dilemma – he either contents himself with the setback, which means waving his original communicative goal of reaching an understanding with Sp 2 by showing signs of resignation or Sp 1 will not take ‘No’ for an answer and ventures to try again, that is, he renovates his initiative by insisting. One might say that argumentative dialogue sets in with the third move.

The basic model of minimal dialogue structure gives the relevant correlations:



Sp1	Sp2	Sp1	Sp2	Sp1
First	Second	Third	Fourth	Fifth
move	move	move	move	move

Insisting is not just a repetition of the initial speech act, but a renewal of it that takes into account the experience of having been thwarted; this knowledge determines the conditions of performance for Sp 1's third move; it is responsible for a change of tone and quite often for a change of utterance form with additional emphasis; by Sp 2's negative reply it has become clear for Sp 1 that his communicative interest will meet with reservation and objection.

3. Argumentation words

To return to the question of 'word meaning in argumentation' we have to take a closer look at the conventional utterance forms in the minimal dialogue sequence.

So and *that* are characteristic words in connection with the initial speech act, a sort of demonstrative PRO-forms for the proposition underlying the initial speech act:

<i>So</i> it is.	<i>So</i> ist es
<i>That's</i> what I wish you to do	<i>So</i> will ich, daß du handelst
<i>That's</i> what I'm going to do	<i>So</i> werde ich handeln
<i>That's</i> how I feel (about...)	<i>So</i> ist mir zumute
<i>So</i> shall it be	<i>So</i> soll es sein

In the first move the proposition has to be made explicit somehow in order to function as the basis and reference ground of what is to be argued for or against.

In the second move Sp 2 makes known his attitude towards Sp 1's interest by uttering *Yes* or *No* (or equivalent replies). The lexical status of these primitive words is not clear in linguistic literature; they have been taken to be one-word sentences or full-fledged assertive speech acts; I take them to be conventional utterances with expressive force, relating to the preceding speech act.

The critical position in verbal interaction, as mentioned before, is marked by a negative reply in the second move. Being aware of Sp 2's disinclination, Sp 1 may desist from pushing things further and scratch his attempt at communicating or he may stick to his initial goal, i.e. insist. In German there is a special utterance form for this, namely *doch* (*oh yes; but of course*). In infantile talk one can sometimes observe insisting sequences of a simple sort:

No – Of course – Not at all – But of course – Not in the least

ISA

Nein – Doch – Aber nein – Aber ja doch – Nein, auf keinen Fall

And it is interesting to observe how in such cases emotions rise step by step and how utterances vary in expressiveness accordingly. This may be a kind of quarreling, but one can be in doubt whether it does in fact belong to the realm of argumentation proper, i.e. of advancing reasons for or against something.

This verbal procedure of advancing reasons will set in sometimes with the performance of the initial speech act already, and there it takes the form of so-called sentence conjunction (Konjunktionalsätze):

I think Peter is ill, because he did not show up this morning.

which in dialogical expansion might take the form of

Peter is ill – Why do you think so? – Because he didn't show up this morning.

As Ernest Lepore (2000: 6-7) points out, argumentative passages in spoken and written texts can to a certain extent be recognised as characterised by specific verbal means as premise indicators:

if, since, because, for, after all, given, whereas, although, suppose, assume, granted;

let us presume, here are the facts,...

as conclusion indicators:

consequently, therefore, so, hence;

it follows; (this) proves, (this) shows, (this) implies;

we can now infer, it cannot fail to be, let us conclude, these facts indicate, this supports the view or claim, let us infer, as a consequence we can deduce,...

These words make explicit the functions of the clauses they belong to, as premises or as conclusions, and thus may be likened to what in speech act theory is called “illocutionary force indicating devices”. This does make sense if we look at argumentation as a special form of complex verbal action of which the stating of premises and the drawing of conclusions are crucial components (Teilhandlungen). As to illocutionary force indicators in general, these might, as Austin (1962: 71-72) ventures to guess, be the result of a general evolution of language towards clarity of expression in special fields, notwithstanding the fact that in everyday speech implicit or primary utterances with equivalent illocutionary force stay in use.

If all language use were aimed at offering deductively valid arguments and all verbal communication could be represented in some standard format of propositional logic, then one could easily maintain that there is a special class of function words such as *yet (doch)*, *if (wenn)*, *then (dann)*, *because (weil)* etc. with meanings well definable in the respective formalism of propositional logic.

But these words do have uses besides those of premise or conclusion indicators; and there are subtle distinctive uses for each word, that will not be caught by postulating a general indicator meaning for them.

To take Lepore’s (200: 92) examples:

I’ll leave the window open *since* it is not raining.
(Ich lasse das Fenster offen, *denn* es regnet (ja) nicht.)


I’ll leave the window open *because* it is not raining.
(Ich lasse das Fenster offen, *weil* es (bei uns) nicht regnet.)

I’ll leave the window open, *if* it is not raining.
(Ich lasse das Fenster offen, *falls* (für den Fall, dass) es nicht regnet.)

In ordinary language, the standard form for argumentative patterns, perhaps under the influence of written discourse, is to be found in the grammatical system of compound sentences, that is, sentences with adversative, causal, concessive, temporal, consecutive, instrumental, purposive and other clauses.

Taking the causal nexus as an example, the general structure of the compound can be shown to be rather flexible with regard to linear order, formal variation and explicitness of indication. W.-D. Hartung (1964) has given a syntactic analysis of compound sentences that differs from Lepore’s propositional logic approach: Hartung postulates a premise–embedding structure that works well for German.

This structure gives the syntactic positions (PRO for premise–related PRO–form and C for conclusion conjunction) that can be used to make explicit the argumentative relations of the component clauses:



Here we have part of the problem of word meaning in argumentation: argumentation can be done by mere juxtaposition of premise and conclusion, without extra words; it can be done by explicit indicators of either one-word-structure or phrasal structure (*because – on account of*), and explicit indicators can turn up either in the premise or in the conclusion or in both. Where meaning is bound up with illocutionary force in complex speech acts, the allocation of meaning to linguistic forms will be facing this type of problem all along.

4. Concluding remarks

When people argue they try to persuade each other of some point that is of interest for them, but they will not always succeed in convincing the other party by means of deductively valid arguments. Persuasion can be pursued for various purposes and by very different means, ranging from physical force and bribery to subtle rhetorical ruses.

There are verbal means like flattering, threatening, lamenting, boasting, exaggerating, belittling and so on, and, of course, there are euphemistic and pejorative words that are instrumental in achieving what one aims at. It is most probable that in assessing such aspects of word meaning we will also have to take into account the types of communicative actions involved in dialogic dispute.

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PRESUMPTION, BURDEN OF PROOF AND LACK OF EVIDENCE

DOUGLAS WALTON

The notions of burden of proof and presumption are fundamental to building a coherent and precise theory of argumentation. There is a growing body of literature about presumption in argumentation theory, but the proliferation of different theories (outlined in section 1 below) suggests that no single theory has yet achieved wide acceptance. These developments, when put together, suggest the usefulness of comparatively evaluating the various theories to build a general theory that brings them together by identifying and integrating the components of an underlying argumentation structure on which they are based. The main target is presumption, but the analysis is built on related work on burden of proof coming out of the artificial intelligence literature (Prakken, Reed and Walton, 2005; Gordon, Prakken and Walton, 2007; Prakken and Sartor, 2007).

The purpose of this paper is to design a logical notion of presumption suitable for argumentation studies. A presumption is basically defined as an inference, but it is not just any inference. It is a special kind of inference. To see how it is special, it is argued that the notion of a presumption has to be defined at two levels, an inferential level and a dialogical level. At the inferential level, a presumption is defined as an inference to the acceptance of a proposition from two other propositions called a fact and a rule. At the dialectical level, a presumption is defined in terms of its use or function in a context of dialog. This function is to shift an evidential burden from one side to the other in a dialog, where the effect of such a shift is on the burden of persuasion set at the opening stage of the dialog. Argumentation is defined as a kind of reasoning used for some purpose in a dialog in which there are two participants, and each participant has the aim of persuading the other to accept the designated proposition called the ultimate *probandum* of that participant.

One of the most culturally significant uses of the notion of a presumption is in law. It is argued in this paper that a logical notion of presumption suitable for argumentation studies is comparable to the way the notion has been used in law. In its legal use, it will be argued, a presumption should be defined as an inference to the acceptance of a proposition in a trial, or in a comparable setting of legal dialog, from two other propositions called facts and rules that are accepted in law, meaning that they have been admitted as evidence at a prior point in the trial (judicially admitted). However, the notion of presumption used in law is slippery and ambiguous, and very hard to define with logical precision. The best we can do is to build a clear and precise logical model of the notion of presumption that represents some aspects of the legal notion in a useful way, and that also represents significant aspects of argumentation more generally.

Once a number of examples of presumptions, both in law and in everyday conversational argumentation, have been examined, the clear and precise logical model of presumption that is yielded is applied to the difficult problem of distinguishing between presumption and argument from ignorance. Argument from ignorance was traditionally classified as an informal fallacy in logic, but recent work has shown that arguing from lack of knowledge, or lack of evidence reasoning, as it is often called, can often be a reasonable form of argumentation. The problem is that presumptions are characteristically used when there is insufficient evidence or lack of knowledge from which a conclusion can be drawn. The two notions are so closely entangled that it is hard to distinguish one from the other.

1. *Survey of theories of presumption in argumentation theory*

A survey of the most influential theories of presumption in argumentation theory has been presented by Godden and Walton (2007), beginning with the account given in Whately's *Elements of Rhetoric* (1846). Whately (1846: 114) adopted the conservative position that there is a presumption in favor of prevailing opinions in existing institutions, like the Church. The reasons why he adopted this conservative attitude may not be entirely clear, but his account of the connection between burden of proof and presumption is clear. According to his account, the burden of proof is initially placed on one side or the other at the outset of an argument. This initial placement has an effect on subsequent argumentation. The party who bears this burden has the responsibility of providing reasons in support of his position, and must give up that position if the reasons offered are insufficient or unsatisfactory. However, the raising of the presumption can relieve this burden and shift it from one side to the other.

Whately's account has often been criticized, and not only on the grounds that his conservative position seem to be a kind of special pleading in favor of religion (Whately was an Archbishop of the Anglican Church). Critics like Kauffeld (2003) have argued that he basically does not provide clear criteria for the identification and justification of presumptive inferences, and that his analysis does not give a proper account of the foundation of presumptions because it retreats into notions of common sense and commonly accepted views. However, two features of Whately's account are noteworthy (Godden and Walton, 2007: 37). One is that he treats presumptions as subject to rebuttal, while the other is that on his theory presumption is closely tied to arguments from authority and expertise. Whately was often credited with basing his notion of presumption on principles of legal reasoning, but it has also been claimed that his theory is primarily psychological rather than legal in nature.

Alfred Sidgwick, a lawyer who wrote a well known book on fallacies (1884), amplified Whately's view by writing (Sidgwick 1884: 159) that "where a belief is in harmony with prevailing opinion, the assertor is not bound to produce evidence", but "whoever doubts the assertion is bound to show cause why it should *not* be believed" (Sidgwick's italics). However Sidgwick was aware of the limitations of this view, and

even remarked that Whately's presumption in favor of existing beliefs might amount to nothing more than an *argumentum ad populum*, a type of argument often held to be fallacious in logic. It might also be added that Sidgwick's account of presumption might amount to nothing more than an *argumentum ad ignorantiam*, an argument from ignorance or lack of evidence, another type of argument that has often been held to be fallacious in logic.

Kauffeld (2003) put forward a theory arguing that presumptions are justifiable on social grounds. According to his theory (Kauffeld 2003: 140), to presume a proposition is to take it as acceptable on the basis that someone else has made a case for accepting it on the grounds that not accepting it will have the powerful negative social consequences of risking criticism, regret, reprobation, loss of esteem, or even punishment for failing to do so. A prominent feature of Kauffeld's theory is that it presents presumptions as similar to, or even coextensive with, social expectations (Godden and Walton 2007: 322). On his theory, presumptions are grounded on rules of social conduct which, if violated, bring a punitive effect on the violator. This approach could be questioned in its applicability to studying the logical aspects of presumption, as it seems to pay more attention to social and psychological factors than underlying inferential structures. However, as will be shown below, social expectations are important for understanding presumptions.

Ullman-Margalit (1983) recognized that there might be differences in the ways presumptions work in law and the ways they work in ordinary conversational reasoning. She suggested the research proposal of attempting to get a more refined and precise analysis of how presumptions work in ordinary reasoning by viewing them in light of the procedures already codified and widely studied in law. The outcome of her analysis was to define presumption in terms of the characteristic sequence of reasoning from premises to a conclusion. There are three parts to the form of inference defining the sequence (Ullman-Margalit 1983: 147). The first part is the presence of the presumption raising fact in a particular case at issue. The second part is the presumption formula which sanctions the passage from the presumed fact to a conclusion. The conclusion is that a proposition is presumed to be true on the basis of the first two parts of the inference structure. She is very careful to describe the status of the conclusion of this presumptive inference, writing (Ullman-Margalit 1983: 147) that the inference is not to a "presumed fact", but to a conclusion that "a certain fact is presumed".

Ullman-Margalit emphasized the practical nature of presumption and its connection with argumentation from lack of evidence. She described presumptions as guides useful for practical deliberation in cases where there is an absence of information or conflicting information that interferes with the formation of a rational judgment but where nevertheless, some determination must be made in order for an investigation better to proceed (Ullman-Margalit 1983: 152). She emphasized that presumptions are not always justified, and enunciated the principle that the strength of a presumption in a given case should be determined by the strength of its grounds on a case by case basis (Ullman-Margalit 1983: 157). She also emphasized the inherent defeasibil-

ity of presumptive rules, stating that such a rule contains a rebuttal clause specifying that it is subject to exceptions (Ullman-Margalit 1983: 149). All these characteristics turn out to be important in the new dialogical theory proposed below.

The dialectical theory of presumption put forward by Walton (1992) was meant to be applied to everyday conversational argumentation. It was not specifically addressed to how presumption works in legal argumentation. According to this theory, in conversational argumentation presumptions take the form of cooperative conversational devices that facilitate orderly collaboration in moving the resolution of a dispute forward even if not everything can be proved by the evidence available.¹ A context of dialog involves two participants, a proponent and a respondent. The dialog provides a context within which a sequence of reasoning can go forward with a proposition *A* as a useful assumption in the sequence. The principle of adopting a presumption in a conversational exchange has the form of a dialog rule that appears to violate the usual requirement of burden of proof: even if there is no hard evidence showing that a proposition can be proved true, it can be presumed (tentatively) true, subject to later rejection if new evidence proves it false. On this theory, the key characteristic of presumption as a speech act in dialogue is that it reverses an existing burden of proof in a dialog by switching the roles of the two participants. Normally, the burden of proof is on the proponent asserting a proposition, but when a presumption is activated, this burden of proof shifts to the respondent, once the presumption has been accepted as a commitment in the dialog. In this dialectical theory, the point where the presumption is first brought forward in a dialog is called “move *x*”, while the point where it may be rebutted is called “move *y*.” This working of a presumption is regulated by the following seven key dialog conditions, summarized from the fuller list in (Walton 1992: 60-61).

- C1. At some point *x* in the sequence of dialog, *A* is brought forward by the proponent, either as a proposition the respondent is asked explicitly to accept for the sake of argument, or as a nonexplicit assumption that is part of the proponent’s sequence of reasoning.
- C2. The respondent has an opportunity at *x* to reject *A*.
- C3. If the respondent fails to reject *A* at *x*, then *A* becomes a commitment of both parties during the subsequent sequence of dialog.
- C4. If, at some subsequent point *y* in the dialog ($x < y$), any party wants to rebut *A* as a presumption, then that party can do so provided good reason for doing so can be given.
- C5. Having accepted *A* at *x*, however, the respondent is obliged to let the presumption *A* stay in place during the dialog for a time sufficient to allow the proponent to use it for his argumentation (unless a good reason for rebuttal under clause III. A. can be given).
- C6. Generally, at point *x*, the burden of showing that *A* has some practical value in a sequence of argumentation is on the proponent.

¹ Note that on this dialectical theory, presumptive reasoning has a negative logic, and is therefore closely linked to lack of evidence reasoning.

C7. Past point x in the dialog, once A is in place as a working presumption (either explicitly or implicitly) the burden of proof falls to the respondent should he or she choose to rebut the presumption.

Applying this theory of presumption enables a dialog to move forward, by giving the argumentation a provisional basis for moving ahead, even in the absence of sufficient evidence to prove key premises. How such presumptions should be accepted or rejected in a given case is held to depend on the type of dialog, the burden of proof set at the beginning of the dispute, and factors in specific arguments like argumentation schemes. Walton's account contrasts with Ullman-Margalit's to some extent, as hers appears to be more inferential in nature while his appears to be more explicitly dialectical in nature.

Hansen (2003) proposed an inferential analysis of the structure of presumptive inference that is comparable to that of Ullman-Margalit in that a presumption is always taken to have three parts: a major premise that expresses a rule, a minor premise that expresses an antecedent fact, and a conclusion stating a presumption drawn by combining the major and minor premises. However, instead of basing his account on legal reasoning, Hansen based it on Whately's theory that presumptions in ordinary reasoning are inferred from presumptive rules using this three part structure.

Rescher's theory brings the Ullman-Margalit and Walton theories together by making an integrated theory in which presumption has two components that fit together. The first is the dialectical component, meaning that presumption is defined in relation to formal structure of disputation of the Rescher type in which there are three parties. The second is the logical component, in which presumption is defined in relation to a certain characteristic type of logical inference. The latter rests on Rescher's defining principle for an appropriate cognitive presumption (Rescher 2006: 33) which has the form of a general rule: "Any appropriate cognitive presumption either is or instantiates a general rule of procedure of the form that to maintain P whenever the condition C obtains unless and until the standard default proviso D (to the effect that countervailing evidence is at hand) obtains". P is the proposition representing the presumption.

Rescher (2006) at first appeared to be taking up Ullman-Margalit's program of research, when he characterized presumption by outlining the historical development of the use of the concept in law, stating that presumption has figured in legal reasoning since classical antiquity (Rescher 2006: 1). However, his theory is much broader in its intended applications. It is by no means restricted to explaining how presumptions work in law, or even in everyday reasoning. He also investigates presumption in science and in economic and political decision-making. He takes inquiry and deliberation into account, as well as persuasion dialog. Rescher (1977) also appears to have been the first to develop a detailed account of presumption in an explicitly dialectical framework, drawing both on formal models of disputation and the legal origins of the notion of presumption in burden of proof (Godden and Walton 2007: 324). Rescher wrote (1977: 25) that burden of proof is a legal concept that functions within an adversary

proceeding where one side is trying to prove a charge while the other is trying to rebut it before a neutral trier of fact. An especially distinctive feature of his way of analyzing burden of proof using a formal dialog model is that three parties are involved, a proponent and an opponent who put forward arguments and rebuttals, as well as a third party trier who sees that proper procedures are followed and decides the outcome of the disputation.

Rescher (1977: 27) drew a distinction between two different types of burden of proof. First there is the probative burden of proving an initiating assertion, stating that an advocate of a claim in a dialog has the burden of supporting it with argument. Second there is “the evidential burden of further reply in the face of contrary considerations”. He calls the second type of one of “coming forward with the evidence” (Rescher 1977: 27). It appears to correspond to what is usually called the burden of producing evidence in law, or the burden of production. Thus it would seem that Rescher’s account roughly parallels the two main legal notions of burden of proof (Godden and Walton 2007: 325). On Rescher’s account, presumption is closely related to burden of proof, to rules, and to argument from ignorance. The latter connection is particularly evident when Rescher (2006: 6) writes that a presumption is not something that “certain facts *give* us by way of substantiating evidentiatioⁿ”, but rather something that “we *take* through a lack of counterevidence” (Rescher’s italics). It appears that he primarily refers to defeasible rules of the kind that are subject to exceptions², and thus in cases where such rules are used to support arguments, it would be expected that in a dialog, arguments and rebuttals would go back and forth from one side to the other. This is in fact the standard format in any formal model of dialog modeling disputation, including Rescher’s. Presumption is described in such a format as a device that “guides the balance of reasons” in the shifting of the burden of proof from one side to the other during a disputation. On this account, “a presumption indicates that in the absence of specific counterindications we are to accept how things as a rule are taken as standing” (Rescher 1977: 30). Thus if there is a general rule that when brought into play favors the argument of one side, a presumption is a device that uses the rule to shift the burden of coming forward with evidence against the other side.

Another feature of Rescher’s theory worth noting here is that there are three especially significant kinds of grounds determining on which side a presumption lies in a dialog. One such ground is negotiated agreement. A second, reminiscent of Whately, is the standing of an authoritative source (Rescher 1977: 39). A third important one is plausibility, for presumption, we are told, generally favors the most plausible among a set of alternatives (Rescher 1977: 38). Note that plausibility on Rescher’s account often depends on how things can normally be expected to go in a familiar situation, in a way that is reminiscent of Kauffeld’s theory.

² Rescher (2006: 6) specifically states the idea of presumption is closely linked to the notion of defeasible reasoning (default position) in computer science.

2. *Presumption and Burden of Proof in Law*

McCormick on Evidence, (Strong 1992: 449) wrote that presumption is the “slipperiest member of the family of legal terms”, except for its first cousin, burden of proof. Encouragingly, however, several recent studies of burden of proof and presumption have appeared in artificial intelligence and law (Prakken, Reed and Walton, 2005; Prakken and Sartor, 2006; Gordon, Prakken and Walton, 2007; Prakken and Sartor, 2007) that offer formal models that can render these important but slippery and vague notions into precise tools useful for helping us to precisely analyze and better understand the roles of presumption and burden of proof in legal reasoning.

The following example can be used to show how burden of proof can shift in a murder trial, but it is expressed in relation to how the crime of murder is defined in a specific set of rules for criminal law. Murder is defined as unlawful killing with malice aforethought in section 197 of the California Penal Code. Section 187 defines an exception for self-defense. In the example, there is sufficient evidence to prove the killing and malice elements of the crime based on sufficient evidence so that the defense has accepted these premises. Next, the defense puts forward an argument for self-defense, by calling a witness who testified as that the victim attacked the defendant with a knife. But in the next sequence of argumentation in the example, the prosecution calls another witness who testifies that the defendant had enough time to run away.

The example is modeled in Carneades by the argument graph in figure 1 (Gordon, Prakken and Walton 2007: 890). At the top part of figure 1 the two premises killing and malice are shown in gray, indicating that they have been accepted. These two leaves in the graph (shown as text boxes), represent premises in the argument. Ordinary premises are represented by lines with no arrowheads. The limits of the crime, killing and malice, are ordinary premises that must be supported by evidence. Pro arguments are represented by ordinary arrowheads. Con arguments are represented by open arrowheads. Assumptions are represented by closed dot arrowheads, while exceptions are represented by open dot arrowheads. The argument itself is represented by the node containing its name a1. The argumentation scheme, a scheme for arguments from legal rules, is identified in this example as the argument a1. The murder charge is acceptable, based on argument from rule, and given acceptance of the two premises by the defense. Hence the conclusion in the text box at the top (murder) is also shown in gray. We can say with respect to this part of the argument that the prosecution has met its evidential burden. At the next stage, when the defense puts forward its self defense argument, it is shown that section 187 is excluded.




Figure 1: Carneades Argument Graph for the Murder Example

The murder charge is acceptable, based on the arguments supposedly given to back it up by the prosecution. Thus the prosecution has met its evidential burden. At the next level of the graph, the defense calls a witness who testifies that the victim attacked the defendant with a knife. The second argument, labeled a2, is also an instance of the scheme for argument from a legal rule. At the bottom level of the graph on the left, the argument a3, based on the scheme for argument from witness testimony, is brought forward to support the claim of self defense. Assuming that the witness testified in court, we can take it that this testimony is accepted, and this is enough to meet the evidential burden of the defense for the self defense claim. In all the instances shown in the example represented in figure 1, the standard of proof applied is that of a scintilla of evidence (the SE standard). This testimony could be challenged by questioning the credibility of the witness, as shown in the text box at the far left at the bottom. However, instead of doing this, the prosecution chooses another move by calling a second witness to testify that the defendant had enough time to run away.

How does all this affect the burden of proof? To begin with, the prosecution has the burden of persuasion in a criminal case. But after the defendant has met his burden of production for self-defense, the proof standard for the self-defense statement is changed to a standard that reflects the prosecution's burden of persuasion because the standard is satisfied only if the best con argument has priority over the best pro argument. While the prosecution is the proponent of the main claim, namely the murder charge, the defense is the proponent of the exclusion by the self-defense rule. The defense is also the proponent of the claim that the defendant did act in self defense, but

due to the prosecution's burden of persuasion in a criminal case, it has the evidential burden of persuading the trier that the defendant did not act in self defense.

According to the dialogical theory, the function of a presumption in a dialog is to shift an evidential burden of proof from one side to the other in the dialog. The dialogical theory would handle this example by saying that presumption is a kind of move in a dialog different from the move of making an assertion. To presume that a proposition is true is to request the other party in a dialogue to accept it without having to give evidence to back it up and fulfill the normal kind of burden of proof that would be required to back up an assertion.

An example used to support the Prakken-Sartor theory is a case where the plaintiff demands compensation on the ground that defendant damaged his bicycle. The plaintiff has the burdens of production and persuasion that the bicycle was damaged and that he owned it. One way he can prove that he owns the bicycle is to prove that he possesses it. According to Dutch law in such a case, given possession, ownership of the bicycle can be presumed. The presumption in such a case can be expressed by the proposition that possession of an object can be taken as grounds for concluding that the person who possesses the object owns it. According to the Prakken-Sartor theory, this proposition has the form of the default rule, and generally speaking, any legal presumption can be cast in the form of such a default rule. The default rule is this proposition: normally if a person possesses something, it can be taken for granted that he owns it, subject to evidence to the contrary. It is held to be default rule in the Prakken-Sartor theory in the same way the following proposition is: if Tweety is a bird, then normally, but subject to exceptions, Tweety flies. Such a proposition is a default rule in that it holds generally, but can fail or default in the case of an exception, for example in the case that Tweety is a penguin.

According to Prakken and Sartor (2006: 23-25), there are three types of burden of proof that need to be carefully distinguished in law, called burden of persuasion, evidential burden, and tactical burden of proof. The burden of persuasion rests on a party in a trial, or comparable legal proceeding, and it requires that this party must prove a designated proposition by supporting it with grounds that are sufficient for endorsing it at the end of the trial. This proposition is called the ultimate *probandum* of the trial, the ultimate proposition to be proved. For example in Dutch law, to prove the case of alleged manslaughter, the prosecution needs to satisfy its burden of persuasion by proving that the defendant killed the victim with intent (Prakken and Sartor 2006: 23). Killing and intent are often called the elements of the ultimate *probandum*. To fulfill its burden of persuasion, the prosecution has to prove that the defendant not only killed the victim but did so with intent. This burden of proof does not change over the whole course of the trial, and it is fulfilled or not only in the final stage when the jury decides the outcome of the trial.

In contrast with the burden of persuasion, the evidential burden and the tactical burden are often said to shift back and forth during the course of the trial from one side to the other. In Dutch law (Prakken and Sartor 2006: 24), the accused can only

escape conviction by providing evidence of an exception to the rule that if killing and intent are proved, the defendant is guilty of manslaughter. One exception of this sort would be evidence that the killing was done in self defense. Such evidence could be provided if the defendant could provide a witness who claims the victim threatened the accused with a knife. However, the defense does not have to prove self defense, by a standard of proof that would be suitable to fulfill a burden of persuasion. All it must do is to produce some evidence, enough evidence to raise the issue of self defense, and it throws sufficient doubt on whether the judge should rule that there is no self defense. This type of burden can be called the evidential burden, but it is also often called the burden of production, or the burden of producing evidence.

There is a third kind of burden of proof that Prakken and Sartor call the tactical burden of proof. Suppose the defense presents enough evidence to fulfill the evidential burden for a finding of self defense, and the prosecution attempts to rebut this argument by bringing forward a witness who declared that the defendant had enough time to run away. If the prosecution's argument is strong enough, it would have the effect of making the prosecution's ultimate *probandum* of manslaughter justified once again. This move puts a tactical burden of proof on the prosecution. They might discharge it, for example, by arguing that the witness put forward by the prosecution is a friend of victim, and that this fact makes her an unreliable witness. Accordingly, a tactical burden of proof can shift from one side to the other, as each side brings forward a new argument. Prakken and Sartor argue (2006: 25) that in contrast, the burdens of production and persuasion are fixed, and cannot shift from one party to the other. This claim is clearly true for the burden of persuasion, which remains on a party until the last stage of the trial. However, it seems less clear that the evidential burden is fixed in this way. The reason that Prakken and Sartor give to support their claim that the evidential burden is fixed is that this burden on an issue "is fulfilled as soon as the burdened party provides the required evidence on that issue and after that is no longer relevant". It should be remarked here that there appears to be considerable disagreement and even controversy on the question of whether the evidential burden shifts back and forth. Most legal commentators appear to assume that it does often shift back and forth from one side to the other in a trial, but some commentators, including Prakken and Sartor, have argued that it never does. These disagreements may simply reflect differences in the way the notion of an evidential burden is defined.

3. *Presumption and Inference*

In one respect, presumption has the same structure as an ordinary defeasible inference. In the most typical case, it is based on two premises, called the fact and the rule. The fact can be described as an atomic proposition in logic, a simple statement that is not conditional (disjunctive, conjunctive) in form. It is called a "presumption-raising fact" in law, and that terminology can be retained here. In law, the facts of a case consist of the evidence judged to be admissible at the opening stage of a trial. A fact is a judicially

admitted proposition. The rule is often described as a generalization. Rules can be defined by the following seven characteristics (Gordon 2008: 4).

1. Rules have properties, such as their date of enactment, jurisdiction and authority.
2. When the antecedent of the rule is satisfied by the facts of a case, the conclusion [consequent] of the rule is only presumably true, not necessarily true.
3. Rules are subject to exceptions.
4. Rules can conflict.
5. Some rule conflicts can be resolved using rules about rule priorities, e.g. *lex superior*, which gives priority to the rule from the higher authority.
6. Exclusionary rules provide one way to undercut other rules.
7. Rules can be invalid or become invalid. Deleting invalid rules is not an option when it is necessary to reason retroactively with rules which were valid at various times over a course of events.

This notion of a rule cannot be modelled adequately by material implication of the kind used in deductive logic. Instead, rules need to be modeled by identifying the parts of the rule – antecedent, consequent, exceptions, assumptions, and type.

There are different theories about which parts of this inference are identified as the presumption. On one theory, the presumption is to be identified with the defeasible rule (Prakken and Sartor 2006). Often the presumption is identified with the conclusion. It is said that the fact and the rule together “give rise to” the presumption stated in the conclusion. Still other writers talk about presumptive reasoning by equating the presumption with the whole inferential process leading from the fact and rule to the conclusion drawn from it. However, although presumption may be correctly identified as a defeasible inference of this kind with two premises and conclusion, there is another question to be raised. What is the difference between an inference and a presumption?

What makes presumption different from other kinds of inferences is that it is put forward in a special way in a context of dialog where two parties are reasoning together. When one party puts forward an assertion or argument to the other party in such a context, the assertion or argument is typically put forward in such a way that the other party is meant to either accept the assertion or argument or challenge it in some way. It can be challenged by raising doubts about it by asking critical questions, or by demanding some proof of what has been asserted. The respondent to the assertion or argument presented normally has such a right of challenge. Very often the proponent’s responsibility to provide such proof is called the burden of proof. What makes presumption different as a way of putting forward a proposition for acceptance in a dialog is that this right of the challenge is at least temporarily removed. It is often said that when a presumption is put forward, instead of there being a burden of proof on the side of the proponent, the burden shifts to the other side to disprove the proposition in question.

Another distinguishing factor that makes a presumption different from an inference that is not presumptive in nature is the probative weight of the premise stating the rule. Normally when an inference is put forward in the form of an argument, the proponent of the argument has to support the premises, if any of them are challenged by the respondent. A premise supported by evidence is said to have probative weight. It is this probative weight that moves the argument forward as a device that forces the respondent to accept the conclusion, given that the argument has a valid logical form. However, in the case of a presumptive inference, a problem is that there is insufficient evidence to prove the premises and give them enough probative weight to move the argument forward towards acceptance. What fills the gap in the case of presumptive inference is that one premise is a rule that is accepted by procedural reasons even though it lacks the probative weight that would be bestowed upon it by sufficient evidence. In law, the distinction is drawn as follows: “[An] inference arises only from the *probative force of the evidence*, while the “presumption” arises from the rule of law” (Whinery 2001: 554).

More generally, a presumption arises from a rule that is established for procedural and/or practical purposes in a type of rule-governed dialog (like a trial).

When talking about presumptions, both in law and everyday conversational argumentation, this aspect is typically called the shifting of the burden of proof, described as follows. When an assertion in an argument is put forward a proponent has the burden of proof to support it with evidence if it is challenged by the respondent. When a presumption is put forward, however, this burden of proof on the respondent is no longer there. The presumption is put forward as proposition or an inference that the respondent has to accept. He can't demand proof of a kind that would normally be required to back it up. It is as if the presumption has to be accepted as a fiat or stipulation. Reasons can be given to back up acceptance of the presumption, but they are typically practical reasons relating to the continuation of the dialogue that is underway, as opposed to evidential reasons of the kind one would normally use to back up or prove a claim made.

Hence in one respect, a presumption is simply defeasible inference, and it can be looked at that way. According to Verheij (1999: 115) and Walton (2002: 43) the deductive form of *modus ponens* that we are familiar with in deductive logic may be contrasted with a defeasible form. The strict *modus ponens* form of argument in deductive logic is based on the material conditional binary constant \Rightarrow called strict implication. The variables A, B, C, \dots , stand for propositions (statements).

Strict *Modus Ponens*
 Major Premise: $A \Rightarrow B$
 Minor Premise: A
 Conclusion: B

In contrast, there is also a defeasible *modus ponens* in which the symbol $\sim \Rightarrow$ represents a defeasible conditional that is subject to exceptions.

Defeasible *Modus Ponens*
 Major Premise: $A \sim > B$
 Minor Premise: A
 Conclusion: B

Verheij (1999: 115; 2000: 5) called this form of inference *modus non excipiens*, but it was called defeasible *modus ponens* (DMP) in (Walton 2002: 43). To cite an example, the following argument arguably fits the form of DMP: if something is a bird and generally, but subject to exceptions, it flies; Tweety is a bird; therefore Tweety flies. If we find out that Tweety is a penguin, the original DMP argument defaults. It is best seen as an argument that holds only tentatively during an investigation, but that can fail to hold any longer if new evidence comes in that cites an exception to the rule specified in the major premise. *Modus ponens* arguments, whether of the strict or defeasible type, are typical linked arguments. Both premises go together to support the conclusion. If one is taken away, there is much less support for the conclusion in the absence of the other.

4. Examples

In the following case, Donald bought a new printer from Hewlett Packard, and later returned it to them, asking for his money back. However, the printer had been returned to Hewlett Packard in a damaged state. They did not want to return his money, claiming that they delivered the printer to Donald in good condition (with no damage). Donald claims that he is owed restitution (his money back) for the damage. Hewlett Packard claims that since they delivered the printer to Donald in good condition, the damage must have been due to him. Thus in this case, we have a conflict of opinions. Each side has a thesis, or claim made by that side, and the proposition claimed to be true by the one side is opposed to that of the other side.

What happens when a case like this is disputed is that a general legal rule will be applied to it. *McCormick on Evidence*, (Strong 1992: 455) cited the following general rule recognized and accepted in law: if a first party proves delivery of property to a second party in good condition, and also proves that it was returned in a damaged state, a presumption arises that the damage was due to the second party (Strong 1992: 456-457). This generalization may not be itself a law, but it might be recognized as having the force of an accepted legal rule, as it has been relied on in many cases ruled on at trial, and may have been specifically cited and accepted as a principle by judges in their rulings.

Williams (1977: 156) offered the following example in English law of a rule stated in section 25(3) of the Theft Act: "Where a person is charged with an offence under this section, proof that he had with him any article made or adapted for use in committing burglary, theft or cheat shall be evidence that he had it with him for such use." This rule relates to the offense of possessing "burglarious implements", as Wil-

liams calls them (Williams 1977: 156), or burglar tools, as we would call them. As a particular instance, let's consider a case where a person was charged with an offense under this section, and evidence was presented that he had articles with him that fit the description of burglar tools. In such a case, the conclusion would immediately follow he had these articles with him for use in committing burglary. In other words, given this rule, the factual finding of these articles on the person charged is sufficient for acceptance of the proposition that he had these articles with him for use in committing burglary.

This kind of case is a good example to illustrate how a presumption works in law. The general rule is stated by law, in this case in the Theft Act. The factual premise is the proposition that articles that may be classified as burglar tools were found on the person charged with the offence. The presumption that arises is the proposition that the person charged with the offence had these articles with him for use in committing burglary. As shown in figure 2, the rule and the factual premise constitute the two premises of a defeasible inference that leads to the conclusion that he had these articles with him for use in committing burglary.




Figure 2: Structure of the Presumptive Inference in the Theft Act Example

This conclusion constitutes that is often said to be the presumption that arises in such a case.

According to Williams (1977: 156) this example illustrates how an evidential burden works in law. When a person is found with such articles, a burden is placed on him to give some explanation of why he had such articles in his possession at the time, offering evidence that the articles he had with him were for some use other than committing burglary. If he fails to offer such evidence, the proposition that he had these

articles with him for use in committing a burglary will stay in place as accepted by the court. In other words, it can be said that in such a case, once the fact and rule are accepted by the court, the conclusion produced by them is lodged in place, until such time as the defendant can produce evidence against it. We can say then that the defendant now has an evidential burden to discharge. It is this phenomenon that is frequently described by commentators as the shifting of an evidential burden. We can see, however, that what produces the shifting of the evidential burden in this case is a presumptive inference resting on a factual premise and a rule. Next we turn to some examples of presumptions used in everyday conversational reasoning.

In many cases of everyday conversational reasoning, it may be evident that some presumption has been made, but how it was connected to some burden of proof operative in the case may not be evident. However there are some cases where such a burden of proof can be identified and classified, even though it is not explicitly stated.

5. The Seat Belts Example

Coming back on the flight from the Chicago APA 08 meeting, there was a little turbulence, and the pilot announced to the passengers to fasten their seat belts. A little later, the pilot announced that the passengers could undo their seat belts, and could get up and walk around if they wished. A little later, the pilot announced to the passengers to fasten their seat belts again. He added that although there was no evidence of further turbulence, he felt it was better to err on the side of safety. A little while later, he announced once again that passengers could undo their seat belts.

This case is a typical and very common type in which the factor of safety in a case sets a burden of proof to one side. In this case, pilot may not have had any visual evidence or weather report evidence of further turbulence, but he still may have had a slight suspicion that there could be some further turbulence. Or to put it in a negative way, he may not have felt sure enough that there wouldn't be any further turbulence.

In such a case, we need to note that the seriousness of the consequences on both sides of the decision needs to be taken into account. If the pilot announces that the passengers need to fasten their seat belts again, it is only a minor and temporary nuisance for the passengers. However, if he doesn't make any announcement, and there is turbulence, the outcome could potentially be serious. For example, some passengers could be thrown around the cabin or injured, depending on how bad the turbulence is. We could describe the pilot's reasoning in this kind of case using the notion of presumption. Although he reported that he had no evidence that there would be further turbulence, he acted on the presumption that there might be, by telling the passengers to fasten their seat belts again. Thus he could be said to have made a presumption, even though there was no evidence, or no objective evidence at any rate, supporting the truth of the proposition that he accepted as a presumption.

The clue to how best to analyze the reasoning in this case can be found in the pilot's saying that it was better to err on the side of safety. The pilot doesn't know

whether there will be turbulence or not. No specific evidence indicates that there will be. But there is a possibility of error. This possibility would be apparent to the pilot, who has a lot of experience of flying in this type of plane in conditions in which there is turbulence. Since the possibility of error exists, a way of making the decision is to look at the cost of error on both sides. Even though the probability of there being turbulence may be fairly low, the cost of it may, at least potentially, be comparatively high.

Announce to passengers to fasten belts.	Cost of error: small inconvenience.
Make no announcements.	Cost of error: potential for injury.

In this kind of case, the pilot has two choices. He can presume that there will be turbulence, or that there will not be. The probability of there being turbulence may be so low, based on the objective evidence, that from the point of view of cost benefit analysis (weighing the costs of the two outcomes against the probability of the occurrence of each) the right decision may be to make no announcement. But this point of view ignores the burden of proof to tilt the decision to the side of safety if there is a possibility of error. Hence a presumption is made and acted on. The presumption is made that there will be turbulence, and the action taken in line with this presumption is to announce to the passengers to fasten their seat belts again.

6. *Arguments from Ignorance*

It has been known for some time that arguments from ignorance represent an argumentation scheme, but one that is closely tied in with shifts in burden of proof. For example, consider the argument, "You can't disprove my claim, therefore you must accept it". Such arguments are associated with the informal fallacy of argument from ignorance: a certain proposition is not known to be true, therefore it must be accepted that it is false. Based on this form of argument, if a claim can't be disproved, that would be a reason for accepting it. However, recent work has shown that this form of argument is not always fallacious, and that it is a heuristic we use all the time to go ahead and provisionally accept a conclusion. Such arguments are less prejudicially called lack of evidence arguments rather than arguments from ignorance, a label that has negative connotations, perhaps suggesting that all arguments of this form are fallacious. An example is the hypothesis that Romans did not give military decorations posthumously (Walton 1996: 66-67). Historians have examined considerable evidence from tombstones, from historical writings on military campaigns, and from other evidential sources, and none of these sources offers any evidence of a posthumous military decoration. What can properly be concluded from this historical evidence? The conclusion can be drawn that that Romans did not give military decorations posthumously. Of course, the inference that this conclusion is based on needs to be regarded as defeasible, meaning that it needs to be treated as subject to exceptions. Hence histo-

rians need to be prepared to give up the hypothesis if new evidence comes in showing a case where a Roman soldier was given a military decoration after his death. The long and the short of this discussion is that the so-called argument from ignorance traditionally deemed to be a fallacy can be a reasonable argument under the right conditions of its use.

Notice as well that this argument from ignorance can be described as a presumptive inference based on burden of proof. The facts in the case are that historians have examined considerable evidence from tombstones, from historical writings on military campaigns, and from other evidential sources, and none of these sources offers any evidence of a posthumous military decoration. If it is true that none of these sources offers any evidence of a posthumous military decoration, the conclusion can be drawn defeasibly (in the absence of any evidence to the contrary) that Romans did not give military decorations posthumously. Such an inference is a classic case of presumptive reasoning, as will be shown in the analysis of presumptive reasoning below.

Trying to examine a real case of argumentation used in a given text of discourse, argumentation schemes and other argumentation devices can be combined. It is possible for two such devices or schemes to be combined into one case, and in some such cases one scheme is the basic scheme whereas the other is merely peripheral. The question of how to sort out this kind of problem when dealing with presumptive reasoning, burden of proof and argument from ignorance can be posed in a more specific way by examining the following real example³.

Representative Keith Ellison became the first Muslim ever elected to the U.S. Congress on November 7 2007. During an interview with Ellison on the November 14 edition of his CNN headline news program, Glenn Beck asked Ellison to “prove to me that you are not working with our enemies”. He added “And I know you’re not. I’m not accusing you of being an enemy, but that’s the way I feel, and I think a lot of Americans will feel that way”. Ellison replied: “Well, let me tell you, the people of the Fifth Congressional District know that I have a deep love and affection for my country. There’s no one who’s more patriotic than I am. And so, you know, I don’t need to - need to prove my patriotic stripes”.

The question-reply sequence in this example is reminiscent of some of the standard cases of the argument from ignorance that have been studied in the fallacy literature. Probably the most obvious case is the spy example, where someone is accused of being a spy and then has to prove that he is not a spy (Walton 1996: 97-110). Refuting a negative accusation of this sort is very difficult, and ultimately it may be impossible to refute the charge conclusively. Thus if one is accused of being a spy without any evidence being offered to back up the allegation, the most reasonable strategy is generally to shift the burden of proof back to the other side in some way. For example, the per-

³ The text of the whole interview can be found at the following site [accessed December 23, 2007]. <http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0611/14/gb.01.html>

son accused might demand that his accuser produce some evidence of the allegation, and perhaps also express his dismay that the accuser has made such an unwarranted allegation without evidence to back it up.

It is very hard for someone accused of being a spy to prove he is not a spy, because any evidence concerning such an allegation is secretive. This difficulty of disproving an allegation was also evident in the case of the congressmen accused of working with enemies, just above. It seems like the best response to the allegation is to say, "Prove it, and if you can't, you must withdraw the allegation". This response invokes the general principle of burden of proof requiring that if a claim is made, it must be backed up by evidence or it must be retracted. Such a reply may not be very effective rhetorically, however, because any accusation, once made, tends to stick, leaving a lingering suspicion by innuendo, because even though there may be no evidence to prove it, there may also be no evidence to disprove it. On the basis of a presumption for safety (spies are dangerous to national security), the conclusion that may be suggested is that we should take care in telling this individual any secrets.

The congressman case is subtle, because the interviewer claims that he is not accusing him of being an enemy. On the other hand he says that a lot of Americans will feel that way, which does give a weak reason to think that the accusation might be true, or at least that a lot of viewers might think it is true, and therefore that it is worth rebutting. If the congressmen were to reply that there is no evidence that this claim is true, that might appear weak, even though logically speaking it does seem to be the correct response. His reply is that he doesn't need to prove his patriotic stripes. This reply is rhetorically clever as well as being appropriate as a way of answering the question. Although it does seem to be an argument from lack of evidence, in certain respects, more importantly it seems to shift the burden of proof against the questioner by raising a presumption. The congressman does not attempt to prove that he is patriotic, but he reasons on the basis that that proposition is not subject to doubt, and therefore he does not have to prove it.

Thus a general problem for argumentation theory is posed. How can we distinguish (a) lack of evidence reasoning, (b) presumptive reasoning and (c) shifts in a burden of proof?

A professor lives too far from the university to walk home, and his wife has the car, so they make an arrangement so that on many days he walks part way home, along a street called Wellington Crescent, and she picks him up there. One day as he is leaving in the morning, he says to her, "if you don't hear from me, I'll meet you on Wellington Crescent". She knows that it means that he will be walking that evening, expecting her to pick him up on Wellington Crescent, and not at the university.

This is a case of a particular presumption. In another kind of case, the husband and wife might also operate on a general presumption that if neither of them says anything in the morning, both will take it that he will be walking home that evening, and are supposed to meet on Wellington Crescent. In this case, there is a general rule that if he

doesn't tell her in the morning that he wants to be picked up after school, she is supposed to meet him on Wellington Crescent. Note that this general rule is expressed in a conditional form. Note also that it is a defeasible rule. If there is bad weather, and walking conditions are not good, one can phone the other during the day and suggest that it might be a good idea that he should be picked up rather than walk home. Note also that in both cases what is happening looks like it could come under the category of argument from ignorance. For example when he says "if you don't hear from me, I'll meet you on Wellington Crescent" the antecedent of the conditional has a negative form. Her conclusion to meet him on Wellington Crescent is derived from an absence of information received.

The language of presumption and its relation to associated logical concepts can sometimes be slippery and confusing, because, at least as argued in this paper, these terms need to be defined in a way that is sensitive to context. Let us contrast two types of cases to bring out this point. One is the standard type of case where a person is declared legally dead because he has not appeared for a fixed period of years. We take this to typically refer to a normal kind of case in which a person was living a normal life in a house in a city, let's say, and he just disappeared one day without leaving any traces of where he might have gone. Let's contrast this with a different type of case where a person is hiking in the wilderness in the mountains in a cold and inhospitable area where it is not possible for even an experienced woodsman to survive for more than a week. Let's say, to add a statistical component, many people have been lost in this area, and none has survived for as long as a week.

In the first case, it is easily possible for the person to survive for the number of years at issue, say five years. It's just that he disappeared without trace, and so there is no evidence of his survival. In the second case as well, there is no evidence of the person's survival. Hence both cases appear to fit the category of a lack of evidence argument, argument called *argumentum ad ignorantiam* in logic. But are both cases instances of presumptive reasoning. Certainly the first one is, for all the reasons argued above. But it can be argued that the argument in the second case is based on evidence, as opposed to presumptive reasoning. The arguments supporting this contention is that the lack of any evidence of the person's survival, given the existing conditions hostile to survival, should be considered a kind of evidence in its own right. It can be called negative evidence. This issue, however, is controversial. Some have argued that negative scientific evidence should be taken into account when reporting experimental results, and others have argued that experimental results based on negative evidence should not be published. This controversy continues, but if it is correct that negative evidence can properly be described as a kind of evidence, than the argument in the second type of case is based on evidence, as opposed to presumption. According to the new theory presented above, something is a presumption, or an instance of distinctively presumptive reasoning, if the evidence by itself is insufficient to prove the conclusion that is drawn and put forward. If the evidence is sufficient, the case is no longer one of a presumption.

7. *The New Dialogical Theory of Presumption*

The function of making a presumption is to enable a discussion or investigation to move forward without getting continually bogged down by having to prove a proposition needed as part of an argument required to help the investigation move forward. The problem may be that proving such a proposition may be too costly, or may even require stopping the ongoing discussion or investigation temporarily so that more evidence can be collected and examined. The problem is that a particular proposition may be necessary as a premise in a proponent's argument he has put forward, but the evidence that he has at present may be insufficient to prove it to the level required to make it acceptable to all parties. Hence moving forward with the argumentation may be blocked while the opponent demands proof. The two parties may then become locked into an evidential burden of proof dispute where one says "you prove it" and the other says "you disprove it". This interlude may block the ongoing discussion. A way to solve the problem is for the proponent or a third party to say, "Let's let this proposition hold temporarily as a premise in the proponent's argument, so that we can say he has proved his contention well enough so that we can accept the conclusion of his argument tentatively as a basis for proceeding." If necessary, later on, the subdiscussion can be continued by bringing in more evidence for or against the proposition that served as the premise.

There is also a more subtle but no less important distinction to be drawn between a presumption and a putting forward of that presumption. The putting forward of a presumption can be seen as a kind of speech act in a dialog, while the presumption itself can be identified, as indicated above, by the inference it is part of. The same ambiguity attaches to the concept of an argument, and is a common source of confusion. A distinction needs to be drawn between an argument, and the putting forward of an argument for acceptance in a dialog. From one point of view, a traditional one in logic, an argument can be viewed simply as an inference from premises to a conclusion. Or, from another point of view, an argument can be seen as something that is put forward by one party for acceptance by another party. An argument, on this latter view, is something that is advanced or advocated by a claimant. It is something that has the function of backing up a claim by giving reasons to accept it.

Krabbe (2001) studied the problem of retraction and persuasion dialogue, and showed how the notion of a presumption is important for solving this problem (Krabbe 2001: 151-153). He offered an example of a dialog (Krabbe 2001: 152) similar to the following one illustrating some conditions for retraction of a presumption. The dialog illustrates a presumption in favor of a source of evidence that is generally accepted as trustworthy, like a weather forecast.

Wilma: The fine skating weather is holding.
 Bruce: Why?
 Wilma: The weather forecast says so.

Bruce: So what?

Wilma: You can usually trust the weather forecast. Why not in this case?

At his second move, Bruce refuses to accept Wilma's argument that the fine skating weather is holding because the weather forecast says so. When he says "So what?", he implies that he does not accept the weather forecast as a reliable source of evidence about the weather. But the problem is that he has given no reason why the weather forecast should not be accepted as a reliable source of evidence. Wilma replies at her last move by pointing out that the weather forecast is generally accepted as trustworthy. Here she is actually giving a reason to support acceptance of the inference that what the weather forecast said implies that the fine skating weather is holding. Whately would have analyzed this case by calling this acceptance a presumption in favor of authority. In more recent terms, we could say there is generally a presumption in favor of expert opinion.

As part of her last move, Wilma adds the remark, "Why not in this case?", at the end of her last move. This remark has the effect often described as that of reversing the burden of proof. It is reminiscent of the recent literature on what should be the effect of asking a critical question in response to a defeasible argument like argument from expert opinion. In some instances, the asking of the critical needs to be backed up by supporting evidence before the question defeats the original argument. Krabbe (2001: 151) puts this point by writing that after Wilma's last remark, it is up to Bruce to justify his challenging of the presumption that you can usually trust the weather forecast. Krabbe concludes, "Hence there has been a role reversal" for at that point in the dialog, the burden of proof has fallen on Bruce, not Wilma (2001: 151). Krabbe uses this dialogue to make the point that even though presumptions may not be easy to retract, they are retractable, and need to be retracted under the right conditions in a dialog structure that represents rational argumentation. Judging by this example it appears that Krabbe basically accepts the contentions of the Walton theory that one of the conditions under which a presumption needs to be retracted is that evidence is given against it, but that in a case like the example dialog above where no such evidence has been given, the presumption stays in place.

However it is evident from Krabbe's discussion that he sees the notion of a presumption in a different way from the way it is seen in the Walton theory. This difference is made evident in a remark in a footnote Krabbe (2001: 158): "Walton stresses the way a presumption is introduced into the dialogue by a speech act of presumption. At present we are more interested in the way a presumption may be withdrawn from the dialogue." Following up this remark into personal communication (e-mail of April 4, 2008), Krabbe wrote that Walton writes about presumption as a kind of speech act whereas Krabbe treats it as a kind of commitment. He added that what Walton calls a presumption he would call "proposing a presumption". It is a little hard to compare the separate writings of Walton and Krabbe on presumption, even though both are based on a dialog theory approach because there seems to be a basic terminological differ-

ence underlying the treatment of presumption in the two sets of writings.

These observations suggest the usefulness of drawing a distinction between two notions that are often confused: (a) the notion of presumption itself and (b) the speech act of putting forward a presumption for acceptance by another party in a dialog. This distinction is fundamental and highly important, despite the fact that it has not been clearly recognized in the past and is often overlooked. Interestingly, the same kind of fundamental ambiguity affects the notion of an argument, because a distinction needs to be made between what an argument is, and the speech act of putting forward an argument for acceptance.

For these reasons, it has clearly been shown that it is necessary to revise the older Walton theory of presumption, and to see the older theory as presenting a definition of the speech act of putting forward a presumption in a dialog. This revision leaves the question open of how to define a concept of a presumption. The older Walton theory shows that it is something put forward in a dialog, and it offers a set of normative conditions defining how it should be put forward, and how the other party and the dialogue should properly react to its being put forward. However the older theory does not define what it is that has been put forward. To fill this gap, a new theory of presumption needs to be advanced.

In presenting the dialogical theory, the following answer has been given to the question of how presumption is related to evidential burden. As explained above, the general principle of burden of proof requires that the party who makes the claim and puts forward the argument for its acceptance must supply evidence to back it up if the claim or argument is questioned. But it commonly happens that, for various reasons, it may be difficult or problematic to meet this requirement. It may be too costly to obtain such evidence, or even more generally, it may take such time and effort to obtain it that this quest would obstruct the progress of the dialog currently moving forward in its argumentation stage. In some instances, presumptive reasoning can be the tool of choice in overcoming this problem. In such cases raising a presumption can be a way to, if not meet the evidential burden, at least satisfy the need to meet it by justifying the drawing of a conclusion on a tentative basis. Thus, although the claim challenged has not been proved, satisfactory, even if temporary, substitute for proof has been offered.

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THE ARGUMENTATIVE POWER OF WORDS OR HOW TO MOVE PEOPLE'S MINDS WITH WORDS

EDDA WEIGAND

1. *Rethinking argumentation theory*

A genuine interdisciplinary enterprise needs to include the 'multiple voices' from different disciplines which all address the same object. If this object is considered to be a natural object of performance, we have to go beyond narrow disciplinary boundaries and to take the complex whole as our starting point. I think, nowadays we no longer need to fall back on reductionist theories but are capable of facing complexity and of developing a genuinely *holistic model* which includes the voice of rationality as well as the voice of persuasion in argumentative games and integrates the meaning of words into a theory of action. A concept of meaning defined in an abstract code will not come up to 'living with uncertainty' (Toulmin 2001). We are looking for a concept of meaning that is open, flexible, adaptable to ever-changing conditions. The point where competence and performance meet neither makes rules more precise nor gives hope for enlightenment by empirical data; the place where competence and performance meet is in the minds of human beings. As social individuals we are able to orient ourselves in ever-changing surroundings by applying rules as far as they go and drawing individual inferences where rules come to their limits. It is this extraordinary human ability of *competence-in-performance* which enables us 'to come to terms with whatever life throws at us' (Sampson 2005: 193). We proceed not by abstracting from disturbing factors and searching 'in the underground' of protected competence nor by subjecting ourselves to the arbitrariness of empirical appearance. Instead, competence-in-performance means knowing how to deal with empirical variability and adapting to ever-changing conditions. In performance, there is no absolute truth determined by codes; the world is dependent on the eye of the perceiver. Adaptation means giving up models restricted to rules as well as models restricted to a concept of language as spoken language. The authentic text is not an autonomous entity. If the study of dialogue is limited in that way, it seems inevitable that major aspects of dialogic interaction will remain a mystery.

To get to the heart of the issue: We have to rethink what theorizing means. To my mind, it means devising a theory about an object. A theory about an artificial object, such as codes, may consider *lexical meaning as encoded in signs* and argumentation restricted to rationality. A theory of natural performance however has to take account of the fact that we do not put signs into use but *negotiate meaning* and understanding in the action game. Consequently, the lexical issue does not relate to the interface be-

tween encoded and intended meaning but addresses from the very beginning meaning as a flexible concept which is adaptively used in the speaker's interest. The same is true of argumentation. The argumentative game in performance is not a game which exclusively relies on logical rules but is a game which proceeds using different voices, both rational and persuasive ones. In performance we do not "pragmatically narrow and broaden encoded lexical meaning" nor can argumentation be reduced to "a kind of constrained mind-reading" (Carston 2002: 12, 364f.). Communicative meaning is, from the very outset, created by human beings in their interests as social individuals and negotiated in argumentative dialogues by a variety of communicative means. Encoded meaning and discourse, encoded meaning and dialogic performance do not go together.

2. *Argumentation as a mixed game*

Let me briefly take up the issue of what a holistic model looks like which is able to describe and explain how argumentation works in performance (Weigand 2006). Argumentation in performance is not a game in the abstract; it *starts from human beings' minds*. Human beings are social individuals, guided by self-interest but forced to respect social concerns. Completely neglecting social concerns would in the end lead to self-destruction. In dialogic interaction we use our abilities to achieve what we want. Our abilities are interconnected and cannot be used otherwise. Speaking interacts with perceiving and thinking and is influenced by emotions. Rationality is not a universal feature but a guideline for action shaped by Western culture. A model based on the addition of two separate domains, rationality versus persuasion and emotion, remains a model constructed in the abstract; competence-in-performance proceeds by means of different voices which interact. What determines human action from the very outset is not logic and pure rationality but evaluation in one's self-interest. *We are persuasive beings* and apply communicative means and techniques as far as they seem useful for our purposes, among them means of rationality or reasonableness.

Words play an important role in the dialogic action game, not as signs which have meaning on their own by definition and are simply put to use, but as communicative means applied by the speakers in their interests. The meaning of words is to a certain degree open, uncertain and flexible as it is dependent on the speakers' individual evaluation and their different points of view. Words do not have power on their own but achieve power through the speakers who are clever enough to use them in their own interests. To give a clear authentic example: in the current American election campaign words play a crucial role. They have the power to decide the outcome of the elections if they express what the Americans want. It seems to be that they want *change*. Barak Obama succeeded in winning the elections in Iowa and other states by the use of this word. *We believe in change* is his motto. It is not the encoded meaning of a sign *change* put to use; it is the open-endedness of meaning which enables the speakers to use words in a way that moves people's minds.

One might object that an election campaign is not a game of argumentation as argumentation is conceived of in traditional argumentation theories. This is right but it refers to an artificial concept of argumentation which is restricted by methodological exigencies. The decision for a theory of competence-in-performance presupposes that we start from our natural object, i.e. argumentation ‘embedded in the stream of life’, which is not a game in the abstract of encoded meaning nor a game played exclusively at the level of reasonableness. If reasonableness is to be understood as a relevant guideline in performance, i.e. as what Toulmin (2001) calls ‘practical reason’, it will be dependent on individual evaluation and particular action conditions.

Competence-in-performance cannot rely on absolute truth. There is no absolute truth but only the speaker’s claim to truth. Otherwise, argumentation, even in the classical sense, could not take place. The world we perceive is dependent on the observer. It is the *individual* nature of human beings that lets them perceive the world differently and shapes meaning individually. It is the *dialogic, social* nature of human beings that inevitably requires, to some degree, a common ground of meaning in order to come to an understanding. Argumentation starts from divergent views. Different claims to truth are expressed by representative speech acts and then negotiated in argumentative dialogues. Arguing for or giving reasons for a specific position is not restricted to representative games about the world but can be part of other games as well, for instance, games of positioning oneself as the best candidate. Every candidate starts with the same claim to be the best. The campaign thus changes to a debate based on individual representative claims which are supported by arguments, for instance, Obama’s claim:

1. I am the best candidate as I will bring change to America.

Looking at argumentation from a speech act theory point of view, we can distinguish between *games* of argumentation and *moves* of arguing. The classical game of argumentation is a representative game of negotiation about the world between thesis and antithesis:

thesis	↔	antithesis
claim to truth		claim to truth
↑arguments		↑arguments

Fig. 1 Representative game of argumentation

Moves of arguing, i.e. of providing reasons, are representative subordinate moves which can appear in every game, not only in support of representative claims but also in support of claims to volition:

representative game	directive game
claim to truth	claim to volition
↑arguments	↑arguments

Fig. 2 Arguing in representative and directive games

Argumentation as well as arguing is action in the speakers' interests. The interest selects the arguments and determines the way they are expressed. It is not the words themselves but words used by the speaker which give the argument its power in the whole constellation of the particular game. If we liberate the notion of argumentation from methodological restrictions, we are always more or less arguing in dialogic interaction and use the power of communicative means if we do not want to use physical power.

One might be inclined to admit that argumentation takes place in performance as a *mixed game* that combines rationality and persuasion and integratively applies different communicative means but nevertheless still be in doubt about what a theory of the mixed game might look like. What is at stake here is "the architecture of complexity", as Simon (1962) called it, or the methodology of a holistic theory which needs to be derived from the complex object. We need in any case a substantial idea of the complex whole and a key to opening it up. I have to be very brief here with respect to this issue and can only summarize what I have expounded elsewhere.

With the notion of the *dialogic action game* or *the mixed game* we grasp the complex whole with human beings acting and reacting at the centre. We always act in specific games such as the game of positioning oneself as the best candidate. Our *interests, purposes and needs* give us the key to opening it up. Purposes or speech act functions are expressed by communicative means; interests mostly remain hidden behind verbal expression and act as a driving force or strategy that determines the sequence of speech acts. Performance is not completely governed by conventions but is, in principle, based on speakers' expectations or *Principles of Probability*.

Human beings orient themselves as complex adaptive systems within ever-changing surroundings by principles of probability of various kinds, *constitutive, regulative and executive ones*. Constitutive principles are the principles of action, dialogue and coherence. They are always accompanied by regulative principles, basically those that regulate the mutual influence of reason and emotion and those that regulate the speaker's self-interest and his/her social concerns. Executive principles, finally, are primarily underlying strategies that determine the sequencing of speech acts.

Rhetoric in the mixed game is not an independent part that can be separately addressed. The mixed game is in any case a game played in the interests of the interlocutors, consciously or unconsciously. The interlocutors may choose the benchmark of logic or reasonableness or put a premium on persuasion in the hope of being successful. Rhetoric is at work everywhere, determines the regulation of interests and the choice of communicative means and strategies. The selection of words is crucial for the effect of speech. The argumentative power of words however is not the power of the words themselves but arises from their persuasive use in a particular game.

3. *Words and action*

Lexicology and action theory have usually been treated as separate areas. In recent years, however, it has become more and more evident that *words and actions are interconnected*. Issues such as the polysemy of isolated words are issues of theory not of language use, as Sorin Stati (e.g., 1986) repeatedly emphasized. Words are used in multi-word units or phrases which range from rather fixed phrases to more or less variable units. Their meaning is open to change and affected by the particular game. That is the point speakers can make use of in their attempts to move people's minds.

What we need is a theory that can explain how human beings act and react in the dialogic action game. Human beings are neither completely rational nor chaotic beings. They are able to reflect rationally and are sometimes overwhelmed by emotions. Their abilities are mutually dependent, speaking interacts with perceiving and thinking, and together all three make up the extraordinary human ability of being competent in performance. Human beings basically tackle complexity by *focusing attention* on what seems to be relevant in the actual case and proceed by *adapting* to ever-changing conditions. Adaptation implies broadening or even changing one's point of view.

The *Mixed Game Model* as a holistic model starts from the complex whole of the action game with human beings at the centre. Human beings are social individuals who have to regulate their double interests of being selfish individuals and social beings at the same time. It is not enough to simply express directly what we want to achieve; we have to negotiate our goals with our fellow beings in dialogue, i.e. with respect to what other human beings want. In order to be successful it is often advisable not to express directly what we want but to proceed indirectly, step by step, and sometimes even to hide our real intentions. In this case, we apply strategies behind openly expressed purposes. What we want to achieve is not a simple entity but is in itself complex, a *structured hierarchy of meaning*. Searle's formula F(p) needs to be complemented by the basic category of INTEREST:

INTEREST [F (p)]
INTEREST [PURPOSE (REFERENCE + PREDICATION)]

Fig. 3 Speech act functions

Our interests determine what we say, i.e. the choice of speech acts and how they are expressed. Purposes or speech act functions F are based on claims to truth and volition. They are not autonomous but related to propositions or states of affairs which are constituted by reference and predication. The hierarchy of meaning is thus built up by different types of meaning:

- What we mean is guided by superordinate interests and needs which – even if hidden – determine the course of action or the sequence of speech acts.
- Speech acts are defined by their purpose.

- Purposes relate to states of affairs.
- A state of affairs is constituted by reference and predication.

Having focused on the hierarchy of meaning or the functional side of the action game, we have now to address the issue of how we express what we want to achieve. That is the issue which includes the role of *words* among the *communicative means and techniques* we use in order to successfully negotiate what we want.

We have various verbal means at our disposal which interact with perceptive and cognitive means, such as gestures and inferences, and together they form the utterance which is the carrier of action. Words are part of the verbal means and play a specific role integrated with other verbal means. The meaning of ordinary words is not defined by a code but rooted in habits of life. Life means 'living with uncertainty' which usually happens rather smoothly on the basis of habits. Sometimes, however, diverging interests lead to conflicts which cannot be solved by the conflicting parties themselves. What is needed is a superordinate institution, the institution of the law, which draws on definitions and provides reliability for human interaction. Words in the language of law or other languages for specific purposes aim at having a meaning which is defined, i.e. a meaning which is not negotiable. Nonetheless, the law and its legal terms have to be interpreted with respect to cases of performance. Their defined meanings are not universally valid but dependent on the individual culture of the legal system. Languages for specific purposes are however not at issue here.

We are interested in the general theoretical question of what part in the hierarchy of meaning is expressed by words. This question is crucial for a theory of language as it marks the point where words and action meet. It should be clear from the very beginning: we do not act with words, we act with utterances in dialogic sequences. Action is not speaking, but speaking, perceiving and thinking in integration. *Utterances* are the complex whole of different communicative means used to carry out an action. Not even speech act verbs carry out the action; in explicit performative utterances they predicate what action is carried out. To be more precise: it is not the verb itself that predicates, it is the speaker who predicates by the use of a specific verb. He/she is not obliged to use a verb that literally faces facts. For instance, the executive of a department can express an official request to his/her secretary by saying

2. I am asking you to rewrite this page once again.

An official request is not an action of asking. Nonetheless, for reasons of politeness or of business culture, the executive predicates an action of asking which is in fact an order. To my mind, *predication* is, in general, the way lexical phrases are used, not only verbal phrases but the other parts of speech as well. We predicate by phrases not by single words. Phrases are the lexical units. As constituents of the utterance they need to be syntactically defined. Predication is, of course, not completely free to the speaker but bound to certain restrictions of the current speech act and of the game in general. Nonetheless, utterance grammar allows us a certain leeway we are able to exploit in our

own interests. This is a very interesting point because it demonstrates how lexical conventions interact with the individual interest of the speaker or how in general conventions interact with individuality.

The other verbal means also fulfil their task as parts of the complex utterance. Grammatical words are applied for *referring*, syntactical and suprasegmental means are used for *putting into action* what we mean, i.e. for creating the utterance as the carrier of action.

Having clarified to some degree the nuts and bolts of an utterance grammar, we can now tackle the *issue of how words get their power* to move people's minds. Words are communicative means in the speakers' hands. As human beings are unable to recognize the world as such, there are no facts as such, everything depends on speakers and their views and interests which determine how they *predicate the facts*. Speakers' attitudes may make it desirable to *keep to the facts*; they will therefore prefer a clear and honest way of expression. Their interests may however also require them to *colour or even change the facts*. In the mixed game, both voices interact. Words get their power since they allow speakers to predicate the facts in a way which is favourable to them.

Human beings normally do not pursue ideal interests but aim to achieve success or to get 'adherence' from their partners (Perelman 1977). In some games, *clarity and rationality* are the techniques which promise success. For instance, in scientific argumentation, we aim to expound our views as rationally as possible. In other cases, for instance in business negotiations, it is more advisable to conceal what we really want or to *change the facts* a bit to our own advantage. As the meaning of words is to some degree open and flexible, speakers can make words and phrases fit their interests by adjusting them to the conditions of the game.

Predicating is subordinate to action. It is *words* which are used as *a key to action* as they are capable of making the interlocutor perceive the world in the way the speaker wants and of triggering specific individual inferences. The way we predicate is crucial for effectively negotiating our claims to truth and volition. If we consider communication from the perspective of people who act and react as purposeful, interest-guided beings, communication turns out to be intrinsically rhetorical even if no specifically rhetorical figures are applied.

In communication we can speak with various voices, not only the *voice of reasonableness* and the *voice of persuasion*, we are also confronted with the voices of manipulating, deceiving and simulating power. The choice of our voice is, at bottom, an ideological choice. If we choose reasonableness and rationality, we aim to convince our partner that our claim to truth is justified. If we choose persuasion, we aim to move our partner's mind to act in a certain way. This dichotomy of rationality and persuasion in the narrow sense as a dichotomy of representative and directive games does not affect the general desire of human beings to be accepted, i.e. human beings' nature as persuasive beings. Burke's well-known dictum (1950) of "meaning is persuasion" represents a general principle of human communication as a mixed game: we always try to gain our fellow beings' adherence, be it in games of practical reason or games of emotion, in

games in which we simply position ourselves in a favourable light or even in games in which we change the facts and deceive the others.

4. *How to move people's minds with words*

Let us now consider in more detail a few rhetorical techniques by which we can move people's minds with words. As just mentioned, we might put a premium on facing facts or on changing facts. I will take this distinction as a structuring principle and start with the voice of rationality or sticking to the facts.

4.1 The voice of rationality

Rationality relies on the fact that the steps of argumentation are conclusive and on the clarity and lucidity of how we depict what we want to present as facts. Sincerity does not necessarily play a part. For many games, for instance, scientific argumentation or instructions for use, *clarity of expression* should be a prerequisite. The question of how the voice of rationality can draw on lexical meaning is a difficult one. Without doubt, *direct and literal expression* of the action function and the sequencing of actions will be an appropriate means. Indicating the structure of our discourse helps to facilitate understanding and to avoid misunderstanding. Moreover it allows us to underline the points we want to focus on and to make clear the position these points have in the sequencing of our argumentative steps.

Devices indicating the action function are traditionally called *illocutionary devices*. They consist of lexical means, speech act verbs or phrases, and grammatical means such as modal categories and particles. In explicit performative utterances such as

3. I am of the opinion, my position/thesis is, I object, I concede, I admit, I agree ...

we indicate the argumentative step we are taking.

These phrases often contain *hedges* of various kinds which are not to be taken compositionally or literally:

4. I have to object, I would like to call into doubt, my advice would be ...

Hedged performatives modify the performative phrase by a modal verb which however does not touch on the action function. *I have to object, I would like to object, I wanted to propose* are objections and proposals which are only formally hedged by modal verbs. Hedges take account of politeness routines which only seemingly weaken the action function but in fact represent persuasive means (Weigand 2003: 186) and demonstrate that we are moving in the mixed game.

We also have at our disposal lexical and grammatical means to indicate precisely the structure of our argumentative discourse. We can use verbal phrases such as

5. I start from the assumption, I have to come to a close, we also have to take into account ..., we can conclude ...

or particles, adverbs and connectors such as

6. firstly, secondly, not only – but also, additionally, by the way, in passing

For specific games such as scientific argumentation, it is certainly in the speakers' interest to stick to rationality, at least in part, in order to achieve adherence by conviction through objectivity and matter-of-factness. Nonetheless, in performance, these games are mixed games; pure rationality remains an artificial concept.

4.2 The voice of persuasion

Let us now focus on the voice of persuasion in the sense of putting a premium on communicative means which allow us to *depict and colour the facts* in our own interest. This does not necessarily mean changing the facts but expounding them in a way which is favourable to our aims. Various devices can be differentiated, among them the following:

- the call to rationality
- magical words
- the culture code
- the appeal to emotions, especially compassion
- non-falsifiable predications
- provocative words
- phrases of politeness

What I categorized as 'call to rationality' is an interesting technique as it demonstrates that even rationality and clarity can become a matter of persuasion. With phrases such as

7. I am in favour of clear realities and facts, in plain language

the speaker primarily implies that the opponent's arguments lack clarity and plain language (Weigand 1999: 59). These phrases are not only used as a statement to strengthen the position of the speaker but also to trigger off inferences to the disadvantage of the opponent.

Persuasive techniques mainly rely on emotions and desires in order to move people's minds. A very powerful means is the use of *magical words*. Magical words have a meaning which evokes desires, hopes and fears. They can mobilize whole peoples and decide elections. Their meaning is deliberately left open, uncertain, and thus induces the audience to complete it in the concrete framework of the game. There are famous utterances which can serve as examples, for instance, the use of the word *evil* by George Bush:

8. If this is not evil, evil has no name.

Evil is not used here as a sign with encoded meaning. It is predicated on Saddam's actions and has the magical power of deterrence. Evil has to be suppressed by any means.

This magical word is thus used in an indirect speech act as an effective means to trigger off the quasi-inevitable inference that a pre-emptive war should be accepted.

In the debates on the war in Iraq, the use of other words such as *force* versus *diplomacy* is also illuminating with respect to the power words can have over specific audiences. These words do not contain evaluations in the abstract which, for instance, tell us that *force* is to be avoided and *diplomacy* to be chosen. There is no marker inherent in the lexical items; it is the way they are used in phrases and the actual conditions of the game that change their meaning.

A very effective sample of the power of magical words can be observed in the current American election campaign with the use of the word *change*. This word is being used to mobilize the American people, and it enabled Obama to win first in Iowa, and then in other states. After years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, what most American people want is 'change'. 'Change' is again not a word with a defined meaning. We could define it as a single word but argumentation does not mean putting single defined words to use. Words get their meaning by being used in specific cultural settings. This can be clearly seen in Obama's brilliant speech in which he thanks his voters after the elections in Iowa (internet references 1). I can only pick out a few moves of this speech. Obama starts by throwing in the magical word 'change', first as an open concept – *time for change, coalition of change* – which is capable of binding people's hopes and desires:

9. ... we are one people; and *our time for change* has come. ... to build a *coalition for change* ... sending a powerful message that *change is coming* to America.

He then states more precisely what he means by 'change' by making a series of contrasts between the present situation and the situation to come:

10. ... the time has come to tell the lobbyists ...that they don't own the government; we do; and we are here to take it back.
The time has come for a President who will be honest ... who will listen to you and learn from you ... who won't just tell you what you want to hear, but what you need to know.

He positions himself as that President who will bring the change. 'Change' is used as argument in an indirectly directive game which starts from a representative-commissive speech act:




Fig. 4 Change as argument in an indirect directive game

He emphasizes by repetition what he will change:

11. I'll be a President who finally makes health care affordable ...
I'll be a President who ends the tax breaks for companies ...
I'll be a President who harnesses the ingenuity of farmers and scientists ... to free this nation from the tyranny of oil ...
I'll be a President who ends this war in Iraq and finally brings our troops home ...

At the end of his speech, he comes back to the message of change:

12. ... our destiny will not be written for us; but by us, by all those men and women who are not content to settle for the world as it is; who have the courage to *remake the world as it should be*.

The clear argumentative structures of this speech in such an emotional situation, the power displayed by the use of the word 'change', is amazing (see Appendix).

His opponent, Hillary Clinton, also appeals to emotions but puts a premium on another magical word: *the American dream*. Having lost the elections in Ohio, Hillary Clinton changed her rhetoric from positioning herself on the issue of 'inner security' to partly joining the line of change but primarily calling the Americans by what they desire or believe to be, by what they believe to be able to achieve, by what they dream. It is the greatness of America she envisages and the will to work for it (see Appendix). In doing this she succeeded in getting more votes than Obama in the primary elections in New Hampshire. The phrases she uses in her speech after the primary win (internet references 2) are astonishingly similar to what Rapaille (2007: 197) describes as the *Culture Code* for America, namely "keeping the dream alive":

13. I intend to be that president, to be a president who puts you first *I believe deeply in America, in our can-do spirit, in our ability to meet any challenge and solve any problem. I believe in what we can do together.*
14. ... that people across our country know what's really at stake, that we will all be called upon to *deliver on the promise of America* ... that every generation will have their shot at *the American dream* ...

It is the promise of America she repeatedly appeals to, the 'call to greatness' which she considers to be the force that can unify her supporters and persuade others to join in:

15. ... we are called upon to deliver on that promise. And if you join in this *call to greatness*, we will together answer.

And again, she uses phrases that predicate how Americans want to see themselves:

16. So, tomorrow, we're going to get up, *roll up our sleeves and keep going* ... We're going to tap into all of the spirit, the talent and just the plain grit of *this great nation* again. ... We are determined to *tackle our toughest problems* and stand up for those who most need a cham-

... because we are determined to make America work again for all of our people.

It is these phrases, the rhetoric of the American dream, which Hillary Clinton uses to call on Americans to follow her:

17. ... on behalf of this country we love so much. ... I'm going out there accompanied by millions and millions of people who believe as I do that this country is worth fighting for.

She therefore positions herself as the person who as President would be able to deliver on the promise of America. In doing this, she is more cautious, one might even say, more honest than Obama as she expresses it as her intention, not as a promise:

representative	<i>I intend to be that president who is able to deliver on the promise of America.</i>
↓	↓
directive (indirect)	Vote for me.

Fig. 5 The American dream as argument in an indirectly directive game

Again we see that a strategy based on emotions, desires, dreams is more powerful in moving people's minds than factual information or expertness. If people do not have any desire or see any interests of their own in the subject matter, they can hardly be moved by words and arguments.

Besides magical words such as *change* or *the American dream* that catch a mood which is in the air, the Culture Code also includes desires and driving forces hidden in the mind. According to Rapaille (2007: 14), "most people don't know why they do the things they do". The American dream certainly does not represent an unconscious dream. Nonetheless Rapaille organized conversational sessions to find out what makes up the Culture Code for America at an unconscious level. The result completely matches the phrases used by Hillary Clinton. First of all, however, Rapaille uses his technique of conversational sessions in the service of the *advertising industry*. It can easily be imagined that businesses can gain great advantages from knowing the unconscious desires of people so that they can use them as an *argument* to sell their products. In advertisements various emotions are appealed to depending on the product to be promoted. To know the 'culture code' is very useful. If a culture likes freedom, even cigarettes can be advertised by promising this feeling. If the culture code for a certain type of car puts a premium on reliability and security, we will find adverts like the following:

18. Toyota does not break down.

There is no direct indication of a directive speech act nor of the argument of reliability. The predicating phrase *does not break down* is intended to trigger off the inference of 'that's what I want'.

The Allianz company launched a similar advert:

19. We are on your side, wherever you are.

What seems to be a representative speech act, *we are on your side*, is dependent on a condition which is not explicitly expressed: 'if you are a member'. This condition is precisely what the text aims at by promising reliability and assistance: 'become a member'. The means used to strengthen the claim to volition are sophisticated means of persuasion that manifest the power of words and syntactic constructions.

Appeals to emotion are a very effective persuasive technique, especially the appeal to compassion. Politicians know the power of compassion and use it in their interests. Georg W. Bush, for instance, in his famous speech in Congress on the State of the Union of January, 28, 2003, employed this technique in picturing in detail a terror scenario by using a sequence of representative utterances in order to get acceptance for a pre-emptive war against Iraq:

20. Iraqi refugees tell us how *forced confessions* are obtained: by *torturing children while parents are made to watch*. International human rights groups have catalogued other methods used in the *torture chambers* of Iraq: *electric shock, burning with hot irons, dripping acid on the skin, mutilation with electric drills, cutting out tongues, and rape*. If this is not evil, then evil has no meaning. [Applause]

At the literal level, he uses the phrase *torturing children while parents are made to watch* as an argument to excite compassion, and he lists violations of human rights as further arguments using phrases such as *electric shock, burning with hot irons*, etc., which will provoke indignation. He thus evokes powerful emotions in this indirect directive game in order to move his audience.

There is a nice story on the Italian internet which once again demonstrates the power of words and of indirect speech acts. It is the story of an anonymous author, not the description of an authentic case. The story compares two ways of asking for help in the case of a blind beggar. The beggar first writes directly and explicitly on the sign beside his hat:

21. I am blind. Please help me.

using his blindness as argument, and gets very few coins. A copywriter passes by and changes the text, expressing the argument of blindness using other words as an appeal to compassion and leaving the claim to act verbally unexpressed:

22. Today, it's springtime, and I can't see it.

And the hat fills up with coins. People are more likely to be moved by persuasive appeals to their emotions than by direct demands telling them what to do (cf. also Weigand forthcoming.)

Another persuasive technique frequently used in political debates gets its power from *predicating in a way which cannot be falsified*. It is based on an interesting type of

words which refers to the opponent's mind and predicates evil intentions or missing capabilities. Such derogatory predications, for instance, *to deceive*, *to drag out*, *to be unable*, can simply be put forward without any argument because nobody can look into the mind of another person. Assertions based on non-falsifiable predications of this type are therefore often used in demagogic speeches and provocative attacks such as the following authentic and well-known examples

23. (Schulz about Berlusconi in the European Parliament, cf. Weigand 2006)
We owe that not least to Mrs Nicole Fontaine, because if she had not made such a good job of *dragging out* the Berlusconi and Dell'Utri immunity procedures ... you would no longer have the immunity that you need.
24. (Schröder, SPD, about his opponent Stoiber, candidate for the CDU/CSU)
Sie möchten regieren, aber Sie sind unfähig dazu.
"You want to govern but *are unable* to do it."
(supporting his own directive claim to be elected)

The other way round, the same technique can be used to position oneself by simulating power and other capabilities (Weigand 2008):

25. Schröder (trotzig): Aber entschuldigen Sie, natürlich *kann* ich das.
Schröder (defiantly): "I'm sorry, of course *I can*." (be the strong leader of a new government)

Another well-known example is Bush's rhetoric against Saddam:

26. (Bush about Saddam)
The dictator is not disarming. To the contrary, he is *deceiving*.
(supporting his directive claim to accept the necessity of a pre-emptive war)

The argumentative power of these words in weakening the opponent and strengthening the own position is masked as a statement which is intended to trigger off the desired inference.

The *provocative use of words* is not restricted to attacks as was the case with Schulz's provocation against Berlusconi, in example (23). It is also exploited in *explorative* games where it has the function of eliciting knowledge that is not willingly delivered or should not be made public. Questions using provocative words tend to emphasize the *confrontational strategy* of so-called 'hard interviews'. They not only have the cooperative function of providing knowledge but primarily aim to bring to the fore what the interviewee wants to hide (Bollow 2007). Thus a cooperative interview could, for instance, start with the neutral question:

27. Wie ist ihr Gespräch mit dem Kanzler verlaufen?
"How did your conversation with the Chancellor go?"

whereas the confrontational type relies on the power of provocative words as in the following authentic example:

28. Hat Ihnen der Kanzler *den Kopf gewaschen*?
 “Did the Chancellor give you a good telling off?”

By the use of such provocative words in the syntactic format of a question the interviewer can bring in his view as a presupposition. He/she thus exploits a technique that allows them to include their argumentative position in the format of an interview.

The interviewer could also use a prestatement as an argument as another authentic example demonstrates:

29. Die Wirtschaft liegt am Boden. Wie gehen Sie mit der Situation um?
 “The economy is in crisis. How are you going to deal with the situation?”

Again we see, meaning is persuasion from the very outset, and the lexicon is at the core of the game. Phrases such as *am Boden liegen* “to be in crisis” or *den Kopf waschen* “to give a good telling off” are used to provoke the politician to disclose what lies behind the official mode of presentation.

Finally I would at least mention the *technique of ingratiating oneself* by routines of politeness which are not an honest expression of respect but a communicative means to further one’s own interests. Flattering words or compliments can be used in this sense. What seems to be intended to support the position of one’s interlocutor, is used in a deceitful way to support one’s own position.

5. *Words as a key to action*

As we have seen, language use provides many subtle and sophisticated techniques in order to move people’s minds with words. What they reveal is, in my opinion, crucial for our understanding of argumentation and of dialogic interaction in general. Argumentation starts in the minds of interacting people and relies on various human abilities which are used in favour or against certain positions in a process that can be described as a mixed game. Words play a key role in the game as they express how speakers predicate the world. It is the speaker’s individual point of view which lies behind the use of words and gives them their argumentative power. Human beings are persuasive beings by nature. In the mixed game, they use different integrated means of communication to achieve their goals. They may put a premium on rationality or on emotion, on cooperative or on confrontative strategies and even proceed by manipulative, deceptive techniques. Words not only predicate but by their very predication trigger off inferences which are intended to strengthen certain positions. They thus display their power in use as a *key to action*.

Human beings are able to create signs, but in ordinary language use we do not put signs to use. In ordinary language use, we attribute meaning to words and negotiate

meaning and understanding in dialogue. Lexical conventions are flexible and can be modified by individual interests in our minds. This process cannot be represented by the addition of different theories which are by definition incompatible. Argumentation in performance is not a process of definition but a process of adaptation and negotiation, a mixed game of competence-in-performance which is played by multiple voices and various techniques of exercising influence and power.

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Appendix

Remarks of Senator Barack Obama: Iowa Caucus Night (Internet reference 1)

Des Moines, IA, January 3, 2008

Thank you, Iowa.

You know, they said this day would never come.

They said our sights were set too high.

They said this country was too divided; too disillusioned to ever come together around a common purpose.

But on this January night – at this defining moment in history – you have done what the cynics said we couldn't do. You have done what the state of New Hampshire can do in five days. You have done what America can do in this New Year, 2008. In lines that stretched around schools and churches; in small towns and big cities; you came together as Democrats, Republicans and Independents to stand up and say that we are one nation; we are one people; and our time for change has come.

You said the time has come to move beyond the bitterness and pettiness and anger that's consumed Washington; to end the political strategy that's been all about division and instead make it about addition – to build a coalition for change that stretches through Red States and Blue States. Because that's how we'll win in November, and that's how we'll finally meet the challenges that we face as a nation.

We are choosing hope over fear. We're choosing unity over division, and sending a powerful message that change is coming to America.

You said the time has come to tell the lobbyists who think their money and their influence speak louder than our voices that they don't own this government, we do; and we are here to take it back.

The time has come for a President who will be honest about the choices and the challenges we face; who will listen to you and learn from you even when we disagree; who won't just tell you what you want to hear, but what you need to know. And in New Hampshire, if you give me the same chance that Iowa did tonight, I will be that president for America.

Thank you.

I'll be a President who finally makes health care affordable and available to every single American the same way I expanded health care in Illinois – by--by bringing Democrats and Republicans together to get the job done.

I'll be a President who ends the tax breaks for companies that ship our jobs overseas and put a middle-class tax cut into the pockets of the working Americans who deserve it.

I'll be a President who harnesses the ingenuity of farmers and scientists and entrepreneurs to free this nation from the tyranny of oil once and for all.

And I'll be a President who ends this war in Iraq and finally brings our troops home; who restores our moral standing; who understands that 9/11 is not a way to scare up votes, but a challenge that should unite America and the world against the common threats of the twenty-first century; common threats of terrorism and nuclear weapons; climate change and poverty; genocide and disease.

Tonight, we are one step closer to that vision of America because of what you did here in Iowa. And so I'd especially like to thank the organizers and the precinct captains; the volunteers and the staff who made this all possible.

And while I'm at it, on "thank yous", I think it makes sense for me to thank the love of my life, the rock of the Obama family, the closer on the campaign trail; give it up for Michelle Obama.

I know you didn't do this for me. You did this-you did this because you believed so deeply in the most American of ideas – that in the face of impossible odds, people who love this country can change it.

I know this-I know this because while I may be standing here tonight, I'll never forget that my journey began on the streets of Chicago doing what so many of you have done for this campaign and all the campaigns here in Iowa – organizing, and working, and fighting to make people's lives just a little bit better.

I know how hard it is. It comes with little sleep, little pay, and a lot of sacrifice. There are days of disappointment, but sometimes, just sometimes, there are nights like this – a night-a night that, years from now, when we've made the changes we believe in; when more families can afford to see a doctor; when our children-when Malia and Sasha and your children-inherit a planet that's a little cleaner and safer; when the world sees America differently, and America sees itself as a nation less divided and more united; you'll be able to look back with pride and say that this was the moment when it all began.

This was the moment when the improbable beat what Washington always said was inevitable.

This was the moment when we tore down barriers that have divided us for too long – when we rallied people of all parties and ages to a common cause; when we finally gave Americans who'd never participated in politics a reason to stand up and to do so.

This was the moment when we finally beat back the politics of fear, and doubt, and cynicism; the politics where we tear each other down instead of lifting this country up. This was the moment.

Years from now, you'll look back and you'll say that this was the moment – this was the place – where America remembered what it means to hope.

For many months, we've been teased, even derided for talking about hope.

But we always knew that hope is not blind optimism. It's not ignoring the enormity of the task ahead or the roadblocks that stand in our path. It's not sitting on the sidelines or shirking from a fight. Hope is that thing inside us that insists, despite all evidence to the contrary, that something better awaits us if we have the courage to reach for it, and to work for it, and to fight for it.

Hope is what I saw in the eyes of the young woman in Cedar Rapids who works the night shift after a full day of college and still can't afford health care for a sister who's ill; a young woman who still believes that this country will give her the chance to live out her dreams.

Hope is what I heard in the voice of the New Hampshire woman who told me that she hasn't been able to breathe since her nephew left for Iraq; who still goes to bed each night praying for his safe return.

Hope is what led a band of colonists to rise up against an empire; what led the greatest of generations to free a continent and heal a nation; what led young women and young men to sit at lunch counters and brave fire hoses and march through Selma and Montgomery for freedom's cause.

Hope-hope-is what led me here today – with a father from Kenya; a mother from Kansas; and a story that could only happen in the United States of America. Hope is the bedrock of this nation; the belief that our destiny will not be written for us, but by us; by all those men and women who are not content to settle for the world as it is; who have the courage to remake the world as it should be.

That is what we started here in Iowa, and that is the message we can now carry to New Hampshire and beyond; the same message we had when we were up and when we were down; the one that can change this country brick by brick, block by block, calloused hand by calloused hand – that together, ordinary people can do extraordinary things; because we are not a collection of Red States and Blue States, we are the United States of America; and at this moment, in this election, we are ready to believe again. Thank you, Iowa.

Clinton Thanks New Hampshire for Comeback after Primary Win (Internet reference 2)

CQ Transcripts, January 8, 2008

Thank you. Thank you.

I come tonight with a very, very full heart.

And I want especially to thank New Hampshire. Over the last week, I listened to you and, in the process, I found my own voice.

I felt like we all spoke from our hearts, and I am so gratified that you responded. Now, together, let's give America the kind of comeback that New Hampshire has just given me.

For all the ups and downs of this campaign, you helped remind everyone that politics isn't a game. This campaign is about people, about making a difference in your lives, about making sure that everyone in this country has the opportunity to live up to his or her God-given potential. That has been the work of my life.

We are facing a moment of so many big challenges.

We know we face challenges here at home, around the world, so many challenges for the people whose lives I've been privileged to be part of.

I've met families in this state and all over our country who've lost their homes to foreclosures, men and women who work day and night but can't pay the bills and hope they don't get sick because they can't afford health insurance, young people who can't afford to go to college to pursue their dreams.

Too many have been invisible for too long. Well, you are not invisible to me.

The oil companies, the drug companies, the health insurance companies, the predatory student loan companies have had seven years of a president who stands up for them. It's time we had a president who stands up for all of you.

I intend to be that president, to be a president who puts you first, your lives, your families, your children, your futures. I believe deeply in America, in our can-do spirit, in our ability to meet any challenge and solve any problem. I believe in what we can do together.

In the future, we will build together. There will be no more invisible Americans. So we're going to take what we've learned here in New Hampshire and we're going to rally on and make our case. We are in it for the long run.

And that is because we are in it for the American people.

This victory will serve notice that people across our country know what's really at stake, that we will all be called upon to deliver on the promise of America. We'll be called upon to deliver on the promise that the middle class will grow and prosper again, to deliver on the promise that government will be of the people, by the people and for the people, not just the privileged few.

To deliver on the promise that every generation will have their shot at the American dream, to deliver on the promise that we'll have the will and the wisdom to end the war in Iraq the right way.

To deliver on the promise to take care of our brave veterans and restore America's standing, respect and credibility around the world.

We know that for the promise of America to be real, we are called upon to deliver on that promise. And if you join in this call to greatness, we will together answer. So, tomorrow, we're going to get up, roll up our sleeves and keep going.

I invite you to come join us at hillaryclinton.com. We're going to tap into all of the spirit, the talent and just the plain grit of this great nation again.

We are determined to tackle our toughest problems and stand up for those who most need a champion, because we are determined to make America work again for all of our people. We came back tonight because you spoke loudly and clearly.

You want this campaign to be about you, because there is so much at stake for our country. I have so many people to thank. I want to thank the two most important people in my life, Bill and Chelsea.

I want to thank them for their incredible commitment, their passion and their heart. I want to thank my entire family, particularly my mother, who is watching tonight.

I want to thank the extraordinary team here in New Hampshire that never faltered one minute. And that team had a great staff. It had volunteers and supporters from across the state and this country.

I want to thank the young people across New Hampshire who came out.

They asked the hard questions, and they voted their hearts and their minds, and I really appreciate it.

And finally, I want to say how much I respect our Democratic candidates. Senators Dodd and Biden, who were in the race earlier, have given great service to our country.

Governor Richardson, Congressman Kucinich, Senator Edwards and Senator Obama – they all...

They all have put themselves on the line day and night on behalf of this country we love so much. This campaign will transform America, because we will take on the challenges. We will seize the opportunities. Every single day I am not going out there on my own. I'm going out there accompanied by millions and millions of people who believe as I do that this country is worth fighting for.

Thank you, and God bless you.

CONSIDERING ARGUMENTATIVE DISCOURSE IN GERMAN

ARGOMENTAZIONE FILOSOFICA E TRADUZIONE: CONFRONTO E CONTRASTO DI IDEE E PAROLE

LAURA BALBIANI

Testi prodotti in lingue differenti offrono particolari opportunità di analizzare in prospettiva interlinguistica e interculturale la struttura dei processi argomentativi; per questo ho pensato di basare le mie osservazioni su un testo tedesco e sulla sua traduzione italiana, e ho scelto un'opera filosofica nella quale la riflessione sul significato delle parole riveste un'importanza fondamentale, come del resto in tutti i testi specialistici, ma dove si crea, proprio intorno a questo aspetto, un interessante e inusuale gioco a tre fra l'autore, il lettore e il traduttore. Metterò infatti a confronto la *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* di Immanuel Kant (KrV) e la sua poco conosciuta prima traduzione italiana, pubblicata a Pavia, in otto tomi, dal 1820 al 1822 (Crp M)¹ – si tratta tra l'altro della prima traduzione in assoluto, in una lingua moderna, dell'opera fondativa del criticismo kantiano, un'impresa portata a termine da Vincenzo Mantovani, di professione chirurgo militare e professore di medicina a Pavia.

Se, per alcuni studiosi, a ogni testo può essere attribuita una dimensione argomentativa², nel testo kantiano troviamo riuniti molti di quei tratti specifici che caratterizzano i testi argomentativi nell'accezione più ristretta del termine: abbiamo un tema intorno al quale si organizza tutta l'esposizione (la ragion pura e il suo funzionamento); un soggetto argomentante che si propone di convincere un 'antagonista', reale o apparente, della validità della propria opinione; una struttura logica molto articolata, a sostegno del ragionamento, che prevede sezioni, libri, parti, paragrafi e così via. Il testo segue inoltre una logica discorsiva fatta di deduzioni, induzioni, reti anaforiche e ragionamenti, e poggia dunque su processi squisitamente razionali³. Un aspetto dell'argomentazione che risulta invece, in questo caso, più sfumato, è l'elemento della persuasione, in quanto il testo è volto a dimostrare e a spiegare più che a persuadere⁴, e la "seduzione" del destinatario (così la definisce Stati 2002: 17) si dispiega su un piano pret-

¹ La traduzione di Mantovani è passata a lungo inosservata; solo di recente gli studiosi le hanno dedicato una certa attenzione. Cfr. Santinello 1986; Burgio 1992; Frigo 1994; Landolfi Petrone 1998 e 2004; Balbiani 2007; Duichin 2007.

² Una definizione di argomentazione ad ampio raggio è adottata ad esempio da Plantin (1996: 18) e da altri studiosi, come illustrato in Stati 2002: 16.

³ Sull'argomentazione come processo e prodotto razionale cfr. Grize (1990: 21-22, 41 e *passim*).

⁴ In base ai vari tipi di luoghi formali e di scenari argomentativi, Lo Cascio (1991: 71) distingue ad esempio diversi tipi di argomentazione: argomentazione scritta e orale; argomentazione formale e colloquiale; testi argomentativi volti a dimostrare e testi argomentativi volti a persuadere. L'opera di Kant rientra appunto in quest'ultimo gruppo. Cfr. anche Stati 2002: 17-21, in part. p. 19: "un'imponente massa di (frammenti di) testi argomentativi non ha come effetto e scopo principale la persuasione, bensì la spiegazione".

tamente verbale e logico più che retorico o emotivo. Nel suo tentativo di eliminare tutto ciò che è empirico e soggettivo per individuare le condizioni puramente razionali della conoscenza, Kant non fa appello ai sentimenti del destinatario, alle sue paure o stati emotivi ma esclusivamente alla sua capacità di elaborazione concettuale. Kant stesso lo sottolinea nella *Prefazione* alla prima edizione dell'opera, dove afferma di aver privilegiato la "chiarezza discorsiva (logica) mediante concetti", e di aver invece dovuto necessariamente trascurare la "chiarezza intuitiva (estetica)" (KrV A: XVII-XVIII, *Vorrede* – Crp M I: 108-110)⁵. La funzione conativa è invece preponderante nei commenti all'opera di Kant, dove i suoi *Anhänger* cercheranno di dedurre, dai principi esposti nella *Critica della ragion pura*, norme comportamentali e conseguenze applicative, e dove quindi è molto più evidente l'intenzione di influire concretamente sui comportamenti e sulle convinzioni del destinatario per modificarli.

Data la vastità e la complessità dell'opera, come campione per la mia analisi ho scelto l'introduzione alla seconda edizione della *Critica*, un brano che può essere considerato programmatico dal punto di vista dei contenuti, e altrettanto rappresentativo del *ductus* kantiano per quanto riguarda la forma⁶. Qui emergono molto chiaramente il ruolo cruciale del significato lessicale e la dimensione dialogica e argomentativa, due elementi che nella traduzione appaiono ancora più strettamente correlati. Ma per poter mettere meglio a fuoco questi aspetti credo sia utile per prima cosa descrivere, anche se solo brevemente, la struttura argomentativa del testo.

L'intenzione di Kant nello scrivere la *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* è quella di individuare, sulla scorta di principi nuovi, i limiti e le possibilità della ragione (quella che lui stesso definisce la sua personale "rivoluzione copernicana"). Egli cerca quindi le condizioni di possibilità della conoscenza e indaga le facoltà che stanno all'interno della ragione umana (sensibilità, intelletto e giudizio/ragione), e per far questo parte da una critica delle grandi correnti di pensiero dell'epoca (empirismo e scetticismo in particolare) – qua e là nella trattazione emerge infatti una vena polemica che si basa, dal punto di vista argomentativo, sul contrasto e sulla confutazione di opinioni diverse.

L'*Introduzione*, in particolare, ha il compito di legittimare i fondamenti di una filosofia trascendentale, ed entra quindi già nel cuore del criticismo. Essa è suddivisa in sette paragrafi piuttosto ampi, lunghi mediamente tre o quattro pagine; i titoli che

⁵ Anche più avanti, verso la fine della KrV, Kant si occupa di questo aspetto e chiarisce la distinzione fra convinzione e persuasione: "Il tener per vero [*Fürwahrhalten*] è tale occorrenza nel nostro intelletto, che può benissimo avere fondamenti obiettivi, sui quali poggiare; ma che richiede ragioni subbiective nell'animo di quello, che giudica. Allorquando ha valore per ciaschedun uomo, solché sia di ragione dotato, è obiettivamente sufficiente il motivo, di cui si tratta; nel qual caso il tener per vero si chiama *convincimento*. Se poi tale motivo ha solamente fondamento nella natura e qualità particolare al soggetto, allora lo si denomina *persuasione*" (KrV B: 848-849 – Crp M VIII: 132-133). La convinzione risponde al razionale, è discorso dominato dalle leggi universali e dai processi di deduzione logica ed è quello di cui deve occuparsi la filosofia; la persuasione risponde invece al ragionevole, ed è basata su regole sociali, individuali o di gruppo, quindi soggettive e variabili.

⁶ KrV B: 1-30, *Einleitung*; nella traduzione di Mantovani, l'*Introduzione* si trova alle pp. 203-273 del primo tomo.

introducono ciascun paragrafo hanno talvolta la funzione di annuncio dell'argomento che verrà affrontato, che viene formulato tipicamente mediante un sintagma nominale ("Von dem Unterschiede der reinen und empirischen Erkenntniß", § 1; "Von dem Unterschiede analytischer und synthetischer Urtheile", § 4); più spesso però presentano sotto forma di Tesi alcuni punti cruciali che saranno subito dopo sviluppati. In questi casi la forma sintattica è quella della frase dichiarativa, dell'asserzione: "Wir sind im Besitze gewisser Erkenntnisse a priori, und selbst der gemeine Verstand ist niemals ohne solche" (§ 2); "In allen theoretischen Wissenschaften der Vernunft sind synthetische Urtheile a priori als Principien enthalten" (§ 5). Emergono chiaramente i tratti del discorso dimostrativo apodittico, volto a dimostrare fatti logicamente e razionalmente accettabili: la Tesi si pone infatti in relazione co-testuale con ciò che segue, e il testo del corrispondente paragrafo è costituito da una catena di proposizioni di appoggio, volte a dimostrare con deduzioni, dimostrazioni ed esempi la validità della Tesi stessa, che assume così il ruolo argomentativo di Bersaglio (sul rapporto Tesi-Bersaglio e la loro definizione si veda in particolare Stati 2002: 57-61). Nello sviluppo dell'argomentazione, che l'autore è libero di organizzare secondo un "modello pragma-dialettico ideale" (van Eemeren & Houtlosser & Snoeck Henkemans 2007: 9-12), incontriamo molti dei tradizionali ruoli di appoggio: Accordo, Giustificazione, Prova, Obiezione, ma a prevalere sono, come è facile immaginare, i ruoli esplicativi: Spiegazione⁷, Analogia e Comparazione, Condizione, Deduzione, Dimostrazione, Conseguenza negata o affermata, Esempio.

L'Esempio, in particolare, ha un ruolo centrale; secondo la definizione di Aristotele, è una prova tecnica che insieme ai fatti e agli indizi prepara il destinatario all'accettazione di una tesi. In genere è marcato dall'avverbiale *zum Beispiel*, si tratta quindi di 'esemplificazione esplicita' (cfr. il modello di Angeloni 2001: 98) e, fra i ruoli di appoggio, ha una grande forza probatoria. Kant stesso è consapevole della sua funzione nell'economia del testo, e ritiene che il lettore abbia il diritto di pretendere questo particolare tipo di chiarezza intuitiva: "so hat der Leser ein Recht, zuerst die diskursive (logische) Deutlichkeit, durch Begriffe, denn aber auch eine intuitive (ästhetische) Deutlichkeit, durch Anschauungen, d.i. Beispiele oder andere Erläuterungen, in concreto zu fordern". Però prosegue:

Ich bin fast beständig im Fortgange meiner Arbeit unschlüssig gewesen, wie ich es hiermit halten sollte. Beispiele und Erläuterungen schienen mir immer nötig und flossen daher auch wirklich im ersten Entwürfe an ihren Stellen gehörig ein. Ich sah aber die Größe meiner Aufgabe und die Menge der Gegenstände, womit ich es zu tun haben würde, gar bald ein und, da ich gewahr ward, daß diese ganz allein [...] das Werk schon genug ausdehnen würden, so fand ich es unratsam, es durch Beispiele und Erläuterungen, die nur in populärer Absicht notwendig sind, noch mehr anzuschwellen. (KrV A: XVII-XVIII)

⁷ Sul rapporto fra argomentazione e Spiegazione e sull'importanza della Spiegazione nei processi razionali, cfr. Mayes 2000.

Egli decide quindi di rinunciare agli esempi nella versione definitiva dell'opera, non ritenendoli indispensabili per la sua comprensione. Di diverso parere è invece il traduttore, che commenta questa affermazione dell'autore aggiungendo un'annotazione di suo pugno:

Senza defraudare al merito dei motivi, con che l'autore giustifica l'ommissione dei commenti ed esempi; questi riescirebbono tuttavia, come dissi nei cenni biografici, più graditi di quando in quando, che non la giustificazione di avergli ommessi. (Crp M I: 110)⁸

Mantovani ha evidentemente intuito la centralità dell'esempio come procedimento testuale dell'argomentazione, ma ne sottolinea prevalentemente la funzione illustrativa, cioè il compito di rendere comprensibili le asserzioni contenute nel discorso filosofico; ne trascura invece la fondamentale funzione argomentativa, che va invece a corroborare il valore di verità dell'enunciato e quindi la sua stessa forza illocutiva.

Spesso, il passaggio da una sezione all'altra è marcato da esponenti linguistici che indicano che si è concluso, o si sta per compiere, un macro-atto argomentativo e che sono tipici dell'intenzione didattica o didascalica propria dell'autore – sono espedienti tipici del Kant didatta, presenti molto spesso anche nei testi delle sue *Vorlesungen*. Si tratta di enunciati con funzione cataforica o anaforica, che annunciano il tema del paragrafo successivo e la sua articolazione interna (“Ich will daher gleich anfangs von dem Unterschiede dieser zwiefachen Erkenntnißart handeln”, KrV B: 10), oppure contengono una ripresa sintetica e conclusiva dell'argomento appena trattato (“Nel dimostrare poc'anzi [...] essere principio a priori quello; che tutto quanto accade aver deve una causa e produrre un effetto, si è dimostrato qualmente la legge di causalità, che noi trasportiamo a tutta la natura, e possiamo qual base a tutte le nostre osservazioni, è già per se stessa una rappresentazione a priori, che noi attribuiamo per sintesi agli oggetti.” – Crp M I: 249 nota).

L'argomentazione è per sua natura un'attività sostanzialmente dialogica anche se non presuppone necessariamente la presenza fisica degli interlocutori, che possono interagire anche a distanza nello spazio e nel tempo. Anche Kant ha sempre ben presente il suo lettore-interlocutore ideale, e lo fa spesso intervenire nel testo: cerca di formularne le obiezioni e di confutarle, ne esprime i dubbi, ne esplicita gli interrogativi, anticipando così, nel gioco strategico dell'esposizione, le possibili posizioni del let-

⁸ Anche in un passo precedente, infatti, Mantovani si era soffermato su questo punto e aveva auspicato qualche esemplificazione in più, cosa che avrebbe senz'altro facilitato il suo compito di traduttore: “Siccome i suoi sopravvissuti concittadini attestano del tanto più interessanti riescire i ragionamenti cattedratici di Kant, in quanto vi frammetteva copia d'illustrazioni, per via massime d'esempi, così credo bene che fluissero questi spontanei dalla prontezza, come dicono, del vasto ed a sì gran dovizia fornito ingegno; ma credo eziandio che si questi si quelle derivassero non meno dall'intimo convincimento di loro necessità. Il perché sarebbe a desiderarsi ne foss'egli stato ugualmente largo negli scritti; come quelli che riesciranno per ciò sempre difficili ed oscuri a parecchi leggitori che, attesa la somma confidenza nei concetti che andava sponendo, forse nel modo in che gli esponeva, non credette necessario di ricorrere più spesso, che non suole, a quei rischiaramenti ed esempi, né di più a lungo arrestarvi quando pure vi ricorre” (Crp M I: 50-51).

tore reale. Nell'economia dell'argomentazione, al lettore competono in genere ruoli di stimolo come la Domanda, la Richiesta di prova o di ulteriore Spiegazione, oppure l'Obiezione – o più propriamente la Prolessi –, volta a insinuare dubbi sulla correttezza della Tesi-Bersaglio, in modo che l'autore, confutando l'obiezione, ne fornisca ulteriori prove⁹.

Il testo è così scandito da catene di ruoli argomentativi come la sequenza elementare Domanda-Risposta o sequenze più complesse come Tesi-Dimostrazione- Obiezione-Confutazione dell'obiezione e così via¹⁰, ma il coinvolgimento diretto del lettore si realizza anche a livello sintattico e grammaticale, ad esempio tramite l'oscillazione dei pronomi. Si parte con un *wir* che può essere inteso come autoriale ma che, proprio per la natura dell'opera, ha piuttosto una valenza di universalità – 'noi in quanto uomini', l'umanità tutta; quando però il soggetto argomentante vuole interagire con i destinatari li interpella direttamente con *ihr*, per poi contrapporsi con un *ich*. In altri brani del testo l'uso della seconda persona plurale serve a guidare i lettori lungo tutti i passaggi del processo razionale, quasi a costringerli a ripercorrere lo stesso cammino dell'autore per forzarli ad accettare la logica stringente e necessaria delle sue deduzioni:

Lasset von eurem Erfahrungsbegriffe eines Körpers alles, was daran empirisch ist, nach und nach weg, die Farbe, die Härte oder Weiche, die Schwere, selbst die Undurchdringlichkeit, so bleibt doch der Raum übrig, [...] und den könnt ihr nicht weglassen. Eben so, wenn ihr von eurem empirischen Begriffe eines jeden körperlichen oder nicht körperlichen Objects alle Eigenschaften wegläßt, die euch die Erfahrung lehrt: so könnt ihr ihm doch nicht diejenige nehmen, dadurch ihr es als Substanz oder einer Substanz anhängend denkt [...].

Proviamo infatti a distaccare col pensiero, poco a poco, dal complesso dell'idea, che abbiamo del corpo, tutto quanto vi è di empirico, il colore, la durezza o la mollezza, la gravità, ed anche l'impenetrabilità, resterà però sempre, né sarà forza di pensiero, che valga scancellare lo spazio [...]. Nella stessa maniera se dal nostro concetto empirico di un oggetto qualunque, sia esso corporeo od altro, stacciamo tutte le proprietà e modificazioni apparse dalla esperienza, non è però caso che possiamo togliergli quelle per le quali ce lo immaginiamo come una sostanza, o come alcunché di aderente alla sostanza [...].

Ihr müßt also, überführt durch die Nothwendigkeit, womit sich dieser Begriff euch aufdringt, gestehen, daß er in eurem Erkenntnißvermögen a priori seinen Sitz habe. (KrV B: 5-6, sottolineature mie)

Convinti pertanto da quella stessa necessità, colla quale ci si affaccia ed insinua la detta idea, non possiamo a meno di confessare ch'essa *risiede a priori* nella nostra facoltà di sapere. (Crp M I: 215-216)

⁹ Nel testo kantiano si tratta in genere di obiezioni impiegate su una *confutatio ad rem*, che interessa cioè il contenuto della tesi (cfr. Aristotele, *Retorica*: 1413b).

¹⁰ Non è possibile, in questa sede, soffermarsi adeguatamente sulle tipologie di argomenti più ricorrenti nel testo. Sono prevalentemente argomenti basati sulla probabilità, su induzione e deduzione, sillogismi e inferenze. Sugli schemi argomentativi e le diverse forme di argomento, cfr. Walton 2006; Eggs 1996.

Nell'esempio, la condizione iniziale viene espressa in forma esortativa, quasi come una sfida nei confronti del lettore, seguita dalla sua conseguenza (*so*); la seconda condizione è più morbida, introdotta da un *wenn* invece che dalla forma imperativa, e qualificata come analogica rispetto alla prima (*eben so, wenn*), che appare dunque rafforzata nel suo contenuto di veridicità. Anche la seconda condizione è seguita dalla sua conseguenza, ugualmente introdotta da *so*, con un parallelismo sintattico che rafforza l'analogia e suggerisce un possibile proseguimento dell'elenco delle condizioni, che porterebbero tutte alla stessa conclusione. Ai due lunghi periodi si aggancia infatti la deduzione finale, dove il modale *müssen*, che funge da qualificatore, esprime la necessità forzata e allo stesso tempo l'evidenza dell'asserzione conclusiva (*Ihr müsst also gestehen, daß...*). La tesi presentata inizialmente viene dunque alla fine confermata e ribadita con ancora maggior forza, in una procedura argomentativa "a spirale" che implica anche il consenso più o meno 'spontaneo' del lettore. Nella formulazione ci si richiama spesso alla necessità, alla certezza, all'assolutezza o universalità di alcune affermazioni e definizioni; esse vengono corroborate non soltanto dall'uso frequente di *müssen* e di altri modali, oppure mediante il ricorso a determinati modi verbali e a un'aggettivazione altrettanto 'convincente', ma anche dall'elevata frequenza di particelle (avverbi e particolari *Abtönungspartikeln* come *gar kein, niemals, gewiß, nothwendig, unentbehrlich nothwendig, überhaupt*) che svolgono la funzione di rafforzare l'argomentazione – i cosiddetti "indicatori di forza" (*force modifying expressions* in van Eemeren & Houtlosser & Snoeck Henkemans 2007: 30-45).

La situazione si anima ulteriormente nella traduzione, dove anche il traduttore interviene in prima persona e crea un gioco argomentativo a tre che coinvolge le dimensioni lessicale, traduttiva e interculturale. Sebbene il frontespizio del primo tomo non ne indichi il nome¹¹, Mantovani si presenta però immediatamente con il *Proemio alla traduzione* che apre il volume (firmato solo con le iniziali V.M.), dove non esita a utilizzare la prima persona singolare, né a qualificarsi come italiano, creando così un senso di solidarietà con il lettore (vi sono accenni alla patria comune ed espressioni come "da noi", "nel nostro uso" ecc.). Nella lunga trattazione sulla vita e le opere di Kant che premette alla traduzione, Mantovani lascia trasparire in più punti anche la sua competenza in campo medico e fa spesso accenno al suo viaggio a Königsberg, sulle orme del filosofo – una vera chicca per quell'epoca, che lo accredita come profondo estimatore e conoscitore di Kant (una *Beglaubigungsstrategie* in piena regola!). Così l'autore della *Critica* diviene "il nostro Manuele", "il nostro professore", e spesso il traduttore interviene in prima persona dissentendo dall'opinione di alcuni biografi o avanzando sue teorie personali riguardo ad esempio ai primi studi di Kant, che ritiene poco probabile essere stati teologici (Crp M I: 33 nota), o entrando nei dettagli della teoria kantiana sulla digestione, che giudica molto acuta e innovativa (Crp M I: 33-38).

¹¹ Soltanto nel quarto tomo il frontespizio riporterà le indicazioni complete: "Tradotta dal tedesco dal Cav. V. Mantovani, già Prof. di Medicina pratica nell'I.R. Università di Pavia, Chirurgo in capo militare, ecc."

Nel tradurre, Mantovani tende a rendere più personale e diretto ciò che nel testo originale è impersonale: a livello di morfologia, sostituisce spesso il *man* con soggetti di seconda persona singolare se il riferimento è al lettore, con *io* se all'autore. Si perdono quindi l'anonimità e l'oggettività che contraddistinguono molti passaggi dell'argomentazione kantiana – e che sono una delle caratteristiche tipiche dei testi specialistici – per andare verso un contatto comunicativo più diretto, come dimostra l'esempio seguente:

Man sollte anfänglich zwar denken: daß der Satz $7+5=12$ ein bloß analytischer Satz sei, der aus dem Begriffe einer Summe von Sieben und Fünf nach dem Satze des Widerspruches erfolge. Allein wenn man es näher betrachtet, so findet man, daß der Begriff der Summe von 7 und 5 nichts weiter enthalte, als die Vereinigung beider Zahlen in eine einzige. (KrV B: 15)

Crederai sulle prime la proposizione che stabilisce $7 + 5 = 12$ essere puramente analitica; comechè risulti dal concetto di una somma di sette e cinque, giusta l'assioma dei contrari. Ma, se rifletti, con più di attenzione, troverai che l'idea della somma di 7 e 5 altro non inchiude che l'accoppiamento di due numeri. (Crp M I: 238)

In genere Mantovani presta molta attenzione alla traduzione delle espressioni meta-argomentative, che esplicitano o annunciano i ruoli delle proposizioni seguenti, aiutando così il lettore nella lettura e nella comprensione dell'argomentazione, di per sé già estremamente complessa. Si tratta talvolta di intere proposizioni (“questa è una prova che...”; “se si volesse fare un'obiezione”; “il miglior esempio...”; “Und nun ist auch von dieser die Frage: Wie...”; “Diese letzte Frage, die aus der obigen allgemeinen Aufgabe fließt, würde mit Recht diese sein:”) oppure anche di locuzioni avverbiali più brevi come “z.B.”, “a cagion d'esempio”¹². Molto interessante, dal punto di vista argomentativo, è anche il repertorio di connettori che compaiono nella traduzione, e Mantovani è in questo molto creativo: abbiamo una serie lunghissima di congiunzioni, dalle più comuni (ma, se, perché, bensì, nonostante) alle meno diffuse (solchè, locchè, stantechè, tuttochè, conciossiachè, ecc.), fino a locuzioni congiuntive più complesse (ora gli è appunto, atteso che, gli è che, quindi è che, non è però caso che). Il ruolo delle congiunzioni interfrastiche è effettivamente essenziale, vista la natura del testo; esse forniscono informazioni circa la funzione sintattica della proposizione e ne esplicitano il ruolo logico all'interno del processo razionale della dimostrazione o dell'argomentazione, stabilendo così un parallelismo fra il piano sintattico e quello logico (l'esempio tipico sono le proposizioni concessive e condizionali)¹³. Non è un caso infatti, che una

¹² Sull'evoluzione storica di espressioni meta-comunicative e connettori (*Argumentationswörter*) in testi argomentativi tedeschi prima di Kant si veda von Polenz 1988.

¹³ Le congiunzioni interfrastiche, che rappresentano i connettivi sequenziali per eccellenza, possono essere suddivise, in base a un criterio sintattico, in coordinative (*Konjunktoren*) e subordinative (*Subjunktoren*); sulla base di un criterio lessicale si distinguono poi in causali, temporali, consecutive ecc. Cfr. Engel 2004: §§ 6.3, 6.8; Weinrich 1993, in particolare il cap. 7, „Syntax der Junktion“. Sulla polifunzionalità delle congiunzioni come connettori cfr. anche Gobber 2002.

delle prime preoccupazioni del traduttore sia quella che noi oggi definiremmo *congruità semantica*, requisito fondamentale per avere un testo coerente e sensato¹⁴: Mantovani è consapevole delle difficoltà nel far emergere la gerarchia predicativo-argomentale che costituisce l'organizzazione del testo e nel rendere la stretta connessione fra gli aspetti semantici e quelli pragmatici, e ne ragiona spesso col lettore italiano, esprimendo le proprie perplessità e incertezze su questo punto. Del resto, si giustifica Mantovani, si tratta spesso di esprimere, “con parole destinate all'uso delle cose sensibili, [...] concetti che ne trascendono la sfera, e dove non si può quindi [fare] a meno di trovarsi, col dire, bene spesso e molto al di sotto di ciò cui si pensa” (Crp M I: 7, *Proemio alla traduzione*).

Egli individua con chiarezza un primo ostacolo proprio nella sintassi, e denuncia l'andamento a volte oscuro delle frasi nel processo argomentativo: sono “si fluidi e concatenati che sovente lunghi, a non poterne reggere il senso, i di lui periodi”, tanto che i suoi testi “riesciranno per ciò sempre difficili ed oscuri a parecchi leggitori” (Crp M I: 50-51, *Della vita e delle opere di Kant*). La difficoltà nel ricostruire le relazioni logiche tra le proposizioni lo costringe a ricorrere alla traduzione latina di Born (1796-1798) per avere lumi su alcuni passi particolarmente intricati – ma invano, la versione di Born è ancora più oscura dell'originale, e sempre a causa della sintassi: Born infatti “non fece che aggiungere alle difficoltà e scurezze dell'originale; quand'anche non già imbarazzante per noi la latinità degli alemanni, atteso che, trasportandovi, senza forse avvedersene, la sintassi teutonica, rendono spesso impossibile il ben comprenderli a cui [=chi] non sa quanto ed in che differisca tal sintassi dalla vera latina” (Crp M I: 18, *Della vita e delle opere di Kant*). La traduzione lo costringe comunque a modificare l'ordine degli elementi nell'argomentazione, e per quanto egli si sforzi di restare il più vicino possibile al testo di partenza, come si è visto dagli esempi precedenti, il passaggio a un sistema linguistico diverso impone diverse regole di scrittura legate a riflessioni stilistiche soggettive da un lato, e alla disponibilità oggettiva, in italiano, di strutture capaci di riprodurre in modo analogo le funzioni dei componenti argomentativi dall'altro. Se il profilo logico-gerarchico dell'argomentazione rimane invariato, non può dirsi dunque lo stesso per il suo profilo testuale, che segue invece le regole pragmatico-comunicative proprie dell'italiano¹⁵.

Il secondo, grave ostacolo che si pone al traduttore di questo testo, allora come oggi, del resto, è quello lessicale. Mantovani individua subito alcune particolari parole-

¹⁴ “A partire dalla Teoria della congruità, l'organizzazione comunicativa si può considerare naturalmente come una specificazione del rapporto di congruità tra sequenza testuale e connettivo sequenziale: in questo modo l'organizzazione comunicativa diventa parte integrante dell'organizzazione logico-semantica del testo.” Gobber & Gatti & Cigada 2006: XII. Ulteriori approfondimenti circa la teoria della congruità in Rigotti & Rocci 2006; Rigotti 1993.

¹⁵ Si consideri anche solo un breve esempio: “Anche le Geometria non ha principj che possano riferirsi agli analitici. Ed è già sintetica la proposizione che annunzia la linea retta per la più breve in fra due punti;” (Crp M I: 240-241) in rapporto al testo di partenza: “Eben so wenig ist irgend ein Grundsatz der reinen Geometrie analytisch. Daß die gerade Linie zwischen zwei Punkten die kürzeste sei, ist ein synthetischer Satz.” (KrV B: 16).

chiave, caratteristiche della terminologia kantiana, che sono di estrema pregnanza lessicale e marcano i punti centrali dell'andamento discorsivo del testo; esse non soltanto causano particolari difficoltà nella ricerca di equivalenti traduttivi adeguati, ma richiedono anche un ulteriore sforzo di contestualizzazione rispetto al criticismo. Già nel testo originale i ruoli argomentativi Definizione e Denominazione (introdotti tipicamente dai verbi performativi *heißen* e *nennen*) sono molto rilevanti, in quanto proprio nell'*Introduzione* Kant definisce il campo semantico di alcuni termini fondamentali quali 'conoscenze a priori', 'giudizi sintetici' e 'analitici', 'filosofia trascendentale' e così via; ma Mantovani vi deve ricorrere ancora più spesso¹⁶. Iniziando a tradurre egli avverte il lettore che alcune "voci ordinarie" sono usate in un'accezione diversa da quella comunemente in uso, e oltretutto possono assumere significati diversi all'interno della stessa opera: tra queste evidenzia in particolare 'scienza', 'dottrina', 'oggetto', 'rappresentazione', 'pensare', 'organo' e 'canone' (Crp M I: 7-8, *Proemio alla traduzione*). Il traduttore sceglie una doppia strategia traduttiva: spesso si serve di quelle che egli stesso definisce le "sinonimie per via di parentesi" (inserisce cioè "di quando in quando fra parentesi, nel testo, quei vocaboli o cenni, che [gli] sembrarono atti a rischiarare l'espressione antecedente")¹⁷, mentre in altre occasioni avvia un confronto serrato con il lettore, un confronto che parte dal *Proemio alla traduzione* e si sviluppa, lungo tutto il testo, nelle annotazioni che Mantovani vi aggiunge di suo pugno, non solo per rendere trasparenti i termini dal punto di vista semantico, ma anche per motivare e accreditare le sue scelte traduttive. Eccone un esempio:

Anschauung, facoltà della visione. I francesi lo traducono *intuizione*, vocabolo che mi pare penetri più addentro nella cosa veduta, che non quello di *visione*, cui ho perciò data la preferenza, non però quell'altro escludendo. Mi sarei giovato della voce *intuito* poiché italianizzata da Gallilei [!] nel significato di aspetto veduto di slancio; ove però si decampi (e ne priego i lettori), almeno in questa traduzione, dal prendere colla crusca *visione* per *sogno*, a rigor di termine, parmi anche in ciò giustificata la detta preferenza. (Crp M I: 55-56 nota)

In molti casi egli commenta le scelte traduttive dei compendi francesi di Villiers o Degérando, e sottopone al lettore riflessioni sul significato dei termini nell'uso kantiano confrontandolo con l'uso di altri filosofi quali Locke, Hume, Leibniz o Wolff, per evitare possibili fraintendimenti. Ma lo scoglio costituito dalla terminologia kantiana è davvero enorme e, per il suo primo traduttore italiano, troppo carico di insidie. All'inizio del lavoro, ad esempio, Mantovani avvisa il lettore che "Idee, concetti o nozioni

¹⁶ Tipica del testo di Kant, oltre che dei testi filosofici e scientifici in generale, è la "essence definition" (Walton 2006: 251-256), che ha la funzione preziosa di stimolo per l'argomentazione: "Thus, essence definitions should be seen as having a provocative function of giving rise to arguments that throw a new slant on an issue by opening up a different point of view that was concealed or that you may not have thought of before, because it is different from the conventionally accepted way of looking at it." (Walton 2006: 252).

¹⁷ Crp M I: 6. Su questo modo di procedere mi sono già soffermata altrove (Balbiani 2007: 246-249).

intellettuali valgono, parmi, lo stesso nel linguaggio di Kant; appartengono assolutamente all'intelletto, e ne costituiscono il legittimo impero" (Crp M I: 62 nota) – siamo all'inizio del primo tomo della *Critica della ragion pura* e il traduttore evidentemente non ha ancora le idee molto chiare, perché idee e concetti sono, per Kant, due cose ben distinte: le prime rientrano nella sfera della ragione, i secondi in quella dell'intelletto. Pagina dopo pagina, si approfondisce la sua familiarità con questi termini-chiave, giungendo talvolta anche a modificare in corso d'opera le precedenti scelte traduttive. Così, arrivato alla *Dialettica trascendentale* – siamo al quarto degli otto tomi della traduzione – Mantovani si avvede del grave fraintendimento e, con un certo imbarazzo, è costretto ad avvertire il lettore che "Nel linguaggio di Kant idea non è dunque sinonimo di concetto; il che si avverte, non avendosi forse avuto sempre preciso riguardo alla distinzione in discorso, massime nei primi volumi di questo volgarizzamento" (Crp M IV: 214 nota).

Dall'esperienza di Mantovani emerge con chiarezza come il confronto del traduttore con il testo originale sia un processo dinamico di evoluzione continua, e generi qualche volta un conflitto intellettuale fra autore e traduttore ma anche interno al traduttore stesso, un contrasto che si manifesta in scelte traduttive contraddittorie. Le annotazioni di Mantovani, con le sue ingenuità di traduttore non professionista, sono un documento preziosissimo per la pratica della traduzione, perché ci consentono di ricostruire questo processo, che oggi passa invece per lo più inosservato, anche per i più evoluti strumenti di elaborazione dei testi a nostra disposizione. Possiamo invece solo immaginare lo sconcerto e le difficoltà dei lettori nell'avvicinarsi al criticismo tramite la traduzione di Mantovani – forse questo è proprio uno dei motivi della mancata diffusione di questa monumentale traduzione che, pur avendo inaugurato la stagione del criticismo in Italia, rimase sempre negletta.

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NOMINALPRÄDIKATE UND ARGUMENTATIVE FUNKTIONEN: DIE ERKLÄRUNG*

SIBILLA CANTARINI

1. *Einführung*

Gewöhnlich sind es, was die subordinierenden Konnektoren anbelangt, die Konjunktionen, hauptsächlich diejenigen, die keine komplexe Struktur aufweisen, die bei den wissenschaftlichen und pädagogischen Grammatiken hervorgehoben werden und eine prädominierende oder sogar exklusive Rolle bei der Einführung von determinierten argumentativen Funktionen spielen, wie es bei der ERKLÄRUNG der Fall ist, die wir in Anlehnung an S. Stati als die argumentative Funktion definieren, welche die Kausalität und die Finalität umfasst¹. Der *Zweck* kann Daneš (1985: 151ff.) gemäß, und wie aus der Arbeit von Gross und Prandi (2004: 77 ff.) resultiert, als der prospektive Grund definiert werden, d.h. als das zukünftige Geschehen, das von einer Intention des handelnden Subjekts abhängt, das als solches auch durch Metonymie entsteht, und ein vorangegangenes Geschehen begründet, welches ebenfalls dem handelnden Subjekt zuzuordnen ist, das im Obersatz ausgedrückt wird. Dagegen wird das Geschehen, das nicht der Intention des handelnden Subjekts zuzuschreiben ist, sondern Naturphänomenen, und das als Grund des Obersatzgeschehens gilt, als *Ursache* definiert².

In diesem Beitrag werde ich, indem ich einige Aspekte fokussiere, die zu den Interrelationen zwischen lexikalischer und grammatischer und zwischen lexiko-grammatischer und argumentativer Ebene gehören, mit Bezugnahme auf die Finalität im Ge-

* Es ist mir ein inneres Bedürfnis, diesen Artikel meinem Professor Sorin Stati zu widmen.

¹ Vgl. Stati (2002: 111f.): „Proponiamo di subordinare la causa alla nozione argomentativa di Spiegazione; la causa è ciò che produce qualcosa, l'effetto, e lo spiega; molte volte la Spiegazione è di natura teleologica (si spiega un fenomeno con una finalità). (...) Comunque, ciò che conta dal punto di vista metodologico è che non si tratta tanto di voler persuadere, bensì di descrivere processi con lo scopo di spiegarli. E, come abbiamo ripetutamente asserito, la Spiegazione è dopo la persuasione, la seconda funzione dell'argomentazione.“

² Vgl. Gross und Prandi (2004: 77): „En fait, la relation pertinente en termes conceptuels est la distinction entre la cause et les motifs (...). Les causes trouvent leur place dans notre catégorisation spontanée des événements du monde des phénomènes et de leurs relations impersonnelles, alors que les motifs renvoient à l'univers des actions accomplies en premier lieu par des êtres humains libres et responsables, capables d'évaluer et de décider, et attribuées par analogie aux animaux. À partir de cette distinction, le but se réduit, en termes strictement conceptuels, à un type de motif – le motif prospectif coïncidant avec le contenu d'une intention.“ Dieser Unterschied wird in den wissenschaftlichen Grammatiken oft nicht zum Ausdruck gebracht, vergleiche dazu die Definitionen von finalen und kausalen Angabesätzen bei Engel (1996: 268 ff.): Finale Angabesätze sind Sätze, die „ein Geschehen als Ziel oder Zweck eines anderen Geschehens“ bezeichnen, während kausale Sätze Angabesätze sind, die „einen Sachverhalt“ nennen und „ihn als Grund/Ursache des Obersatzgeschehens“ bestimmen.

genwärtsdeutsch beweisen, dass außer den in den Grammatiken aufgeführten subordinierenden einfachen und komplexen Konnektoren wie *um ... zu*, *damit*, dem gehobenen Konnektor *auf dass*, dem umgangssprachlichen *dass* und dem sehr viel selteneren Konnektor *ausser um* (vgl. Engel 1996; Zifonun, Hoffmann und Strecker 1997; Weinrich 2003; Eisenberg 2006), zahlreiche Konjunkionalgefüge existieren, die aus Nominalprädikaten bestehen und in der Lage sind, die argumentative Funktion der ERKLÄRUNG einzuführen, indem sie metaargumentative Ausdrücke der Finalität sind und semantisch die ausgedrückte Relation modulieren, wobei sie von Mal zu Mal besondere semantische Nuancen liefern. Es ist hervorzuheben, dass dort, wo diese Phänomene, d.h. die Konjunkionalgefüge mit Finalitätswert, in den Grammatiken erwähnt werden, was nur sehr selten geschieht, die semantische Funktion dieser Gefüge nicht erklärt wird, und noch viel weniger wird ihr syntaktisches Verhalten beschrieben. Das Phänomen wird nicht substantiell in Erwägung gezogen, da es im Vergleich zu den Konjunktionen irrtümlicherweise für ein peripherisches Phänomen gehalten wird; auch in den seltenen Fällen, in denen das Phänomen unterstrichen zu sein scheint, wie bei Kubczak und Costantino (1998), wird eine nicht korrekte Interpretierung gegeben, indem die Konjunkionalgefüge hauptsächlich unter den festen Wortverbindungen klassifiziert werden. Dagegen werde ich mit besonderer Bezugnahme auf die Arbeiten von G. Gross beweisen (vgl. Gross 1988, 1995, 1996a, 1996b, 1998, 1999; Gross und Prandi 2004; Prandi, Gross und De Santis 2005), dass die Konjunkionalgefüge nicht Teil des Infinitivsatzes sind, den sie einleiten, wie es bei der grammatischen Tradition anzunehmen wäre, und dass es sich auch nicht um feste Wortverbindungen handelt, da sie aus einfachen Sätzen mit Stützverb oder mit dem Verb *sein* herrühren, und dass die komplexen Sätze, in denen sie erscheinen, demzufolge transformiert werden können.

2. Konjunkionalgefüge: Klassifizierung

In Analogie zu den Klassifizierungen für Französisch und Italienisch (vgl. Gross 1998: 229; Gross und Prandi 2004; Prandi, Gross und De Santis 2005) ist es möglich, die Konjunkionalgefüge zu klassifizieren, die allgemeinen Finalitätswert aufzeigen, und zwar mindestens in vier Klassen, bei denen das Nominalprädikat von Mal zu Mal eine spezifische Bedeutung liefert, da es die ausgedrückte Finalitätsbedeutung semantisch moduliert. Die Klassifizierung der Konjunkionalgefüge beruht auf derjenigen der Nominalprädikate, die den semantischen Kopf der Gefüge bilden; aufgrund der Bedeutung der Nominalprädikate lassen sich die Konjunkionalgefüge folgenderweise definieren:

- a) Konjunkionalgefüge, bei denen Lokativnominalprädikate erscheinen;
- b) Konjunkionalgefüge, bei denen Wahrnehmungsnominalprädikate auftreten;
- c) Konjunkionalgefüge, bei denen Absichtsnominalprädikate vorkommen;
- d) Konjunkionalgefüge, bei denen Gefühlsmominalprädikate erscheinen.

Im Kontext des komplexen Satzes, in dem das Konjunkionalgefüge auftritt, hat das Subjekt des Hauptsatzes, auf den das Konjunkionalgefüge und der Infinitivsatz mit dem gleichen Subjekt folgen, das Merkmal [+BELEBT], gewöhnlich [+MENSCHLICH], oder es geht um ein Subjekt, dem dieses Merkmal metonymisch zugewiesen werden kann, zum Beispiel eine Einrichtung, eine Institution oder eine Organisation. Das Subjekt des Hauptsatzes, auf das Konjunkionalgefüge folgen, in denen Nominalprädikate mit lokativem Wert wie *Ziel* oder *Zweck* auftreten, kann jedoch auch das Merkmal [+ABSTRAKT] haben; in diesem Fall handelt es sich allerdings um ein Nominalprädikat, das ein Geschehen repräsentiert, welches auf ein handelndes Subjekt zurückzuführen ist, wie im Satz (1):

- (1) Die ökonomischen Maßnahmen wurden (von den Politikern) zu dem Zweck getroffen, das Steigen der Preise zu verhindern³.

In dem obigen Satz ist das Nominalprädikat *Maßnahmen* in der Tat auf das handelnde Subjekt *Politiker* zurückzuführen, das im Passivsatz weggelassen werden kann.

3. Nominalprädikate mit Finalitätsbedeutung

3.1 Lokativ- und Wahrnehmungsnominalprädikate

Die erste Klasse von Konjunkionalgefügen, die wir im Einzelnen in Betracht ziehen, ist diejenige, bei denen Nominalprädikate mit lokativem Wert erscheinen, die dann aufgrund von metaphorischen Prozessen den Zweck repräsentieren, den man erreichen will. Das Nominalprädikat *Ziel* stammt z.B. aus dem Althochdeutschen *zil*, das „das Eingeteilte, Abgemessene“ bedeuten würde, woraus sich dann die Bedeutung „räumlicher oder zeitlicher Endpunkt“ entwickelt hätte, vergleiche dazu auch die althochdeutschen Wörter *zilēn*, *zilōn*, die für „sich beeilen“ stehen. Dieses Nominalprädikat tritt im Gefüge *mit dem Ziel* auf, wobei es auch Komposita bildet, denen am häufigsten ein Infinitivsatz oder eine Nominalgruppe im Genitiv folgt, wie nachstehend schematisiert wird:

- S + mit dem Ziel (mit dem Lehrziel, Studienziel..., mit der Zielvorstellung, Zielsetzung) + Inf
 S + mit dem Ziel + NGgen

³ Die in dieser Arbeit angeführten Beispiele wurden auf der Basis ihrer Frequenz einem von der Verfasserin aufgebauten Korpus komplexer Sätze des gemeinen Gegenwartsdeutsch entnommen, in denen Konjunkionalgefüge mit Finalitätsbedeutung vorkommen und deren ursprüngliche Quellen zahlreiche deutsche Websites sind, wobei verschiedene Bereiche (Alltagsleben, Politik, Gesellschaft, Kultur, Geschichte usw.) berücksichtigt wurden. Die Nominalprädikate mit Finalitätsbedeutung, die in den Konjunkionalgefügen erscheinen, wurden aus einer Liste von ungefähr 20.000 Nominalprädikaten der französischen Sprache hergeleitet, die der Verfasserin von Professor Gaston Gross (L.D.I. - Lexiques, Dictionnaires, Informatique, Université Paris XIII und Université de Cergy-Pontoise C.N.R.S., U.M.R. 7167) überlassen wurde und aufgrund deren eine ähnliche aufgestellt wurde, die die deutsche Gegenwartssprache betrifft. Anfangs wurde für diese Liste auch Schwarz (2003-04) kurz konsultiert.

Es lässt sich beachten, dass die Möglichkeit besteht, einen komplexen Satz zu umstrukturieren, in dem das Konjunkionalgefüge *mit dem Ziel* erscheint, und diesen in einen komplexen Satz zu transformieren, bei dem man an Stelle des Konjunkionalgefüges *mit dem Ziel* zu den Sätzen gelangt, *x hat y zum Ziel*, *y ist das Ziel von x* oder *x zielt auf y*, und gleichzeitig den Hauptsatz und den Infinitivsatz auf Nominalgruppen reduziert, wie die Beispiele (2)-(5) zeigen:

- (2) Partnerschaften zwischen deutschen und ausländischen Einrichtungen entstehen häufig mit dem Ziel, gemeinsame Forschungsprojekte zu erstellen und die Mobilität von Studenten, Lehrern und Forschern zu fördern.
- (3) Das häufige Entstehen von Partnerschaften zwischen deutschen und ausländischen Einrichtungen hat die Erstellung gemeinsamer Forschungsprojekte und die Förderung der Mobilität von Studenten, Lehrern und Forschern zum Ziel.
- (4) Die Erstellung gemeinsamer Forschungsprojekte und die Förderung der Mobilität von Studenten, Lehrern und Forschern ist das Ziel des häufigen Entstehens von Partnerschaften zwischen deutschen und ausländischen Einrichtungen.
- (5) Das häufige Entstehen von Partnerschaften zwischen deutschen und ausländischen Einrichtungen zielt auf die Erstellung gemeinsamer Forschungsprojekte und die Förderung der Mobilität von Studenten, Lehrern und Forschern.

In den folgenden Sätzen (6) und (7) werden die oben genannten Nominalgruppen „das häufige Entstehen von Partnerschaften zwischen deutschen und ausländischen Einrichtungen“ und „die Erstellung gemeinsamer Forschungsprojekte und die Förderung der Mobilität von Studenten, Lehrern und Forschern“ erneut progressiv zu Sätzen entwickelt, während das Konjunkionalgefüge mit dem Nominalprädikat *mit dem Ziel* im prädikativen Verb *zielen auf* bestehen bleibt:

- (6) Partnerschaften zwischen deutschen und ausländischen Einrichtungen entstehen häufig und zielen auf die Erstellung gemeinsamer Forschungsprojekte und die Förderung der Mobilität von Studenten, Lehrern und Forschern.
- (7) Partnerschaften zwischen deutschen und ausländischen Einrichtungen entstehen häufig und zielen darauf, gemeinsame Forschungsprojekte zu erstellen und die Mobilität von Studenten, Lehrern und Forschern zu fördern.

Beim Schematisieren der Beispiele werden in den Sätzen (2)–(7) die Transformationen in (A) angewendet,

- (A)
- x mit dem Ziel y
 - x hat y zum Ziel
 - y ist das Ziel von x
 - x zielt auf y

bei denen die Variablen *x* und *y* als Sätze mit prädikativem Verb oder deren entsprechende Nominalgruppen interpretiert werden (vgl. Harris 1976: 194 ff.).

In der Klasse der Konjunkionalgefüge, bei denen Nominalprädikate mit lokativem Wert erscheinen, lassen sich außerdem Gefüge verzeichnen, in denen das Nominalprädikat *Zweck* auftritt. Das Substantiv *Zweck* stammt aus dem Althochdeutschen *zwec* und dem Mittelhochdeutschen *zwec* mit den Bedeutungen „Nagel, Pflock“, vor allem „Pflock in der Mitte der Zielscheibe“, woraus sich die Bedeutung „Zielpunkt“, übertragen „Absicht, Sinn“, entwickelt hat. In den Konjunkionalgefügen des Gegenwartssdeutsch kann das Nominalprädikat *Zweck* von der Präposition *zu* eingeleitet werden; diese erscheint auch in der artikulierten Form *zum*, und das Substantiv, auf das eine Nominalgruppe mit Genitiv folgt, kann im Plural auftreten, wie das folgende Schema komplexer Sätze zusammenfassend darstellt:

- S + zu dem (zum) Zweck + InfS
- S + zum Zweck + NGgen
- S + zu Zwecken + NGgen

Wie man erkennt, besteht die Möglichkeit, bei komplexen Sätzen, in denen das Gefüge *zu dem Zweck* erscheint, Transformationen vorzunehmen, indem auch das prädikative Verb *etwas bezwecken* verwendet wird, wie die Sätze (8)–(13) aufzeigen:

- (8) Der Minister berief eine Sitzung ein zu dem Zweck, für die Verbesserung der wirtschaftlichen Lage geeignete Maßnahmen zu ergreifen.
- (9) Die Einberufung einer Sitzung vonseiten des Ministers hatte das Ergreifen von Maßnahmen für die Verbesserung der wirtschaftlichen Lage zum Zweck.
- (10) Der Zweck der Einberufung einer Sitzung vonseiten des Ministers war das Ergreifen von Maßnahmen für die Verbesserung der wirtschaftlichen Lage.
- (11) Das Ergreifen von Maßnahmen für die Verbesserung der wirtschaftlichen Lage war der Zweck der Einberufung einer Sitzung vonseiten des Ministers.
- (12) Die Einberufung einer Sitzung vonseiten des Ministers bezweckte das Ergreifen von Maßnahmen für die Verbesserung der wirtschaftlichen Lage.
- (13) Der Minister berief eine Sitzung ein und bezweckte damit, geeignete Maßnahmen für die Verbesserung der wirtschaftlichen Lage zu ergreifen.

Der Satz (8) kann noch weitere Transformationen erfahren, indem man die Präposition *zwecks* verwendet, die der Nominalgruppe im Genitiv vorausgeht und deren Ursprung der Genitiv des Nomens *Zweck* ist, wie das Beispiel (14) aufzeigt:

- (14) Der Minister berief eine Sitzung zwecks Ergreifens von Maßnahmen für die Verbesserung der wirtschaftlichen Lage ein.

Außerdem zeigt das Beispiel (15), dass der Satz (8) auf eine lange Nominalgruppe reduziert werden kann, die dann in einen komplexeren Kontext eingesetzt werden könnte:

- (15) Die Einberufung einer Sitzung vonseiten des Ministers zwecks Ergreifens von Maßnahmen für die Verbesserung der wirtschaftlichen Lage [...]

Was das Konjunkionalgefüge *zu dem Zweck* betrifft, wurden demnach folgende Transformationen verwendet:

- (B)
 x zu dem Zweck y
 x hat y zum Zweck
 Der Zweck von x ist y, y ist der Zweck von x
 x bezweckt y
 x zwecks y

Was die Klasse der Gefüge anbelangt, in denen Wahrnehmungsnominalprädikate vorkommen, lassen sich sehr wenige Elemente verzeichnen, was auf den Umstand zurückzuführen ist, dass die semantische Klasse der Wahrnehmungsnominalprädikate eine nur sehr geringe Anzahl von Nominalprädikaten umfasst. Anzutreffende Strukturen sind zum Beispiel:

- S + mit der Aussicht + InfS
 S + mit der Aussicht + NGgen
 S + mit der Aussicht + aufNGakk

 S + mit der Perspektive + InfS
 S + mit der Perspektive + NGgen
 S + mit der Perspektive + aufNGakk

In den obigen Strukturen zeigt sich, dass eine Nominalgruppe im Genitiv oder Akkusativ dem Nominalprädikat folgen kann, in dem letzteren Fall wird die Nominalgruppe von der Präposition *auf* eingeführt.

3.2 Absichtsnominalprädikate

Die semantische Klasse, die dagegen die größte Anzahl von Nominalprädikaten umfasst, mit denen Konjunkionalgefüge gebildet werden können, besteht aus Absichtsnominalprädikaten; das erklärt sich, wie bereits erwähnt, mit der Tatsache, dass der Zweck als zukünftiger Grund definiert wird. Unter den absolut häufigsten Gefügen mit Nominalprädikat, das zu der semantischen Klasse der Absichtsnominalprädikate gehört, verzeichnet man diejenigen, in denen das Substantiv *Absicht* erscheint, wobei diesem entweder die Präposition *mit* oder *in* vorangeht und dem die gewöhnlichen Infinitivsätze und Nominalgruppen im Genitiv folgen:

- S + mit der Absicht + InfS
- S + mit der Absicht + NGgen
- S + in der Absicht + InfS
- S + in der Absicht + NGgen

Mit Bezug auf die Gefüge *mit/in der Absicht* besteht die Möglichkeit, bei dem komplexen Satz, in dem diese Konjunkionalgefüge auftreten, Transformationen in Analogie zu den bereits untersuchten vorzunehmen:

- (16) Im Frühjahr 2002 erstellte das Ontario College of Teachers ein Forschungsprojekt mit der Absicht, das Bewusstsein der Normen der Praxis unter den 187.000 Lehrern des Bundeslandes Ontario zu fördern.
- (17) Das Ontario College of Teachers hatte beim Erstellen eines Forschungsprojekts im Frühjahr 2002 die Absicht, das Bewusstsein der Normen der Praxis unter den 187.000 Lehrern des Bundeslandes Ontario zu fördern.
- (18) Die Förderung des Bewusstseins der Normen der Praxis unter den 187.000 Lehrern des Bundeslandes Ontario war die Absicht des Ontario College of Teachers beim Erstellen eines Forschungsprojektes im Frühjahr 2002.
- (19) Das Ontario College of Teachers beabsichtigte beim Erstellen eines Forschungsprojekts im Frühjahr 2002 die Förderung des Bewusstseins der Normen der Praxis unter den 187.000 Lehrern des Bundeslandes Ontario.
- (20) Im Frühjahr 2002 erstellte das Ontario College of Teachers ein Forschungsprojekt und beabsichtigte damit, das Bewusstsein der Normen der Praxis unter den 187.000 Lehrern des Bundeslandes Ontario zu fördern.

Weitere Konjunkionalgefüge, in denen Absichtsnominalprädikate auftreten, sind folgende:

- S + mit der Intention + InfS
- S + mit der Intention + NGgen
- S + mit dem Gedanken (mit dem Hintergedanken, mit den Rachege-
danken...) + InfS
- S + mit dem Gedanken (mit dem Hintergedanken, mit den Rachege-
danken...) + NGgen

Man erkennt, dass das Substantiv *Gedanke* auch in Komposita und im Plural, wie *Hintergedanke* und *Rachegedanken*, auftreten kann; für beide Gefüge wird die Möglichkeit einer Transformation des komplexen Satzes hervorgehoben, indem man das entsprechende Verbalprädikat verwendet:

- (21) Der Professor schrieb den Artikel in erster Linie mit der Intention, neue Studenten diesem Zweig der Naturwissenschaften zu nähern.

- (22) Der Professor schrieb den Artikel und intendierte damit in erster Linie, neue Studenten diesem Zweig der Naturwissenschaften zu nähern.
- (23) Viele junge Leute arbeiten unter verheerenden Verhältnissen mit dem Gedanken, eines Tages den grauen Alltag in ihrem Heimatort verlassen zu können.
- (24) Viele junge Leute arbeiten unter verheerenden Verhältnissen und denken dabei, eines Tages den grauen Alltag in ihrem Heimatort verlassen zu können.

Andere Konjunkionalgefüge mit Absichtsnominalprädikat sind:

- S + mit dem Vorsatz + InfS
 S + mit dem Vorsatz + NGgen
- S + mit dem Entschluss + InfS
 S + mit dem Entschluss + NGgen
 S + mit dem Entschluss + zu NGdat
- S + mit dem Vorhaben + InfS
 S + mit dem Vorhaben + NGgen

Es lässt sich bei den obigen Nominalprädikaten bemerken, dass dem Substantiv *Entschluss* auch die durch die Präposition *zu* eingeführte Nominalgruppe im Dativ ziemlich häufig folgen kann. Mit Bezug auf das letzte Gefüge wird die Transformation mit dem Verbalprädikat vorgenommen, das in diesem Fall dem Verb *vorhaben* entspricht:

- (25) Hacker nutzen Sicherheitslücken aus mit dem Vorhaben, gleichzeitig Computersysteme und tausende PC anzugreifen.
- (26) Hacker haben beim Ausnutzen von Sicherheitslücken den gleichzeitigen Angriff auf Computersysteme und tausende PC vor.

Weiterhin verzeichnet man das Gefüge mit dem Nominalprädikat *Plan*:

- S + mit dem Plan + InfS
 S + mit dem Plan + NGgen

Mit dem Nominalprädikat *Plan* ist morphologisch und semantisch das Verb *planen* verbunden, wie die Beispiele (27)-(28) beweisen:

- (27) Der Gemeinderat trat an den Bürgermeister heran mit dem Plan, naturschutzrechtliche und baurechtliche Kriterien in Bezug auf die Verwaltungsstrukturen auszuarbeiten.
- (28) Der Gemeinderat plante, naturschutzrechtliche und baurechtliche Kriterien in Bezug auf die Verwaltungsstrukturen auszuarbeiten, und trat damit an den Bürgermeister heran.

Zu der Klasse der Gefüge mit Absichtsnominalprädikaten gehören auch diejenigen, in denen das Nominalprädikat *Wille* vorkommt, das in Analogie zu *Absicht* durch die

Präpositionen *mit* oder *in* eingeleitet wird und auf das sowohl der Infinitivsatz als auch Nominalgruppen folgen, denen die Präposition *zu* vorausgehen kann:

- S + mit dem Willen + InfS
- S + mit dem Willen + zu NGdat
- S + mit dem Willen + NGgen

- S + in dem Willen + InfS
- S + in dem Willen + zu NGdat
- S + in dem Willen + NGgen

Auch die komplexen Sätze mit der Lokution *mit dem Willen* können mit Hilfe des Verbalprädikats *wollen* transformiert werden:

- (29) Die vorübergehend freigesetzten Arbeiter suchten den Gewerkschaftsfunktionär auf mit dem Willen, die Genehmigung für einen Streik zur Durchsetzung ihrer wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Forderungen zu erlangen.
- (30) Die vorübergehend freigesetzten Arbeiter suchten den Gewerkschaftsfunktionär auf und wollten die Genehmigung für einen Streik zur Durchsetzung ihrer wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Forderungen erlangen.

Weitere Gefüge sind diejenigen, in denen die Nominalprädikate *Bemühen* und *Bestreben* erscheinen:

- S + in dem Bemühen + InfS
- S + in dem (im) Bemühen + um NGakk

- S + mit dem Bestreben + InfS
- S + mit dem Bestreben + NGgen

- S + in dem Bestreben + InfS
- S + in dem Bestreben + NGgen

Bei dem Konjunktionalgefüge mit *Bemühen* führt die Präposition *um* die Nominalgruppe im Akkusativ ein. Mit Bezug auf das obige Gefüge werden die gewöhnlichen Paraphrasen geliefert, die bei den komplexen Sätzen verwendet werden, in denen die Gefüge *mit dem Ziel*, *zu dem Zweck*, *mit der Absicht* usw. auftreten:

- (31) Viele Länder engagieren sich in dem Bemühen, die Armut in Afrika zu bekämpfen sowie Demokratie, Menschenrechte und rechtsstaatliche Regierungspraktiken auszubauen.
- (32) Das Bemühen vieler Länder bei ihrem Engagement ist die Bekämpfung der Armut in Afrika sowie der Ausbau der Demokratie, Menschenrechte und rechtsstaatlicher Regierungspraktiken.
- (33) Viele Länder bemühen sich bei ihrem Engagement um die Bekämpfung der Armut in Afrika sowie um den Ausbau der Demokratie, Menschenrechte und rechtsstaatlicher Regierungspraktiken.

- (34) Viele Länder engagieren und bemühen sich, die Armut in Afrika zu bekämpfen sowie Demokratie, Menschenrechte und rechtsstaatliche Regierungspraktiken auszubauen.

Komplexe Sätze mit dem Konjunkionalgefüge, in dem das Nominalprädikat *Bestreben* auftritt, können ebenfalls transformiert werden:

- (35) Der Minister trennte sein Berufs- und Privatleben in dem Bestreben, außerhalb seiner Rolle in der Weltgeschichte unerkannt und unbehelligt zu bleiben.
- (36) Der Minister hatte bei der Trennung seines Berufs- und Privatlebens das Bestreben nach dem Unerkannt- und Unbehelligtbleiben außerhalb seiner Rolle in der Weltgeschichte.
- (37) Das Unerkannt- und Unbehelligtbleiben außerhalb seiner Rolle in der Weltgeschichte war das Bestreben des Ministers bei der Trennung seines Berufs- und Privatlebens.
- (38) Der Minister bestrebte sich bei der Trennung seines Berufs- und Privatlebens, außerhalb seiner Rolle in der Weltgeschichte unerkannt und unbehelligt zu bleiben.
- (39) Der Minister strebte bei der Trennung seines Berufs- und Privatlebens nach dem Unerkannt- und Unbehelligtbleiben außerhalb seiner Rolle in der Weltgeschichte.

Aus allen obigen Transformationen resultiert, dass auch komplexe Sätze, in denen Konjunkionalgefüge mit Absichtsnominalprädikaten auftreten, genauso wie diejenigen, in denen Lokativ- und Wahrnehmungsnominalprädikate vorkommen, regelmäßig paraphrasiert werden können, was unsere Anfangshypothese bestätigt, dass solche Gefüge nicht als Lokutionen zu betrachten sind.

3.3 Gefühlsnominalprädikate⁴

Die letzte semantische Klasse von Nominalprädikaten, die Konjunkionalgefüge bilden, besteht aus Gefühlsnominalprädikaten. Unter den Gefühlsnominalprädikaten finden wir diejenigen, die einen *Wunsch*, eine *Hoffnung*, *Ehrgeiz* usw. zum Ausdruck bringen. In den folgenden Gefügen kommen zum Beispiel zu der semantischen Klasse der Gefühlsnominalprädikate gehörende Nominalprädikate vor:

- S + mit dem Ehrgeiz + InfS
 S + mit der Erwartung + InfS
 S + mit der Erwartung + NGgen
 S + in der Erwartung + InfS
 S + in der Erwartung + NGgen
 S + in Erwartung + NGgen

⁴ Der obige Begriff ist eine allgemeine Bezeichnung und umfasst auch Nominalprädikate, die Emotionen ausdrücken.

Bei den Gefügen mit dem Nominalprädikat *Erwartung*, das sowohl von der Präposition *mit* als auch von der Präposition *in* eingeführt werden kann, ist es möglich, die Transformation mit dem entsprechenden Verbalprädikat vorzunehmen, wie die Beispiele (40)-(41) aufzeigen:

- (40) Der Vizekanzler erzwang überraschend Neuwahlen in der Erwartung, seine Partei zu verstärken.
- (41) Der Vizekanzler erzwang überraschend Neuwahlen und erwartete dabei, seine Partei zu verstärken.

Zu derselben Klasse gehören die Gefüge mit dem Substantiv *Hoffnung*, gefolgt von einem Infinitivsatz und von Nominalgruppen, denen die Präpositionen *mit* oder *in* vorausgehen können, wie bei dem obigen Nominalprädikat *Erwartung*. Die Nominalgruppe wird häufig durch die Präposition *auf* eingeführt oder tritt im Genitiv auf:

- S + mit der Hoffnung + InfS
 S + mit der Hoffnung + auf NGakk
 S + mit der Hoffnung + NGgen
- S + in der Hoffnung + InfS
 S + in der Hoffnung + auf NGakk
 S + in der Hoffnung + NGgen

Bei komplexen Sätzen, in denen die Gefüge mit dem Nominalprädikat *Hoffnung* erscheinen, können alle bis hier in Erwägung gezogenen Transformationen verwendet werden:

- (42) Kleinverdiener hatten ihr Ersparnis in die Papiere des Ex-Monopolisten investiert in der Hoffnung, satten Gewinne zu erzielen.
- (43) Kleinverdiener hatten beim Investieren ihres Ersparnis in die Papiere des Ex-Monopolisten die Hoffnung auf das Erzielen satter Gewinne.
- (44) Die Hoffnung von Kleinverdienern beim Investieren ihres Ersparnis in die Papiere des Ex-Monopolisten war das Erzielen satter Gewinne.
- (45) Beim Investieren ihres Ersparnis in die Papiere des Ex-Monopolisten hofften Kleinverdiener auf das Erzielen satter Gewinne.
- (46) Kleinverdiener hatten ihr Ersparnis in die Papiere des Ex-Monopolisten investiert und hofften, satten Gewinne zu erzielen.

Zu den Klassen der Gefüge mit Gefühlsnominalprädikat gehören außerdem diejenigen mit den Nominalprädikaten *Wunsch*, *Traum*, *Verlangen*, *Begehren*, deren Nominalgruppen auch von Präpositionen eingeleitet werden können und für welche die Transformationen verzeichnet sind, bei denen das entsprechende Verbalprädikat auftritt:

- S + mit dem Wunsch + InfS
 S + mit dem Wunsch + nach NGdat
 S + mit dem Wunsch + NGgen

- (47) In den 60er Jahren begaben sich unzählige Italiener als Gastarbeiter ins Ausland mit dem Wunsch, eines Tages in ihre Heimat zurückkehren zu können.
- (48) In den 60er Jahren begaben sich unzählige Italiener als Gastarbeiter ins Ausland und wünschten, eines Tages in ihre Heimat zurückkehren zu können.

S + mit dem Traum + Infs
 S + mit dem Traum + von NGdat
 S + mit dem Traum + NGgen

- (49) Viele Nichteuropäer kamen nach Europa mit dem Traum, der sozialen Verelendung und Ausbeutung in ihrem Heimatland entkommen zu können.
- (50) Viele Nichteuropäer kamen nach Europa und träumten davon, der sozialen Verelendung und Ausbeutung in ihrem Heimatland entkommen zu können.

S + in dem Verlangen + Infs
 S + in dem Verlangen + nach NGdat

- (51) Bei vielen Prozessen kann man beobachten, wie eine immer größer werdende Menschenmenge vor den Gerichtsgebäuden Schlange steht in dem Verlangen, einen Blick auf die Angeklagten werfen zu können.
- (52) Bei vielen Prozessen kann man beobachten, wie eine immer größer werdende Menschenmenge vor den Gerichtsgebäuden Schlange steht und es sie danach verlangt, einen Blick auf die Angeklagten werfen zu können.

S + mit dem Begehren + Infs
 S + mit dem Begehren + nach NGdat

- (53) Die Delegation wandte sich an den Ministerpräsidenten mit dem Begehren, eine sofortige Untersuchung der untragbaren Situation in der Campania anzuordnen.
- (54) Die Delegation wandte sich an den Ministerpräsidenten und begehrte, eine sofortige Untersuchung der untragbaren Situation in der Campania anzuordnen.

Zusammenfassend ist in Bezug auf die Zugehörigkeitsklassen der untersuchten Nominalprädikate, die Konjunkionalgefüge bilden, leicht zu erkennen, dass es sich hier um eine progressive Verschiebung vom Außenraum des Subjekts, vergleiche die Lokativnominalprädikate *Zweck* und *Ziel*, zu seinem Innenraum handelt, und im Hinblick darauf wird sowohl der Bereich der Vernunft, z.B. das Nominalprädikat *Gedanke*, als auch derjenige der Gefühle und Emotionen herangezogen, wie die Nominalprädikate *Wunsch*, *Hoffnung*, *Ehrgeiz* usw. aufzeigen.

4. Fazit

Abschließend wurde bewiesen, dass die einfachen oder komplexen Konjunktionen, die die Finalität zum Ausdruck bringen, denen gewöhnlich die meiste Aufmerksamkeit gewidmet wird und die nach den traditionellen Grammatiken das Monopol bei der Festlegung der transphrastischen Relationen innehaben, nicht die einzigen Ausdrucksmöglichkeiten sind, die den Sprechern zur Verfügung stehen. Es existiert nämlich eine weit reichende Palette von Nominalprädikaten, die in gleicher Weise in der Lage sind, die argumentative Funktion der ERKLÄRUNG mit Bezugnahme auf die Finalität einzuleiten. Die untersuchten Lokativ-, Wahrnehmungs-, Absichts- und Gefühlsnominalprädikate haben die Fähigkeit, explizit die Finalitätsbedeutung gemäß den verschiedenen Mitteilungsabsichten des Sprechers zu modulieren, wobei sie sich auch als metaargumentative Indikatoren der argumentativen Funktion der ERKLÄRUNG erweisen. Die Transformationen zeigen unter anderem, wie unterschiedlich die argumentative Funktion der ERKLÄRUNG im Hinblick auf die Finalität ausgedrückt werden kann, und das nicht nur unter dem lexikalischen und semantischen, sondern auch unter dem syntaktischen Gesichtspunkt.

Außerdem wurde unter Beweis gestellt, dass die Konjunkionalgefüge in der Tat keine festen Syntagma sind. Auf der Basis der in Betracht gezogenen Transformationen und anderer Aspekte, wie die Möglichkeit, die Präposition, die ein bestimmtes Nominalprädikat einleitet, sowie das Nominalprädikat in bestimmten Kontexten zu ersetzen (*Die Gewerkschaftsfunktionäre bereiteten seit langer Zeit den Nationalstreik vor (mit dem unmissverständlichen, eindeutigen, offensichtlichen... Ziel/zu demZweck/in der ...Absicht), die Regierung zu einer Stellungnahme zu zwingen*), tritt eindeutig hervor, dass das, was gewöhnlich *Lokution* in den herkömmlichen Grammatiken genannt wurde, kein festes Syntagma ist. Es handelt sich hingegen um die Reduktion eines Satzes, der, wenn er durch ein Stützverb oder durch das Verb *sein* erweitert wird, zu einer ganzen Reihe von Transformationen Anlass geben kann, in denen die komplexen Sätze semantisch verbunden resultieren. Bei solchen Transformationen tritt, wie erwähnt, das Nominalprädikat entweder in dem Konjunkionalgefüge oder als aktualisierte lexikalische Einheit in dem einfachen Satz auf, aber in vielen Fällen erscheint die prädikative Wurzel des Nominalprädikats auch in der Form des entsprechenden Verbalprädikats, und in dem Fall des Nominalprädikats *Zweck* kommt sie auch in der Form der entsprechenden Präposition *zwecks* vor, sodass der ursprüngliche Satz weiter transformiert werden kann.

Die Umstrukturierung der Konjunkionalgefüge in Stützverbkonstruktionen und in Konstruktionen mit dem entsprechenden Verbalprädikat führt zu dem Schluss, dass der Terminus *Lokution*, der auf die Festigkeit der Komponenten hinweist, für die untersuchten Strukturen weitgehend unangebracht ist. Aber auch die Definition *Konjunkionalgefüge*, die in diesem Beitrag bis jetzt verwendet wurde und deren Bedeutung einfach darin besteht, dass das Gefüge die Funktion einer Konjunktion erfüllt, wobei es nicht eindeutig ist, um welche Art von Gefüge es sich handelt, scheint nicht ausreichend an-

gemessen zu sein: Anstelle der Bezeichnungen *Lokution* und *Konjunkionalgefüge* schlagen wir vor, *komplexer Konnektor mit Prädikativlexem* zu verwenden, eine Definition, die sowohl auf die erfüllte Funktion als auch auf die Natur der Komponenten hindeutet.

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ZUR DEUTSCHEN SPRACHE DER KONTROVERSE IN DER FRÜHEN NEUZEIT

GERD FRITZ

1. *Einleitung*

Stellen wir uns vor, wir hätten im Jahre 1600 eine wissenschaftliche Kontroverse in deutscher Sprache zu führen, beispielsweise über die Frage, ob die Astrologie eine ernstzunehmende Wissenschaft ist – eine sehr aktuelle Debatte in dieser Zeit. In dieser Lage müssten wir natürlich den damaligen Fachwortschatz der Astronomie und Astrologie beherrschen, wir müssten beispielsweise wissen was eine *Coniunction* der Planeten Jupiter und Mars oder eine „Zusammenfügung Saturni vnnnd der Sonnen“ ist oder wie der Ausdruck „newer Stern“ verwendet wird. Gleichzeitig müssten wir aber auch den nicht-fachspezifischen, allgemeinen wissenschaftlichen Sprachgebrauch der Zeit kennen, der für wissenschaftliche Auseinandersetzungen verwendet wurde. Zumeist wurden Kontroversen zwischen Akademikern in dieser Zeit auf Latein geführt, der wissenschaftlichen *lingua franca* der Zeit. Wenn aber eine größere deutschsprachige Öffentlichkeit angesprochen werden sollte, wurde auch die deutsche Sprache verwendet, in der – wie ich zeigen möchte – für diesen Zweck schon sehr differenzierte sprachliche Mittel entwickelt waren.

Unser Bild von der Entwicklung des Deutschen als Wissenschaftssprache in der frühen Neuzeit ist oft noch geprägt von den kritischen Reflexionen wichtiger Autoren des ausgehenden 17. Jahrhunderts über die wissenschaftliche Sprachpraxis der Zeit und ihren Bemühungen, das Deutsche als Wissenschaftssprache zu fördern. Ich denke dabei an die kritischen Bemerkungen Stieler zum deutschen Sprachgebrauch der Gelehrten in seinem Wörterbuch von 1691, wo er darauf hinweist, dass es „einem Gelehrten allerdings unverantwortlich und höchstnachteilig [sei] / wann er mit der Sprache / so ihm angeboren / beßer nicht / als der gemeine Pöfel / ümzugehen gelernet hat“ (Stieler 1691/1968: 1v); oder an Leibnizens „Ermahnung an die Teutsche, ihren verstand und sprache beßer zu üben“, in der er beklagt, dass viele Gelehrte in Deutschland „gemeinet, dass die Weisheit nicht anders als in Latein und Griechisch sich kleiden ließe“ (Leibniz 1679/1986: 808); oder aber an die Bemühungen des Christian Thomasius, die deutsche Sprache im universitären Unterricht zu etablieren (vgl. z.B. Pörksen 1986: 42ff.). Man denkt in diesem Zusammenhang aber weniger an Kepler und seine Zeitgenossen, die mehr als 60 Jahre vor Leibniz sehr virtuos wissenschaftliche Auseinandersetzungen in deutscher Sprache führten. Mit dieser Periode der Entwicklung der deutschen Wissenschaftssprache soll sich der vorliegende Beitrag beschäftigen und damit einen Aspekt der Entwicklung beleuchten, der bisher in der For-

schung noch unterrepräsentiert ist, und in diesem Punkt das Bild weiter abrunden, das wir von der deutschen Wissenschaftssprache in der frühen Neuzeit haben. Generell kann man sagen, dass die Geschichte des argumentativen Sprachgebrauchs im Deutschen noch relativ wenig erforscht ist, wenn man von verstreuten Hinweisen und von einzelnen Beiträgen von Peter von Polenz, Thomas Gloning und anderen absieht (vgl. von Polenz 1988; Gloning 2002; Hertel 2000).

Ein besonderer Schwerpunkt dieses Beitrags liegt in der Berücksichtigung des Wortschatzes und der Routineformulierungen, die beim Argumentieren in einer wissenschaftlichen Auseinandersetzung benutzt werden. Methodisch werde ich mich im Grenzgebiet zwischen Dialoganalyse und historischer Lexikologie bzw. Semantik bewegen. Dabei werde ich versuchen, einen Zusammenhang herzustellen zwischen charakteristischen kommunikativen Aufgaben im Rahmen einer Kontroverse und den dazu eingesetzten sprachlichen Mitteln¹.

Meiner Untersuchung liegt ein Korpus von Streitschriften aus der Zeit um 1610 zugrunde, in denen zwei Theologen, Helisäus Röslin und Melchior Schaerer, ein Mediziner, Philipp Feselius, und der berühmte Mathematiker und Astronom Johannes Kepler darüber diskutieren, ob eine wissenschaftlich fundierte Astrologie möglich ist. An einzelnen Stellen werde ich zur Ergänzung einige Belege aus einer theologischen Kontroverse um 1580 heranziehen. Wir werden sehen, dass der alltägliche wissenschaftliche Wortschatz und die Routineformulierungen der argumentativen Praxis sich von unserem heutigen Sprachgebrauch z. T. ganz erheblich unterscheiden, aber funktional vieles abdecken, was wir heute als grundlegend für argumentativen Sprachgebrauch beschreiben würden.

2. Kommunikative Aufgaben in Kontroversen – ein Überblick

Ich gebe zunächst einen Überblick über einige typische kommunikative Aufgaben in einer Kontroverse und werde dann anschließend eine Auswahl von charakteristischen sprachlichen Mitteln vorführen, mit denen man um 1600 diese kommunikativen Aufgaben erfüllen konnte, indem man Aspekte einer Kontroverse charakterisierte oder bestimmte kommunikative Züge in einer Kontroverse machte.

1. Die Kommunikationsform oder Textsorte charakterisieren
 - 1.1 Die Art der Kommunikation charakterisieren
 - 1.2 Die Textsorte/Funktion einer Schrift charakterisieren
2. Arten und Aspekte von sprachlichen Handlungen charakterisieren
 - 2.1 Kritik an Personen und Positionen
 - 2.2 Einwände gegen Behauptungen und Argumente
 - 2.3 Einwände zurückweisen
 - 2.4 Eine Auffassung/ein Argument widerlegen

¹ Zu diesem methodischen Ansatz vgl. Fritz 1993; zur historisch-pragmatischen Analyse von Kontroversen des 17. Jahrhunderts vgl. Gloning 1999; Fritz 2003, 2005a, 2007.

- 2.5 Etwas Beweisen
- 2.6 Sich verteidigen, rechtfertigen
- 2.7 Etwas eingestehen bzw. zugestehen (*concessio*)

- 3. Charakteristische Formulierungen für Kontroversenzüge
 - 3.1 Den Streitpunkt (die *quaestio*, den *status controversiae*) angeben
 - 3.2 Eine (eigene oder fremde) Auffassung wiedergeben
 - 3.3 Eine verfehlte Auffassung wiedergeben
 - 3.4 Eine hypothetische oder kontrafaktische Annahme einführen
 - 3.5 Eine Folgerungsbeziehung oder einen Schluss signalisieren
 - 3.6 Einen möglichen Einwand vorwegnehmen
 - 3.7 Eine Aussage abschwächen (Hedging)
 - 3.8 Logische und dialektische Mängel kritisieren
 - 3.9 Kommunikative Prinzipien ansprechen

- 4. Typische Metaphorik

3. Sprachliche Mittel zur Erfüllung der kommunikativen Aufgaben

Nach diesem Überblick über spezifische kommunikative Aufgaben im Rahmen einer Kontroverse sollen jetzt charakteristische sprachliche Mittel vorgestellt werden, die in den Texten unseres Korpus zur Erfüllung der genannten kommunikativen Aufgaben verwendet werden.

3.1 Die Kommunikationsform oder Textsorte charakterisieren

Um die eigenen Kontroversenbeiträge zu kennzeichnen oder um auf die Beiträge des Kontroversenpartners Bezug zu nehmen, war es oft nötig, die Art der Kommunikation zu charakterisieren. Dies konnte mit Hilfe von Verben wie *disputirn* oder *zancken* oder mit Substantiven wie *streit* oder *controversia* geschehen. (In den folgenden, durchnummerierten Belegen sind die fremdsprachlichen Ausdrücke, die in den Originaltexten mit Antiqua-Schrift ausgezeichnet sind, kursiv gedruckt. Groß- und Kleinschreibung folgt dem jeweiligen Originaltext. Die Siglen sind im Literaturverzeichnis aufgelöst.)

3.1.1 Die Art der Kommunikation charakterisieren

Die häufigsten Ausdrücke zur Charakterisierung der Art der Kommunikation sind: *discurrirn*, *argumentirn* / *Argumentation*, *disputirn* / *disputation*, *controversia*, *streit*, *zanck*. Während *discurrirn* eher eine ruhige Form der Auseinandersetzung kennzeichnet und *argumentirn* / *Argumentation* auf die Verwendung von Argumenten hinweist, kennzeichnet *disputirn* / *disputation* die schulmäßige Form der Diskussion, während der Streitcharakter mit den Ausdrücken *controversia*, *streit* und *zanck* hervorgehoben werden kann. Beispiel (2) zeigt sehr schön die kontrastierende Verwendung dieser kennzeichnenden Ausdrücke: Kepler betont damit, dass der Hinweis auf die Größe Gottes in seinem früheren Diskussionsbeitrag nicht als Teil einer Predigt, sondern als

argumentativer Zug gemeint war. Interessant ist es auch, wenn die charakterisierenden Ausdrücke gehäuft auftreten wie in Beleg (9): Die Ärzte „disputiren / streiten / vnd zancken“ am Krankenbett und währenddessen stirbt der Patient. Wenn diese Folge rhetorisch als Steigerung zu verstehen ist, können wir sie als ein Indiz für die feinen Abstufungen des Gebrauchs dieser Ausdrücke nutzen.

- (1) muß D. Röslin mir nit für vbel halten / das ich darüber mit jhme / oder mit dem Leser / *discurrir*, vnnd etwa das *oppositum* halte (K 1610, 126.25ff.)
- (2) Ich hab [...] nit geprediget / sondern argumentiert (K 1609, 110.28)
- (3) Dis ist der Prozeß in dieser *argumentation* (K 1609, 109.27)
- (4) sich gegen mir in *disputation* eingelassen (K 1609, 103.20),
- (5) In welcher er wider die Astrologiam insonderheit scharpff disputirt (F 1609, Ciiijb),
- (6) wann diese *controversia* mehr *authoritatibus* [...] als *rationibus* sollte erörtert werden (F 1609, Fijja),
- (7) ehe er sich gegen mir in streit einlasset (K 1609, 105.29)
- (8) vnd ist davon (von der Position des Kometen) nicht der zanck (R 1609, Fijja) ‚darum geht die Auseinandersetzung nicht‘ (vgl. Jbf)
- (9) Vnd in dem sie (die Ärzte, GF) darüber disputiren / streiten / vnd zancken / geht dem Krancken die Seel auß / ehe sie der Sachen eins werden (S 1611, 205)

3.1.2 Die Textsorte/Funktion einer Schrift charakterisieren

Eine ähnliche Funktion wie die eben behandelten Kennzeichnungen haben auch die Charakterisierungen der Textsorte, die häufig als Teil des Titels einer Schrift verwendet werden. Während *Tractat* und *Diskurs* eher zur Kennzeichnung von unpolemischen Darstellungen zu einem Thema verwendet werden, signalisieren *Gegenschrifft* und *Antwort* den Charakter der Reaktion auf eine Angriffsschrift, *Verantwortung* den Verteidigungscharakter einer Schrift. Dagegen wird mit *Streitschrift* der polemische Charakter der Schrift hervorgehoben und mit Ausdrücken wie *Schmachschrift* oder *Lästerschrift* der beleidigende Charakter einer Schrift gekennzeichnet. Belege aus unserem Korpus sind: *Discurs* (Titelblatt F 1609), *Tractat* (K 1609, 130.8), *Tractätlein* (K 1609, 103.7), *Gegenschrifft* (K 1610, 149.35), *Antwort* ‚Gegenrede‘ (Titel von Kepler 1609), *Verantwortung* (O 1586, Titelblatt), *Schmachschrift* (Rosenbusch 1586, Titelblatt), *ärgerlichen Schmach und Streitschriften* (K 1610, 150.17), *Lästerschrift* (R 1609, Cijb), *Vexationschrift* (R 1611, Vorred, iijb).

3.2 Arten und Aspekte von sprachlichen Handlungen charakterisieren

In einer Kontroverse erweist es sich für einen Teilnehmer häufig als nötig, die Art einer eigenen sprachlichen Handlung explizit zu machen oder sprachliche Handlungen des Opponenten zu kennzeichnen. Dazu werden redekennzeichnenden Verben und ihre Substantivierungen verwendet. Diese expliziten Charakterisierungen dienen häufig auch dazu, die genannten Züge zu machen, d.h. die Ausdrücke werden in diesem Fall performativ verwendet, wie in folgendem Beispiel: „Hierin hab ich Keplern zu straffen“ ‚In diesem Punkt muss ich Kepler kritisieren‘.

3.2.1 Kritik an Personen und Positionen

Im Sinne von heutigem *kritisieren* werden häufig die Ausdrücke *straffen* und *tadeln* verwendet, seltener *taxirn*. Der Ausdruck *kritisieren* wird offenbar erst im weiteren Verlauf des 17. Jahrhunderts aus dem Französischen entlehnt (zur semantischen Entwicklungsgeschichte der Verben dieses Wortfelds vgl. Fritz 2005b, 192ff.).

- (10) Hierin hab ich Keplern zu straffen (K 1609, 122.4)
- (11) ich jnen auch zustraffen hab (R 1609, Fiija),
- (12) Ich hab an diesem andern theil der *argumentation* nichts zu tadeln ‚zu kritisieren‘ (K 1609, 124.9)
- (13) Daran hab ich / den Zweck belangend / auch nichts zu tadeln (K 1610, 166, 38f.)
- (14) in tadlung der *Astrology* (S 1611, 10)
- (15) diejenigen Fantastereyen / welche hie *Feselius* taxiret (K 1610, 226.20)
- (16) dass D. Luther [...] allein den *Abusum* vnd Missbrauch (der Astrologie) soll Taxirt vnd gestrafft haben (S 1611, 172)

3.2.2 Einwände gegen Behauptungen und Argumente

Eine zentrale Rolle in Kontroversen spielen Einwände gegen Behauptungen und Argumente. Es ist deshalb nicht verwunderlich, dass häufig auf Äußerungen dieser Art Bezug genommen wird. Gebräuchliche Substantive und Verben zur Kennzeichnung dieser Art von sprachlicher Handlung sind in unserem Korpus:

Einrede, Einwurff, Gegenwurff, objicirn/Objection, einwenden, Erinnerung. Dabei scheint der Ausdruck *Gegenwurff* (S 1611, 68) eine direkte Lehnübersetzung des lateinischen *objectio* zu sein.

- (17) so gilt diese Einred nicht (K 1610, 139.10)
- (18) Dann ich warlich in seinen Einreden [...] nichts finde / das ein Philosophischer Kopff mit Ehren vnd Reputation fürbringen kann (K 1610, 253.42f.)
- (19) (eines liederlichen) Eynwurffs (K 1610, 254.1)

- (20) Die fürnembste Einwürrff (S 1611, 204)
- (21) Es wirdt auch D. Feselius nunmehr mercken / dass diese Obiection nichts gelte (K 1610, 205.29)
- (22) Hie kommen nun die *psysici, objicirn* vnd sagen: [...] (K 1609, 109.29)
- (23) Letztlich wendet D. Feselius ein / [...] (S 1611, 202)
- (24) notwendige erinnerungen so wieder meine Schrifften einzuführen weren (K 1609, 105.21f.)

3.2.3 Einwände zurückweisen

Ein häufiger Zug im Anschluss an einen Einwand ist die Zurückweisung des Einwands. Auch dieser Zug wird häufig angekündigt oder gekennzeichnet. Die Standardformulierung scheint zu sein *auf eine Einrede antworten*.

- (25) Herrn Kepplern auf seine einreden antworten (R 1609, Jiiijb)
- (26) auff seine Einreden geantwortet (K 1609, 144.10)
- (27) Einreden vnd Gegenwürff [...] ablehnen (S 1611, 68)
- (28) (eine) Objection vmbstossen (K 1609, 139.6)

3.2.4 Eine Auffassung/ein Argument widerlegen

Standardzüge in Kontroversen sind die Widerlegung (2.4) und der Beweis (2.5). Es ist daher nicht verwunderlich, dass auf sie häufig Bezug genommen wird. Die gängigen Ausdrücke zur Kennzeichnung der Widerlegung sind: *widerlegen, refutirn* (häufig in Doppelformeln: *refutirn vnd widerlegen, Refutation und wiederlegung*), *abfertigen* („endgültig widerlegen“), *verwerffen* (häufig von Theorien und Auffassungen), *vmbstossen*. Der Ausdruck *vmbstossen* (und vielleicht auch noch *verwerffen*) wird metaphorisch verwendet und signalisiert den Kampfcharakter der argumentativen Auseinandersetzung (vgl. Abschnitt 4).

- (29) ehe er sich hinder ein Matery macht / dieselbe öffentlich zu widerlegen (K 1610, 192.7)
- (30) Ich wil nit alles refutirn, was Keplerus hiervon mehr scrupulirt (K 1609, 142.12f.)
- (31) Refutation vnd wiederlegung dessen / so Herr Johan Kepplerus [...] wider mein schreiben von den Cometen [...] eingeführet (R 1609, Fija)
- (32) Jetzo will ich sein ander Argument von Vnvollkommenheit der *Astrologia* abfertigen K 1610, 187.37)
- (33) Mein *Meteorologia* bleibt noch biß dato vnverworfen vnd vnwiderlegt (K 1609, 114.7)
- (34) Wir verwerffen zwar nicht die löbliche Kunst der Astronomei / wie wir dann auch nicht straffen / was seine gewissen vrsachen in der natur hat (F 1609, Eija)

- (35) wird D. Feselio seine meynung gerade wegs vmbgestossen (K 1610, 191.7f, K 1609, 109.40)
- (36) weil sie vnser Astronomische beweiß nit verstehen / vil weniger vmbstossen könden (K 1609, 109.31)

3.2.5 Etwas beweisen

Von den Ausdrücken zur Kennzeichnung eines Beweises ist *erweisen* sehr häufig – häufiger als das heute gebräuchliche *beweisen* – ebenso wie das gängige Fremdwort *probirn*. Mehrfach erscheinen sie in Doppelformeln: *probirt vnd erwiesen*. Daneben finden sich *beweisen* / *Beweiß* und *demonstrirn* / *Demonstration*.

- (37) Dann ich habe in meinem Buch *de Marte* erwiesen / daß (K 1610, 172.11)
- (38) Das hab ich erwisen / mit bekannten Exemplis (K 1609, 110.28)
- (39) Das will ich *Feselio* besser probieren / als er niemaln gewusst (K 1610, 190.30)
- (40) mag in viel wege probiert vnd erwiesen werden (K 1610, 209.27)
- (41) So heist das darumb nit auß der Astronomia beweisen (K 1609, 113.6)
- (42) wann er gleich keinen beweiß bringet (K 1609, 106.6)
- (43) so gläubt solches der Medicus, wanns schon nicht *demonstrirt* ist (K 1610, 179.8)
- (44) (Die Astronomie beruht) auff jhren gewissen *Demonstrationibus*, vrsachen vnd beweisungen (F 1609, A)
- (45) dass sie vns fürwerffen/ Wir haben keine *Demonstrationes*, das ist / solche gewisse/ lautere/ nothveste vnd vnumstößliche Vrsachen vnd Beweisungen (S 1609, Aij)
- (46) Vnd laß ich das Exempel einer solchen vngegründeten *demonstration* auch passieren (K 1610, 163.13)
- (47) ein böse *Demonstration* („ein schwacher Beweis“, S 1611, 75)

3.2.6 Sich verteidigen oder rechtfertigen

Der Reaktionszug auf einen Angriff, sei es auf einen Vorwurf oder eine Argumentation, wird mit folgenden Ausdrücken gekennzeichnet: *vertheydigen*, *verantworten* / *Verantwortung*, *Rettung* („erfolgreiche Verteidigung“).

- (48) das nunmehr auch die Astrologi sich in öffentlichen schrifften vertheydigen vnd verantworten dürffen (K 1609, 132.38)
- (49) da würd ich mich verantworten / vnd jhnen refutirn vnd straffen / nicht mit Lästern vnd schelten (wie bey verkehrten Gelehrten jetzt der brauch ist) (R 1609, Cijb)

- (50) Verantwortung
Desjenigen/ was *D. Helisaeus Roeslinus* auß meinem Buch *de Stella nova Anni 1604* angezogen. (K 1609, 104.1ff., Überschrift des Hauptteils der „Antwort“)
- (51) Verantwortung vnd Rettung der Argumenten vnd Ursachen / welche M. Melchior Schärer / [...] eingeführt (Titelblatt Schaerer 1611)
- (52) Rettung der Jesuiter Vnschuld wider die Gifftspinnen Lucam Osiander (Titelblatt Scherer 1586)

3.2.7 Etwas eingestehen bzw. zugestehen (*concessio*)

Ein interessanter dialektischer Zug, der vielfältige strategische Funktionen haben kann, ist das Zugeständnis, die *concessio*. Er wird in unseren Texten mit folgenden Ausdrücken gekennzeichnet: *gestehen, geständig sein, bekennen, zugeben, nachgeben, concessio*. Bemerkenswert sind die Stellen, an denen ein Autor ein bestimmtes Zugeständnis gerade nicht macht, sondern explizit verweigert (*Ich gesteh nit*):

- (53) D. Röslin. Ich gesteh gar nit / das meine *prognostica* auß einem besondern Trib gehen. Ich kann einem die vrsachen für augen setzen. Kepler. So gesteh Ich nit / das sie aus gnugsamen vrsachen gehen (K 1609, 126.39ff.)
- (54) Ich bin ihm seinen Schluß geständig/ aber die Vrsachen zu diesem Schluß/ die *Feselius* brauchet/ seynd einander sehr vngleich: Vnd gesteh nit/ daß die Sterne alle einander gleich seyen (K 1610, 225.32ff.)
- (55) Ich bekenne gern (K 1610, 181.26, K 1609, 107.5, K 1609, 116.15)
- (56) *Feselius* hette seiner meynung [...] schier zuviel zugegeben (K 1610, 221.1)
- (57) wann ich gleich D. *Feselio* alles nachgebe / was er von dieser materia eingebracht (S 1611, 202)
- (58) Auß jhrem Mund per *concessionem* (K 1609, 129.17)

3.3 Charakteristische Formulierungen für Kontroversenzüge

Während in den bisherigen Beispielen zumeist die Verwendung einzelner Ausdrücke zur *Kennzeichnung* bestimmter argumentativer Züge betrachtet wurde – wobei allerdings die explizit performative Verwendung auch berücksichtigt wurde –, sollen nun einige Routineformulierungen für die *Realisierung* bestimmter Kontroversenzüge vorgestellt werden. Dazu gehören Formulierungen, mit denen man den Streitpunkt angeben kann, oder mit denen man signalisiert, dass man eine bestimmte Meinung wiedergibt – möglicherweise eine verfehlt Meinung –, oder mit denen man einen möglichen Einwand vorwegnimmt.

3.3.1 Den Streitpunkt (die *quaestio*, den *status controversiae*) angeben

- (59) Es ist aber alhie die Frage [...] nicht/ sondern das ist die frag (F 1609, Aija)
- (60) quaestiones hernenmen (K 1610, 189.7) ‚Streitpunkte behandeln‘
- (61) Folgt nun der andere Punct / nemlich *authoritas Philosophorum* (K 1610, 198.3)
- (62) den *statum Controversiae* zuverkehren / vnd neue *Themata disputandi* zu erwegen (S 1611, 82f.)

3.3.2 Eine (eigene oder fremde) Auffassung wiedergeben

Häufig verwendete Ausdrücke sind hier: *halten*, *darfür halten*, *erachten*:

- (63) Ich halt er verstehe allhie die Aristotelicos Philosophos, (R 1609, Gija, vgl. R 1609 Jia), (‚nach meiner Auffassung meint er damit die aristotelischen Philosophen‘)
- (64) Kepplerus sagt vnd helt / das sich Gott dieser *Cometen* vnd zaichen gebrauche / den Menschen etwas darmit anzuzaigen (K 1609, 124.04) (‚Kepler ist der Auffassung‘)
- (65) das sie halten die Erden beweglich sein /[...]/ halt es wieder die heilig Schrift sein (R 1609 Ciiija) (‚dass sie der Auffassung sind, dass sich die Erde (um die Sonne) bewegt /[...]/ meiner Meinung nach widerspricht das der Heiligen Schrift‘)
- (66) wie Kepplerus recht helt (‚zurecht annimmt‘, R 1609, Liiija)
- (67) Halte dafür/ das alle kräftten vnd bewegungen/ so sich von oben herab begeben alwegen zu gutem von jhrer natur lencken (F 1609, Ciiija)
- (68) Röslin wirdt ohn zweifel nit dafür halten/ das es eine gantz Crystallstarcke kugel vnd einschliessung seye (K 1609, 107.39f.)
- (69) Vnd erachte ich/ das ich sonderlich Gott loben/ vnd guter hoffnung sein solle/das noch bey meinen lebzeiten die *Astrologia* auch gut werden soll (K 1609, 132.36f.)

3.3.3 Eine verfehlt Auffassung wiedergeben

Wenn man signalisieren will, dass man die Auffassung des Opponenten für verfehlt hält, kann man die Wiedergabe dieser Auffassung mit *er meynet* oder *er vermeynet* einleiten:

- (70) Es meynet ferner Feselius (K 1610, 186.11) (‚weiterhin ist Feselius der (verfehlten) Auffassung‘)
- (71) Feselius vermeynet (‚nimmt irrtümlich an‘, K 1610, 190.24)
- (72) Er meynet [...] Es ist aber weit fehl (K 1610, 194.23)

3.3.4 Eine hypothetische oder kontrafaktische Annahme einführen

Ein interessanter Zug in einer Kontroverse besteht darin, eine hypothetische oder kontrafaktische Annahme einzuführen und zu diskutieren. Der gängige Ausdruck für diesen Zug ist *gesetzt*. In vielen Fällen handelt es sich um Auffassungen, die der Opponent vertritt oder die man ihm unterstellt, um sie gleich anschließend zu widerlegen. Eine Routineformulierung für letzteren Zug, die einer lateinischen Wendung aus dem Disputationswesen nachgebildet ist, lautet *gesetzt, doch nicht gegeben* (76).

- (73) Vnd gesetzt / ein solche Figur gewinne jhre gleiche Winkel
(K 1610, 204.3)
- (74) dann gesetzt/ es hab kein Medicus nie keinen menschlichen Leib geöffnet/
(K 1610, 178.42f.)
- (75) In meiner Epistula ad Moestlinum, setz ich / das ich den Cometen [...]
(K 1609, 122.25)
- (76) gesetzt nun, doch nicht gegeben (K 1610, 184.8)
(vgl. lat. *dato sed non concessio*, Rosenbusch 1586.9)

3.3.5 Eine Folgerungsbeziehung oder einen Schluss signalisieren

Zum Signalisieren einer Folgerungsbeziehung oder eines Schlusses werden in erster Linie *also* und *folget* (häufig in der Verbindung mit *also*) verwendet. Daneben kommen Formulierungen vor wie *daraus schliesse ich* oder *es schließt sich*. Auch das lateinische Gegenstück zu *also, ergo*, ist in unserem Korpus vertreten (93).

- (77) also muß auch der Himmel mit der blauwen Farb auff dem Papier in Wahrheit Gemeinschaft haben. (K 1610, 190.35f.)
- (78) daraus dann folget (K 1610, 204.11; 204.19; 204.33)
- (79) es folget aber drum nit (K 1609, 11.37) ‚non sequitur‘
- (80) also folget / dass auch eines solchen Liechtes Krafft vmb viel schwächer seye (K 1610, 169.1),
- (81) Folget also / dass der Vnterscheidt der Farben [...] ein leibhaftig Werck seye (K 1610, 171.35ff.)
- (82) schliesse ich daraus/das sein Circul der Erden *centrum* nicht mit einschliessen thue (R 1609, D1jb)
- (83) so schleust es sich nicht vneben ‚kann man problemlos schließen‘ (K 1610, 171.22)

3.3.6 Einen möglichen Einwand vorwegnehmen

Zur Immunisierung gegen Einwände ist es eine gängige Strategie, den erwarteten Einwand gleich selbst vorwegzunehmen und zu entkräften. Charakteristische Formulierungen zur Realisierung dieses Zuges enthalten die einleitende Partikel *ja* und/oder ein Modalverb (*möchte, wollte*):

- (84) Ja möchte D. Feselius sprechen (K 1610, 203.3, vgl. 213.25)
- (85) Ja spricht einer [...] Antwort: [...] (K 1610, 183.32ff.)
- (86) Du möchtest gedencken [...] Ist aber nicht (K 1610, 175.1)
- (87) Wollte aber vielleicht allhie jemand einwenden (F 1609, Fa)

3.3.7 Eine Aussage abschwächen (Hedging)

In neueren Untersuchungen zum heutigen wissenschaftlichen Sprachgebrauch ist immer wieder darauf hingewiesen worden, dass eine wichtige Strategie erfolgreichen Argumentierens darin besteht, Aussagen nicht stärker zu machen als notwendig. Diese Strategie wird häufig mit charakteristischen abschwächenden Formulierungen, d.h. Formen des sog. Hedging, realisiert (vgl. Hyland 1998). Diese Strategie finden wir auch in den Kontroversen um 1600. Eine charakteristische Formulierung der Abschwächung besteht in der Relativierung einer Aussage auf die eigene Person mit Verwendung des Ausdrucks *geduncken* (*mich will geduncken* oder *mich geduncket*) oder der in den Beispielen (63), (65), (67) und (69) angeführten Ausdrücke *ich halte (darfür)* und *ich erachte*. Daneben gibt es vielfältige andere Formen des Hedging, von denen einige Beispiele hier wiedergegeben sind.

- (88) so will mich doch geduncken (K 1609, 142.32),
- (89) gedüncket mich [...] zu erweisen zu seyn (K 1610, 213.13)
- (90) also daß ich zimlich starck erwisen (K 1609, 120.30)
- (91) Vnd mag vielleicht die Ursach seyn / warumb [...] (K 1610, 213.43)
- (92) Hierauff sag ich / das ichs nit *epistemonico argumento*, sondern allein per *con(i)ecturas fortes* dargethan (K 1609, 104.22f.)
- (93) ob ich wol hiermit diesen Schluß (Saturnus hält seinen Stillstand im ersten Grad deß Wassermanns/ ergo so muß es kalt dunckel Wetter seyn) nicht für einen vnfehlbaren oder wolgegründeten Spruch außgebe (K 1610, 164.31ff.)

3.3.8 Logische und dialektische Mängel kritisieren

Grundlagen der Argumentationslehre lernten die Akademiker der Zeit um 1600 an der Universität in Fächern des Grundstudiums, nämlich Rhetorik, Logik bzw. Dialektik. Zudem war die Disputation eine wichtige Unterrichtsform des universitären Studiums, so dass dialektische Regeln und Prinzipien des Disputierens den Teilnehmern einer akademischen Kontroverse sehr gut vertraut waren. Dies zeigt sich in den Kontroversen unseres Korpus darin, dass die Teilnehmer nicht nur typische Argumentationsmuster der Disputationspraxis verwenden, sondern auch in ihren reflexiven Bemerkungen zum Gang der Kontroverse die typischen Züge dialektischer Kritik und die dafür ausgebildeten sprachlichen Mittel benutzen. Dazu gehören einerseits die lateinischen Formulierungen für die Kritik an Fehlschlüssen (sog. *fallaciae* wie die *petitio*

principii), andererseits deutschsprachige Ausdrücke wie das Adjektiv *ungereimt*, mit dem die Absurdität einer Auffassung oder eines Schlusses gekennzeichnet werden konnte, oder der Ausdruck *Gegenspiel* ‚Gegenteil‘, mit dem auf einen Selbstwiderspruch hingewiesen werden konnte. An manchen Stellen, z.B. in den Belegen (98) und (99), weisen die Disputanten explizit darauf hin, dass sie mit der Verwendung der lateinischen Fachsprache der Logik „schulmäßig“ reden, was möglicherweise als pedantisch ausgelegt werden könnte.

- (94) Er hat aber droben das Gegenspiel gesagt (K 1610, 195.20) ‚das Gegenteil behauptet‘
- (95) Wider diß Argument hab ich gar viel zu streitten. *Nego praemissas et conclusionem* (K 1610, 249.5)
- (96) Hab also nit argumentirt *à posse ad esse*, (ward vnvnnothen) sondern *à posse ad absurdum non esse* (K 1609, 110.37)
- (97) *mere fallaciae secundum non causam ut causam* (F 1609, Aib)
- (98) *Est petitio principij*, der Herr Doctor verzeih mir / das ich logicè rede (K 1609, 177.38)
- (99) *Principium petiren*, wie man in schulen redt (F 1609, Aib)
- (100) Wenn sie ein sach nit könden *directè refutirn*, so bringen sie solliches letz vnd vberzwerch für / vnd *refutirn* hernach nit des *Authoris*, sondern jhr fürbringen (K 1609, 116.33f.)
,Wenn Sie einen Punkt nicht direkt widerlegen können, so geben sie ihn schief und verquer wieder und widerlegen dann nicht des Autors Darstellung, sondern ihre eigene Wiedergabe.’
- (101) Es sey vnglaublich vnd vngereimt (K 1609, 109.32) ‚absurd, paradox‘
- (102) Jetztermelten *Absurditeten* aber vnd noch mehrer vngereimter sachen halber (R 1611, 125)
- (103) ich beweise [...] das es nichts vngereimbts sey (K 1609, 110.2f.)
- (104) Aus welcher meinung aber vil vngereimtes folgen muß (F 1609, Aiiija)
- (105) welches aber sehr vngereimt zu sagen (F 1609, Ciiija)
- (106) ist *Raymarus* ein grober vngereimter *Physicus* gewesen / mit *absurditeten* wieder Gott (R 1609, Diiija)

3.3.9 Kommunikative Prinzipien ansprechen

Zur reflexiven Praxis in Kontroversen gehörte auch die Erwähnung von kommunikativen Prinzipien, von denen der Kontroversenteilnehmer feststellen konnte, dass er selbst sie befolgt oder dass der Opponent sie verletzt. Diese vielfältigen Prinzipien und die Formen ihrer Anwendung und Thematisierung können hier nicht ausführlich dargestellt werden (vgl. Fritz 2007). Es sollen hier exemplarisch nur zwei häufig erwähnte Prinzipien angeführt werden, das Prinzip der Kürze und das Prinzip der Gründlich-

keit. An diesen beiden Prinzipien lässt sich auch ein besonderes Problem der Befolgung von Kommunikationsprinzipien zeigen, nämlich das Problem der Prinzipienkonflikte. In vielen Fällen ist es sehr schwierig, gleichzeitig gründlich zu argumentieren und Länge (*Weitläufigkeit*) zu vermeiden.

Das Prinzip der Kürze

- (107) weitleuffigkeit zuvermeiden (F 1609, Dijb; F 1609, Fijb)
- (108) keinen weitleuffigen schriftstreit (F 1609, iija)
- (109) diß köndt jetzt [...] weitläufftig dargethan werden/ aber kürtze halben vnterlasse ich es (S 1609, Aijja)
- (110) weil aber solcher zulang sein würd (F 1609, Eijjb)

Das Prinzip der Gründlichkeit

- (111) gründtliche Beweiß (K 1610, 192.1)
- (112) gründlich zu antworten (R 1609, Dijb)
- (113) Gründtlicher Discurs Von der Astrologia Judiciaria (F 1609, Titelblatt)

3.4 Metaphorik: Typische Kampfmetaphorik

Zur rhetorisch wirksamen Darstellung gehört in Kontroversen immer auch die Verwendung von Metaphern. Gerade Kepler macht immer wieder wirkungsvoll von Metaphorik Gebrauch. Diese Praxis wäre eine eigene Untersuchung wert. An dieser Stelle soll jedoch nur auf eine metaphorische Redeweise hingewiesen werden, die routinemäßig in zeitgenössischen Kontroversen eingesetzt wird, nämlich die Kampfmetaphorik für die polemische Auseinandersetzung. Dieses metaphorische Muster, dessen Gebrauch auch für die Gegenwart untersucht worden ist (vgl. Lakoff & Johnson 1980, 4ff.: ARGUMENT IS WAR), geht auf die klassische Rhetorik zurück und wird schon um 1600 als traditionelles Muster wahrgenommen. Typische metaphorisch verwendete Ausdrücke sind *anfechten*, *aufsechten*, *widersechten*, *bestreiten*, *antasten*, *umbstossen*, die in dieser Zeit alle auch zur Kennzeichnung körperlicher Angriffe verwendet werden.

- (114) Allhie gewinnet Feselius einen rechten vnd den Medicis absonderlich gewidmeten Kampffplatz (K 1610, 221.1)
- (115) wellicher mit sehr wichtigen *argumenten* die *Astrologia in genere* zimlich starck angefochten (K 1609, 125.35) ‚angegriffen hat‘
- (116) (die Argumente) / mit welchen die *Astrologia* gewöhnlich angefochten vnd widerlegt wirdt (K 1610, 162.17f.)
- (117) Dann diß hab ich gegen meinen *Opponenten* außzufechten gehabt (K 1609, 131.43, vgl. S 1611, 11)
- (118) darinnen er die ganze *iudiciariam Astrologiam* außdrücklich widerfochten vnd verworffen (K 1610, 149.23)

- (119) *Authoritatibus non pugnandum* (S 1611, 168, Marginalie)
- (120) was er (d.h. Feselius) allhie zu Mentzingen bestritten ‚bekämpft hat‘ (S 1611, 132)
- (121) wird D. Feselio seine meynung gerade wegs vmbgestossen (K 1610, 191.7f.)
- (122) die wahre *sobriam Astrologiam* zu *explodirn* vnd allerdings zu boden zu stossen vermeynet (S 1611, Titelblatt)
- (123) *Argumenta* zurücktreiben vnd unkräftig zu machen (‚zu entkräften‘) (S 1611, 68)
- (124) in welchem (Buch) er sich angetastet sein vermeint (K 1609, 105.35f.) ‚er glaubt, angegriffen worden zu sein‘
- (125) Kein ehrenrührige oder sonsten boßhafftige Politische schimpffliche Antastung Doctoris Röslini (K 1609, 112.15)

4. Fazit

Zusammenfassend kann man feststellen, dass den Akademikern der Zeit um 1600 ein ausdifferenziertes Repertoire von sprachlichen Mitteln zur subtilen Führung von Kontroversen zur Verfügung stand. Zu diesen gebräuchlichen Ausdrücken gehörten:

- gängige deutsche Ausdrücke wie *erweisen*, *verwerffen*, *straffen*, darunter auch Ausdrücke, die Lehnübersetzungen aus dem Lateinischen waren (z.B. *Gegenwurf* zu *ob-iectio*),
- lateinische Ausdrücke wie *controversia* oder *petitio principi*,
- etablierte Fremdwörter (vor allem lateinischer Herkunft) wie *Argument*, *disputirn*,
- sowie eine auffällige Menge von Ausdrücken, die offensichtlich metaphorische Verwendungsweisen hatten, wie *anfechten*, *vmbstossen*.

Bei manchen der erwähnten Quasi-Synonyme kann man feine Bedeutungsunterschiede vermuten, die man noch genauer untersuchen müsste.

Viele der damals gebräuchlichen Ausdrücke gehören auch heute noch zum festen Bestand an Argumentationswörtern, z.B. *Argument*, *beweisen*, *widerlegen* und *daraus folgt*. Andere sind heute wenig gebräuchlich oder ganz ungebräuchlich. Unter den Ausdrücken für Einwände sind fast alle (in diesem Sinne) ungebräuchlich geworden (*Einwurf*, *Gegenwurf*, *Einrede*, *Erinnerung*). Dasselbe gilt für den Ausdruck *refutieren* im Sinne von *widerlegen*. Ausdrücke wie *ungereimt* werden heute sehr selten verwendet, stattdessen sagen wir *absurd*. Ähnliches gilt für *Demonstration* im Sinne von *Beweis*. Die Verwendung von *halten* oder *darfür halten* ist heute völlig ungebräuchlich. Stattdessen verwenden wir *der Meinung sein* oder *der Auffassung sein*. Statt *gesetzt* sagen wir heute normalerweise *angenommen*. Manche Ausdrücke haben einen Bedeutungswandel erfahren, wie z.B. *strafen*, an dessen Stelle sich seit dem 18. Jahrhundert *kritisieren* einbürgert, oder *Verantwortung*, das nur noch im Sinne von *responsibility*

verwendet wird. Auch *probieren* wird nicht mehr im Sinne von *beweisen* verwendet. Man probiert ein Stück Kuchen aber kein Argument. *Verwerfen* wurde vermutlich um 1600 noch metaphorisch verstanden, ebenso wie *umstoßen*. In der Konkurrenz von *erweisen* und *beweisen* setzte sich *beweisen* durch. Insgesamt handelt es sich bei diesen Veränderungen um Entwicklungen des 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts, die im Detail erst noch erforscht werden müssen.

Unsere Beobachtungen zeigen, dass die Frage nach dem gängigen Gebrauch sprachlicher Mittel in bestimmten Kommunikationsformen eine fruchtbare Perspektive für historisch-pragmatische, historisch-lexikologische und historisch-semantische Untersuchungen ist. Eine Geschichte des Sprachgebrauchs in Kontroversen, die sich sowohl mit dem Wortschatz im engeren Sinne als auch mit Routineformulierungen befasst, ist zweifellos ein Desiderat der historischen Pragmatik und Lexikologie².

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² Theoretische und methodische Grundlagen für eine gebrauchtorientierte historische Wortschatzforschung hat Gloning (2003) entwickelt.

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DEUTSCHE ENTSPRECHUNGEN ZU *MAGARI*? EINE ANALYSE ANHAND DER MULTIMEDIALEN DATENBANK FORLIXT 1 UND ANDERER CORPORA DER GESPROCHENEN SPRACHE

CHRISTINE HEISS

1. *Die morphosyntaktische Kategorisierung von magari in Wörterbüchern und weiterführende Klassifizierungsversuche in Corpora der gesprochenen Sprache*

Schlägt man ein beliebiges einsprachiges italienisches Wörterbuch unter dem Stichwort *magari* auf, so findet man noch heute in den meisten Fällen eine Kategorisierung nach den Wortklassen Interjektion, Konjunktion, Adverb¹. Als stellvertretendes Beispiel sei hier der Eintrag aus Zanichelli (2008) angeführt:

magari

[gr. *makárie* 'o beato', vocativo di *makários* 'beato'; av. 1250]

A interiezione

* Esprime forte desiderio o speranza: 'ti piacerebbe riposare una settimana?' 'magari!'; 'vuoi che ti accompagni?' 'magari!'

B congiunzione

1. Volesse il cielo che, oh se (introduce una prop. ottativa, con il v. al cong.): magari fosse vero!; magari potessi venire anch'io!; magari arrivasse in tempo!
2. Anche se, a costo di (introduce una prop. concessiva con il v. al cong.): lo farò, dovessi magari impiegarci anni.

C avverbio

1. Forse, eventualmente: magari non ne sapeva niente; magari non verrà neppure, ma devo ugualmente aspettarlo.
2. Anche, persino: sarebbe magari capace di negare tutto.

1.1 Wunsch und Satzwertigkeit in Corpora der gesprochenen Sprache

Auswertungen von Corpora der gesprochenen Sprache kommen zu einer völlig anderen Gewichtung. So klassifiziert Daniela Zorzi in 284 Belegen für *magari* aus dem LIP nur 4 Belege als satzwertig, d.h. also in der Funktion als Interjektion, die in den Wörterbüchern meist an erster Stelle angegeben wird:

[LIP MD18. *Television quiz programme sponsored by a brand of coffee. If E guesses correctly she wins 80 million lire.*]

¹ Das sizilianische *macari* in der Bedeutung von *anche*, wie es in den Romanen von Andrea Camilleri vorkommt, wird hier nicht berücksichtigt.

A: signora sono ottanta milioni ma lei sa cosa sono ottanta milioni eh??

E: *magari*

(Zorzi 2001: 91)

Nur ein Beleg findet sich für *magari* als Adverb in Kombination mit einem Konjunktiv:

eccomi uh grazie grazie <??> si' magari potessi magari # allora C: <?> che no (Zorzi 1996: 20)

Die in Zorzi zitierten Beispiele für satzwertiges *magari* und *magari* als Adverb in Verbindung mit Konjunktiv beinhalten gleichzeitig die Wunschfunktion. Neben der klassischen morphosyntaktischen Kategorisierung scheint eine Klassifizierung auf pragmatischer Ebene also unumgänglich zu sein.

In der von Zorzi verwendeten Umschreibung der Funktionen von *magari* in adverbialer Verwendung klingen schon deutlich Funktionen an, die in der deutschen Sprachwissenschaft als *Abtönung* bekannt sind:

In all the remaining cases, *magari* is used adverbially, either to indicate uncertainty of various kinds, as in (2), or to mitigate the force of a proposal, making it less brusque (3):

(2) LIP NE11. *Television sale of anti-cellulite products.*

[...] può esser causata *magari* da un fattore ormonale può essere causata perché *magari* avete avuto una gravidanza da poco [...]

(3) LIP MB4. Informal conversation between B and F. B has forgotten to ring a friend.

F: va be' *magari* chiamala adesso

B: sì infatti adesso la chiamo

(Zorzi 2001: 91)

Die oben angeführten Beispiele zeigen außerdem, dass *magari* auch Höflichkeit ausdrücken kann, ähnlich wie dies mit Mitteln der Abtönung im Deutschen geschieht².

1.2 Klassifizierungsversuche auf pragmatischer Ebene (C-ORAL-ROM)

In einer sorgfältigen empirischen Untersuchung unterteilt Schiemann (2008) die Belege für *magari* in C-ORAL-ROM³ in fünf Hauptfunktionen, die sich natürlich auch überlappen können:

- Espressione di desiderio
- Indicazione di possibilità (aletica)
- Valutazione epistemica
- Funzione interattiva
- Funzione rafforzativa

² Zu Abtönung und Höflichkeit vgl. Held (2003).

³ Laut Schiemann finden sich in C-ORAL-ROM 118 Belege für *magari* (*informale*), 58 Belege für *magari* (*formale*).

1.2.1 La funzione rafforzativa – Ab- bzw. Auftönung?

Magari kann also zur Nuancierung eingesetzt werden, in der *funzione rafforzativa* finden sich wiederum deutliche Anklänge an die deutsche *Abtönung* bzw. *Auftönung*, wie Radtke den Begriff erweitert:

L'uso del termine *Abtönung* comporta qualche difficoltà inerente al concetto stesso; se Weydt vede nell'*Abtönung* una specie di attenuazione da parte del parlante, dovrebbe ugualmente esistere una *Auftönung* che sottolinei, e addirittura potenzi il ruolo del parlante. (Radtke 2001: 24)

Bei *magari* finden diese Nuancierungen häufig unterhalb der Satzebene statt, wie folgendes (konstruierte) Beispiel zeigt: „Mi serve una piccola relazione, *magari* solo di una pagina.“

1.2.2 *Magari* in der Interaktion – Mittel zum gezielten Einsatz von Höflichkeit?

Eine wichtige Funktion von *magari* in der spontanen Interaktion ist auch der Ausdruck von Höflichkeit. Dabei spielt die Prosodie (Betonung, Dehnung usw.) eine entscheidende Rolle⁴. Dies ist vor allem in Hauptsätzen der Fall, denn eine mit *magari* zusammenhängende illokutive Funktion ist prinzipiell in Hauptsätzen zu finden.

In folgenden Beispielen aus C-ORAL-ROM kann – mit unterschiedlichen, eventuell auch von der im Korpus mitgelieferten Audioaufnahmen abweichenden Betonungsinterpretationen – mehr oder weniger höflich agiert werden:

(21) *GCM: eh // perché quelle / magari / si fanno <dopo> // (ipubdl05;152)

(22) *GCM: magari / tu gli fai prima <un'introduzione> // (ipubdl05;122)

(23) *FED: Agnese / vogliamo rivedere / assieme / &che i momenti principali / della tua esperienza / poi magari / li commentiamo insieme // (imedts05;22)

(24) *MAB: quindi / magari fra voi / pensate chi &v [/] chi è / disponibile / a [/] a candidarsi // (ipubcv02;27)

(25) *GCM: magari / non / come interrogazione // (ipubdl05;156) (C-ORAL-ROM)

1.3 Fließende Grenzen bei der Klassifizierung

Dass die verschiedenen Funktionen von *magari* sich häufig überschneiden, ist in der Literatur mehrfach angedeutet worden. So beschreiben Brighetti & Licari die Funktionen auch aus kontrastiver Perspektive folgendermaßen:

⁴ Auf die Bedeutung der Intonation bei der Interpretation von satzwertigem *magari* weist auch Arcaini (2000: 528) ausdrücklich hin.

[...] This is a broadly-used, relatively vague marker which signals the speaker's stance towards the probability of an event/state of affairs and its desirability, and which at the same time weighs, through various modes of negotiation with the interlocutor, desirability against probability (in this respect translations might go from 'maybe' to 'hopefully').
Brighetti & Licari, zusammengefasst in Zorzi (2001: 91)

Wie schon oben in Bezug auf den Ausdruck von Höflichkeit durch *magari* erwähnt, ist die Zuweisung einer Funktion oft an eine bestimmte Interpretation gebunden. Mehrere Funktionen können sich in ein und demselben kommunikativen Abschnitt überschneiden bzw. überlagern. Man erwähnt und argumentiert, man bewertet und schlägt etwas vor, man deutet an und manipuliert usw. Dies soll in den in Punkt 3 und 4 diskutierten Beispielen aus Filmdialogen gezeigt werden.

2. Filmdialoge in der multimedialen Datenbank Forlixt 1

Forlixt 1 enthält zur Zeit 12 italienische und 12 deutsche Originalfilme mit jeweiliger Synchronversion (meist Komödien), hinzu kommen mehrere französische und englische Filme mit der jeweiligen Synchronversion, die aber für unsere Auswertung nicht berücksichtigt wurden. Vorausgeschickt werden muss natürlich, dass sich Filmdialoge von spontan gesprochenen Dialogen insofern unterscheiden, als es sich in den meisten Fällen um „mündlich realisierte schriftlich konstituierte Textsorten (mrskT)“ (Gutenberg 2000) bzw. *written to be spoken* handelt, einmal abgesehen von wenigen genreabhängigen Ausnahmen wie z. B. in Dokumentarfilmen mit unbearbeiteter Tonaufnahme oder in Filmen mit improvisierten Dialogen. Aufschlussreich für die Dynamik von Dialogen sind Filmdialoge bestimmter Genres, wie z.B. Komödien, allemal, denn hier soll die Illusion gesprochener Sprache geschaffen werden. Gleichzeitig soll die Handlung effizient und störungsfrei ablaufen. Gerne greift man dafür auf dialogische Signalelemente, ‚Ikonen‘ der gesprochenen Sprache (Heiss & Soffritti, im Druck) zurück, die die Aufgabe haben, ‚Nähesprache‘ zu suggerieren.

2.1 Die Dimension der Übersetzung

Filmdialoge stellen darüber hinaus eine der wenigen Möglichkeiten dar, ein paralleles Korpus ‚gesprochener‘ Sprache (im oben erwähnten Sinn) aufzubauen. Bei der Analyse der übersetzten Dialoge sind allerdings die technischen Einschränkungen der Filmsynchronisation wie quantitative und qualitative Lippensynchronität, Synchronität mit Gestik, Mimik und Proxemik bzw. alle anderen (audio)visuellen Komponenten zu berücksichtigen (vgl. Herbst 1994: 29ff.), was oft zu ‚freien‘ Übersetzungen mit Kompensierungen auch im weiteren Dialogumfeld führt. Im folgenden sollen die Funktionen von Schiemannt anhand der Belege von *magari* in *Forlixt 1* überprüft werden.

3. Belege von *magari* in Forlìxt 1 (*italienische Filme und deutsche Synchronversionen*)

3.1 *magari* als satzwertige Interjektion mit Äußerung eines Wunsches

Das erste Beispiel aus dem Film *L'ultimo bacio* (2000, Gabriele Muccino, *Der letzte Kuss*) zeigt *magari* als satzwertige Interjektion, mit der ein Wunsch geäußert wird. Kontext ist eine getuschelte Unterhaltung zwischen Freunden, die sich in der Kirche während der Messe über ihr Privatleben bzw. das anderer Leute austauschen:

Veronica: Ma la lasci per un'altra?

Adriano: *Magari!*

Veronica: Sag mal, ist es wegen einer anderen?

Adriano: *Schön wär's!*

Ein weiteres Beispiel findet sich im Film *Storia di ragazzi e di ragazze* (1998, Pupi Avati, *Eine Geschichte von Männern und Frauen*). Während gerade ein aufwendiges Hochzeitsmenü vorbereitet wird, spielt sich folgender Dialog ab:

Loretta: Hm, avete già fatto quasi tutto.

Vedova: *Magari*, non siamo neanche a metà.

Loretta: Mhh, ihr habt schon fast alles fertig

Witwe: *Schön wär's*. Wir haben noch nicht mal die Hälfte.

Die deutschen Übersetzungen mit dem Ausruf *schön wär's* bringen den Wunsch deutlich zum Ausdruck. *Schön wär's* könnte als "Standardübersetzung" für das satzwertige *magari* mit Wunschfunktion gelten, für das allerdings auch in *Forlìxt 1* nur zwei Belege aufscheinen.

3.2 *magari* in epistemischer Funktion, mit gleichzeitiger Wunschäußerung und manipulativem Einsatz

Ein besonders schönes Beispiel für die Überlappung von Funktionen, die *magari* in Dialogen übernehmen bzw. auch für die exemplarische Funktion, die *magari* als ‚Ikone‘ gesprochener Sprache in Filmdialogen zukommen kann, findet sich in der folgenden Szene aus dem Film *Caruso Pascoski* (1988, Francesco Nuti, *Einstweilige Verführung*).

Caruso: Ecco, ecco, ma ora che ... ora avete ... cosa avete intenzione di fare, cioè, di lasciarvi oppure *magari* state ognuno per conto vostro e vi vedete ogni tanto, così, come amici ...

Caruso: Gut schön. Aber jetzt was habt ihr nun vor? *Wollt ihr zusammen leben oder lebt jeder von euch für sich alleine? Ich meine*, gleich zusammenzuziehen ist so eine Sache...oder trefft ihr euch nur mal ab und zu, so wie Freunde ...

Der Psychologe Caruso versucht an dieser Stelle seinen Patienten, der gleichzeitig auch der Liebhaber seiner Frau ist, davon zu überzeugen, dass eine zu schnelle feste Verbin-

derung der beiden nicht ratsam ist. Der Satzteil mit *magari* führt manipulativ die Lösung ein, die für den Sprecher selbst die im Augenblick günstigste wäre. Die deutsche Übersetzung findet keine Entsprechung für *magari*, eine Wiedergabe der epistemischen Funktion findet sich nur im Verb (ich *meine*).

3.3 *magari* mit konzessiver Funktion

Im Film *Caro Diario* (1993, Nanni Moretti, *Liebes Tagebuch*) schildert der Sprecher seine Erfahrungen mit dem italienischen Gesundheitssystem. Wegen eines starken Juckreizes läuft er von Arzt zu Arzt, keiner jedoch behandelt seine Beschwerden richtig:

Nanni: [...] E ricomincio ad andare dai dermatologi. C'è un dermatologo, *magari* non famoso come il principe, di cui però mi hanno parlato molto bene e vado a farmi visitare anche da lui.

Nanni: [...] Und wieder gehe ich zu Dermatologen. Da gibt es einen Dermatologen, der *vielleicht* nicht so berühmt ist wie der König⁵, von dem ich aber viel Gutes gehört habe und dort lass' ich mir auch einen Termin geben.

Die deutsche Übersetzung greift hier auf *vielleicht* zurück, das allerdings nicht alle Nuancen von *magari* abdeckt. Im italienischen Dialogteil steht die konzessive Funktion im Vordergrund, im deutschen Dialogteil wird diese zu einer Möglichkeit unter mehreren anderen.

3.4 *magari* mit epistemischer Funktion in Verbindung mit einer Unterstellung

In der folgenden Szene aus *Storia di ragazzi e di ragazze* (1989, Pupi Avati, *Eine Geschichte von Männern und Frauen*) wird beim Festessen über Politik diskutiert. Die politische Einstellung des Sprechers wird von einigen Anwesenden offensichtlich nicht geteilt:

Taddeo: Invece vi dà fastidio che tutti lo amano, che piace a tutti, che finalmente c'è uno che è stato capace di mettere d'accordo la maggioranza con l'opposizione. C'è qualcuno qua *magari* che pensa che io son fesso.

Taddeo: Es ärgert dich doch, dass ihn alle lieben, dass er allen gefällt, dass es endlich einen gibt, der die Mehrheit mit der Opposition vereint. *Vielleicht* gibt es hier irgendwen, der mich für einen Trottel hält.

Auch hier greift die deutsche Übersetzung wieder auf *vielleicht* zurück, das mehrere Funktionen des italienischen *magari* im selben Kontext zumindest teilweise ausdrücken kann.

⁵ Die Übersetzung von *principe* mit *König* soll an dieser Stelle nicht diskutiert werden.

3.5 *magari* mit epistemischer Funktion und gleichzeitiger Wunschäußerung

Aus dem gleichen Film stammt folgende Äußerung:

Ragazza: *Magari* torna, vero zia?

Mädchen: *Vielleicht* kommt er ja zurück, nicht wahr Tante?

Die Rede ist hier von einem umstrittenen Journalisten, in den die Sprecherin verliebt ist und dessen Rückkehr in die Heimatregion sie ersehnt. Interessant ist die Unterstützung des Ausdrucks der Wunschfunktion in der deutschen Version durch die Abtönungspartikel *ja*.

3.6 *magari* mit epistemischer sowie interaktiver und konzessiver Funktion – ein Zugeständnis wird gemacht.

Das nächste Beispiel aus *La vita è bella* (Roberto Benigni, 1997, *Das Leben ist schön*) zeigt *magari* wiederum mit mindestens zwei überlappenden pragmatischen Funktionen. Gleichzeitig wird etwas eingeräumt, ein Zugeständnis wird gemacht. In der deutschen Übersetzung wird dies betont durch die Wendung *von mir aus*:

Ispettore: So che la cucina è chiusa. *Magari* una cosa fredda, quello che trovate.

Gesundheitsinspektor: Ich weiß, die Küche hat schon geschlossen. Bringen Sie mir irgendwas.

Von mir aus auch etwas Kaltes.

4. *magari* in italienischen Synchrondialogen – gezielter Einsatz als ‚Ikone‘ gesprochener Sprache?

Ausdrücke wie *magari*, *dai*, *mica*, *però* oder *mò*⁶ u.a. könnten in italienischen Synchronversionen eine ähnliche Funktion übernehmen, wie Abtönungspartikeln bei der Synchronisation ins Deutsche⁷, d.h. die Dialoge umgangssprachlich gestalten. Im folgenden werden wieder einige Beispiele aus *Forlìxt 1* diskutiert.

4.1 Interaktion – Negation

Im ersten Beispiel aus der Komödie *Abgeschminkt* (1993, Katja von Garnier, *Donne senza trucco*) versucht René sich mit Maischa in der Disko zu verabreden. Anhand der schriftlichen Dialoge allein kann allerdings nicht eindeutig festgestellt werden, ob nun Wunschfunktion besteht oder ein Ablenkungsmanöver versucht wird. Klarheit über die pragmatischen Funktionen gewinnt man erst durch die Prosodie, und dies gilt sowohl für *vielleicht* im deutschen Film als auch für *magari* in der italienischen Synchronversion:

⁶ Zu *mò* als Ikone gesprochener Sprache vgl. Heiss & Soffritti (im Druck).

⁷ Zum Einsatz von Abtönungspartikeln bei der Synchronisation ins Deutsche aus dem Englischen vgl. Herbst 1994; Heiss 1996, 2001, 2004, 2007.

René: Das ist aber schade. Ich dachte wir könnten n' bisschen ... wir könnten ein bisschen reden oder so. Naja, *vielleicht* ein anderes Mal?

Maischa: Ja, *vielleicht*...

René: Mmh, che peccato! Speravo di poter...stare un po' insieme, parlare un po'... un'altra volta *magari*.

Maischa: *Magari*...

4.2 Interaktion und Wunsch

Im nächsten Dialogbeispiel aus dem gleichen Film findet sich die interaktive Funktion zusammen mit der Äußerung eines Wunsches:

Mark: Ist ja auch egal. Ich flieg morgen wieder zurück. Naja, ich dachte wir könnten *vielleicht* irgendwas zusammen anstellen.

Mark: Io riparto domani... e avevo pensato che *magari*...potevamo fare qualcosa insieme.

Die Signalwirkung von *magari* als Element gesprochener Sprache wird hier auch noch durch den stark umgangssprachlichen Imperfekt (*potevamo*) an Stelle der grammatikalisch korrekteren Form *avremmo potuto fare* unterstützt.

4.3 *magari* ohne direkte Entsprechung im deutschen Ausgangsdialog

Der Einsatz von *magari* in Synchrondialogen ohne unmittelbare Entsprechungen in den deutschen Ausgangsdialogen zeigt, welche Signalfunktion *magari* als Element gesprochener Sprache zukommt. Gleichzeitig wird deutlich, wie differenziert die Möglichkeiten zur 'Feineinstellung' mit *magari* sind.

Im folgenden Dialogteil aus dem Film *Nordrand* (1999, Barbara Albert, *Nordrand – Periferia Nord*) will Jasmin ihre Freundin Tamara trösten, die gerade die Nachricht vom Tod ihres Bruders (im Kontext des Balkankonflikts) bekommen hat:

Jasmin: Das gibt's ja net. Das is' sicher nur... a Missverständnis oder so ... Hm?... Und das mitten im Frieden.

Jasmin: No... Non può essere vero... Sarà stato un errore... *Magari* gli hanno detto così, invece ... Adesso che c'era la pace...!

5. Einige quantitative Angaben zum Vorkommen von *magari* in Forlìxt 1

In den deutschen Synchronversionen wird *magari* hauptsächlich durch *vielleicht*, z. T. in Kombination mit Abtönungspartikeln wie *ja* wiedergegeben. In Forlìxt finden wir folgende Belege aus den Synchronversionen von insgesamt 11 italienischen Filmen: *vielleicht* (22); *schön wär's* (2); *wenn* (*wenn auch*, *wenn ja*, *wenn ich das wüßte*) (3); *als etwa* (1); *dann* (1); *falls* (1); Konjunktiv (1); *womöglich* (1); *es wäre möglich* (1); *von mir aus* (1); *wahrscheinlich* (1); *wohl auch* (1); *sicher* (1); Leerstelle (5).

Bei der Übersetzung aus dem Deutschen steht *magari* in 9 Fällen als Übertragung von *vielleicht* in insgesamt 10 Belegen aus 4 deutschen Filmen. In einem Fall (vgl. das Beispiel aus *Nordrand* oben) ist keine Entsprechung vorhanden.

6. Andere Übersetzungsvorschläge

Ein Blick in Wörterbücher und spezifische Publikationen zeigt jedoch, dass in unserem Corpus nicht alle Möglichkeiten der Übertragung ausgeschöpft werden. So führt der Eintrag im DIT (2002) für das satzwertige *magari* noch eine Übertragung mit *und ob* an, für *magari* im adverbialen Gebrauch findet man den Übersetzungsvorschlag *sogar*, bei der Übertragung von *magari* in Kombination mit Konjunktiv das Syntagma *lieber... als dass*:

ma-ga-ri

I *interiez*

1a schön wär's: *hai vinto?* – *magari!* hast du gewonnen? – schön wär's!

b (*volentieri*) und ob: *vorresti fare un viaggio?* – *magari!* möchtest du eine Reise machen? – und ob!

2 (*volesse il cielo*) wenn es doch: *magari fosse vero!* wenn es doch wahr wäre! *magari piovesse!* wenn es doch regnen würde!

II *avv*

1a (*forse*) vielleicht: *magari verrò domani* vielleicht werde ich morgen kommen

b (*probabilmente*) wahrscheinlich

2 (*persino*) sogar: *lo pagherei magari anche un milione* ich würde dafür sogar eine Million bezahlen

III *cong*

1 (*anche se*) auch wenn, selbst wenn: *devo finire il lavoro, magari dovesse durare tutta la notte* ich muss die Arbeit fertig machen, selbst wenn es die ganze Nacht dauern sollte

2 (*piuttosto*) lieber..., als dass...: *magari faccio scoppiare uno scandalo, ma non gliela faccio passare liscia* lieber löse ich einen Skandal aus, als dass ich ihn heil davon-kommen lasse

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Schiemann (2008: 302) diskutiert die Möglichkeit einer Übertragung mit *meinetwegen* beim Einsatz von *magari* zur Einführung eines erklärenden Beispiels:

Qui appare interessante un confronto con il tedesco. Per introdurre un'ipotesi esemplificativa, oltre a *zum Beispiel* (= *per esempio*), nel parlato si usa *meinetwegen* (\approx *per me*) che lessicalmente accenna al soggetto parlante nel senso di: "Io, per me, ho scelto questo esempio. Se a te non va bene, possiamo prenderne un altro."

7. magari in Kontaktsprachen bzw. ‚Kontaktdialekten‘ – eine Leerstelle im Deutschen?

Interessant unter dem Gesichtspunkt der vielfältigen Verwendungsmöglichkeiten von *magari* in vielerlei pragmatischen Kontexten und der Problematik der Auffindung einer Entsprechung im Deutschen sind Beispiele aus einem im Rahmen einer Tesi di Laurea an der Universität Bologna-Forlì erstelltem Corpus. So findet sich *magari* auch im Kontext von Konversationen im Südtiroler Dialekt⁸, im folgenden Beispiel mit epistemischer Funktion bei gleichzeitiger Andeutung einer Möglichkeit. Ein gleichwertig flexibles deutsches bzw. dialektales Wort scheint zu fehlen:

A: Ja aber wenn aso auf an Bauernhof oder auf der Hitt oben an Omlett isch, sem sein woll viele Eier drinnen.

C: Oan Goggele pro Kopf, pro Omlett.

B: Ja, oan Ei pro Kopf.

D: Ja, eben.

B: Ja aber sem machen sie die Ding alm oanzeln o, net?

A: Ja, ja.

C: Backpulver tian sie magari a inni.

B: Sell geht aber net, mit dem Backpulver.

D: Gell, sell hon i a schun amol probiert.

C: Ja sell geht net.

(Gutta Schmid, Tesi di Laurea non pubblicata)

8. Schlussfolgerungen

Die Auswertung der Daten aus *Forlìxt 1* im Vergleich mit den Analysen anderer Corpora der gesprochenen Sprache zeigen keine auffälligen Abweichungen zwischen der spontanen Verwendung von *magari* und dem Einsatz in Filmdialogen. Gerade bei der Analyse von *magari* in Filmdialogen, in denen sprachliche Mittel nicht nur an den Konversationspartner, sondern vor allem an das Publikum gerichtet sind, zeigt sich jedoch, wie unscharf und interpretationsabhängig die semantische und pragmatische Kategorisierung ist. Mehrfache Einordnungen bzw. Bewertungen sind unvermeidlich. Unverzichtbar für die Kategorisierung sind Prosodie und Situation, in der multimedialen Datenbank *Forlìxt 1* jederzeit abrufbar. In Filmdialogen dient *magari* außerdem bevorzugt als Ikone der „spontanen“ dialogischen Interaktion (wie andere Wörter, z. B. *dai*, *mica* oder das süditalienische *mo*)⁹. Die Übersetzung ins Deutsche zeigt, dass *vielleicht* eine ähnliche Flexibilität besitzt, allerdings bei weitem nicht alle Nuancen von *magari* wiedergeben kann. Dies wird auch bei der Übersetzung aus dem Deutschen mehr als deutlich.

⁸ Im Korpus von Schmid findet sich *magari* auch in anderen Funktionen, aus Platzgründen ist es jedoch nicht möglich, auf alle Beispiele einzugehen.

⁹ Zu *dai* vgl. Heiss & Soffritti 2008: 55ff., zu *mo* Heiss/ Soffritti im Druck, zu *mica* Soffritti (in diesem Band).

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AFFEKTBELADENE AUSDRUCKSFORMEN IN DEN SITZUNGSDEBATTEN DES EUROPÄISCHEN PARLAMENTS

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1. *Einführung*

In *De Interpretatione* hatte bereits Aristoteles darauf hingewiesen, dass das, was in der Stimme ist, ein Symbol der Affekte der Seele ist, und das Geschriebene ein Symbol dessen, was in der Stimme ist. Und wie nicht alle die gleichen Buchstaben haben, sind auch die Laute nicht bei allen dieselben. Das aber, wovon diese zuallererst Zeichen sind, die Affekte der Seele, ist bei allen das gleiche, und ebenso sind die Sachverhalte, von denen diese Ähnlichkeiten sind, dieselben (*Lehre vom Satz 1; 16 a 3-8*).

Jahr (2000: 61) weist auf das starke Interesse zahlreicher Forscher für die affektive Seite der Sprache im 20. Jahrhundert hin. So hatte auch Wittgenstein¹ bemerkt, dass Empfindungsworte mit den natürlichen Empfindungen verknüpft sind. Ferner weist Jahr auf die Beiträge von Bally im Rahmen der „Affektiven Linguistik“ sowie von Sperber, von von Polenz, von Daneš hin. Wichtig sind auch die Arbeiten von Plantin, der sagt, dass „on dispose en français d'études remarquables sur le lexique et la grammaire des sentiments“ (2000: 7). Jahr (2000: 109) hat eine Formel erarbeitet, um die emotionale Intensität von Sachtexten zu ermitteln. Ferner ist auch auf die Forschungen über das Vokabular des Ärgers, und zwar auch in kontrastiver Hinsicht, hinzuweisen. Dabei ist Weigand (1998) den meisten (auch okkasionellen) Ausdrücken des Ärgers in dessen verschiedenen Nuancierungen nachgegangen und Schmitt (1998) hat solche Formulierungen auf der Grundlage eines Vergleichs zwischen Paralleltexten analysiert.

Für die vorliegende Studie ist man davon ausgegangen, dass solche Ausdrücke in den Sitzungsdebatten des Europäischen Parlaments besonders häufig sein dürften. Emotionen, Affekte sind nämlich besonders stark, wenn man in eine Debatte involviert ist und die eigenen Ideen und Stellungnahmen überzeugend versprachlichen soll. Im Rollenspiel der parlamentarischen Debatte sollten die EP-Abgeordneten nämlich während der EP-Sitzungen diese Emotionen besonders kräftig in ihren Reden durchbli-

* Lorenza Rega hat die Kapitel 1 und 2 und Marella Magris die Kapitel 3, 4 und 5 geschrieben.

¹ § 256. „Wie ist es nun mit der Sprache, die meine innern Erlebnisse beschreibt und die nur ich selbst verstehen kann? *Wie* bezeichne ich meine Empfindungen mit Worten? – So wie wir's gewöhnlich tun? Sind also meine Empfindungsworte mit meinen natürlichen Empfindungsäußerungen verknüpft? – In diesem Falle ist meine Sprache nicht >privat<. Ein Anderer könnte sie verstehen, wie ich. – Aber wie, wenn ich keine natürlichen Äußerungen der Empfindung, sondern nur die Empfindung besäße? Und nun *assoziiere* ich einfach Namen mit den Empfindungen und verwende diese Namen in einer Beschreibung“.
(Wittgenstein [1953]1977: 144).

cken lassen, um ihre Kollegen von der Güte ihrer Ideen, Stellungnahmen usw. und umgekehrt von der Sinnlosigkeit der Vorschläge, Ideen usw. ihrer andersgesinnten Kollegen zu überzeugen bzw. zu überreden. Dabei ist auf den besonderen Charakter dieser Texte hinzuweisen. Es handelt sich um Texte, die zum großen Teil zuerst gesprochen und aufgenommen und dann schriftlich fixiert und vom Autor revidiert werden². Dies bedeutet, dass einige Züge der gesprochenen Sprache ohnehin in ihnen zu finden sind. Aber das Merkmal, das für die vorliegenden Bemerkungen von besonderer Bedeutung zu sein scheint und dessen man sich immer bewusst sein sollte, ist, dass „einer sprachlich ausgedrückten emotionalen Bewertung nicht zwangsläufig ein entsprechendes Gefühl zugrunde liegen muß“ (Jahr 2000: 77). Man kann mit Jahr (2000: 4) einverstanden sein, wenn sie sagt, dass keine eindeutige Grenze zu ziehen ist, die festlegt, wann Emotionen als strategisch eingesetzte Mittel zu deuten sind und wann dies völlig ausscheidet. Und dies gilt um so mehr für Texte von Politikern, im Unterschied zu Texten, die mit einer nicht zu leugnenden, wirklich echten Leidenschaft verfasst sind, wie z.B. Texte von Autoren, die die eigenen Entdeckungen oder Resultate ihrer Forschungen in ihrem Gebiet beschreiben, auch wenn die Texte der Forscher der Human- und Sozialwissenschaften – dank des mehr diskursiven Charakters dieser Disziplinen – in vielen Fällen durch eine größere Emotionsintensität charakterisiert sind (vgl. z.B. die emotionale Intensität, die einige Texte von Max Weber³ ausstrahlen, wo u.a. die ganz besondere Verwendung der Interpunktion die Emotionalität besonders stark durchblicken lässt).

2. Sprachliche Mittel zum Ausdruck von Affekten

Nach dieser Prämisse, die notwendig war, um das eventuelle Missverständnis zu vermeiden, dass jeder Text der getreue Spiegel der eigenen Gefühle ist, kann man anhand einer Sprachanalyse versuchen zu ermitteln, welche sprachlichen Mittel zum Ausdruck der sei's echten, sei's nicht echten Affekte eingesetzt wurden. In einem zweiten Schritt soll dann darauf eingegangen werden, ob diese Affekte in den übersetzten Texten beibehalten wurden.

Die Analyse ist anhand von 24 Sitzungsdebatten (von Januar bis Juni 2007) durchgeführt worden. Dabei hat man die Reden von deutsch- und italienischsprachigen Abgeordneten sowie die entsprechenden Übersetzungen berücksichtigt, auch wenn die Übersetzungen immer nur vom Englischen her durchgeführt werden.

Bei der Lektüre der Texte hat man sofort Folgendes bemerkt:

1. Das Wort Emotion wurde nur einmal gefunden, und zwar in einer Rede, die Romano Prodi als Ministerpräsident Italiens vor dem Parlament hielt (*è con questa consapevolezza, e non senza emozione, che mi rivolgo a voi oggi – mit diesem Bewusstsein und keineswegs frei von Emotionen spreche ich heute zu Ihnen*);

² Manchmal werden aber auch geschriebene Texte vorgetragen.

³ Vgl. z.B. *Politik als Beruf* (1917/1919) und *Wissenschaft als Beruf* (1919).

2. die Worte der Freude, der Genugtuung werden meistens ausdrücklich gesagt;
3. die Worte des Ärgers, der Feindseligkeit im engeren Sinne werden fast nie *expressis verbis* gesagt;
4. die Worte der Besorgnis werden ziemlich oft *expressis verbis* verwendet.

In vielen Reden findet man *Ich möchte meine Freude zum Ausdruck bringen; Ich bin stolz darauf und froh darüber; ich freue mich* usw. In den Reden ist man aber nur selten auf eine explizite Formel *Ich bin verärgert* usw. gestoßen, sondern viel öfter auf Formulierungen, die verstehen lassen, dass ein Abgeordneter empört, verärgert, unzufrieden ist bzw. dies den Kollegen/Innen zu verstehen geben will. In einem Fall lehnt Frattini „respinge con assoluto sdegno le accuse infondate“ – „empört die unberechtigten Vorwürfe ab“. Ferner finden manchmal Ausdrücke wie *entrüstet, entsetzt* usw. in Reden Anwendung, die sehr heikle Themen ansprechen, z.B. „Als Abgeordnete sind wir insbesondere entsetzt über die brutale Misshandlung unseres Kollegen Nelson Chamisa, der [...] von Schergen des Regimes brutal zusammengeschlagen wurde“ oder „Die massiven Menschenrechtsverletzungen in Moskau und St. Petersburg [...] haben wir mit Entsetzen wahrgenommen“.

In einem anderen Falle wird ein Satz aus einem offiziellen Dokument zitiert, in dem es heißt: „Die Kommission ist empört“. Viel öfter wird aber der Empörung auf andere Art und Weise Ausdruck verliehen, wie später anhand weiterer Beispiele gezeigt werden soll. Nicht nur in Bezug auf Ärger und ähnliches, sondern auch im Allgemeinen lässt sich festhalten, dass eine Rede auch dann als affektbeladen gelten kann, wenn sie keine explizit einen Affekt, eine Emotion ausdrückende Formel enthält. Nach der Rede eines Berichterstatters bemerkt z.B. der Vorsitzende: „Es ist schön zu sehen, wie Sie wieder richtig jugendlich werden, wenn es um unsere gemeinsame Zukunft geht“. Das ist eine Bemerkung, die auf eine gewisse emotionelle Anteilnahme des Sprechers zu deuten scheint. In seiner Rede sind aber keine Wörter enthalten, die unmittelbar eine Emotion bezeichnen würden. Ebenso sind in der vorher zitierten Rede Prodis keine solchen Ausdrücke⁴ zu finden.

Nachdem man festgestellt hat, dass die expliziten Worte der Emotionen in diesen Debatten nicht oft zu finden sind, stellte sich das Problem, zu eruieren, wie ein Abgeordneter zu verstehen gibt, dass er verärgert, zufrieden usw. ist, und eventuell, ob dies im Deutschen und Italienischen anders erfolgt. Dieser letzte Punkt scheint nicht unbedeutend zu sein: Wenn nämlich eine Person nicht *expressis verbis* sagt, sie sei verärgert, ist es nicht sofort verständlich, ob sie wirklich verärgert ist. Und das Verstehen ist um so schwieriger, wenn man mit allophonen Gesprächspartnern aus einer anderen Kultur zu tun hat, in der auch die Modalitäten zum Ausdruck der Emotionen anders sein können.

Ferner hat man sich gefragt, ob es rekurrierende Worte, Formulierungen gibt, die die Emotionen der Feindseligkeit, des Ärgers (aber auch der Genugtuung, der Freude)

⁴ Mit der Ausnahme von ‚Emotion‘, die aber – wie gesagt – nur einmal vorkommt.

usw. widerspiegeln, ohne auf die kanonischen Worte zurückzugreifen, die diese Emotionen direkt ausdrücken. Und dies abgesehen von einer ganzen Reihe von Faktoren, die dem einzelnen Individuum bei dem Verstehen und der Deutung der Emotionen seines Gesprächspartners helfen. Zu diesen Faktoren sind selbstverständlich der Ton der Stimme, die Mimik, die Gebärden, aber auch die Zugehörigkeit zu einer bestimmten Partei zu zählen. Die ersten beiden Faktoren lassen in sehr vielen Fällen fast sofort verstehen, ob eine Person pikiert, verärgert, entgegenkommend usw. ist, es sei denn, die Ironie wird mit besonderer Feinheit eingesetzt. Ferner fragt man sich, ob affektbeladene Worte per se existieren, die abgesehen vom behandelten Thema die Empörung, die Genugtuung usw. vermitteln können. Jahr (2000: 76) sagt z.B., dass Wörter keineswegs auf die Selbstbetroffenheit einer Person schließen lassen, solange situative Umstände, in denen die Äußerung erfolgt, nicht bekannt sind und Informationen fehlen, die auf das Vorhandensein von Selbstbetroffenheit schließen lassen. Z.B. signalisiere das Wort *obszön* keineswegs Selbstbetroffenheit im in der Fußnote 5 angeführten Beispiel⁵. Das Wort *obszön* scheint aber einen so starken konnotativen Wert zu haben, dass es zumindest die Schlussfolgerung zuzulassen scheint, dass die Person, die es sagt, eine starke Aversion gegen Waffenlieferungen wirklich oder auch nur scheinbar spürt, und dies abgesehen vom Kontext. Die Loslösung vom Thema scheint wichtig, weil der Zuhörer und der Leser somit während des Prozesses des Verstehens und der Deutung des Gesagten (vgl. auch Jahr 2000: 229) eben durch diese Schlüsselwörter (Inseln des Verstehens) und Standardformulierungen unterstützt werden und schneller und effizienter zur Eruiierung des Gesagten gelangen können. Dabei ist es ja logisch, dass der Leser bzw. Zuhörer den Kontext (Debatten im EP, Zugehörigkeit der Parlamentarier zu der jeweiligen Fraktion usw.) ganz gut kennt. Es ist auch zu sagen, dass bestimmte Themen (z.B. *Rechte des Individuums und Kampf gegen den Terrorismus*, *Umweltschutz*) stärker affektbeladene Wörter in den Vordergrund treten lassen als die Diskussion über das Statut der Europäischen Privatgesellschaft oder das Roaming.

Ferner werden Affekte nicht nur durch einzelne Wörter (lexikalische Ebene), sondern auch in hohem Maße auf syntaktischer und textueller Ebene zum Ausdruck gebracht und diese drei Ebenen sind schwer voneinander zu trennen. So ist z.B. die Rekurrenz eines Wortes auf textueller Ebene ein Signal der Affektivität, aber das Wort gehört an und für sich zur lexikalischen Ebene. Die Interpunktion spielt eine wichtige Rolle sowie die Thema-Rhema-Folge zur rhetorischen Hervorhebung eines Wortes, die (meistens) rhetorischen Fragesätze, der Einsatz von Zitaten usw.

Mehr noch als einzelne Wörter scheinen Topik- bzw. Isotopieketten wichtig zu sein. Es ist deshalb schwierig, eine Klassifikation affektbeladener Wörter bzw. Formulierungen vorzunehmen, eben weil eine Isotopiekette auch Wörter enthalten kann, die nicht unbedingt mit einem Affekt zu tun haben, die aber in der jeweiligen Situation affektbeladen werden können. Dabei steht fest, dass es Wörter gibt, die –unabhängig

⁵ A: „Die Lieferung von Waffen an Militärdiktaturen ist obszön.“ B: „Ich bin ja gar nicht für diese Dinge verantwortlich.“ (Die Beispiele sind Fritz (1986: 76) entnommen, der in Jahr (2000: 76) zitiert wird).

von der Situation – zu semantischen Feldern gehören, die auf ein Gefühl hinweisen können, wie z.B. *bedauern, Tragödie, Katastrophe, es freut mich*. Aber auch in diesem Falle gibt es Ausnahmen: Borghezio sagt z.B. *Glückwunsch!* ironisch. Aus einem positiven Wort wird ein Wort, das Feindseligkeit seitens des Redners signalisiert, weil es in der Singularform ausgedrückt und ihm ein Ausrufezeichen folgt.

In einem anderen Beispiel meldet sich Sigmar Gabriel, amtierender Ratspräsident, zu Wort, „um auf einen Angriff der Kollegin Harms auf die deutsche Ratspräsidentschaft klar zu reagieren!“ Ein verbaler Angriff setzt voraus, dass der/ie Gesprächspartner/in gewisse Worte gesagt hat, die dessen/deren Ärger, Empörung zum Ausdruck gebracht haben. Frau Harms hat nicht gesagt, sie sei empört, verärgert, zornig, sondern bestimmte Topik- bzw. Isotopieketten verwendet, die auf diese Emotionen verweisen. *Worte vs. Taten; Jonglieren; bezweifeln; vieles falsch und wenig richtig; Katastrophe; falsche Investitionen, sich ruinieren; torpedieren – parole vs. azioni; giochi di prestigio; è problematico; molti elementi sbagliati e pochi giusti; disastro; distruggersi; investimento sbagliato; affondare.*

Diese könnten letzten Endes die Schlüsselwörter sein, die Sigmar Gabriel die Rede von Frau Harms als aggressiv deuten ließen.

3. Katalogisierung der Affekte

Um eine Basis zur Katalogisierung dieser Affekte zu haben, hat man unter den verschiedenen Studien der Psychologie zu den emotionellen Zügen die Katalogisierung von Zuckerman *et al.* (1999) in Betracht gezogen, die *anxiety, depression, hostility, positive affect* und *sensation-seeking (surgent) affect* vorsieht. Solche *Gesamtemotionen* werden anhand von Adjektiven beschrieben. Für die vorliegende Analyse sind vor allem die letzten drei Gesamtemotionen interessant, aber auch die übrigen zwei sind vorhanden. Nachstehend werden einige Beispiele der von den EP-Abgeordneten verwendeten sprachlichen Mittel zum Ausdruck eines Gefühls geliefert, wobei zunächst das Original und darauffolgend die Übersetzung stehen ⁶. Es werden sowohl einzelne Wörter, als auch Isotopieketten und Standardformulierungen angeführt:

POSITIVE AFFECT

Ich freue mich – sono molto felice, lieto, è un piacere per me
 Wir sind heute sehr froh – siamo oggi ben lieti
 Das Parlament ist stolz und froh – è orgoglioso e lieto
 Io plaudo – ich begrüße
 Lo sostengo con soddisfazione – ich freue mich, dies feststellen zu können
 Le auguro i miei migliori auguri – Ich wünsche Ihnen alles Gute
 È stato certamente opportuno – Es war richtig
 Mi congratulo – ich bedanke mich

⁶ Die Übersetzungen sind selbstverständlich von offiziellen Übersetzern des europäischen Parlaments, nicht von den Autorinnen des Beitrags angefertigt worden.

Große Hoffnungen hegen – essere molto fiduciosi
 Ich bin sehr zuversichtlich – Confido fermamente
 Esprimendo soddisfazione per ... – Ich möchte meine Genugtuung über
 ... zum Ausdruck bringen
 Ne prendo atto con grande piacere – ich nehme es erfreut zur Kenntnis
 Eine enge, eine konstruktive, intensive Kooperation – una cooperazione
 stretta, costruttiva e intensa
 Wimpernschlag, kurze Zeit, unvorstellbar viel – battito di ciglia, breve
 periodo, cose inimmaginabili
 Erfolgreich sein, Sackgasse, vernünftig, Erfolg erreichen, es ist vernünftig
 – garantire il successo, vicolo cieco, ragionevole, conseguire risultati
 positivi, è una mossa intelligente
 Ein großer Erfolg, das ist sensationell – un grande trionfo, un risultato
 sensazionale

SENSATION-SEEKING (SURGENT) AFFECT

Spero veramente – ich erhoffe mir sehr
 Spero – ich wünsche mir
 Ich bin hoffnungsfroh, dass – mi auguro che
 Abbiamo tutte le ragioni di attendere – wir dürfen gespannt sein
 Ich bekenne mich – credo, sono convinta che
 Ich denke/Ich glaube – credo
 Credo – meiner Ansicht nach
 Es ist mir sehr wichtig – ciò che ritengo fondamentale

ANXIETY

Condividiamo l'allarme – Wir teilen die Besorgnis
 Erschreckende Bilanz – un risultato allarmante
 Besorgniserregender Anstieg der Gewalt – inquietante aumento della
 violenza
 Mit großer Sorge – con grande preoccupazione
 Anlass zur Besorgnis, Grund zur Besorgnis – motivo di allarme, motivo
 di preoccupazione
 Wir bringen unsere große Besorgnis zum Ausdruck – esprimiamo la
 nostra profonda preoccupazione
 Sehr beunruhigend – allarmante
 Ein Punkt, der mich ausgesprochen besorgt macht – un punto che mi
 preoccupa molto
 Ich befürchte, dass – il mio timore è che
 Soprattutto, ciò che mi preoccupa – was mich am meisten beunruhigt
 Una via che, temo, possa portare – einen Weg, der meiner Befürchtung
 nach ...
 Fenomeno preoccupante – beunruhigendes Phänomen

DEPRESSION

Sono molto triste – Ich bin sehr betrübt
 Mi dispiace – Es tut mir leid
 Das mag man bedauern – potrebbe essere motivo di rammarico
 Unsere Fraktion war sehr traurig – Al nostro gruppo è dispiaciuto molto

Bedauerlich – deplorable, riprovevole
Sehr enttäuschend – estremamente deludente
Ich bin enttäuscht – sono rimasto deluso
Schmerzhafte Reformen – dolorose riforme

HOSTILITY

Wie bereits gesagt (siehe Kapitel 2), wird Feindseligkeit nicht durch einzelne Wörter zum Ausdruck gebracht, sondern vielmehr durch Topikketten, wie auch folgende Beispiele belegen:

Worte/Taten; Verblendung; unklar; Riesenprobleme; fataler Schritt; geht nicht klar hervor; furchtbar beschämend – parole vs. fatti; confusione; non si può avere la certezza; problemi enormi; mossa fatale; non è affatto chiaro; è davvero una vergogna
Sgorgano come lacrime di cocodrillo; protestare; atto senza precedenti; processi stalinisti; una vergogna, un insulto ai principi; violazione arrogante; parole ricattatrici; insultare; violazioni così pesanti, così arroganti e inammissibili – Ergießen sich wie Krokodilstränen; protestieren; eine nie dagewesene Situation; stalinistische Prozesse; Skandal und Verhöhnung der Prinzipien; arrogante Verletzung; heuchlerische Worte; Beleidigungen; schwere, arrogante, inakzeptable Verletzung; tolerieren
collusione e complicità; strumento superato; ruolo subordinato; viziato dall'ipocrisia; tendenzioso; risibile; pericoloso – heimliches Einverständnis und Komplizenschaft; überholtes Instrument; untergeordnete Rolle; durch die grundsätzliche Heuchelei unbrauchbar werden; tendenziös; verabscheuenswürdig; lächerlich; gefährlich
unerhörtes Armutzeugnis; Wiege des Humanismus; ich habe kein Verständnis; unwürdig, beschämend und nicht hinnehmbar; Martyrium; ohne Wenn und Aber klipp und klar erklären; kein Freibrief; parteipolitische Manöver – dimostrazione di meschinità; culla dell'umanità; un simile atteggiamento lascia di stucco; è indegno, vergognoso e inaccettabile; martirio, dichiarare apertamente senza ma e senza se; niente alibi; manovre di partito
unerbittlich gehandelt, gefordert, ja sogar erpresst; Druckmittel – continui negoziati, richieste e persino ricatti; strumento per esercitare pressioni die zynischste Rede; tatsächlich über Leichen gehen; eine Diktatur legitimieren – il discorso più cinico; non guardare in faccia nessuno; legittimando una dittatura
eine Schande; stolz geschwellter Brust; derart feiger und gewalttätiger Weise – una vergogna; pavoneggiandosi; tanta viltà e violenza

Man könnte selbstverständlich Beispiele dieser Art *ad infinitum* liefern, eben weil echte bzw. scheinbar echte Affekte durch einzelne *Wörter* aber auch durch Isotopketten zum Ausdruck gebracht werden.

Die sprachlichen Mittel, welche die Redner einsetzen, um ihre Affekte zum Ausdruck zu bringen, scheinen eher durch die Zugehörigkeit zu einer Partei bzw. Fraktion gekennzeichnet zu sein als durch die jeweilige Kultur. So zeichnen sich z.B. die Abgeordneten der Verts/ALE-Fraktion oft durch ihren direkten Stil aus: „der morgige Be-

schluss ist eine tiefe Verbeugung der EU vor den verkrusteten Strukturen, Herr Ministerpräsident, mit einer Lüge ist weder das 21. Jahrhundert, noch Europa zu gewinnen, Die Sündenregister der Regierungen [...] sind lang“ usw.

Die mangelnden Unterschiede zwischen *nationalen Stilen* könnten aber auch auf die Entstehung und Durchsetzung eines europäischen parlamentarischen Stils zurückzuführen sein. Zu diesem Stil gehört zweifellos auch der Rückgriff auf positive Emotionen im Rahmen einer Strategie des *face saving*⁷, und zwar um einen Einwand, eine Kritik einzuleiten und dabei allzu negative Auswirkungen zu vermeiden. Dazu zwei Beispiele:

Die EVP-ED-Fraktion begrüßt die Einigung mit dem Rat in erster Lesung. Das ist ein gutes Beispiel für exzellente Kooperation. Wir bedanken uns natürlich auch bei dem Berichterstatter, Paolo Costa, für seine äußerst engagierte Arbeit. [...] Bedauerlich, Herr Staatssekretär, ist allerdings, dass sich der Rat einer schnellen Lösung, wie sie das Parlament gefordert hat, widersetzt hat.

Herr Präsident! Ich stimme zu, dass das für Urlauber, für Geschäftsreisende und auch für MdEP und andere Menschen, die in verschiedenen Ländern Europas unterwegs sind, eine gute Botschaft ist. [...] Es ist eine gute Botschaft, dass Europa bereit ist, gegen Monopolinteressen gemeinsame Regelungen durchzusetzen. Leider ist ein Wermutstropfen dabei: Die Vorschläge des Parlaments wurden durch Partikularinteressen von Diensteanbietern und ihre Monopolstellung in einigen Mitgliedstaaten verwässert.

Wie von Brown und Levinson (1987: 65-66) hervorgehoben wurde, gehören nicht nur Einwand und Kritik, sondern auch Empfehlung und Ratschlag zu den *face-threatening acts*, da sie einen gewissen Druck auf den Hörer ausüben. Daher ist es nicht verwunderlich, dass auch diesen Sprechhandlungen sehr oft positive Formulierungen (z.B. Danksagungen, Gratulationen usw.) vorangehen.

4. Ursprüngliche und übersetzte Emotionen

Die Übersetzungen widerspiegeln in der Regel adäquat die Originalformulierungen. In einigen Fällen jedoch wird die emotionelle Kraft des ursprünglichen Ausdrucks etwas abgeschwächt: Das geschieht z.B., wenn *schamhaft versteckt* mit *deplorablemente nell'ombra* übersetzt wird, oder wenn der Ausdruck *tatsächlich über Leichen gehen* in Bezug auf eine Diktatur mit *non guardare in faccia nessuno* wiedergegeben wird.

In der Übersetzung folgender Textpassage wurde der letzte Satz, der einer besonderen Hervorhebung der abschließenden Bewertung diente, durch ein einziges Adjektiv zusammengefasst:

⁷ Aus der Definition von *face* als „something that is emotionally invested, and that can be lost, maintained, or enhanced, and must be constantly attended to in interaction“ (Brown & Levinson 1987: 61) ist die Bedeutung dieses Begriffs für das Thema des vorliegenden Beitrags unmittelbar ersichtlich.

Wir wissen bereits, dass es trotz des Prinzips „Gleicher Lohn für gleiche Arbeit“ zwischen Männern und Frauen krasse Unterschiede gibt, wenn es um behinderte Frauen geht. Das ist sehr schockierend.

Già sappiamo che, nonostante il principio della pari retribuzione a parità di lavoro, esistono profonde, scandalose differenze tra donne disabili e uomini.

Auch bei den Übersetzungen lohnt es sich außerdem, nicht einzelne Wörter, sondern ganze Isotopieketten zu betrachten. So erscheint die deutsche Übersetzung folgender Ausdrücke v.a. im Hinblick auf die mit der Variatio verbundene Wirkung nicht völlig zufriedenstellend: *assassinato dalla mafia in modo terrificante – aufschreckliche Art und Weise von der Mafia ermordet, anno terribile – schreckliches Jahr, cifra raccapricciante – erschreckende Summe, aumento spaventoso – erschreckend in die Höhe schnellen.* Auch im Deutschen hätte man leicht dieselbe Wirkung (z.B. mit den Adjektiven *grausam, grauenerregend* o.ä.) erreichen können.

In weiteren Fällen dürfte die Übersetzung beim Leser wohl eine andere Wirkung als der Ausgangstext hervorrufen. So erscheint in der folgenden Passage die Wiedergabe des Verbs *bedrücken* durch das Adjektiv *deprimente* nicht besonders gelungen:

Präsidentin, verehrte Abgeordnete! Lassen Sie mich an dieser Stelle für den Rat eine kurze Anmerkung machen und zum Ausdruck bringen, wie sehr uns dieses Thema alle bedrückt. Am 12. März wurde in Gaza der BBC-Korrespondent Alan Johnston entführt. Im Außenministerrat am vergangenen Montag herrschte große Sorge um Herrn Johnston, der nun bereits seit sechs Wochen verschleppt ist. Wir fordern eine bedingungslose und unverzügliche Freilassung!

Signora Presidente, onorevoli deputati, consentitemi, a questo punto della discussione, di fare un breve commento a nome del Consiglio, per dire quanto sia deprimente per tutti noi affrontare questo argomento. Il corrispondente della BBC Alan Johnston è stato rapito a Gaza il 12 marzo. Il Consiglio "Affari esteri" di lunedì scorso si è svolto in un clima di grande preoccupazione per la sorte del giornalista, sequestrato ormai da sei settimane. Chiediamo la sua immediata e incondizionata liberazione.

Bemerkenswert ist auch das folgende Beispiel:

Frau Präsidentin! Der vorliegende Bericht enthält eine Menge guter Ideen und positiver Anregungen für menschenwürdige Arbeit. Danke, Frau Panayotopoulos-Cassiotou! Wir sollten bei unseren Forderungen aber auch bedenken, dass es in der EU mehr als 20 Millionen Arbeitslose gibt, die vielfach ausgegrenzt und stigmatisiert sind. Ebenso sollte man nicht vergessen, dass immer mehr Arbeitnehmer trotz Beschäftigung nicht das Lebensnotwendige verdienen und dass durch so genannte prekäre Arbeitsverhältnisse Arbeits- und Steuerrecht umgangen und vor allem junge Leute regelrecht ausgebeutet werden.

Hier soll der Verweis auf die „Menge guter Ideen und positiver Anregungen“ den Weg ebnen für die darauffolgende Kritik. In der italienischen Übersetzung hingegen beeinträchtigt das Wort *plethora* das Gelingen der *face-saving*-Strategie, da es eine negative Konnotation hat.

Signora Presidente, la relazione contiene una plethora di buone idee e di proposte positive per il lavoro dignitoso, e per questo motivo l'onorevole Panayotopoulos-Cassiotou merita la nostra gratitudine. Tuttavia, nell'avanzare le nostre proposte e richieste non dobbiamo dimenticare che nell'Unione europea ci sono oltre 20 milioni di disoccupati e che molti di essi subiscono discriminazioni ed emarginazione; né va dimenticato che un numero crescente di lavoratori, pur avendo un posto di lavoro, non guadagna un salario sufficiente per mantenersi, che le cosiddette "condizioni di lavoro precarie" altro non sono che un modo per aggirare le norme fiscali e sul lavoro e che sono soprattutto i giovani a subire forme di sfruttamento.

Die Entsprechung Menge – plethora lässt sich hier nur unter Bezugnahme auf die englische Version erläutern, wo von „a plethora of good ideas and positive suggestions“ die Rede ist. Der Übersetzer könnte dabei nicht bemerkt haben, dass sich englisch *plethora* und italienisch *plethora* im Hinblick auf die semantische Prosodie⁸ unterscheiden: während im Englischen das Wort meistens in Verbindung mit positiven Ausdrücken auftritt (z.B. *a plethora of improvements, of innovation*), wird das italienische Wort oft von negativen Ausdrücken begleitet (*una plethora di parole inutili, di politicanti*).

Dieselbe Erklärung könnte übrigens auch auf das erste Beispiel zutreffen. Auch hier zeigt der italienische Text den Einfluss der englischen Übersetzung (*how very depressing this topic is for all of us*), auch hier hat man nicht genügend Aufmerksamkeit auf die Bedeutung und die semantische Prosodie der zwei Adjektive *depressing* und *deprimente* geschenkt.

5. Schlussfolgerungen

Affektbeladenheit hängt teilweise von den Worten ab, die sie bezeichnen und die also themaunabhängig sind, aber auch vom Interaktionsnetz, in das diese Worte eingebettet sind (Topikketten), wodurch Affekte, Gefühle, Emotionen indirekt zum Ausdruck gebracht werden. Festzuhalten bleibt auf jeden Fall, dass positive Affekte und teilweise Affekte der Angst, Depression, „tastende“ Affekte direkt gesagt werden, negative Affekte fast nie mit den klassischen, diese Emotionen ausdrückenden Worten gesagt werden. Dies ist vielleicht darauf zurückzuführen, dass negative Affekte motiviert werden sollten, damit sie nicht einfach verletzend wirken.

⁸ Semantische Prosodie wird definiert als „the consistent aura of meaning with which a form is imbued by its collocates“ (Louw 1993: 157). Durch das gehäufte Auftreten innerhalb bestimmter Kollokationen können an sich neutrale Wörter eine positive oder negative semantische Prosodie annehmen (vgl. Olohan 2004: 82).

Bei der Übersetzung sollte man beachten, dass auch geringfügige Unterschiede die kommunikative Wirkung der Emotionen beeinflussen können. Der Übersetzer sollte daher seine Aufmerksamkeit auf die gesamten Topikketten lenken und auch schwerer fassbare Aspekte, wie z.B. die semantische Prosodie einzelner Wörter, berücksichtigen.

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MARKER IMPLIZITER BEDEUTUNG IN WERBETEXTEN: EINE KONTRASTIVE ANALYSE

FEDERICA RICCI GAROTTI

1. *Theoretische Annahmen*

Die Übertragbarkeit von Werbetexten einer Kultur in eine andere ist seit langem eine *vexata quaestio* der Forschung über die Werbesprache und der Kommunikation.

Obwohl in den Anzeigen der verschiedenen Kulturen die gleiche Struktur erkennbar ist, kann die Übereinstimmung der sprachlichen Bestandteile und die perlokutive Funktion der Werbetexte in jeder Kultur anders sein. Wenn die illokutive Funktion zu den Eigenschaften der Werbekommunikation gehört und in jeder Werbebotschaft dieselbe Bedeutung übernimmt, nämlich jemanden zu einer Kaufaktion zu bewegen, so sollte man doch den in den jeweils kulturellen Landschaften implizierten Sprechhandlungen unterschiedliche Intentionen zuerkennen, die auf unterschiedlichen Sozialwissen stützen. Die Frage nach einer möglichst allgemeingültigen Werbung aufgrund der gemeinsamen kommerziellen Ziele von Werbetexten impliziert die Untersuchung von Massenkommunikation im Allgemeinen und des noch bestehenden Bedarfs an kulturellen und lokalisierten Unterscheidungen im Besonderen. Wenn man davon ausgeht, dass sich sprachlich-kommunikative und textuelle Differenzierungen von Fachmerkmalen weniger stark entfalten können, wenn ein gemeinsames Ziel verfolgt wird, als bei den geografischen und kulturellen Besonderheiten, dann sollte man daraus schliessen, dass Werbung leicht übertragbar und sogar übersetzbar sein müsste. Das Gegenteil ist jedoch der Fall, da die sprachlichen Markierungen immer sprach- und kulturspezifisch sind, auch wenn sie innerhalb eines gleichen Interaktionsmusters erscheinen.

Der vorliegende Beitrag versucht die impliziten Voraussetzungen von einigen deutschen und italienischen Werbeslogans durch die Analyse der sprachlichen Merkmale zu erschließen und zu vergleichen. Verglichen werden Slogans aus Werbekampagnen für Produkte, die im gleichen Jahr sowohl auf dem italienischen als auch auf dem deutschen Markt beworben wurden. Der Analyse liegen folgende theoretische Annahmen über die Werbemitteilung zugrunde:

- 1) Die Werbung ist ein kommissiver Sprechakt, in dem der Sprecher gegenüber dem Empfänger ein Engagement (*commitment*) übernimmt. Dafür entwickelt der Sprecher mit verschiedenen Variationen das Thema der Verbesserung des Empfängers: der Status des Empfängers, seine psychologische Situation, sein Aussehen und sogar seine Konflikte können dank des beworbenen Objekts besser werden;

- 2) In der kommissiven Handlung sind bestimmte Sprechakte des Versprechens, Tröstens und Behauptens zu erwarten, die eine positive Wirkung auf die Konsumenten als Personen haben;
- 3) Die Werbekommunikation wird von den wichtigsten Merkmalen der Massenkommunikation bestimmt: Einseitigkeit, lokale und zeitliche Trennung zwischen Vermittlern und Empfängern, Anonymität der Teilnehmer, Teilung der Empfänger zwischen Guten (im Fall der Werbung: Konsumenten) und *Schlechten* (nicht Konsumenten) (Ricci Garotti 2004: 14);
- 4) Die neusten Werbungen scheinen die Tendenz der Werbesprache zu einer Unterstreichung des „Seins“ statt des „Habens“ zu bestätigen. Das Produkt entspricht nicht mehr einem Traumobjekt, sondern einem Lebensstil als Form des Seins, es steht nicht mehr für Besitz, sondern für ein *modus essendi*, in dem der Besitz, also das Kaufen, eine Voraussetzung und kein Ziel mehr ist. Zu diesem Ansatz gehört die Personifizierung bzw. Subjektivierung der beworbenen Objekte oder oft sogar die Übereinstimmung zwischen Objekten (Werbeprodukten) und Subjekten (Empfängern).

Diese Merkmale ermöglichen die Verwirklichung eines Kommunikationsmodells, das am Beispiel der Werbeslogans näher untersucht werden kann.

Die Frage ist, inwieweit die Anwendung dieses Modells in den Werbebotschaften von verschiedenen und unterschiedlichen Sprachen und Kulturen möglich ist und durch welche sprachlichen Merkmale es sich in kommunikativen Werbekontexten verwirklicht. Für die hier illustrierte Untersuchung hat man ein *Korpus* aus 50 deutschen und italienischen Slogans benutzt. Hier werden einige exemplarische Analysen und die dazugehörigen Schlussfolgerungen wiedergegeben. Die ausführliche Beschreibung der Ergebnisse werden nach Abschluss des gesamten Forschungsprojekts (vermutlich 2009) veröffentlicht werden.

Die für die Forschung benutzte Methode ist die kontrastive Analyse von italienischen und deutschen Slogans derselben Produkte, die sich besonders auf folgende sprachliche Elemente der Werbetexte konzentriert hat:

- Präsuppositionsauslöser (auch *triggers* genannt)
- Deixis
- Konnektoren.

Die Präsuppositionsauslöser (*triggers*) sind nicht einfach Indikatoren, sondern sie induzieren Präsuppositionen als gemeinhin angenommene Bedeutungen¹ im Hintergrund der Kommunikation. Durch ihre *backgrounded* Position sind sie vor Wider-

¹ Man bietet hierhin die Definition von Präsuppositionen aus dem Taschenwörterbuch der Linguistik: „Präsuppositionen sind Voraussetzungen, die durch eine Sprechsituation erfüllt sein müssen, damit in ihr bestimmte Äußerungen sinnvoll möglich sind“, S. 187. Voraussetzungen und Präsuppositionen sind zentrale Bedeutungskomponenten der Massenkommunikation, insbesondere der persuasiven politischen Kommunikation, wie u.a. Sbisà (1999) geforscht hat.

spruch und Diskussionen geschützt. Nach der Definition von Givón sind sie „shielded from challenge“ (1989: 32), d.h. sie werden als selbstverständlich betrachtet, obwohl die von ihnen aktivierten Inhalte nie offen ausgedrückt werden. Sollten sie explizit im Vordergrund erscheinen, wäre ihre Bedeutung analysierbar wie jede andere ausgesprochene Äußerung und damit nicht mehr unumstritten. In unserer Analyse herrscht die Perspektive eines *parole*-bezogenen, kontextabhängigen Ansatzes, nach dem die Präsuppositionen von Sprachhandlungen und sprachlichen Konventionen abhängig sind. Zu den sprachlichen Bestandteilen, die auf sehr unterschiedliche Weise als Präsuppositionsauslöser benutzt werden, zählen Prädikate, faktive Verben, temporale/aspektuale Modifikatoren (z.B. aufhören, unterbrechen, scheiden, erwecken und alle Verb-Komposita mit wieder-, die oft in der Werbung benutzt werden: „der Boden strahlt wieder“ setzt vor, dass der Boden früher nicht strahlte, also schmutzig war), die Fillmores Verbs of Judging (1971) wie anklagen und kritisieren (man vermutet, dass jemand, der angeklagt wird, etwas Böses getan hat und man vermutet, dass er es wirklich getan hat)², nichtrestriktive Relativsätze und pragmatische Aufrichtigkeitsbedingungen z.B. bei der Verwendung von Höflichkeitsformen.

Nach Ducrot sind die *triggers* der Preis, den man bezahlen muss, damit die Kommunikation weitergehen kann (1972). In unserer Analyse sind sie wichtig, um zu bestimmen:

- ob man in den jeweiligen Kulturen von den gleichen Voraussetzungen ausgeht;
- welche Basis in jeder der beiden Kulturen gemeinsam vorausgesetzt wird;
- welche Inhalte man hingegen in der einen oder in der anderen Situation noch diskutieren und in Frage stellen kann.

Die deiktischen Ausdrücke dienen in Werbetexten zum Zweck der Orientierung der Leser unter Bezug der Sprechhandlungen selbst. Die Untersuchung der Deixis kann vor allem Mehrdeutigkeit in den Referenzen enthüllen und eine möglichst breite Palette von Realitätsdarstellungen deutlich machen, die die Kommunikation einer so großen Menge wie möglich zugänglich macht. Da alle Sprachen und Texte eine deiktische Komponente aufweisen, insofern die Referenz deiktischer Ausdrücke nur aus der jeweils pragmatisch situierten Sprechsituation heraus ermittelbar ist, können sich aus einer kontrastiven Analyse interessante Merkmale über bestimmte Elemente des gemeinsamen Wissens ergeben, auf die man in den jeweiligen Sprachen und Kulturen die Aufmerksamkeit der Empfänger lenkt.

Schließlich sind die Konnektoren Textkomponente, die die Entfaltung der Haupttextfunktion der untersuchten Werbeslogans bestimmen können. Laut Janich ist die informative bzw. argumentative Funktion in Werbetexten nicht dominierend, obwohl ihnen einige Studien noch diese Texttypologie zuweisen (2001: 34). Hingegen erweist sich die appellative und sogar manipulative Funktion als die stärkste in Werbe-

² Eine ausführliche Beschreibung der triggers und ihrer verschiedensten Realisierungsmöglichkeit kann man in Caffi, 2002: 77-79 finden.

texten, vor allem aufgrund der Benutzung von rhetorisch-persuasiven Redemitteln und überredend-wertschätzenden Äußerungen.

Zum methodologischen Ansatz der hier illustrierten Forschung geht man von den theoretischen Annahmen der funktional-pragmatischen Perspektive aus, die nicht nur die Sprechakte sondern auch die *discourse markers* untersucht. Beispiele in der deutschen Literatur sind in Flader (1990), in Möckelmann & Zander (1970) und in Ehlich (2007). Diesem Ansatz nach werden nicht mehr nur die rhetorischen Strategien als Markierungen der Massenkommunikation betrachtet, sondern man versucht bestimmte sprachliche Elemente als „Techniker“ der Sprechakte zu analysieren und zu interpretieren.

Eine letzte Bemerkung zur Perspektive der Analyse, die sich hier immer auf die Seite der Empfänger bezieht; mit anderen Worten wird der Effekt der Kommunikation aufseiten des Publikums analysiert, das den Erfolg oder den Misserfolg der Mitteilung in all ihren Aspekten mitbestimmen kann.

2. Exemplarische Analyse.

Fall 1: SONY

In der Werbekampagne 2006 erschienen in Italien und Deutschland Anzeigen für die Videokamera Sony, die anscheinend den gleichen Slogan (übersetzt) benutzten:

Taschentuch suchen oder filmen?
Preferisci filmare o applaudire?

Der von den Bildern³ bestimmte Kontext der Werbeinszenierung ist unterschiedlich und auf den ersten Blick könnte man die Stereotypen einer unterschiedlichen Tradition bezüglich der Kindererziehung vermuten: Einerseits die kinderdistanzierte, selbständige deutsche Mutter, andererseits die behütende italienische Mutter. Obwohl die Interpretation der Bilder ein Grundelement in der Anzeigeanalyse ist, beschäftigen wir uns hier, wie erwähnt, vornehmlich mit den verbalen Ausdrücken, die zu tieferen und nicht stereotypischen Hypothesen über die kommunikative Wirksamkeit in den zwei Sprachen führen mag.

Die Struktur der Sätze ist in beiden Slogans von dem Optionsmarker „oder/o“ bestimmt. In beiden Ausdrücken führt die Konjunktion zwei mögliche Alternativen exklusiv und nicht inklusiv ein: die von „oder/o“ implizierten Möglichkeiten schließen aus, dass beide gleichzeitig oder zusammen bestehen können. Die vorausgesetzte Sinnbedeutung entspricht einer „entweder/oder“ Äußerung. Das ist nicht die einzige Benutzung von der Koordinationskonjunktion „oder/o“, die auch eine inklusive Option für die Zuhörer unterstützen kann (Schiffrin 1987: 177).

³ Für die hier erwähnten Bilder sieh Anhang in dem hiesigen Beitrag.

Der hier beobachtete Slogan impliziert außerdem zwei inhaltliche Elemente:

- a) der Zuhörer besitzt das beworbene Objekt schon (der Kauf, zu dem angeregt werden soll, liegt bereits in der Vergangenheit)
- b) der Empfänger wird zwangsläufig die von „oder/o“ markierte Option wählen.

Die erste Implizierung schließt aus, dass sich die Sprachhandlung der Aufforderung auf die Kaufaktion bezieht: der unterschwellige Appell betrifft eventuell die Weise, wie das Produkt gebraucht werden sollte. Auf der pragmatischen Ebene würde das heißen, dass die Sprachhandlung die Zielaktion impliziert und nicht vorschlägt. Das würde die Kategorisierung der Kommunikationshandlungen der Werbung nach Typen der Sprechakte wesentlich ändern, wie man in den Schlussfolgerungen des hiesigen Beitrags zu skizzieren versucht. Für die sprachliche Realisierung der strukturellen Funktion gilt also folgendes Schema: S(ubjekt, Sprecher) empfiehlt E(mpfänger) den möglichst besten Gebrauch von O(bjekt). Insoweit stimmen die Aktionssätze der beiden Headlines überein, aber dann sind Unterschiede in der Realisierung auf der Ebene der illokutionären Akte in den zwei Anzeigen bemerkbar. Sehr weit über die außersprachliche Referenzsemantik hinaus reicht der Unterschied aus der Benutzung der Deixis. Im Vergleich zu dem italienischen impliziten Personalpronomen „preferisci“⁴, der den Empfänger direkt anspricht, lässt die im Deutschen benutzte Infinitivform (Null-Einheit) eine unspezifische, thematische Frage vermuten, nämlich:

IT: Was würdest du in diesem Kontext machen?

DEU: Was ist in diesem Kontext besser?

Die Verwendung der Deixis markiert nicht nur den semantischen Unterschied, sondern lässt auch die Identifizierung der von der Konjunktion aktivierten Sätze anders analysieren. Das italienische „o“ bezieht sich auf den Empfänger mit der vom Verb *preferire* implizierten Bewertung. Die Verwendung dieses Verbs verschleiert die Tatsache, dass der Empfänger selbst die eigene Verantwortung übernimmt, die richtige Entscheidung zu treffen (nämlich zu filmen und nicht Beifall zu spenden). Die thematische Einheit in der deutschen Anzeige scheint dem Empfänger eine breitere Wahl zu überlassen, indem der Marker „oder“ sich nicht unbedingt auf ihn bezieht: er könnte zum Beispiel auch das photographierte Kind miteinschließen oder das Thema zu einer breiten Diskussion vorzuschlagen.

In den Werbeillustrationen scheinen die Photos den verbalen Sachverhalt durch die kontextuelle Gestaltung zu bestätigen: das deutsche Kind wird in einer natürlichen alltäglichen Situation aufgenommen und ist seiner zentralen Lage in dem kommunikativen Werbeprozess unbewusst, das italienische Mädchen führt hingegen eine künstlerische Leistung vor einem Publikum bewusst durch. Die Ansprehungshandlung auf den Empfänger-Konsumenten ermöglicht in der italienischen Anzeige nur eine Interpretation über die Adressaten (das Publikum), während der unpersonale Bezug der

⁴ Möchtest du lieber...

deutschen Anzeige mehr als eine Interpretation möglich macht und dadurch die Wahlverantwortung der Käufer vermindert. Auf der Ebene der pragmatischen Analyse ist bemerkenswert, dass die unpersönliche Form der deutschen Anzeige eine faktive Sprechhandlung markiert (suchen, filmen), während die italienische Verbalphrase eine ethische, persönliche Wahl prädiziert (*preferisci tu...*), die ins Schuldgefühl der Empfänger einzugreifen scheint. Dieser Unterschied führt zu einer größeren Objektivierung bzw. Thematisierung des Objekts in der deutschen Anzeige durch die Vermeidung des judging-Verbs *preferire* und des Personalpronomens. Tatsächlich könnte es sich auch um eine theoretische Diskussion über die geeignete Handlung handeln, ohne eine explizite Beurteilung über den Empfänger zu geben.

Fall 2: VOLKSWAGEN

Der deutsche Slogan für Volkswagen „Aus Liebe zum Automobil“ wird durch den Satz „Automobili per amore“ ins Italienische übertragen. Wie in vielen anderen deutschen Werbefällen übernimmt die Präposition „aus“ eine kausale Bedeutung, die im italienischen Satz nach und nicht vor der Benennung des Werbeprodukts gelegt wird (*automobili*).

Je nach dem, ob man die Perspektive des Empfängers oder des Sprechers übernimmt, könnte diese Färbung den Satzinhalt umkehren. Im deutschen Slogan scheint *aus* die innere emotionelle Begründung der Werbenden durch die Herkunft der Produktion zu markieren:

- a) (*Unsere Produktion stammt*) aus Liebe zum Automobil, (*wir produzieren Autos, weil wir sie lieben*)

oder hingegen die Aufmerksamkeit der Käufer auf ihre eigene Begründung zu lenken:

- b) (*Sie werden VW*) aus Liebe zum Automobil (*kaufen*); (*sie werden Autos kaufen, weil Sie sie lieben*)

Im ersten Fall signalisiert die Präposition die Sprechhandlung einer Selbstexposition oder subjektiven Involvierung der Werbenden, im zweiten Fall übernimmt sie die Rolle einer prädiktiven Kaufaktion, indem sie sie durch ein emotionales Signal rechtfertigt.

Der italienische Slogan fügt eine dritte Hypothese hinzu, d.h. die emotionelle Involvierung des Produktes selbst, nämlich:

- c) (*Volkswagen sind*) *automobili per amore* (*für den Konsumenten?*)

oder noch wahrscheinlicher eine Personifizierung des Werbeobjekts, die für sich spricht:

- d) (*Wir Volkswagen sind*) *automobili per amore*

Im italienischen Slogan erlaubt die Position der Präposition nach dem Namen (*automobili*) eine Bedeutungsextension, die über den Dialog S/E hinaus geht und das Objekt als aktiven Teilnehmer an der Interaktion involviert. Diese mögliche Verbreitung der Kommunikationssubjekte lässt das Referenzschema der Botschaft in Bezug auf den

deutschen Slogan total anders lesen:

O/S [als URSACHE DES SEINS] = BEGRÜNDUNG DER AKTION,

wobei das Produkt weder ein Wunsch- noch ein Liebesobjekt von anderen ist, sondern selbst zum liebenden Subjekt wird.

Im deutschen Satz ist hingegen das emotionelle Engagement der Sprecher oder der Empfänger relevant, nach der Perspektive, die die lexikalische Wertstellung bezüglich des Wortes „Liebe“ übernimmt:

S: URSACHE → OBJEKT → AKTION DES E.

oder

E: AKTION → URSACHE → OBJEKT

Die kommissive Sprechhandlung wird von dem Wort Liebe bestimmt: wenn der Werbende (Sprecher) aus Liebe Autos herstellt, verspricht er, sie so gut wie möglich zu bauen; die Liebe ist auch der Motor der Kaufaktion und damit verspricht der Käufer (Empfänger), die Autos zu kaufen. In beiden Interpretationen impliziert die Liebe eine Diathese in Form eines ethischen Auftrags.

Die wichtigste Präsupposition in dem italienischen Slogan ist die Tatsache, dass das Produkt als lebendes Wesen gilt, deshalb fließt es in den Bereich des Subjekts zusammen und überschneidet sich mit ihm. Zentralhandlung der Werbung ist nicht mehr die (Ver-)Kaufaktion, sondern die Behauptung der Lebendigkeit des geworbenen Objekts, sein Dasein. Dieser Personifizierungsprozess der Produkte entspricht einer gleichzeitigen Objektivierung und Mechanisierung der Menschen, die im Hintergrund in der neuen Werbelandschaft steht. Nach diesem besonders auf dem Automobilmarkt benutzten Werbeansatz ist das Grundprinzip der Werbung nicht mehr die Aktion des Habens sondern die Bedingung des Seins, die Maschinen und Menschen nicht auseinandersetzt, sondern ihnen eine gemeinsame hybride Identität schenkt. Man denke nur an die neuesten Werbekampagnen von Automarken wie Renault und Toyota, in denen ein menschliches Wesen nach der Kindheit, dem Jugend- und Erwachsenenalter seinen letzten Evolutionsschritt als Auto erlebt oder, umgekehrt, wo sich ein Auto graduell in ein lebendes, unbestimmtes Wesen verwandelt. In Bezug auf die hier illustrierte VW Werbung scheint die deutsche Anzeige noch eine „habenfundierte“, traditionelle Werbestrategie zu bevorzugen: die Ambiguität des italienischen Kausalkonnektors *per* und vor allem seine Position suggeriert hingegen eine Tendenz zur Werbung des Seins. Während das Konzept der deutschen Werbung noch als kompensatorisch zu den mangelnden Liebeserlebnissen der Empfänger gestaltet wird, spielt die italienische mit einer imaginierten Omnipotenz des Objekts und setzt viel mehr voraus als die Kaufaktion und den Gebrauch des Produktes: sein Recht, sich mit dem Empfänger zu verbinden, ihn schließlich in seinem eigenen Leben zu ersetzen.

Fall 3: L'OREAL

Im Lauf der Jahre hat sich der deutsche Slogan von L'Oreal geändert: insbesondere hat die Deixis verschiedene Veränderungen erlebt:

- Weil Sie es sich wert sind.
- Weil du es dir wert bist.
- Weil ich es mir wert bin.

Schließlich sind die Werbenden 2006 bei einem weltverbreiteten Slogan gelandet, der in Italien und Deutschland folgende Formen hat:

IT Perché voi valete

DEU Sie sind es sich wert

Noch einmal wird die tragende Rolle im interlingualen Unterschied von der Kausaljunktion gespielt, diesmal von dem Marker des Nebensatzes. Wir werden uns mit der Wirkung dieses Markers und nicht mit der unterschiedlichen Deixis (*voi/Sie*) beschäftigen (die mehr eine interkulturelle bzw. soziologische Analyse verdienen würde).

Jede Kausalkonjunktion (*because, weil, perché*) ist ein grammatikalisches Signal für eine Ursache, die sich in einem angekündigten Nebensatz entwickelt. Es steht normalerweise in Gegensatz zu dem Effekt, der durch andere sprachliche Signale (*so, così, allora*) ausgedrückt wird und ist im Hauptsatz platziert. Auf der funktional-pragmatischen Ebene hat der Kausalmarker eine Nebenrolle in der Ursache-Effekt Beziehung, wobei die Aufmerksamkeit auf die in dem Hauptsatz beschriebene Aktion fokussiert wird. Das in dem Nebensatz bestehende Material ist deshalb nicht an sich relevant, sondern nur insofern es in einer breiteren Diskurseinheit einen Sinn findet. Obwohl der Hauptsatz in dem italienischen Beispiel fehlt, muss man glauben, dass der Satz den Effekt und konsequenterweise die Effektsignale impliziert, so z.B.:

- e) (*Usate L'Oreal!*) perché voi valete

AUFFORDERUNG/ OBJEKT – URSACHE

Vergleicht man diese explizierte Paraphrase mit dem deutschen Slogan, so sollte man vermuten, dass es sich um einen Behauptungssatz, also mit einem definitonischen Charakter handelt:

- f) (*Sie benutzen/voi usate*) L'O perché voi valete

Die im deutschen Satz fehlende Konjunktion macht es einfacher, den Satz als Behauptung zu interpretieren. Die generellen Implikationen von Aussagen solcher Art werden normalerweise auf der logischen Ebene durch den Negationstest sichtbar:

- g) x nicht h, x nicht g

SUBJEKT (*nicht*) OBJEKT / SUBJEKT (*nicht*) URSACHE

umgangssprachlich: *chi non usa L'Oreal non vale* / *wer nicht L'Oreal benutzt*, ist es sich nicht wert.

Durch den Negationstest wird die implizierte Teilung zwischen positiven (wertvollen) und negativen (nicht wertvollen) Empfängern besonders deutlich.

Dass der Ursachenmarker im deutschen Satz nicht da ist, kann dem Slogan eine unterschiedliche Färbung schenken als dem italienischen. Einerseits wird die Behauptung durch die rhetorische Figur der Sentenz verstärkt, auf der anderen Seite markiert das Pronomen „es“ nicht nur den Wert der Empfänger (wie im Italienischen), sondern auch den des Produkts. So werden Empfänger und Objekt als auf der gleichen Ebene stehend behandelt (beide sind wertvoll) und S übernimmt die Rolle von demjenigen, der diese Gleichheit beobachtet. Das Pronomen „es“ relativiert außerdem den Wert von E und verbindet ihn ausschließlich mit dem beworbenen Produkt. Im deutschen Satz sind also S und P gleichwertig und setzen sich E auseinander, wie es in jedem Schema der Werbekommunikation zu erwarten ist.

Im Gegenteil dazu ist S in dem italienischen Slogan der Schiedsrichter, der den Wert der Empfänger in Frage stellt und ihn nur unter der Bedingung der Kauf- und Gebrauchsaktion auflösen kann. In dem italienischen Satz übernimmt der benannte Wert von E eine absolute Perspektive, die sich nicht auf den Gebrauch des Produkts beschränkt. Der italienische Kommunikator appelliert für eine ideale Totalität, die von E leicht durch das Produkt erreicht werden kann, indem er den Ausdruck einer ästhetischen, ethischen und globalen Wertung (das Fillmores *Judging Verb valere*, einen Wert haben, wertvoll sein) benutzt. Auf der anderen Seite ist die Kausalkonjunktion *perché* Indiz einer argumentativen Entfaltung des Satzes, als ob sich der Sprecher die Mühe gäbe, dem Empfänger eine plausible Begründung für seine Kaufaktion zu geben, damit die unterschwellige Aufforderung des Slogans rechtfertigt wird. Die Verwendung eines Argumentationsmarkers suggeriert die Anwendung einer Erklärung und spiegelt die Struktur einer Ursache-Effekt Sequenz wider, die wie in *e* und *f* formuliert werden kann. Die argumentative Entfaltung wird in der Werbekommunikation als gegenteiliger Ausdruck zu der Assertion betrachtet: während die Assertion ein allgemeines, sozial anerkanntes Wissen voraussetzt und deshalb den Sprecher nicht verpflichtet, seine Aussagen zu belegen, wird der Inhalt mit dem Kausalsatz durch erklärende bzw. argumentative Strukturen explizit ausgedrückt.

Die Sentenz in dem deutschen Slogan schließt diese Argumentation aus und erlaubt keine Interaktion zwischen S und E.

Die Interpretation der L'Oreal Slogans auf einer kontrastiven Ebene ist deshalb zweideutig: Einerseits öffnet die syntaktische Struktur mit der Kausalkonjunktion den Dialog S/E in der italienischen Anzeige, während die Gestaltung der deutschen Aussage durch eine Assertion keine kooperative Struktur erzeugt. Die lexikalische Wahl ist hingegen in dem deutschen Satz weniger definitiv als im italienischen und nicht so einseitig: die Schätzung von E verweist keinen definitiven und absoluten Wert, weil sich die *Judging* Verbalphrase (sich wert sein) in dem deutschen Satz auf das Produkt und seinen Gebrauch beschränkt ist. Die dialogische Offenheit der italienischen Syn-

tax wird von der lexikalischen Wahl des *Judging Verbs* ausgelöst, indem die E rundherum und unabhängig von dem erworbenen Produkt an sich bewertet werden.

3. Abschließende Bemerkungen

Unter dem Aspekt der Kommunikationsakte kann die Strategie der deutschen und der italienischen Konsumwerbung als ein ähnlicher Versuch beschrieben werden, den Lebensstil der Empfänger, ihre Persönlichkeit durch einen Identifikationsprozess zu einem idealen Vorbild zu bewegen. In beiden Kulturen werden die Wünsche überwiegend nicht auf ein Konsumobjekt gelenkt, sondern zum Aufbau einer Idealidentität genutzt. Es ist auffallend, dass die meisten Kommunikationshandlungen in beiden Sprachen nicht durch die Sprechakttypen Befehlen, Versprechen, Raten konstitutiv werden, sondern durch Evaluations- und Beurteilungsausdrücke wie Behaupten, Bestätigen, Erlauben, Bewerten. Im Gegenteil zur objektorientierten Werbung, die die Bedürfnisse der Empfänger zu verwirklichen verspricht oder neu entspringen lässt, beziehen sich die erwähnten Sprechhandlungen auf die Empfänger selbst, auf ihre subjektiven Attribute und ihre Persönlichkeit. Die sogenannte „Werbung des Seins“ (überwiegend im Vergleich zu der Werbung des Habens) wird durch kommissive Nominal- und Verbalphrasen vollzogen, die den Effekt haben, die Empfänger selbst und vor allem ihre Angehörigkeit zu der Gruppe der „Guten, Schlaunen, Wertvollen“ zu bestätigen. Die wichtigste Voraussetzung solcher Kommunikationsstrategie ist eine unterschwellige Diskreditierung der Nicht-Konsumenten, mit denen sich die Empfänger nicht zu identifizieren riskieren wollen. Die faktiven Verben, die die auf das geworbene Objekt referierte Aktion beschreiben (machen, geben, genießen, verschaffen, schaffen...), sind in dem untersuchten Korpus kaum zu finden, weil die Slogans kein Handlungsziel voraussetzen, das dank dem gekauften Objekt erfüllt werden kann. Überwiegend sind im Korpus raffinierte Bezüge auf ein individuelles Lebensziel, auf eine Identifizierung zwischen E und O. Die sich ergebenden Effekte beeinflussen deshalb nicht die Kauf- und Konsumaktion, sondern die Wertstellungen der Empfänger. Die ausgeklügelte Strategie besteht in beiden Kulturen aus der Präsupposition einer anscheinend faktiven Freiheit (ich sage dir nicht, was du machen musst), die von einer kommissiven Relativierung verstärkt wird (deine Wahl hängt nicht von mir ab) und schließlich zu einer therapeutischen Bestätigung *sub iudice* führt. Die Bedingung kann nur von dem Empfänger selbst durch die richtige Entscheidung ausgelöst werden.

Aber diese ähnlichen Präsuppositionen übernehmen in der sprachlichen Verwirklichung der deutschen und italienischen Slogans unterschiedliche Formen. Die Verwendung von wenigeren deiktischen Ausdrücken, so wie von wenigeren *Judging Verbs* scheinen den deutschen Slogans (mindestens im hier benutzten *Korpus*) eine größere Objektivierung zuzuweisen, indem sie sich auf das Objekt mehr als auf das Subjekt fokussieren. Das relativiert und vermindert die Tendenz zu einer unkooperativen Interaktion durch unpersönliche und passive Verbalformen. Die deiktischen Ausdrücke, die ein gemeinsames Wissen voraussetzen, verhindern eine aktive Teilnahme der Emp-

fänger. In den deutschen Texten scheint die Identifizierung O/E nicht so stark wie in den italienischen zu sein, in denen die Überschneidung O/E als selbstverständlich betrachtet werden mag, als ob die Distanz zwischen den beiden den Schritt der Kaufaktion irrelevant und selbstverständlich machen würde. In einigen Fällen vermitteln die italienischen Slogans eine informative Funktion, indem sie versuchen etwas zu klären (statt davon auszugehen), trotzdem erscheinen im Korpus die Nominalisierungen und die synthetischen Ausdrücke häufiger in deutschen Slogans als Zeuge eines objektivierten Gehalts in der syntaktischen Gestaltung.

Trotz der Ähnlichkeiten, die die gemeinsamen Grundrisse der Werbekommunikation in beiden Kulturen ins Licht bringen, sind einige Färbungen in der Verwendung der sprachlichen Marker in den zwei Korpora sichtbar. Zukünftige und ausführlichere Untersuchungen können die Möglichkeit einer globalisierten Werbung auch in relativ nahen Kulturen ausschließen oder bestätigen, indem man durch linguistische Analysen näher auf die benutzten Sprach- und Redemittel in den jeweiligen Werbungen eingeht, damit ihre Referenzen als Bestandteil der Massenkommunikation in unterschiedlichen Sozialkontexten aufgeklärt werden können.

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Anhang

Teil des gesammelten Corpus:

Marke	Deutsche Slogans	Italienische Slogans
Garnier	Denk an Dich	Prenditi cura di te
Miele	So individuell wie Sie	Chi Miele chi no
Zurich	Einfach. Mehr. Direkt.	Because change happenz
Magnum	Ich bete es an	Non resisto alle tentazioni
Kodak	Kenner kaufen Kodak	Voi premete il pulsante, noi facciamo il resto
Venus	Erwecke die Göttin in Dir	Risveglia la dea che c'è in te
De Beer	Ein Diamant ist unvergänglich	Un diamante è per sempre
Barilla	Der Geschmack Italiens	Dove c'è Barilla c'è casa
Cola Light	Das kleine Plus zum Wohlfühlen	Great taste zero sugar

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SINNGEHALT IM ARGUMENTATIVEN DIALOG: „DAS EWIGE LEBEN“ IM EVANGELIUM NACH LUKAS (LK. 10, 25-37)¹

LUCIA SALVATO

1. *Die dialogisch-argumentative Struktur des Textes*

Betrachtet man das Zwiegespräch zwischen Jesus und dem Schriftgelehrten im 10. Kapitel des Evangeliums nach Lukas, fällt unmittelbar ins Auge, dass es sich um ein sprachliches kommunikatives Ereignis handelt, das in Form eines argumentativen Dialogs vorliegt.

Der Komplex Lk. 10, 25-37 kann als eine Einheit gelesen werden, in der die Teilnehmer in einem Spiel von Fragen und Gegenfragen, von Antworten und Rückantworten (Schürmann 1993: 129) abwechselnd über ein bestimmtes Thema argumentieren. In der gewählten Passage betrifft die Argumentation den Sinngehalt des Terminus *ewiges Leben*, aber zum wahren Sinn, d.h. zur Botschaft Jesu gelangt man erst im Laufe des Dialogs und durch die angeführten Argumente, denen sich ein zweites Thema (*wer der Nächste sei*) anschließt.

Man kann daher von einem argumentativen Dialog im Sinne Waltons sprechen, nach dem sich die Argumentation auf eine dialogische Struktur stützt, in welcher verschiedene spezifische Themen aufeinander folgen, die mit weiteren Themen verbunden sind. Jede Argumentation habe so die Form einer Kette, die aus der Verbindung verschiedener spezifischer Argumente bestehe. Kern eines Argumentes sei eine Begründung oder eine Folge von Begründungen, welche eine These bzw. eine Theorie aufstellen, in der auch die Schlussfolgerung der ganzen Argumentation bestehe (Walton 2006: 1-4).

Die Art und Weise wie sich der Dialog durch Fragen und Antworten fortsetzt, lässt auch an jene ‚sokratische Methode‘ (die sog. *Mäeutik*²) denken, die auf die Gesprächsführung Sokrates zurückgeht und nach welcher der Lehrende durch geschicktes Fragen den Schüler selbst zu neuen Erkenntnissen gelangen lässt. In diesem Sinne kann man eine Ähnlichkeit zwischen der Methode der Reflexion, die Jesus im Dialog verwendet, und derselben ‚sokratischen Ironie‘ erkennen, nach welcher einer der Gesprächspartner vorgibt, der Unwissende zu sein und Fragen stellt, in denen die Antworten schon verborgen liegen. Die Erkenntnis der Wahrheit vollzieht sich auch im

¹ Version nach der deutschen Bischofskonferenz: Einheitsübersetzung der Heiligen Schrift, 1980 Katholische Bibelanstalt, Stuttgart; Online-Version: <http://alt.bibelwerk.de/bibel/>.

² Das von Sokrates geübte Verfahren wurde von Platon in seinem *Theaitetos* (148e – 151d) erklärt und mit jener Kunst der Hebamme (gr. *maieutikē*, ‚Hebammenkunst‘) verglichen, die Sokrates von seiner Mutter ererbt haben soll.

Dialog mit Jesus nicht direkt, sondern allmählich, schrittweise und durch ständig neue Fragestellungen. In der gewählten Evangeliumspassage gelingt dies auch durch die Erzählung eines Gleichnisses, durch welches Jesus „den Zuhörer ins Mitdenken und am Ende zur Tat bewegen möchte“³ (Schürmann 1993: 129).

Ziel der vorliegenden Arbeit ist es daher, die Dialogpartner bei der Entfaltung aller Argumente, welche die Struktur des Dialogs bilden, Schritt für Schritt zu begleiten, um allmählich zum vollkommenen Sinngehalt des Terminus *ewiges Leben* zu gelangen.

2. Die Grundfrage des Menschen

Da stand ein Gesetzeslehrer auf, und um Jesus auf die Probe zu stellen, fragte er ihn: „Meister, was muss ich tun, um das ewige Leben zu gewinnen?“

Die erste Frage des Gesetzeslehrers führt den Dialog ein, wobei sie aus tieferen Gründen („um Jesus auf die Probe zu stellen“) gestellt wird, und somit die allgemeinen Regeln des Dialogs widerlegt (vgl. dazu u.a. Walton 2006: 1ff.; Stati 1982).

In den Worten „was muss ich tun, um das ewige Leben zu gewinnen?“ geht es um die Grundfrage des Menschen; doch die Sorge, die darin scheinbar auftaucht, ist eher eschatologisch, d.h. sie betrifft das Leben nach dem Tod. Der Schriftgelehrte stellt nämlich seine Frage auf einem theoretischen Niveau, auf welchem Jesus oft – als „der Sohn des Zimmermanns“ (Mt. 13,55) und „Prophet ohne Bibelstudium“ (Ratzinger 2007: 234) – auf die Probe gestellt wird.

3. Wie antwortet Jesus?

Jesus sagte zu ihm: „Was steht im Gesetz? Was liest du dort?“

Jesus antwortet auf eine andere Weise als man erwarten würde, und zwar mit einer doppelten Frage. Wie gewöhnlich antwortet er nicht direkt, sondern er zeigt den Weg, damit sein Gesprächspartner selbst zur Antwort gelangt. Aber dies soll schrittweise geschehen, im Laufe des Dialogs.

Zunächst verweist Jesus ganz einfach auf die Schrift⁴ und er lässt den Gesetzeslehrer selbst die Antwort geben, weil er sicher ist, dass er als Meister der Exegese die zutreffende Antwort kennt.

Jesus' erste Gegenfrage („Was steht im Gesetz?“) lässt so ein stillschweigendes Einverständnis zwischen beiden Gesprächspartnern durchblicken, das mit dem *Argument from Commitment* von Walton vergleichbar ist, in welchem der Sprecher als Prämisse eine Aussage formuliert, an der auch der Gesprächspartner beteiligt ist (Wal-

³ Siehe hier Abschn. 9.

⁴ Linguistisch kann man den Verweis auf die Schrift als ein Beispiel für Waltons *Argument from Expert Opinion* interpretieren; siehe Walton (2006: 84f., 89). Vgl. auch folgende Worte: „Die Tora gilt auch Lukas als der Wille Gottes; das ‚Geschriebensein‘ genügt als Begründung“ (Schürmann 1993: 132).

ton 2006: 116f.)⁵. Der Unterschied zu Walton besteht aber darin, dass gewöhnlich nicht Jesus die Aussage als Prämisse voranstellt, sondern er sie seinen Gesprächspartner formulieren lässt. Dies geschieht auch bei dem Zitat aus der Tora: Jesus (*the proponent*) lädt den Schriftgelehrten (*the respondent*) ein, das wichtigste in der Tora enthaltene Gebot als Prämisse anzunehmen, an dem Letzterer beteiligt ist. Der Experte der Exegese versteht sofort, was „the proponent“ meint und drückt die Prämisse selbst aus.

Mit seiner doppelten Frage hat nun Jesus die Führung des Gesprächs in die Hand genommen „und es seelsorglich umorientiert. [...] Das ‚streitende Schulgespräch‘ wird so in der folgenden Gesprächsführung Jesu in der Tiefe umfunktioniert zu einem ‚seelsorglichen Gespräch‘, das den Mithörenden zum Tun bewegen möchte“ (Schürmann 1993: 132).

4. Die Antwort aus der Schrift

Er antwortete: „Du sollst den Herrn, deinen Gott, lieben mit ganzem Herzen und ganzer Seele, mit all deiner Kraft und all deinen Gedanken, und deinen Nächsten sollst du lieben wie dich selbst“

Für seine treffende Antwort verbindet der Schriftgelehrte zwei Zitate: eines aus dem Buch *Deuteronomium* (Dtn. 6,5) – in dessen Mittelpunkt die Liebe für Gott steht – und eines aus dem Buch *Levitikus* (Lev. 19,18) – in dessen Mittelpunkt die Liebe für den Nächsten steht.

Die Antwort mit dem Verweis auf die Schrift ist aber noch eine bloße und voraussehbare Wiederholung von dem, was in der Tora enthalten ist. Im ersten Wortwechsel bleibt somit der Sinngehalt des Terminus *ewiges Leben* noch auf einem theoretischen bzw. informativen Niveau. Der Gesetzeslehrer „zeigt sich dabei aber nicht ernstlich an seinem persönlichen Heil interessiert; er stellt aus Distanz [...] eine theoretisch-theologische Frage“ (Schürmann 1993: 131). Seine Vernunft, seine Freiheit, sein eigenes alltägliches Leben sind noch nicht in der ersten Antwort berücksichtigt, und Jesus ist sich dessen bewusst. Um zum vollkommenen Sinngehalt zu gelangen, muss darum der Dialog weiter fortgeführt werden.

5. Ein erster Schritt im Sinngehalt des Terminus *Leben*

Jesus sagte zu ihm: „Du hast richtig geantwortet. Handle danach und du wirst leben.“

Die Antwort des Schriftgelehrten braucht Jesus nur zu bestätigen, und in dieser Bestätigung ist seine erste Antwort enthalten: „Du hast richtig geantwortet“.

Was aber soll das Adverb *richtig* bedeuten? Dass der Gesetzeslehrer theoretisch, d.h. im Sinne der Tora präzise geantwortet hat. Jesu genügt das aber nicht. Er will weitere Schritte vollziehen, und auch diese im Laufe des Dialogs.

⁵ Jesus' Frage lässt auch an Waltons *Appeal to Expert Opinion* denken (Walton 2006: 86ff.).

Im zweiten Satz und durch den Verweis auf die Anwendung des Gebots nach der Tora (*handle danach*) formuliert Jesus eine Einladung: Sein Gesprächspartner soll jetzt konkret nach der Tora handeln. Der wahre Zweck der Nachricht muss also noch erreicht werden: die praktische Anwendung des Gebots im alltäglichen Leben, was das Gewinnen des „Lebens“ ermöglichte. Jesus fügt nämlich hinzu: „und du wirst leben“.

Interessant ist hier, dass das Verb *leben* ohne das Adjektiv *ewig* vorkommt. Etwas anderes muss sich in dem Sinngehalt des Terminus *ewiges Leben* verstecken, mehr als die bloße Wiederholung einer theoretischen Antwort, die im engeren eschatologischen Sinn nur das jenseitige Leben betrifft. Die Frage muss noch mehr in die Tiefe gehen: Was verdient der Mensch auf dieser Welt, der der Einladung Jesu folgt? Bei der Antwort geht es um ein besonderes Versprechen, das offenbar auch im konkreten Sinn des diesseitigen menschlichen Lebens verstanden werden kann. Aber inwiefern? Folgende Worte kommen hier zu Hilfe:

Was wollen wir also eigentlich? [...] Was ist das eigentlich „Leben“? Und was bedeutet das eigentlich „Ewigkeit“? Es gibt Augenblicke, in denen wir plötzlich spüren: Ja, das wäre es eigentlich – das wahre „Leben“ – so müsste es sein. Daneben ist das, was wir alltäglich „Leben“ nennen, gar nicht wirklich Leben. Augustinus hat [...] einmal gesagt: Eigentlich wollen wir doch nur eines – „das glückliche Leben“, das Leben, das einfach Leben, einfach „Glück“ ist. (Benedikt XVI. 2007b: Nr.11).

Das Versprechen Jesu („und du wirst leben“) soll also auch in dem Sinn des „glücklichen Lebens“ verstanden werden, jenes Lebens, das „einfach Leben, einfach ‚Glück‘ ist“, das schon auf der Erde seinen Anfang nehmen kann. Nicht zufällig verspricht Jesus seinen Jüngern bzw. jedem, der um seines Namens willen alles verlassen hat, nicht nur das ewige Leben in der kommenden Welt, sondern auch „das Hundertfache“ in dieser Zeit (siehe Mt. 19,27-29; Mk. 10,29-30; Lk. 18,29-30).

6. *Wer ist der Nächste?*

Der Gesetzeslehrer wollte seine Frage rechtfertigen und sagte zu Jesus: „Und wer ist mein Nächster?“

Die erste Antwort Jesu reicht dem Gesetzeslehrer nicht: Er muss seine erste Frage rechtfertigen. Das Schriftwort über die Erzielung des ewigen Lebens war nämlich zu jener Zeit theoretisch unumstritten, doch warf seine Anwendung in der Praxis des Lebens Fragen auf, „die in der Schule (und auch im Leben selbst) umstritten“ waren (Ratzinger 2007: 235). Das Problem liegt also darin, wer konkret der Nächste im menschlichen Leben sei.

Die zweite Frage des Gelehrten ertönt als eine Art Kritik an der Folgerung Jesu, indem Letzterer ihn eingeladen hat, so zu handeln, wie die Torah besagt. Es reiche nicht, dass er Gott mit ganzem Herzen, mit all seiner Kraft und all seinen Gedanken liebe; er soll auch seinen Nächsten lieben, wie sich selbst. Worin aber liegt der Kern seiner Frage nach dem Nächsten? Damit „stellt er im Grunde die nach der Grenze der

„Nächsten“-Liebe. Es geht um den Geltungsbereich von Lev. 19,18b und aller Torah-Vorschriften, die den „Nächsten“ betreffen“ (Schürmann 1993: 142). Einerseits wurde der Begriff zur Zeit Jesu vielfach eingeeengt, weil „mit dem ‚Nächsten‘ der Volksgenosse gemeint sei“ und alle einem anderen Volk zugehörigen Menschen als Fremde (d.h. als keine ‚Nächsten‘) galten. Es blieb also umstritten, wo die Grenzen zu ziehen waren. Nicht nur Häretiker, Denunzianten und Abtrünnige, sondern auch Samariter wurden nicht als Nächste angesehen (siehe Ratzinger 2007: 235). Auf der anderen Seite will sich der „orthodox fragende Gesetzeslehrer“ wahrscheinlich von Jesus „nicht auf die Ebene der praktischen Forderung abdrängen lassen. Er möchte recht behalten auf der theoretisch-theologischen Ebene“ (Schürmann 1993: 141f.).

Die Frage um den Nächsten wäre so eine weitere und irgendwie berechnete Forderung, der Jesus nachkommen soll; und dies geschieht durch eine Gleichnisrede. Auf diese Weise fügt er die Antwort in den damaligen sozialen Kontext, und somit ermöglicht und erleichtert er ihr Verständnis.

7. Die Gleichnisrede Jesu als Exemplum

Darauf antwortete ihm Jesus: „Ein Mann ging von Jerusalem nach Jericho hinab und wurde von Räubern überfallen. Sie plünderten ihn aus und schlugen ihn nieder; dann gingen sie weg und ließen ihn halb tot liegen.“

Auf die konkrete Frage des Schriftgelehrten antwortet Jesus mit dem ‚Gleichnis vom barmherzigen Samariter‘. Die vorangehend genannten Worte fungieren hier als Einleitung; aber warum verwendet Jesus eine Gleichnisrede bzw. eine Allegorie⁶?

7.1. Die Klarheit der Darlegung

Nun, jeder Erzieher, jeder Lehrer, der seinen Hörern neue Erkenntnisse vermitteln will, wird sich immer wieder auch des Beispiels, des Gleichnisses bedienen. Durch das Beispiel rückt er eine Wirklichkeit, die bislang außerhalb des Blickfelds der Angesprochenen lag, an ihr Denken heran. [...] Er rückt durch das Gleichnis das Fernliegende an sie heran, so dass sie über die Brücke des Gleichnisses zum bisher Unbekannten hinüberkommen. [...] Er [Jesus] zeigt uns Gott, nicht einen abstrakten Gott, sondern den handelnden Gott, der in unser Leben hereintritt und uns an die Hand nehmen will. (Ratzinger 2007: 230ff.).

„Das Herzstück der Verkündigung Jesu bilden ohne Zweifel die Gleichnisse“ (Ratzinger 2007: 222), denn verhüllende Formen wie Allegorien waren der geläufige Umgang mit bildlicher Rede in seiner Umwelt. Und das von Jesus erzählte Gleichnis war zu jener Zeit „eine durchaus realistische Geschichte, denn auf diesem Weg kamen derlei Überfälle regelmäßig vor“ (Ratzinger 2007: 236).

⁶ Über die Gleichnisdeutung und die Unterscheidung zwischen Gleichnis und Allegorie siehe u.a. Dodd (1938); Jülicher (1899/1910); Jeremias (1956).

Obwohl es sich dabei um verborgene und vielschichtige Einladungen zum Glauben handelt, hat jedoch die Wahl einer Gleichnisrede sicher mit ihrer „einzigartige[n] Klarheit und Schlichtheit“ zu tun (Jeremias 1956: 6; vgl. Ratzinger 2007: 222), d.h. mit der besseren Deutlichkeit der gemeinsamen Argumentation. Die darin enthaltene Geschichte soll als Exemplum zur Deutung eines Begriffs (in diesem Fall *der Nächste*) dienen, indem Gleichnisse „ein Stück wirklichen Lebens [sind], bei dem es nur um *einen* – und zwar möglichst allgemein zu fassenden – Gedanken, einen einzigen ‚springenden Punkt‘ gehe“ (Jülicher 1899/1910 zitiert in Ratzinger 2007: 223).

7.2. Das Beispiel als Analogie

Das Gleichnis gibt Jesus die Möglichkeit, sich bei seiner Argumentation auf ein gegebenes Beispiel zu stützen. Dies kommt gleichzeitig seinem Gesprächspartner „as a powerful lesson“ (Walton 2006: 98) vor, als eine wirkungsvolle Lehre, die zum ähnlichen Handeln einladen soll. Die Wahl einer Gleichnisrede lässt somit an jene Typologien von Argumenten denken, die Walton *Argument from Example* und *Argument from Analogy* nennt (Walton 2006: 96; ders. 1995). Anders aber als in Waltons Beispielen, lässt Jesus – wie schon erwähnt – seine Gesprächspartner die Folgerung aus den Argumenten selbst ableiten. Diese Vorgehensweise soll erleichtert werden, weil zwischen ihrem Alltagsleben und den im Dialog enthaltenen Argumenten eine enge Verbindung besteht, so dass die erzählte Geschichte für sie ein beispielhafter Fall wird. Durch das Alltägliche möchte also Jesus „die wahre Richtung zeigen“, die man im Alltag einschlagen soll, „um rechtzugehen“. Er zeige somit, wer der Mensch sei und was er demnach zu tun habe (Ratzinger 2007: 232).

7.3. Die Struktur des Gleichnisses

Das Gleichnis kann in zwei Teile geteilt werden. Im Mittelpunkt des ersten Teils stehen zwei Gestalten, der Priester und der Levit; im Mittelpunkt des zweiten steht der Mann aus Samarien:

Zufällig kam ein Priester denselben Weg herab; er sah ihn und ging weiter. Auch ein Levit kam zu der Stelle; er sah ihn und ging weiter.

Der erste Teil kann als Gegenargument betrachtet werden. Der Priester und der Levit sind nicht nur „Kenner des Gesetzes, die um die Heilsfrage wissen und ihr beruflich dienen“ (Ratzinger 2007: 236); vielmehr sind sie Angehörige derselben Solidargemeinschaft, der auch der von den Räubern überfallene Mann angehören muss und dem sich deswegen beide verantwortlich zeigen sollten. Beide gehen jedoch vorüber⁷. Aus linguistischer Sicht handelt es sich hierbei um eine anaphorische Wiederholung

⁷ Vom Priester würde man sich erwarten, dass er dem von den Räubern überfallenen Mann Hilfe leistet. Seine Haltung lässt darum an Waltons *Circumstantial Argument against the Person* denken; siehe Walton (2006: 122 ff.; 104-111); vgl. Benedikt XVI. (2006: Nr. 18) und im Neuen Testament den *Ersten Johannesbrief* (1Joh. 4,7-16).

des entsprechenden Ausdrucks („er sah ihn und ging weiter“), der eine passive bzw. im negativen Sinne beispielhafte Reaktion kennzeichnet.

Ist es aber wirklich möglich, so wie die ersten zwei Gestalten der Gleichnisrede zu leben, d.h. ohne dem doppelten Gebot der Tora zu folgen, und zwar Gott zu lieben und doch gleichzeitig dem Nächsten in der Not nicht zu helfen? Die Erfahrung lehrt: Es ist möglich.

Im zweiten Teil des Gleichnisses liegt die vollkommene Antwort, welche in diesem Fall als Pro – Argument fungiert:

Dann kam ein Mann aus Samarien, der auf der Reise war. Als er ihn sah, hatte er Mitleid, ging zu ihm hin, goss Öl und Wein auf seine Wunden und verband sie. Dann hob er ihn auf sein Reittier, brachte ihn zu einer Herberge und sorgte für ihn. Am andern Morgen holte er zwei Denare hervor, gab sie dem Wirt und sagte: Sorge für ihn, und wenn du mehr für ihn brauchst, werde ich es dir bezahlen, wenn ich wiederkomme.

Dank der Figur des Samariters zeigt sich hier das wahre Thema der ganzen Argumentation: die Liebe, und in diesem Sinne, dass die Liebe zu Gott auch die Liebe zum Nächsten mit einschließen soll, die allen möglich ist, auch jenen, die nicht zu derselben Solidargemeinschaft gehören. Die Grundfrage des Menschen hat nun mit der Barmherzigkeit zu tun, nach der sich jeder Mensch zum Nächsten von allen Menschen machen kann, die sich ihm in Not nähern.

8. *Jesus zweiter Appell an die Vernunft*

„Was meinst du: Wer von diesen dreien hat sich als der Nächste dessen erwiesen, der von den Räubern überfallen wurde?“

Mit der letzten Frage kommt die Argumentation des Dialogs zum Punkt: Jesus fordert den Schriftgelehrten direkt heraus und setzt seine Freiheit aufs Spiel. Mit jenem „Was meinst du?“ äußert er sein unerschütterliches Vertrauen zur menschlichen Vernunft und seinen Appell an sie: Er lädt seinen Gesprächspartner ein, nicht mehr die Worte der Tora auswendig zu wiederholen, sondern seine persönliche, sich auf das alltägliche Leben auswirkende Antwort zu geben.

8.1. Die Herausforderung Jesu: Die Barmherzigkeit als wahres Thema der Argumentation

Der Gesetzeslehrer antwortete: „Der, der barmherzig an ihm gehandelt hat.“

Der Gesetzeslehrer hat Jesus' Gedankengang Schritt für Schritt nachvollzogen, so dass er am Schluss zur endgültigen Antwort gelangt, die in einer reinen Feststellung besteht: Das Gebot der Tora soll die alltägliche Praxis einbeziehen.

Aber wie hat ihn Jesus herausgefordert? Die Frage „Und wer ist mein Nächster?“ wird hier von ihm verlagert: Der Prototyp des ‚Nächsten‘ soll nicht an dem überfallenen Menschen festgemacht werden, sondern unter den drei Gestalten des Gleichnisses (dem Priester, dem Levit und dem Samariter) gesucht werden, d.h. unter jenen, die

Hilfe bieten können. Mit der endgültigen Antwort des Gesetzeslehrers tritt somit das wahre Thema der Gleichnisrede in den Vordergrund: die Barmherzigkeit bzw. die Liebe.

9. „Die Liebe als Heilsforderung“⁸: Die Nachricht des Evangeliums als performativer Akt

Da sagte Jesus zu ihm: „Dann geh und handle genauso!“

Was wird nun in Bezug auf den Sinngehalt des Terminus *ewiges Leben* durch das Argumentieren erreicht? Ist durch die Darlegung der Argumente eine tiefere Einsicht in den Terminus erkennbar?

Wie im traditionellen aristotelischen Argumentationsverlauf beginnt der Dialog tatsächlich mit einem *Exordium*, in dem der Schriftgelehrte eine Auslegung von Jesus verlangt („Meister, was muss ich tun, um das ewige Leben zu gewinnen?“), womit erst einmal eine Art Begriffsbestimmung erreicht wird. Doch erweist sich diese als ungenügend, sowohl für Jesus als auch für den Gesetzeslehrer, der einer weiteren Erläuterung bedarf („Und wer ist mein Nächster?“). Der Vorgang soll daher anhand von Fragen und Gegenfragen, Antworten und Rückantworten so oft wiederholt werden (neun Mal), bis ein positives Resultat erreicht wird.

In seiner ersten Antwort möchte Jesus nicht nur das *informative* Niveau der biblischen Nachricht betonen („Du hast richtig geantwortet“), sondern auch dem *praktischen* bzw. *performativen* Niveau der Gleichnisrede gerecht werden („Handle danach und du wirst leben“). Beim ersten Schritt im Dialog soll darum der Sinngehalt des fraglichen Terminus folgendermaßen lauten: Das ewige Leben bzw. das wahre menschliche Leben erreicht man („und du wirst leben“), wenn man so handelt, wie das erste Gebot der Tora besagt („Handle danach“). Der Schriftgelehrte braucht jedoch weitere Argumente, um den wahren Sinn zu erfassen; er braucht ein Beispiel, ein Exemplum⁹, das ihm durch die Gleichnisrede geboten wird. Diese soll ihm lehren, dass die Worte der Tora bzw. der christlichen Botschaft nicht nur eine *informative* Mitteilung ausdrücken, sondern auch in die Praxis gelangen sollen, wie Benedikt XVI. erklärt:

Man würde in unserer Sprache sagen: Die christliche Botschaft war nicht nur „informativ“, sondern „performativ“ – das heißt: Das Evangelium ist nicht nur Mitteilung von Wißbarem; es ist Mitteilung, die Tatsachen wirkt und das Leben verändert. (Benedikt XVI. 2007b: Nr.2).

So gesehen wäre der Samariter die Realisierung der richtigen Antwort auf die Aufforderung Jesu bzw. der Torah.

⁸ Schürmann (1993: 129).

⁹ Wie schon Aristoteles besagt hatte, ist auch das Exemplum ein Beispiel der induktiven Methode; siehe Aristoteles (*Rhetorik*: I,2,1356b) und Mortara Garavelli (2003: 75).

9.1. Das Ergebnis: Wie hat Jesus gehandelt?

Jesus gibt eine erste theoretische Antwort als geheimnisvolles Herrenwort, das als eine verborgene und vielschichtige Einladung allmählich zum wahren Glauben werden soll. Im Kern des Gleichnisses wären so zwei Arten der Nachricht Jesu erkennbar: die informative und die performative Auskunft.

Durch die Gestalten des Priesters und des Levits manifestiert sich im ersten Teil nur *die informative Auskunft* der biblischen Nachricht: Das negative Beispiel beider Gestalten soll lehren, dass die Gebote Gottes auch nur als „Mitteilung von Wißbarem“ aufgenommen werden können, d.h. sie können allein auf dem theoretischen bzw. informativen Niveau bleiben.

Dank der Gestalt des Samariters realisiert sich dagegen im zweiten Teil auch *die performative Auskunft* der biblischen Nachricht. Jesus nimmt diese Gestalt als Modell und fordert somit den Schriftgelehrten zum ähnlichen Handeln auf, d.h. von innen her Bruder aller derer zu werden, die seiner Hilfe bedürfen.

Was geschieht also am Ende der kompletten Argumentation? Wie in einem traditionellen aristotelischen argumentativen Dialog kehren Jesus' erste Worte zurück. Am Anfang hatte er gesagt: „Handle danach und du wirst leben“; jetzt sagt er: „Dann geh und handle genauso!“ Der Kreis schließt sich: Die Anfangsthese gleicht der Schlussfolgerung und der Wahrheitsgehalt wird am Schluss erneut betont.

Welchen Wahrheitsgehalt soll nun der Gesetzeslehrer in seinem Dialog mit Jesus entschlüsseln? Der Gelehrte – und mit ihm der Leser – soll erkennen, was der Terminus *ewiges Leben* wirklich bedeutet: Er impliziert eine innere Wandlung des Gesprächspartners, der als Mensch nicht nur das ewige jenseitige, sondern auch das wahre menschliche Leben bzw. seine Erfüllung erreichen kann. Die Bedingung dafür besteht jedoch darin, dass seine eigene persönliche Antwort nicht auf dem theoretischen bzw. *informativen* Niveau stehen bleibt, sondern sich auch in der Liebe zu seinem Nächsten (in der *performativen* Folge der Nachricht) konkret ausdrückt. In diesem Sinne handelt es sich um eine „doppelte Bewegung“:

Einerseits bringt das Gleichnis das Entferntliegende in die Nähe der Zuhörenden und Mitdenkenden. Andererseits wird der Zuhörer damit selbst auf den Weg gebracht. Die innere Dynamik des Gleichnisses [...] lädt ihn dazu ein, sich selbst dieser Dynamik anzuvertrauen und über seinen bisherigen Horizont hinauszugehen [...]. Das bedeutet aber, dass das Gleichnis die Mitarbeit des Lernenden verlangt, dem nicht nur etwas nahegebracht wird, sondern der selbst die Bewegung des Gleichnisses aufnehmen, mit ihm mitgehen muss. (Ratzinger 2007: 231)

Nach Schürmann wird „das Streitende Schulgespräch“ in der Gesprächsführung Jesu „in der Tiefe umfunktioniert zu einem seelsorglichen Gespräch, das den Mithörenden zum Tun bewegen“ möchte. Der Weg zum Leben in seiner Ganzheit soll darum als „sich in der Nächstenliebe bewährende Gottesliebe“ (Schürmann 1993: 125) verstanden werden. Denn beide Leben – das diesseitige irdische und das jenseitige ewige Le-

ben nach dem Tod – wären folgendermaßen mysteriös verbunden: Wenn man das menschliche Leben in Beziehung zu dem Nächsten lebt und sich somit als Nächster der Anderen macht, verwirklicht man konkret das Gebot Gottes, indem seine Nächstenliebe die Gottesliebe reflektiert, und so gewinnt er *das Leben*.

Vom Standpunkt der Theorie Peirce bestehe diese innere Wandlung des Menschen in einer tieferen Veränderung im *hábitus* bzw. im Verhalten eines Menschen dem Leben bzw. der Realität gegenüber, d.h. in der Verwirklichung des sog. *habit change* (siehe Peirce 1871: 449, 8.18; ders. 1934: §§ 388-402). Diesen Begriff entlehnte Peirce „aus der scholastischen Philosophie und machte ihn in der Zeit um 1870 innerhalb seiner Kritik an Berkeley für sein Konzept der *Unconscious Idea*, die er schon 1959/60 entwickelt hatte, fruchtbar“ (Erny 2005: 41f.).

Da aber die performative Auskunft der biblischen Nachricht immer die Freiheit des Menschen einbezieht, besteht die Möglichkeit, dass die Verhandlungspartner sich nicht immer einig werden: Nicht unbedingt geschieht eine Wandlung in der Einstellung des Gesprächspartners, der nämlich bei seiner bisherigen Einstellung bleiben kann. Am Ende der o.g. Evangeliumspassage bleibt z.B. offen, ob die Übermittlung der biblischen Nachricht beim Schriftgelehrten auf dem informativen Niveau geblieben ist oder ob er sie als performative Nachricht aufgenommen hat (vgl. dazu Ratzinger 2007: 231ff. und Rigotti 2004: 56). Die Umsetzung der Lehre in die Praxis wird somit auch dem freien Willen desselben Lesers überlassen.

Obwohl der Sinn der zwei Schlüsselwörter des Dialogs (*ewiges Leben* und *der Nächste*) in der Argumentation niemals explizit mit dem alleinstehenden Terminus *Leben* in Verbindung gesetzt wird, ist es am Ende dem Experten der Exegese klar, dass der Weg zum Erreichen des ewigen Lebens schon im menschlichen Leben beginnt. Dazu kommt er aber erst allmählich und nur mit Hilfe des unablässigen Drängens seines Gesprächspartners.

Zum völligen Verstehen des von Jesus gemeinten Sinngehalts sollte man nun weitere Passagen aus den Evangelien konsultieren, vor allem jene aus dem Evangelium nach Johannes. Darin wird explizit ausgedrückt¹⁰, dass das *ewige Leben* gleichzeitig das *Leben im wahren Sinn* mit einbezieht, indem der Terminus *Leben* zweierlei Bedeutungen impliziert. Einerseits wird er mit dem Adjektiv *ewig* assoziiert und somit im engeren Sinne *eschatologisch* (bzw. im Sinne des Endes der Welt und der Erweckung am letzten Tag; vgl. Joh. 6,40 und Joh. 6,54) verstanden. Auf der anderen Seite zieht der Terminus *Leben* – alleinstehend oder in Verbindung mit dem Adjektiv *wahr* – im weiteren Sinn auch das Versprechen eines erfüllten diesseitigen Lebens¹¹ in Betracht. Die Worte Jesu müssen somit eine ‚doppelte‘ Verheißung einschließen, deren Sinn Benedikt XVI. folgendermaßen erklärt:

¹⁰ Vgl. folgende Worte Jesu: „Dies habe ich in verhüllter Rede zu euch gesagt; es kommt die Stunde, in der ich nicht mehr in verhüllter Rede zu euch spreche, sondern euch offen den Vater verkünden werde.“ (Joh. 16, 25).

¹¹ „Ich bin gekommen, damit sie das Leben haben und es in Fülle haben.“ (Joh.10,10).

Jesus, der von sich gesagt hat, er sei gekommen, damit wir das Leben haben und es in Fülle, im Überfluß, haben (vgl. *Job* 10,10), hat uns auch gedeutet, was dies heißt – „Leben“: „Das ist das ewige Leben: dich erkennen, den einzigen wahren Gott und den du gesandt hast, Jesus Christus“ (*Job* 17,3). Leben im wahren Sinn hat man nicht in sich allein und nicht aus sich allein: Es ist eine Beziehung. Und das Leben in seiner Ganzheit ist Beziehung zu dem, der die Quelle des Lebens ist. Wenn wir mit dem in Beziehung sind, der nicht stirbt, der das Leben selber ist und die Liebe selber, dann sind wir im Leben. Dann „leben“ wir. (Benedikt XVI. 2007b: Nr.27).

Vom Standpunkt der Theorien von van Eemeren & Grootendorst (2004: 1) und Walton (2006: 4), nach denen das Argumentieren „a social activity“ ist, kann man schließlich auch von einem *social benefit* des argumentativen Dialogs Jesu reden. Worin besteht aber die *soziale Wirkung* seiner Worte und worin hat sie ihren Ursprung? Benedikt XVI. spricht von einer *sozialen Sendung*, die im „persönlichsten Akt der Begegnung mit dem Herrn“ gereift ist und „die Grenzen aufreißen will“, die den Herrn von den Menschen und diese voneinander trennen¹². Diese Vereinigung mit Christus vollziehe sich im Sakrament der Eucharistie¹³ (in der „Beziehung zu dem, der die Quelle des Lebens ist“; vgl. dazu Carrón 2008: 28-37) und befähige die Menschen zu einer Neuheit der sozialen Beziehungen (vgl. dazu Benedikt XVI. 2006: Nr.14; ders. 2007a: Nr.89).

Der Sinn des Terminus *ewiges Leben* – so wie er sich im argumentativen Dialog im Evangelium nach Lukas entfaltet – kann nun ohne Zweifel als *eschatologisch* verstanden werden, aber eschatologisch in dem Sinn, dass sich Gottes ewiges Reich in seinem Kommen ‚realisiert‘. Dort, wo sich Benedikt XVI. „auf das Wesen des abendländischen Mönchtums“ bzw. auf „die Wurzeln der europäischen Kultur“ besinnt, erklärt er die Lebensweise der Mönche mit folgenden Worten:

Ihr Ziel hieß: *quaerere Deum*. In der Wirrnis der Zeiten [...] wollten sie das Wesentliche tun – sich bemühen, das immer Gültige und Bleibende, das Leben selber zu finden. [...] Man sagt darüber, dass sie „eschatologisch“ ausgerichtet waren. Aber das ist nicht in einem zeitlichen Sinn zu verstehen, als ob sie auf das Ende der Welt oder auf ihren eigenen Tod hingeschaut hätten, sondern in einem existenziellen Sinn: Sie suchten das Endgültige hinter dem Vorläufigen. (Benedikt XVI. 2008a)

Bei den Termini *ewiges Leben* und *wahres Leben* kann man darum von *sich realisierender Eschatologie* sprechen, denn erschienen ist der, dessen verborgene Herrlichkeit in

¹² Benedikt XVI., *Ansprache an die Römische Kurie* (22. Dezember 2005), zitiert in: ders. (2007a: Nr.66).

¹³ Vgl. dazu folgende Worte: „Indem wir an der Eucharistiefeyer teilnehmen, werden wir uns immer mehr der engen Verbindung bewusst, die zwischen der Verkündigung des Wortes Gottes und dem eucharistischen Opfer besteht: Es ist dasselbe Geheimnis, das unserer Betrachtung dargeboten wird. Deshalb unterstreicht das Zweite Vatikanische Konzil: ‚Die Kirche hat die Heiligen Schriften immer verehrt wie den Leib Herrn selbst, weil sie, vor allem in der heiligen Liturgie, vom Tisch des Wortes Gottes wie des Leibes Christi ohne Unterlass das Brot des Lebens nimmt und den Gläubigen reicht.‘ (Benedikt XVI. 2008b).

der Person Jesu Christi aufleuchtet. Es ist in der Beziehung zu Ihm, dem Gekommenen bzw. dem die ganze Geschichte hindurch Kommenden, dass es dem Menschen ermöglicht wird, das Leben in seiner Ganzheit zu erleben (Ratzinger 2007: 227).

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DEUTSCHE ENTSPRECHUNGEN ZU *MICA*: EINE ANALYSE ANHAND FORLIXT 1 UND ANDERER CORPORA DER GESPROCHENEN SPRACHE

MARCELLO SOFFRITTI

In diesem Beitrag soll das italienische Adverb *mica* in seiner Eigenschaft als charakteristische Komponente des spontanen gesprochenen Italienisch untersucht werden. Nach einer kurzen linguistischen Analyse sollen dabei vor allem Fragen der Übersetzung ins Deutsche anhand der Belege diskutiert werden, die sich aus der Film-Datenbank FORLIXT 1 ergeben. Insbesondere soll diskutiert werden, inwieweit die Verwendung von *mica* in Filmdialogen derjenigen in spontanen Äußerungen entspricht, wie die entsprechenden Dialoge ins Deutsche übersetzt wurden, und in wieweit *mica* bei der Übersetzung von deutschen Filmdialogen ins Italienische zur Anwendung kommt. Die Grundannahme der Untersuchung ist, dass *mica* typische Funktionen der Auf- und Abtönung ausübt, die mit den entsprechenden Kategorien der Partikelforschung zu erfassen sind (vgl. dazu auch Radtke 2001; Heiss 2001).

1. *Lexikographische Erfassung*

Es sei – stellvertretend für eine Reihe ein- und zweisprachiger Wörterbücher – folgende Darstellung als Ausgangspunkt gewählt:

- **mi-ca 1** *avv* COLLOQ.
- 1 (*rafforzativo di negazione*) ja, doch, gar: *non sono mica stato io* ich bin es doch nicht gewesen; *questo vino non è mica male* dieser Wein ist gar nicht schlecht; *non sono mica un bambino* ich bin doch kein Kind
- 2 (*non*) (gar) nicht, kein: *mica male* nicht übel, nicht schlecht; *mica male quella ragazza* gar nicht schlecht das Mädchen; *mica tanto* nicht sehr, nicht besonders; *mica scherzo!* das ist durchaus kein Witz!
- 3 (*in frasi interrogative*) zufällig: *hai mica visto il mio ombrello?* du hast nicht zufällig meinen Schirm gesehen? *non sarà mica successo qualcosa?* es wird doch nichts passiert sein (DIT 2000).

Obwohl – wie in traditionellen Wörterbüchern üblich – die entscheidenden pragmatischen Eigenschaften nicht angegeben sind, so dass man nicht genau nachvollziehen kann, worin genau der Unterschied zwischen einer *negazione* und einem *rafforzativo di negazione* bestehen, enthalten die deutschen Entsprechungen schon eine kleine Palette von Abtönungs- und Gradpartikeln (*ja, doch, gar*), die man in Kontexten der mündlichen Interaktion unschwer kombinieren oder austauschen könnte. Hierzu einige konstruierte Beispiele:

dieser Wein ist gar nicht schlecht / dieser Wein ist doch gar nicht
schlecht / dieser Wein ist ja gar nicht schlecht / dieser Wein ist ja doch
gar nicht schlecht

Wichtig ist zunächst die Feststellung, dass man *mica* sowohl in Aussagen als auch in Fragen gebrauchen kann. Der Beispielsatz: *mica scherzo!* legt außerdem die Vermutung nahe, dass man mit *mica* nicht nur einer schlichten Verneinung sondern auch einem Ausruf Nachdruck verleihen kann. Eine befriedigende Charakterisierung der Verwendung von *mica* und der entsprechenden deutschen Ausdrucksmittel kann aber nur erreicht werden, indem man – wie grundsätzlich bei Abtönungselementen – sowohl die konkrete Kommunikationssituation als auch die Prosodie mit einbezieht. Die Nähe zu den Abtönungsmitteln ist in der vergleichenden Negationsforschung schon von J. Visconti betont worden:

Such a use is reminiscent of a set of phenomena linked to the behaviour of modal particles. (Visconti, im Druck)

2. Linguistische und pragmatische Beschreibung von *mica*

Es kann hier aus Platzgründen leider keine vollständige Übersicht der verschiedenen Beiträge zur Beschreibung von *mica* geboten werden. Erst in den letzten Jahren hat man angefangen, systematisch Belege aus größeren Corpora zu erheben und auszuwerten. Es ist jedoch anzumerken, dass bei der Analyse von Daten aus einsprachigen italienischen Corpora der Prosodie und der soziolinguistischen Variation bisher nur sehr geringe Beachtung geschenkt wurde. Die bisher geleisteten Beschreibungen von *mica* in syntaktischer und pragmatischer Hinsicht tendieren jedenfalls dazu, eine Grundbedeutung zugrunde zu legen, die prototypisch in Aussagesätzen in Verbindung mit Negationswörtern zustande kommt, wobei der allgemeine Redehintergrund für eine angemessene Verwendung entscheidend ist. Dass die standardsprachliche Verwendung von *mica* erst durch eine illokutive Funktion legitimiert wird, zeigt sich an folgenden, konstruierten Beispielsätzen:

?Ti ho detto mille volte che questo televisore non funziona mica.

*Se questo televisore non funzionasse mica, lo venderei

*Quando questo televisore non funziona mica, non devi arrabbiarti

*Non ci credo che questo televisore non funziona mica

*Un televisore che non funziona mica non lo voglio

Zur Funktion von *mica* in Aussagesätzen als Mittel der dialogischen Interaktion sind folgende Meilensteine der linguistischen Beschreibung zu beachten, aus denen sich eine progressive Präzisierung der Verwendungsbedingungen ergibt (alle Hervorhebungen von mir, M.S.):

In Catalan post-verbal *pas* is used to give the negative construction [...] adversative meaning on the pragmatic level; its use, comparable to that

of *mica* in Italian, implies that **the speaker presupposes that whatever he is denying is on the contrary considered true or understood as realizable by his interlocutor**." (Bernini & Ramat 1996: 17)

As was first discussed in Cinque (1976), the occurrence of *mica* is pragmatically restricted to those contexts in which the non-negative counterpart of the proposition expressed in the sentence is assumed in the discourse. For example, in order for *mica* to be uttered felicitously in example (2), it is necessary that the proposition that Gianni has a car be entailed by the common ground. **If such a proposition is not part of the common ground, the presence of *mica* renders the sentence infelicitous and its counterpart without *mica* must be used** (i.e., *Gianni non ha la macchina*). (Zanuttini 1997: 61).

Thus, *mica* can be employed felicitously when the negated proposition is accessible or entailed in the common ground of the discourse, but the manner in which that proposition becomes part of the common ground is crucial to the felicity of *mica*; **it is NOT the case that any proposition entailed by the common ground can be negated using *mica***. Rather, as was the case in Catalan, **the proposition being denied by NEG2 must be discourse-old (whether introduced linguistically or not) and salient in the discourse context**. In addition, as (6b) shows, prior belief in the corresponding affirmative proposition ("Gianni has the car") is not a necessary requirement on the use of NEG2; **rather, activation of that proposition (even via implicature) is sufficient**. Finally, it is also notable that, like the Catalan NEG2 construction, Italian *non V mica* is possible in a "confirmatory" context like the one in (4) above. (Schwenter 2006: 335).

Hinzu kommen weitere wichtige Beobachtungen und Klarstellungen durch einen neueren Beitrag von Visconti (im Druck), die den Blick auf die Fragesätze erweitert und nicht konstruierte Belege aus aktuellen Corpora (C-ORAL-ROM und NUNC-IT Generic I) verwendet. Es handelt sich zum einen um eine prinzipielle Ausleuchtung der textpragmatischen Voraussetzungen für den aktuellen Gebrauch von *mica* in dialogischen Aussagen (erweiterter Relevanzradius der relevanten Annahmen in gelegentlich polyphonischer Perspektive):

[...] in the NUNC database only 3% of the examples manifest in the preceding co-text some kind of explicit trigger (*colpa* 'guilt') (29), whereas the overwhelming majority of examples (69%) concerns **an inference licensed by the preceding co-text, especially relationships in which extra-linguistic context (30) and encyclopaedic knowledge (31, 32) are necessary to flesh out the inference**. [...] Secondly, in a significant number of examples **the inference that is denied is attributed to another 'voice' in the discourse**, to which in many cases explicit reference is made in the surrounding co-text [...] The polyphonic component would arise in *mica* from the increase in dialogical contexts in which the refutation of the interlocutor's point of view is not realized explicitly.

In Bezug auf den Gebrauch von *mica* in Fragesätzen, der bisher vor allem als höfliche Abschwächung charakterisiert worden war, ermittelt sie außerdem

a much more complex range of shades between questions and requests, both with and without accompanying *non* [...],

um zu einem allgemeinen Schluss zu gelangen, der, wie schon oben angedeutet, die Dimension der Abtönung ins Spiel bringt:

Modulation, as “the formulation of a speech act along one of the opposite stylistic directions of weakening and boosting” (*ibid.*: 32) captures at an abstract level the function of reinforcing and mitigating *mica*: both vary the intensity of the speech act they occur in.

Es gilt nun, diese noch etwas allgemeinen Beschreibungsvorschläge mit einer genaueren, translationsrelevanten Analyse der einzelnen Sprechakte in konkreten Interaktionssituationen zu verbinden. Es wird sich zeigen, dass in sehr vielen Fällen der Verwendung von *mica* eine zusätzliche emotionale Involvierung des Sprechers ins Spiel kommt und in der Regel wahrgenommen wird. Dadurch wird die Nähesprache in zahlreichen dialogischen Austauschsituationen sehr unterschiedlich geprägt. Es zeigt sich dabei außerdem eine regiolektale Differenzierung, die weiter reicht, als bisher in der Forschung untersucht wurde.

3. Die Daten in translatorischer Hinsicht

Es werden nun die 77 Belege von *mica* und die dazu gehörigen Entsprechungen in den 12 italienischen Originalfilmen, die z.Zt. in FORLIXT zusammen mit einer deutschen Version enthalten sind, analysiert. Parallel dazu werden die 7 Belege analysiert, die in den italienischen Fassungen der 9 deutschen Originalfilme nachzuweisen sind. Es gelten diesbezüglich die translatorischen und texttypologischen Rahmenbedingungen, die schon in dem Beitrag von C. Heiss in diesem Band dargelegt wurden und hier aus Platzgründen nicht wiederholt werden sollen. Zum Vergleich soll noch erwähnt werden, dass das LIP-Corpus von T. De Mauro (489.178 Wörter) 114 Belege von *mica* enthält¹.

Die im Corpus mikrostrukturell feststellbaren Entsprechungen sind in der folgenden Übersicht zusammengefasst:

¹ Im Internet verfügbar unter <http://languageserver.uni-graz.at/badip/>

ENTSPRECHUNGEN BEI DER ÜBERSETZUNG INS DEUTSCHE		AUSGANGSELEMENTE BEI DER ÜBERSETZUNG AUS DEM DEUTSCHEN	
<i>kein Verstärker</i>	37	<i>doch nicht /kein</i>	
<i>doch nicht</i>	12	<i>ja net</i>	
<i>gar nicht</i>	5	<i>kein Verstärker</i>	
<i>ja nicht</i>	2	INSGESAMT	
<i>wirklich nicht</i>	2		
<i>zufällig(erweise)</i>	2		
<i>etwa ohne Neg.</i>	2		
<i>vielleicht nicht</i>	2		
<i>(noch) nicht mal</i>	1		
<i>bloß keine</i>	1		
<i>eben nicht</i>	1		
<i>ganz im Gegenteil</i>	1		
<i>kein bisschen</i>	1		
<i>niemals</i>	1		
<i>ja doch nicht</i>	1		
<i>auch nicht</i>	1		
<i>vielleicht</i>	1		
<i>doch</i>	1		
<i>aber kein</i>	1		
<i>bestimmt nicht</i>	1		
<i>schon nicht</i>	1		
Insgesamt	77		

Wie man sieht, wird in über einem Drittel der Fälle (36 mal) kein spezifisches Element bei der Wiedergabe von *mica* verwendet. Aus den entsprechenden Belegen entsteht deshalb gelegentlich der Eindruck, dass die deutsche Fassung pragmatisch und kommunikativ abgeflacht wurde:

PADRE DI VANNI

Mah, mi sembra un po' troppo moderna. Non so *mica* se mi trovo bene.

VATER VON VANNI

Ah, die kommt mir ein bisschen zu modern vor. *Ich weiß nicht*, ob ich mich hier wohl fühlen kann.

Es handelt sich in diesem Fall um eine Szene aus *La festa di laurea*, in der ein älterer, scheuer Mann aus der Emilia höflich-warnend sein Unbehagen bei der Vorbereitung einer Feier artikuliert², noch bevor sein Gesprächspartner irgend etwas äußert. Diese besondere Verwendung von *mica* ist sicher regional beschränkt und würde eine genauere Untersuchung verdienen, weil sie in der dialogischen Interaktion eine spezifische Strategie einleitet und eine subjektive Haltung markiert. Davon ist in der deutschen Fassung, die weit weniger diplomatisch klingt, nicht mehr viel zu spüren, zumal der Synchronsprecher diese Sequenz prosodisch so gestaltet, als würde er eine richtige Informationslücke beklagen (keine besondere Betonung von *weiß*, sehr schnelle Artikulation, rhematischer Akzent eindeutig im Bereich des Nebensatzes, dessen Inhalt nach Schwenter (2006: 335) jedoch „discourse-old“ sein müsste).

Neben der Funktion der höflichen Abtönung einer Weigerung werden auch andere Funktionen, die mittels *mica* getätigt werden, in der deutschen Fassung mehr oder weniger bewusst übergangen. In der folgenden Szene aus dem selben Film, zum Beispiel, behauptet eine Frau mit emotionalem Nachdruck und Zustimmung heischend, dass sie zu einer anständigen Familie gehört; gleichzeitig will sie der etwaigen Vermutung begegnen, sie gehöre zu einer Gruppe von Obdachlosen, und tut es mit Hilfe von *mica*:

ADRIANA

Villeggianti. Siamo sempre venuti qui e nessuno c'ha mai detto niente, vero Guido? Non siamo *mica* degli sfollati, sa? Siamo villeggianti, infatti abbiamo invitato anche il nostro professore di latino, per lei.

ADRIANA

Aber wieso denn nicht? Wir picknicken immer hier und noch nie hat jemand was gesagt, stimmt's? Wir sind keine Obdachlosen. Wir sind Ausflügler. Wir haben sogar unser'n Lateinlehrer mitgebracht. Ihretwegen.

Auch in diesem Fall kann man im deutschen Dialog nur eine glatte Verneinung hören, und die tiefere Schicht der emotionalen Interaktion ist nicht mehr spürbar – dabei wäre eine einfache Partikel wie *nämlich* oder *doch* sehr leicht einzufügen gewesen. Auf syntaktischer Ebene wird außerdem nach dem Aussagesatz – wohl aus technischen Gründen – darauf verzichtet, die rhetorische Vergewisserungskomponente *sa?* des Originaldialogs wiederzugeben, und das ganze wirkt auch deswegen sehr trocken. In anderen Dialogen (hier aus *La vita è bella*) wird dagegen versucht, die emotionale Beteiligung in einer dialogischen Situation durch Umformulierung der emotionstragenden Aussagen bzw. Ausgleich im Textumfeld zu vermitteln:

² Zu Abtönung und Höflichkeit vgl. Held (2003). In diesem Fall müssen interessante Nuancen des sprachlichen Substandards zusätzlich berücksichtigt werden.

FERRUCCIO	FERRUCCIO
Come stai?	Guido!
GUIDO	GUIDO
Bene bene. Sto bene, sto bene.	Ja, was ist?
FERRUCCIO	FERRUCCIO
Mi dispiace, eh?	Was ist los? Wie fühlst du dich?
GUIDO	GUIDO
No, ma un mi' son <i>mica</i> fatto nulla.	Gut, sehr gut. <i>Danke phantastisch.</i>
FERRUCCIO	FERRUCCIO
No dicevo per ..	Es tut mir leid für dich.
GUIDO	GUIDO
E la Guicciardini?	..und, und die Guicciardini?
FERRUCCIO	FERRUCCIO
È tutto a posto.	Bei mir läuft es bestens.

Insgesamt sind die kommunikativen Situationen, in denen (wie hier) für *mica* keine spezifische Partikel eingesetzt wird, sehr differenziert und man kann sie leider nicht einzeln erläutern. Zur allgemeinen Distribution der Illokutionstypen sei nur angemerkt, dass sich in FORLIXT mehr als 70 Belege in Aussagen befinden, während 12 in einem Fragekontext stehen: Das ergibt proportional die doppelte Frequenz, die Visconti (i.D.) für NUNC und C-ORAL-ROM (6 bis 7%) festgestellt hat.

Was die Verwendung von *mica* in der italienischen Fassung deutscher Originaldialoge betrifft, ist vor allem die äußerst geringe Frequenz hervorzuheben (nur 7 Fälle in 9 Filmen), obwohl man in zahlreichen Szenen passende stilistische und pragmatische Bedingungen nachweisen könnte. Synchronisationstechnische Faktoren (Lippenbewegungen und sonstige Erfordernisse der Synchronie) dürften hier keine besondere Rolle spielen. Die Vermutung, dass *mica* gezielt gemieden wird, ist nicht von der Hand zu weisen, obwohl wahrscheinlich keine offizielle Sprachregelung dafür verantwortlich zu machen ist. Es ist jedenfalls offensichtlich, dass man dadurch auf ein sehr bedeutendes Ausdrucksmittel verzichtet, das in der italienischen Sprache nicht nur regiolektale Effekte realisiert oder verstärkt, sondern – wie ein Blick in die Tabellen des NUNC-Corpus bestätigt³, in der überregionalen informellen Kommunikation immer stärker Fuß fasst.

Aus der Auswertung der Belege ergeben sich insgesamt folgende typische Möglichkeiten der explizierenden Umformulierung von Kontexten, in denen *mica* verwendet wird:

³ Im Internet unter <http://www.corpora.unito.it/>. Gesamtwerte der Frequenz sind jedoch systembedingt schwer zu bestimmen.

- „was ich jetzt gerade negiere, ist für mich wichtig und aktuell“
- „denk über das nach, was ich gerade negiere, und du wirst mir bestimmt zustimmen“
- „ich sage nun, dass etwas nicht der Fall ist, und dies widerspricht deinen noch so berechtigten Erwartungen – allerdings kannst / sollst du dich noch dazu äußern oder darauf reagieren“.
- „Ich frage nun nach etwas, was ich eigentlich schon vermutet habe [...]“

Die sprachliche Realisierung dieser Implikationen kann zwischen Aussage, rhetorischer Frage und Ausruf alternieren, was sich manchmal auch in den translatorischen Entscheidungen zeigt. Darüber hinaus sind spezielle Verwendungen zu berücksichtigen, die überwiegend regional begrenzt sind: echte Aufforderungen, etwas zu unterlassen, und der Ausdruck von Verwunderung. Für solche Fälle sind zusätzlich folgende explizierende Umformulierungen denkbar:

- „Ich stelle gerade mit Verwunderung fest, dass etwas nicht meiner Erwartung entspricht“
- „Ich weiß, was du möglicherweise tun könntest, und teile dir meinen gezielten Dissens mit“

4. Dialogische Funktionen in soziolinguistischer Sicht

In FORLIXT sind regiolektale Verwendungen von *mica* leicht festzustellen, weil dort das Genre der Filmkomödie vorherrscht, und die entsprechenden Plots meist in einem regionalen Milieu angesiedelt sind. Bei der Analyse unserer Belege ergeben sich denn auch einige Besonderheiten, die auf die regionale Charakterisierung der Sprache mit Hilfe von *mica* schließen lassen. *Mica* in präverbaler Stellung als einziges Negationswort im Aussagen lässt sich vor allem in den Sätzen von süd- oder mittelitalienischen Charakteren nachweisen (hier unten: Mario in *Il postino*, Rosalba in *Pane e Tulipani*, Domenico in *La stazione*). Die deutsche Übersetzung schafft nur in den ersten zwei Fällen mit Hilfe von Partikeln und kleinen umgangssprachlichen Signalen eine Annäherung an das regiolektale Kolorit der Originaldialoge:

No, cioè mi- <i>mica</i> mi ho messo il cappello. Solo perché serve per fare la forma se nò dopo fa male la testa portarlo tutti i giorni eh me l'ha detto il ca-è un trucco proprio dei postini, una cosa nostra insomma.	Nein, wieso? Ich mein ich hab <i>doch bloß</i> die Mütze. Das ist gut, weißt du, wenn ich sie schon aufhab, weil sie dann besser passt. Wenn ich sie nämlich später den ganzen Tag auf hab, tut das sonst weh. Das eh hat mir der Chef gesagt, alle Postboten machen das so, das ist so'n Trick von uns.
Ma guarda a questi... <i>mica</i> s'accorgono, eh?	Das gibt es doch nicht! Sie merken's <i>nicht mal!</i>

Ma che scusi, qua è proprio noioso, d'altronde se non era noioso, <i>mica</i> venivamo a lavorare qua, venivamo in villeggiatura no? Eh, eh...	Sie müssen sich doch nicht entschuldigen, es ist einfach langweilig hier, außerdem wenn's hier nicht langweilig wäre, dann wäre das hier keine Arbeit, sondern Urlaub.
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Desgleichen erscheint *mica* mehrmals als eigenständiges Negationswort in postverbaler Stellung und markiert die lombardische Herkunft von Fiore in *Mimi metallurgico*. Die deutsche Fassung wirkt insgesamt angemessen, und borgt sich zudem aus dem Italienischen das Vergewisserungssignal *eh?* in satzfinaler Stellung:

E allora? Anche se mi piacevi sono <i>mica</i> innamorata, scusa, eh!	Wenn schon... aber deshalb muss ich dich <i>noch längst nicht</i> lieben, eh?
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In einem anderen Film rundet die etwas eigenartig anmutende Verwendung von *mica* in einer Aufforderung und in einer verwunderten Frage – jeweils unterstützt durch einen besonderen prosodischen Verlauf – das regiolektale Profil von Charakteren aus der Emilia ab:

ADRIANA

Don Emilio, se vuol cambiarsi... vada pur dentro, eh? Non faccia *mica* complimenti.

ADRIANA

Don Emilio, wenn Sie auf andere Gedanken kommen wollen, dann gehen Sie ruhig rein. Haben Sie bloß keine Hemmungen.

NANDO

Beh, non saran *mica* già loro, eh?

NANDO

Das sind sie *doch hoffentlich noch nicht!*?

Wie schon bei der Übersetzung anderer Ikonen von Dialekten oder Regiolekten festgestellt (Heiss & Soffritti im Druck), ist es auch in diesem Fall kaum möglich, in den deutschen Synchrondialogen Elemente einzubauen, die etwas mehr als eine allgemeine Umgangssprachlichkeit signalisieren. In diesen Belegen sind es die Partikeln *bloß* und *doch*, die einerseits dem Dialog eine informelle Note verleihen, andererseits im Wesentlichen den freundlichen Aufforderungsdruck bzw. die Mitteilung der Verwunderung in sich tragen. Gleichzeitig muss man natürlich auch den krassen Fehlgriff bei der Wortwahl in der deutschen Übersetzung (*haben Sie bloß keine Hemmungen*) im ersten Beleg unterstreichen, der in Verbindung mit der Partikel einen sehr befremdlichen Effekt verursacht⁴.

In den BADIP-Daten, die allerdings in den frühen 90er Jahren erhoben wurden und auf eine Aktualisierung warten, kann man die diatopische Differenzierung im Gebrauch von *mica* deutlich erkennen und die regiolektalen Besonderheiten aus den Filmdialogen bestätigt sehen. In erster Line tritt die allgemeine Häufigkeit hervor, die man an den vier verschiedenen Erhebungsorten verzeichnet, wobei sich südlich von

⁴ Leider ist es im gegebenen Rahmen nicht möglich, auf die Qualität der Übersetzungen detailliert einzugehen.

Florenz eine deutlich sinkende Tendenz zeigt ⁵:

ORT	FREQUENZ	WÖRTER
Milano	41	122014
Firenze	39	122698
Roma	23	123551
Napoli	8	120915

Die Verwendung von *mica* als eigenständiges Negationswort im Satz in postverbaler Stellung („son mica colori che tengono“) wird als typische norditalienische Erscheinung dadurch bestätigt, dass alle 6 Belege auf Mailand entfallen. Die Verwendung von *mica* als eigenständiges Negationswort vor dem Verb oder an erster Stelle im Satz („e perché mica posso stare in galera così giovane“) scheint dagegen typisch für Rom (17 Belege) und Neapel (6 Belege von insgesamt 8), kann aber gelegentlich auch in Mailand (5 Belege) und Florenz (3 Belege) nachgewiesen werden. Nur in Mailand ist *mica* schließlich als Komponente in einer negativen Aufforderung nachweisbar:

ma scherziamo mica
mica andare di là

Die Verwendung als eigenständiges Negationswort in postverbaler Stellung verdient jedoch in typologischer Hinsicht insofern eine besondere Aufmerksamkeit, als dabei die besondere Abtönung und Interaktivität als Bedingung für den Einsatz von *mica* in Frage gestellt werden könnte. Intuitiv würde man diese Abtönung in den Fällen von präverbaler eigenständiger Negation dagegen voll bestätigen.

5. Schlussfolgerungen

Außerhalb der besonderen Welt der Filmdialoge, in denen spontane Kommunikation gleichzeitig nachgeahmt und bereinigt wird, scheint sich *mica* als beliebtes überregionales Ausdrucksmittel nicht nur in der mündlichen Nähesprache, sondern auch in schriftlichen Kurzmitteilungen jeder Art (und vor allem via Internet oder SMS) stark verbreitet zu haben. Dieser Schluss ergibt sich vor allem aus der hohen Frequenz in Corpora wie C-ORAL-ROM und NUNC oder im Allgemeinen aus anderen Stichproben in Web-Corpora. Dabei ergibt sich jedoch ein sehr komplexes und diatopisch differenziertes Bild der Verwendung, das bis heute nicht vollständig analysiert worden ist. Selbst wenn man die diatopischen Besonderheiten vorläufig außer Acht lässt, kann man feststellen, dass *mica* in zahlreichen Gesprächssituationen viele unterschiedliche Sprechhandlungen initiieren oder begleiten und ihnen dabei eine besondere Note der emotionalen Beteiligung (eigene oder partnerbezogene) aufprägen kann, und zwar weit über die Funktion eines einfachen Negationsverstärkers hinaus.

⁵ Die Unterschiede in der Größe der jeweiligen Sammlungen fallen dabei nicht ins Gewicht.

Zur Abbildung spontaner Gespräche in Dialogen italienischer Originalfilme bedient man sich vieler dieser Muster und der damit verbundenen Möglichkeit, Emotionen anzudeuten, zu verstärken oder gar zu inszenieren. Es können dabei, je nach Situation, Herausforderung, Mitgefühl, Ironie, Skepsis, Aggressivität, Sarkasmus und viele andere subjektive Einstellungen unterschiedlich gewichtet in Aussagen, Fragen oder Bitten zum Ausdruck kommen. Aufgrund dieser Eigenschaften wird deutlich, dass Auf- und Abtönung in der kontrastiven Beschreibung der Funktionen von *mica* relevante Kategorien sind. Dies wird auch durch die Tatsache bestätigt, dass man bei der Übersetzung ins Deutsche diese Funktionen von *mica* durch Abtönungspartikeln differenziert und gezielt wiedergeben kann – vorausgesetzt, es sind keine technischen Beschränkungen zu beachten und die Qualität der Übersetzung wird ernsthaft überprüft. Hinzu kommt, dass *mica* sich dazu eignet, durch gezielten Einsatz in besonderen syntaktischen und prosodischen Kombinationen bestimmte regionale Charaktere sprachlich zu stilisieren (vgl. dazu Heiss & Soffritti im Druck; Heiss & Leporati 2000). Auch diese regiolektale Dimension der Abtönungsmittel spielt eine entscheidende Rolle in der kontrastiven und translationsrelevanten Textanalyse (vgl. dazu mehrere Ansätze in Heinrich 1996).

Die deutsche Übersetzung der italienischen Dialoge, in denen *mica* verwendet wird, zeichnet sich dadurch aus, dass die zur Verfügung stehenden Abtönungsmittel bei weitem nicht in dem Umfang eingesetzt wurden, in dem es möglich und angebracht gewesen wäre. Kompensationen für diese Armut an Abtönungsmitteln sind in den meisten Kontexten auch nicht feststellbar, und dies erzeugt an vielen Stellen einen Effekt von Kälte, Grobheit oder Banalität. Es darf hier allerdings nicht vergessen werden, dass in mehreren einschlägigen Studien eine zufrieden stellende Berücksichtigung von Abtönungsmitteln bei den deutschen und bei den italienischen Synchronübersetzern überhaupt vermisst wurde⁶. Noch gravierender ist es, dass *mica* als Abtönungsmittel bei der Wiedergabe deutscher Filmdialoge insgesamt nur 7 mal in 9 Filmen Verwendung fand.

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⁶ Diese Bewertungen müssen natürlich komplexe Wechselwirkungen unterschiedlicher Faktoren berücksichtigen. Vgl. dazu Nadiani (1996), Heiss (2000).

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LINGUISTIC DEVICES IN ARGUMENTATIVE DIALOGUES

WORDS IN CONTEXT. AGREEING AND DISAGREEING WITH *ALLORA**

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1. *Introduction*

There is a growing interest, in argumentation theory, for “argumentative indicators” (van Eemeren, Houtlosser and Snoeck-Henkemans 2007), especially lexical indicators. This is a desirable development from several points of view:

- argument reconstruction (cf. e.g. Houtlosser 2002; Rocci 2008),
- conversation analytical research on argumentation in interaction (Keim 1996; Graumann & Kallmeyer 2002; Spranz-Fogasy 2002),
- semantics and pragmatics, which will be our main concerns in this paper.

Thanks to Anscombe’s and Ducrot’s work and more recent research on discourse markers (cf. e.g. Fischer 2006), we know that argumentation plays a role as a functional domain of many linguistic items and structures. The relationship between semantic analysis and use in argumentative texts is still not too clear, though (cf. e.g. Ducrot 2004), and there is no stabilized consensus on the range of possible argumentative functions. The identification and description of lexical argumentative indicators is complicated not only by the difficulty of defining argumentative functions, but also by the fact that there is rarely a one-to-one correspondence between a form and a however defined argumentative function (cf. e.g. van Eemeren this volume).

This difficulty is related to the more general problem of indeterminacy and context-dependence in language: word meaning tends to be underdetermined, polysemic and polyfunctional (cf. Weigand this volume). In language use, indeterminacy is compensated by inference and by reference to context (cf. Akman & Bazzanella 2003). This context-dependence appears clearly e.g. in phenomena such as *dialogic repetition* (the same item acquires different meanings and performs different functions according to its specific occurrence, cf. Bazzanella 1996), metaphorical language (two different domains are associated and “blended”, cf. Fauconnier & Turner 2000; Leezenberg 2001), or translation (“literal” correspondences often fail to convey the “intended meaning” which rather requires a functional correspondence, cf. Bazzanella & Morra 2000).

The related phenomena of polysemy, polyfunctionality and context dependence rise methodological problems that are particularly evident in the lexical zone of function words such as modal markers or connectives (cf. Bazzanella 2006), highly relevant to the description of argumentative indicators.

* We would like to dedicate this paper to the memory of two excellent scholars and friends: Sorin Stati and John Sinclair.

Modal verbs may be cited as an example. As has been shown by a recent analysis of English modals in an argumentation theoretical perspective (Rocci 2008), a careful analysis of the modals' polysemy is an important prerequisite of their description as argumentative indicators. Certain readings of the modals – the epistemic ones – may indeed be considered “direct indicators of argumentation”, inasmuch as their semantic structure as inferential evidential markers (cf. Dendale 1994 for an exemplary analysis of French *devoir* in terms of evidentiality) matches a schema of enthymemic reasoning: they invariantly mark their host utterance as a standpoint based on certain premises¹. In contrast, the non epistemic readings of the modals do not intrinsically, or directly, express argumentative relations. This does not mean, however, that the functional domain of argumentation is irrelevant in the case of these readings. As a matter of fact, they are recurrently used in certain types of argumentation schemes and may therefore be considered useful “indirect indicators” of argumentation². Recurring to the concept of polyfunctionality, we might say that in these readings, invariant properly modal functions co-exist with more strongly context-dependent argumentative functions.

In what follows, we will explore similar problems with regard to a connective, Italian *allora* (corresponding roughly to English *at that time*, *then* and *so* in its core meanings). Building on preceding corpus-based research (cf. Bosco & Bazzanella 2005; Bazzanella *et al.* 2007a, b, 2008; Bazzanella & Miecznikowski *forth.*)³, we will present a qualitative analysis of *allora*'s argumentative uses. We will focus on readings of *allora* that express a causal-consequential relation, distinguishing different uses with regard to their potential to mark an inferential relation (section 2.1), and then investigate in more detail the way speakers exploit inferential readings as an argumentative resource in dialogue (section 2.2). Throughout the analysis, we will insist in the role of contextual parameters (with a special attention to prosody) and in polyfunctionality, claiming that even the most clearly inferential readings of *allora* fulfill important functions not only in the construction of reasoning, but also in the organization of argumentation as a joint activity⁴.

¹ “[...] we have seen that epistemically interpreted modals help us (a) to recognize the standpoints being advanced, (b) to make explicit the force of the commitment towards the standpoints, and that at the same time they prompt the anaphorical recovery of premises (c)” (Rocci 2008:184).

² “[...] that non-epistemic modals can be indirect indicators and that they can convey information on the argumentation schemes being used (d) – as in the case of ontological modalities pointing to causal argument schemes or deontic-practical modalities functioning as indicators of practical reasoning” (Rocci 2008:184).

³ Besides the corpora analyzed in the studies mentioned above (see, in particular, Bazzanella *et al.* 2008), a small corpus of audio-video recordings of political debates (various TV programs broadcasted during March-April 2007) was also considered for the present study.

⁴ In the examples discussed below, the following transcription conventions will be adopted: ‘[]’ overlap; ‘:’ vowel lengthening; ‘(h)’ inbreath; ‘allora-’ truncation; ‘.’ pause.

2. *Allora* in argumentative dialogue

2.1 Consequential *allora*: a potential argumentative indicator

In previous work, where we have taken into account both monological and dialogical uses of *allora*, we have distinguished three basic values:

- (1) the use as a temporal adverb, expressing simultaneity or consecution relative to a distant reference point (“at that time”, “then”);
- (2) the use as a consequential connective (“if p *allora* q”, “given q *allora* p”);
- (3) the use as a discourse marker with textual and interactional functions, indicating the beginning of a new sequence of activity.

These three values (1 being the most archaic one, 3 the most recent one) differ as to their syntactic and semantic properties and may fulfill a range of functions depending on co- and contextual parameters such as position, sentence mode, speech act and text type, and prosodic correlates (e.g., intonation contour, volume, lengthenings and pauses).

We will here concentrate on value (2). As a consequential connective, *allora* can be placed utterance initially or finally, in contrast to (1), characterized by greater syntactic freedom, and (3), which can occur exclusively in utterance-initial position. When used utterance-initially, prosodic cues are important indicators to distinguish the values (2) and (3):

- Consequential connective *allora* in utterance initial position is in tight prosodic connection with the following material and can have a rising or a falling pitch accent;
- In contrast, *allora* as a text and interaction structuring DM, in its “prototypical” use (i.e. when marking a clear thematic and/or sequential boundary; cf. Bazzanella & Miecznikowski forth.), tends towards a falling intonation contour and to be followed by a strong prosodic boundary.

Consequential *allora* expresses a causal relation, in the broadest sense, between a state of affairs or a speaker’s utterance q and an antecedent p, construed as in some way distant from the speaker’s point of view. Within this group of uses, one can further distinguish between modal uses in hypothetical constructions (“if p *allora* q”) – which are diachronically prior –, and inferential or speech act introducing uses, in which the distance of p to the speaker’s point of view is not modal, but polyphonic (“given p, I infer q / I perform speech act q”; cf. Bazzanella & Miecznikowski forth.).

It is noteworthy that all types of consequential *allora* are relevant to argumentation as indicators of an act of reasoning. However, those cases are of particular interest in which *allora* contributes to realize an argumentative “schema” (Toulmin 1958) or “cell” (Plantin 1990) or “sequence” (Adam 2004), introducing a conclusion based on premises uttered in the immediately preceding discourse according to a schema of enthymemic reasoning: “given the fact p [+implicit warrants] *allora* I claim q”.

This type of argumentative function can be present in conditional constructions in which consequential *allora* introduces a possible future consequent, as in the following fragment taken from a play by Carlo Goldoni:

(Torquato Tasso (1755), second act, scene 8a, cf. Goldoni 1955)

1. T: Lo vuoi ricever solo. Ve l'ho da dir cantando?
I want to receive him alone. Do I have to sing to convince you?
2. G: Voi mi mandate via. *You are sending me away.*
3. T: Sì signore, vi mando. *Yes, sir, I am.*
4. G: So che scherzate, amico, perciò non me n'offendo.
I know you are joking, my friend, therefore I do not offend myself.
5. Dovete restar solo, è ver, non lo contendo.
You [2nd pers. pln.] must be left on your own, it is true, I do not contest it.
6. Ma quando il forestiere sia stato un pezzo qui,
But after the foreigner being here a while
7. Potrò venire **allora**?
Will I/I will be allowed to come, then?
8. T: Signor no. *No, sir.*
9. G: Signor sì. (parte.) *Yes, sir. (leaves)*

In this example, utterance final *allora* has ambiguous scope. It expresses a relation between possible states of affairs (p1: “quando il forestiere sia stato un pezzo qui”; q: “potrò venire”)⁵. Simultaneously it may be interpreted as introducing a more complex conclusion (p2: “quando il forestiere sia stato un pezzo qui, potrò venire”), based on the premise “lo vuoi ricever solo” (ln. 1), taken up by G in ln. 5 (“dovete restar solo”) and on further implied warrants.

Argumentative functions are not an invariant of *allora* in conditional constructions, though. Their activation depends on contextual parameters; in the fragment above, for example, the inferential reading of the conditional is favored by indicators that make explicit the argumentative organization of G's turn (“non lo contendo”, ln. 5: concession of a premise; “ma”, ln. 6, as a marker of contrast). We may therefore consider *allora* in conditional constructions an indirect argumentative indicator.

In contrast, *allora*'s inferential and speech act introducing uses are intrinsically argumentative in the sense that the entities *allora* relates as a consequential connective are speech acts and the relation expressed is not construed as a property of the world, but as a discursive relation established by the speaker.

⁵ Note that the relation between states of affairs expressed by *allora* in this interpretation is both temporal (posteriority) and modal (p *allora* q as a conditional construction). In the antecedent, the temporal aspect is underlined by “quando” (“when”), which, however, in Goldoni's time is frequent also in conditional constructions; the hypothetical aspect is reinforced by the conjunctive “sia stato”.

So in (2), taken from a map-task dialogue⁶, *allora* introduces a conclusion (ln. 7) the speaker infers from premises given in the preceding discourse:

- 2.
1. F: ah ah quindi cioè in pratica rispetto al lago
aha so practically, in which angle do I have to
2. anomalo di quanti gradi mi devo spostare cioè di
move away from the anomalous lake,
3. quanti centimetri rispetto al bordo?
how many centimeters from its edge?
4. G: rispetto al bordo sarà a un centimetro che ne so?
from its edge it must be about one centimeter,
5. due sarà a un centimetro potrebbe essere anche
whatever, two, it's one centimeter I think, it could be
6. sarà un centimetro
also – one centimeter, I think
7. F: toh eh **allora** sono arrivato sì
wow, this means I've reached the end, yes
8. G: eh
9. F: eh
10. G: eh, basta sei arrivato
yeah, that's it, you've reached the end

In (3), taken from *Porta a porta*, a TV political debate, *allora* motivates a non-assertive speech act ("stai zitto") by referring to the immediately preceding discourse (ln. 1-3), via an inference left implicit (something like "I infer that you are not competent in these matters").

- 3.
1. T: tu non sai neanche quant'è il prodotto interno
you don't even know how much is Italy's gross
2. [lordo dell'Italia]
[*domestic product*]
3. F: [no, non so neanche cos]`è, sei felice (h)
[*no, I don't even know what it*] *is, are you happy now*
4. X: allora-
ok-

⁶ This fragment is taken from the map-task dialogue C03 of the corpus AVIP-API (cf. Bertinetto 2001; Albano Leoni 2003). This is an experimental setting in which one participant instructs the other to trace a path in a map, exclusively by verbal means. The label C03 codes the type of maps used ("C") and the dialogue considered ("03").

5. T: [OH:::: e allora stai zitto]
[OH:::: so keep quiet]
6. F: [io s- io ti faccio questa domanda no] . io ti faccio questa domanda
[Is- I ask you a question okay]. I ask you a question

In the next section, we will investigate in more detail the functions inferential and speech act introducing *allora* fulfills in argumentative dialogue.

2.2 Agreeing and disagreeing with inferential *allora*

2.2.1 Properties of inferential *allora*

Argumentation in dialogue is intertwined with the organization of interaction as a dialogic action game (Weigand 2000) in various ways. Speakers not only express, justify and relate standpoints, but attribute standpoints and entire lines of reasoning to the arguing parties and negotiate agreement and disagreement on them. Moreover, argumentation can become functional to the organization of interaction at a meta-communicative level.

The expression of inference, in particular, is closely related to the expression of commitment and to the evidential, eventually polyphonic, specification of the premises. On the textual and interactional level, the expression of inferential relations can be used by speakers to make explicit the way they relate their dialogic moves and the sequential implications of these moves to the preceding discourse⁷.

Which specific functions does inferential *allora* fulfill in dialogue?

To understand these, one must pay attention to two properties of inferential *allora*:

- (a) *allora*, as a connective, is undetermined as to the expression of commitment. Commitment to the conclusion introduced by *allora* depends on the degree of assertiveness of the conclusion, expressed by an interaction of parameters such as sentence mode, modalizations, and prosody⁸. As a matter of fact, inferential *allora* is used also in utterances that are not analysable as expressions of standpoints at all, especially in certain question types.
- (b) Inferential *allora* is strongly polyphonic, in contrast to other Italian inferential connectives such as *dunque* or *quindi*. It signals that the premises are textually given and marks the act of drawing a conclusion as clearly separate from the act of formulating the premises (cf. also Mosegaard Hansen 1997:170-180 with regard to French *alors* as opposed to *donc*). In dialogue, in an overwhelming majority of cases, speakers use it to refer to premises formulated by their interlocutors.

⁷ Cf., e.g., anaphorical properties of modal verbs as inferential markers (Miecznikowski forth.; Rocci 2008), or discourse and interaction related properties of inferential uses of the conditional form in Italian and French (Miecznikowski 2008).

⁸ For prosody, in particular, both phonological choices (such as those relating to rising and falling pitch patterns) and phonetic parameters (higher vs lower pitch values) may play a role in conveying the degree of commitment through the communication of various degrees of certainty/uncertainty (Gussenhoven 2002).

Allora's polyphonic properties and its compatibility with all degrees of assertiveness and in particular with a wide range of interrogative "cotexts" make it an inferential marker that is highly relevant to the dialogic co-construction of argumentation and to the negotiation of agreement, a functional domain we will explore in the next three sections.

2.2.2 Conclusions the speaker is committed to

Allora is frequently used in utterances that can be analysed as an expression of a standpoint the speaker is – more or less strongly – committed to. In what follows, we will distinguish two types of dialogic moves that differ as to the degree of commitment to the standpoint and as to their function in the interactive negotiation of agreement and disagreement.

The first type of move signals overall agreement with the interlocutor's standpoint and dialogic actions, which implies an interpretation of preceding discourse as shared by the speaker and the interlocutor. Combined with signals of agreement, the polyphonic semantics of *allora* implies a convergence of perspectives, i.e. a process that reduces the distance between the speaker's and the interlocutor's perspective. In this kind of move, the inferential semantics of *allora* is regularly exploited to draw a conclusion that the speaker considers a good candidate for concluding not only a schema of reasoning, but also an interactive sequence of negotiation.

Example 2 (see above) illustrates this particular pragmatic configuration (Bazzanella 2006). *Allora*, in ln. 7, introduces a conclusion based primarily on premises given in the preceding turn and marked by *si* as an agreeing reaction to that turn. By using *allora*, the speaker underlines that he has no direct access himself to the information concerning the map in question, but is relying on his interlocutor's discourse as evidence. At the same time, by agreeing with his interlocutor, the speaker ratifies the preceding turn as an acceptable answer to his question and acknowledges that the given information is plausible to him – a fact that, in a setting with partially differing maps, does not go without saying.

Furthermore, it is typical, in this example, that the inference marked by agreeing *allora* introduces the closing sequence (ln. 7-10) of a more complex sequence of negotiation, extending in fact the anaphoric scope of the connective from the immediately preceding turn to a longer stretch of preceding discourse. In cases such as these, prosodic characteristics help recognizing this orientation towards the end of a phase of argumentation. The intonation contour of the utterance is usually falling. *Allora* itself, prosodically connected to the following material as in all its consequential interpretations (cf. section 2.1), is pronounced with a falling pitch, whereas it tends to have a rising pitch (within a globally descending melodic contour) when it marks a conclusion that the speaker considers still to be further debated (see also our discussion of example 3 below, where prosody marks both the phase of negotiation and the dis-

agreement of the speaker)⁹.

In a second type of move, assertive inferential *allora* is combined with signals of disagreement. In this context, the polyphonic properties of the connective are exploited to accentuate the divergence between the speaker's and the interlocutor's perspectives. The inferential relation tends to have local anaphoric scope and is used polemically to turn preceding discourse into an argument for a conclusion not projected by the interlocutor, usually by implying warrants clearly not shared by the interlocutor.

Example 3 illustrates this case. In the turn containing inferential *allora* (ln. 5), T utters a speech act ("stai zitto") presented as motivated by a premise that had been formulated by T in 1-2 and ironically up-graded by F in his turn in ln. 3. "Stai zitto" contradicts the ironical conclusion from this premise sketched by F in the same turn ("sei felice"), and consequential *allora* is realized with rising pitch, in accordance with the highly controversial character of a conclusion most obviously not suited to end the on-going negotiation of consensus. Disagreement is accentuated by various signals of reduced cooperation: T's turn ignores any possible sequential implications of the second part of F's preceding turn; it is pronounced in full overlap with F's next turn; it constitutes a face-threatening speech act; and it contains prosodic indicators of disagreement such as an overall high volume and focus phenomena (in the above mentioned example, the word "zitto" is clearly focused and realized with emphasis).

2.2.3 Conclusions the speaker is not committed to

Allora may occur in ironical utterances that express a conclusion not subscribed by the speaker. In such contexts, *allora* always implies non commitment to the premises identified in preceding discourse. When these have been formulated by the interlocutor, the connective necessarily implies disagreement.

An interesting aspect of this use of *allora* is that, in virtue of the polyphonic dissociation, signaled by the connective, between the act of formulating the premises and the act of drawing the conclusion (cf. Mosegaard Hansen 1997:178), the speaker's ironic distantiation¹⁰ from the conclusion does not usually serve to imply that the conclusion is attributed to the hearer. Rather, *allora* is used to formulate a *reductio ad absurdum*: an inference that is unacceptable both for the speaker and the interlocutor and therefore can be used by the speaker to demonstrate the invalidity of the premise from which it follows.

⁹ Differences in the prosodic realization of inferential *allora* appear to be related much more to the final *vs.* non-final position in the argumentation than to the degree of commitment to the conclusion, a finding that is congruent with the strongly connective and anaphorical nature of consequential *allora* and its general underdeterminedness as to illocutionary force and degree of illocutionary force (see point (a) above).

¹⁰ Irony, in general, exploits polyphony and underlines dissociation (cf. e.g. Sperber and Wilson 1981).

Consider the following fragment taken from *L'infedele* (TV political debate):

- 4.
1. A: Alitalia. non è da: da ieri credo che sia in questa situazione disastrosa,
Alitalia. has been in this disastrous situation not just recently,
2. (h) sono un po' di anni (h) e il Governo Berlusconi m-
it's been a couple of years now (h) and Berlusconi's Government m-
3. [heh:::]
4. B: [E **allora** la svendiamo [ai francesi?]
[**ok why don't we just sell it [to the French then?]**]¹¹
5. A: [No, lasciami and-] lasciami finire
[*No, let me go-*] *let me finish*

In this example, *allora* introduces an ironical question by B oriented towards a negative answer (ln. 4), marked as such among others by a particular prosodic contour not rendered in the transcript. Speaker A reacts with disagreeing “no” immediately after the key-word “svendiamo” (“sell it out”) (ln. 4), recognizing the question as a disagreeing move.

What is it B disagrees with? In non-subscribed ironical inferences marked by *allora*, disagreement directly concerns the premise in the interlocutor's discourse the inference is based on, and, as a consequence, the entire line of argumentation the interlocutor is developing. In the above example, the premise rejected is A's strongly negative evaluation of *Alitalia's* state of health as a company, expressed by the adjective “disastrosa” (ln. 1) and insistence in long duration. Indirectly, then, B rejects certain further implications of this premise, too. It is not by chance that B takes the floor just after A has pronounced the topic of the next utterance, “il governo Berlusconi”, and does not ratify the introduction of that topic. On the basis of relevant background knowledge, it can easily be inferred that the last bit of A's turn projects in fact an argumentative structure proceeding from the argument given in ln. 1-2 to a conclusion consisting in an accusation of Berlusconi's government. It is reasonable to assume that B's manoeuvre against the argument in ln. 1-2 is designed to indirectly and preventively refute precisely that conclusion.

2.2.4 Searching for a conclusion by means of interrogative *allora*

Besides the cases of subscribed or unsubscribed conclusions discussed in the two preceding sections, *allora* occurs in a range of interrogative contexts in which the speaker does not formulate any standpoint, but suggests a line of reasoning starting out from the interlocutor's discourse and exhorts the interlocutor to complete it. Typically speakers urge their interlocutor to draw a conclusion that he/she has not thought of

¹¹ Lit. “**And so** we will send it to the French?”

or is refraining to draw: the polyphonic semantics of *allora* combines with the illocutive force and sequential implications of questions as requests to constitute a corrective intervention of the speaker in the argumentative organization of the interlocutor's discourse.

Consider the following stretch of TV talk-show dialogue (*Amici di Sera*, partly quoted in Bazzanella *et al.* 2008) between a young girl (A) and an expert invited to the show (P). The girl had previously accused her father of not being interested in her. In (5), P asks A a question that aims at eliciting a declaration of intents on which to base further plans of action (ln. 1). Note that the question is introduced by non inferential, discourse structuring *allora*, pronounced with a rising accent within a falling contour that conveys the presence of a prosodic boundary, even without any following pause:

5.
 1. P: allora, vuoi papà o non vuoi papà
Ok, do you want your dad or you don't you want your dad
 2. A: posso instaurare un rapporto con mio padre
I can have a relationship with my father
 3. ma una persona che mi [è stata vicina vent'anni come x-
but a person that has been staying close to me for 20 years
 4. P: [**allora** vuoi papà o non vuoi papà?
 so do you want your dad or don't you want your
 dad?
 5. perché se vuoi l'affetto di tuo padre devi conoscerlo
for if you want your dad's love you have to know him

The girl gives an answer with a contrastive structure (ln. 2-3), which the expert interrupts by repeating his question, this time introducing it by clearly inferential *allora* (ln. 4). The connective has, typically for its consequential value in a context of an on-going controversy, a rising pitch accent, particularly strong in this context of competition for the floor, and is in tight prosodic connection with the rest of the utterance. By repeating his question, in overlap, P rejects the answer begun by A. Inferential *allora*, in this context, motivates this non-acceptance, interpreting the two turn parts contrasted by A as premises not allowing to make the desired decision between the two alternatives proposed by P.

The hetero-correcting function of this question type can serve various goals, from the co-construction of argumentation in an asymmetric context (e.g. teacher-student) to the management of disagreement. In the above example, both these goals may be considered relevant. There exists one variant of inferential interrogative *allora*, then, which is preponderantly polemic: the inferential discourse marker *e allora?*, typically realized as an independent intonation phrase with a contrastive rising-falling accent and meaning roughly "so what" (to be distinguished from temporal-consequential *e allora?* meaning "and then?").

(6) illustrates this case:

6.
 1. A: l'ho invitata diverse volte a venire con me e la mamma
I've invited her many times to come with me and with her mom
 2. a farsi la pizza .. e la devo pregare in ginocchio
to eat a pizza ... and I have to beg her on my knees
 3. B: **e allora?**
so what?

In this fragment of a TV talk-show (*Amici di sera*), a father (A) advances an argument (ln. 1-2) to justify his standpoint that he is doing more to improve the relationship with his daughter than she does. Speaker B's reaction, whole-turn *e allora?* (ln. 3), asking A to complete his reasoning, ignores the obvious link between A's argument and a standpoint already expressed before and thereby implies disagreement with this standpoint.

E allora? is used in an analogous way in the following title of a newspaper article (La Repubblica, 21 maggio 2008), as a type of polyphonic monologue:

7.

L'ultimo strappo del gerarca Ugo. 'La Valsusa si arrabbia? E allora?'
Hierarch Ugo's most recent affront: 'The Susa Valley is upset? So what?'

Polemic *e allora?* is here attributed to an important promoter of the TAV fast train connection between Torino and Lyon, leading through the Susa Valley. It conveys the idea of an arrogant attitude that ignores all consequences that could possibly derive from the opposition of the Susa Valley inhabitants against this project and thereby, in a nutshell, nullifies this opposition.

3. Conclusions

In face-to-face interaction, argumentation is intertwined with the negotiation of agreement and, more generally, with the coordination of action and the management of interaction at all levels. In the examples discussed in this paper, we have seen e.g. the relevance to argumentation of phenomena such as the management of the floor and of topics, the interactive construction of adjacency pairs and of longer sequences, or speaker roles and face.

This tight relationship between argumentation and interaction is likely to be reflected in the lexical semantics of discourse markers and other potential argumentative indicators such as *allora*. In our opinion, such indicators are highly useful to argument reconstruction and discourse analysis, provided that sufficient attention is paid to prosodic and sequential micro-contextual phenomena.

The analyses proposed in section 2 confirm the importance of not privileging a priori one level of analysis over the other. By means of a careful analysis of the word's

polysemy, it is possible to identify those of its readings that are most directly linked to argumentation, in this case consequential *allora* used to express inference to motivate speech acts. But even those readings remain strongly polyfunctional – in particular, connective *allora* always combines argumentative functions with text and interaction structuring functions – and depend on context as to the actualization of their argumentative functions. They are used e.g. to mark consensual conclusions (example 2) or standpoints in an on-going controversy (3), to ironically refute arguments (4), or to ignore potential conclusions projected by the interlocutor, often implying disagreement (5, 6, 7).

These configurations result from a close interaction between the connective's invariant meaning components and contextual parameters such as speech act type, degree of assertiveness of the host utterance, and sequential implications of the host turn. In spoken dialogue, prosodic cues related to *allora* and to the adjacent cotext play an important role in conveying different possible interpretations. In particular, the melodic contour and prosodic phrasing as a whole (involving melodic changes together with variations in volume, lengthening and presence/absence of pauses) contributes to differentiate various situations ranging from an open contrast of standpoints to convergence and sequence closing.

In conclusion, in order to grasp relevant form-function correlations it is necessary to move from the level of lexical analysis to the level of complex pragmatic configurations, which include the propositional content, global and local context (Akman & Bazzanella 2003), the speaker's attitude, the relational level, and the sequential development of argumentation and conversation.

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RUSSIAN “CHASTICY” ARGUE IN DIALOGUES

ANNA BONOLA

1. *The status of Russian particles*

Russian has at its disposal many functional words with a so-called discursive function i.e. discourse markers (Nikolaeva 1985, Kobozeva 1991); as Kiseleva and Paillard noted (1998), they include either full words, for instance, adverbs (*dejstvitel'no*), adverbial phrases (*na samom dele*), nouns (*pravda*) or particles, i.e. clitics like *da*, *ved'*, *že*, *li...*

Particles have a special morpho-semantic status: they are formless words (i.e. words without morphology, unlike the parts of speech) and they are synsemantic too, i.e. they have no independent meaning, unlike the so-called full words, which can be formless but have an independent meaning, for instance *kakadu* (*parrot*), *kino* (*cinema*) etc.

In this communication I will deal only with those discourse markers that can be considered particles as well, which never modify their syntactic function.

On the other hand, we must note the fact that not all clitic-particles are discourse markers: we have, for instance, clitic-prepositions, whose function is very close to that of grammatical cases.

This first selection of particles among the existing discourse markers is not merely a way to restrict and simplify the object of our research. It reflects the fact that particles are a very special linguistic instrument in Russian: they are short, flexible, spread throughout the text in an almost unperceivable way, and they seem to have a vague, undefinable meaning.

This is a fact for both linguists and speakers as the following quotation from Gogol's short story “The coat” shows:¹

– А я вот к тебе, Петрович, того...
Нужно знать, что Акакий Акакиевич изъяснялся большею частью предложениями, наречиями и, наконец, такими частицами, которые решительно не имеют никакого значения. Если же дело было очень затруднительно, то он даже имел обыкновение совсем не оканчивать фразы, так что весьма часто, начавши речь словами: ‘Это, право, совершенно того...’ – а потом уже и ничего не было, и сам он позабывал, думая, что всё уже выговорил.

According to Gogol's quotation, particles are small, meaningless words. Nonetheless, the protagonist of Gogol's story, Akakij Akakevič, finds them very useful in difficult dialogical negotiations, when he needs to persuade the listener in an imperceptible way.

¹ Quoted in Rathmayr 1985: 11.

Gogol's words reflect the common perception of ordinary speakers, but linguists know that the apparent lack of meaning of particles hides a more complex issue. Šmelev supports this idea (2004: 4) when he says that these "tiny words" have been wrongly considered parasitic words, or packaging, that speakers use to fill in pauses or just to give rhythm to the speech. As a matter of fact, the content of particles isn't vague at all, it's just difficult to make it explicit, since it belongs to hidden layers of the text. In fact, the kind of particles we'll deal with have to do with cohesion, argumentation and with some pragmatic features, displaying the relationship between speaker and listener.

In order to point out their content, it may be useful to bring about a further restriction of the set of particles: the particles we are going to analyse are not mere interjections (like *ach*, *oj*). Particles as interjections, with a parenthetical position, convey the mood of the speaker in a rather clear way (for instance surprise – *o*, *oj* –, sorrow – *ach* –, hesitation – *ugu* etc). They have a so-called emotional expressive meaning (Šarounov 2006). Instead, the particles we are dealing with are something more: they build up textual cohesion. Considering this textual function, can we assume that particles are logical connectors? Particles may be connectors, indeed, but let us consider the difference between the following sentences, quoted in Rathmayr (1985):

- (1a) Из нашей школы только Галя пользуется настоящим успехом, *так как* Борячук, *как мы все знаем*, ещё недоразвита.
In our school only Galja is a good student, because (*tak kak*) Borjačuk, as we all know (*kak my vse znaem*), is still immature.
- (1b) Из нашей школы только Галя пользуется настоящим успехом. Борячук, *ведь*, ещё недоразвита.
In our school only Galja is a good student. Borjačuk, X (*ved'*), is still immature.

Both *tak kak* and *ved'*, from a logical point of view, indicate a cause and, from an argumentative point of view, indicate a motivation; in addition *ved'* indicates that this motivation belongs to the common ground of hearer and speaker. In sentence a) the same meaning is expressed by the parenthetical sentence *kak my vse znaem* (as we all know). Moreover, *ved'* is used to achieve the hearer's assent and this meaning in sentence a) is totally absent.

Summing up, sentence a) is longer and more explicit, whereas sentence b) is shorter, it conveys the speaker's attitude towards the hearer, is more implicit and, as a consequence, activates more inferences. In a) the propositional content is dominant, in sentence b) we have many pragmatic additions.

This fact shows us that the particles we want to consider on the one hand are not just modal markers like interjections, but, on the other hand, they are not just logical connectors. They can be both and may be something more.

In order to understand their function, we have to adopt a complete textual approach, such as in the Congruity Theory by Rigotti (2005).

According to Rigotti (2005: 77-78):

the meaning of an utterance coincides with its intended effects, that is to say, with the change that it brings about in the context – [...] Pragmatic and semantic structures at all levels of a text are respondent to such a task. This is why we see the text as deeply pervaded by subtle but strong *logical* ties. The coherence of a text, and indeed its *meaningfulness*, can be accounted for if we represent the text as a hierarchy of predicate-argument relations holding between the text sequences at different levels and connecting each sequence to the whole text.

This kind of textual predicates are called *connective* predicates. According to this vision, the *particles* we are dealing with are:

1. *linguistic expression of connective predicates*, in which semantic and pragmatic components are both present. Their function is “to link directly or indirectly the action accomplished by the utterance to the action accomplished by the whole of the text, and thus to the change that it is supposed to produce” (Rigotti 2005: 82)².
2. Furthermore, the particles we are going to analyse *indicate an argumentative connective predicate*, that is to say, they are used in texts where the speaker is trying to persuade through argumentation, i.e. is trying “to cause somebody else to let him/herself be convinced by the given argument” (Rocci 2005, 99).
3. Finally, as these particles indicate connective predicates in argumentative texts, they occur mainly in *dialogues*, or *soliloquies*.

For all these reasons I will call dialogical-argumentative particles those very particles that perform the functions we have just described.

In my opinion, the main dialogical-argumentative particles in Russian are: *ved'*, *že*, *nu*, *da*, *razve*, *neuželi*, *taki*, *vot*.

As it is impossible to analyse them all, I will consider the particles *ved'*, *že*, since in these the dialogical-argumentative function is dominant (unlike other particles in the list, like *vot* or *nu*, where, sometimes, the deictic or modal function prevail).

2. *Ved'*

- (2) Пора ложиться. (U2). *Ved'* тебе завтра рано вставать (U1).
It's time you went to sleep (U2). VED' you'll have to get up early tomorrow morning (U1). (Kiseleva & Paillard 1998)

Ved' introduces an utterance (U1) justifying a previous speech act (U2). U1 (you'll

² Insofar particles express connective predicates, they also contribute to the text coherence: “The text *as a whole* is coherent if – regarded as a casual chain – it is congruent with its communicative goal. That is, in other words, if it is adequate to produce the intended effect on the hearer at the illocutionary level. In Congruity Theory this *adequacy*, or *congruency* is interpreted in terms of presupposition that the connective predicate dominating the whole text imposes to its arguments” (Rigotti 2005: 103-104).

have to get up early tomorrow) conveys the reason for the order given in U2 (It's time you went to sleep). From a logical point of view, in U2 we have the consequence of a cause conveyed in U1, which explains why the first Utterance has been numbered as 2, and the second as 1.

So *ved'* orders the text in such a way that U1 (reason or cause) follows U2 (act of speech or consequence); therefore the reason is given later as though the speaker thought that Utterance U2 had not been clear enough or had not been accepted by the hearer, or could be difficult to accept.

Moreover, *ved'* justifies and gives reasons for the previous speech act by introducing information which may sound new, but which is actually part of the shared ground which the speaker reminds the hearer of (both of them know perfectly well that the day after it will be necessary to get up early). In fact *ved'* derives from the Russian verb *vedat'*, which means *to know*.

The fact that the presupposition of *ved'* is common ground is proved by the following example:

- (3a) Я сегодня в час ночи проснулся. (U2) В Москве *ведь* как раз в это время утро, а я ещё не перестроился на местное время (U1).
Так и не заснул до утра. (Rathmayr 1985)
Tonight I woke up at one (U2). At that time *VED'* in Moscow it is already morning and I couldn't get used to the local time, so I couldn't sleep any longer (U1).

Indeed *ved'* cannot be used in an example like this:

- (3b) Я сегодня в час ночи проснулся (U2). *Меня *ведь* разбудил телефон и не заснул до самого утра (U1).
Tonight I woke up at one (U2). *The phone *VED'* rang and I couldn't sleep any longer (U1).

Utterance (3b) is wrong because the hearer cannot know that the phone rang (therefore *ved'* doesn't refer to a common ground); instead (3a) is correct because both speaker and hearer are aware of the time zones.

So, the particle *ved'* carries a connective predicate similar to the verbal predicate *justify*, and imposes on its arguments the following presuppositions:

1. U2: speech act.
2. U1: Argument which justifies the speech act U2.
3. Speaker: s/he assumes to have been misunderstood or not accepted; s/he needs to argue in order to make the message clearer or to persuade the hearer.
4. Hearer: s/he may not /or pretends not to remember the common ground the speaker is referring to, and so s/he may not understand or may not agree on what is said.

5. X: the presupposition of the argument in favour of U2 is based on common ground.

As we can see, the reasons expressed in U1 seem to justify U2 either clarifying or persuading. This is a consequence of the fact that *ved'* can justify different kinds of speech acts. We are going to analyse some of them.

A) Assertion:

(4)

– Позвольте, товарищ генерал, – сказал Крымов. – Толстой в Отечественной войне не участвовал (U2).

– То есть как это “не участвовал”? – спросил генерал.

– Да очень просто, не участвовал, – проговорил Крымов. – Толстой ведь не родился, когда шла война с Наполеоном (U1). (В. Гроссман)

– Excuse me companion General – Krymov said – Tolstoj didn't take part in the war against Napoleon. (U2)

– What do you mean “he didn't take part in it”? – the General asked.

– It's easy, he just didn't take part in it – Krymov said – Tolstoj, *VED'*, hadn't been born yet at the time of the war against Napoleon (U1).

(V. Grossman)

In U1, in order to justify the assertion, *ved'* introduces an explanation about the logical-causal relationship between U2 (Tolstoj didn't take part in the war against Napoleon = consequence) and U1 (Tolstoj hadn't been born yet at the time of the war against Napoleon = cause). In an assertive context the propositional content is dominant, and usually it indicates a cause-effect relationship between events.

We must observe the position of *ved'*: when *ved'* refers to an assertion (4), that is when we justify U2 by giving an explanation, it usually comes second and it could be replaced by the causal conjunction *potomu-čto*, as we saw in examples 1a and 1b; nonetheless, the pragmatic effect of communication will change.

B) Order or request

Ved' can introduce an argument to justify the reasonableness of an order or a request. In this case it comes first and it has a clearer pronunciation.

(5)

Мама, дай-ка мне двойной мед и масло (U2), я *ведь* утром проспала (U1). (В. Гроссман)

Mum, give me a double ration of honey and butter (U2). *VED'*, this morning I overslept (U1). (V. Grossman)

C) Reproach/objection

(6)

– Чего это ты в сапогах ходишь? (U2) – спросил он. – Жарко ведь (U1). (В. Пелевин)

– Why are you wearing a pair of boots (U2) – he asked. *VED'* it's hot (U1). (V. Pelevin)

(7)

– Зачем ты ему отдал деньги (U2) – обманет ведь (U1)!

Why did you give him some money? (U2) – *VED'*, he will cheat you (U1). (Kiseleva & Paillard 1998)

(8)

– Ты что форточку открыл (U2) – ребенка ведь простудишь (U1)!

Why have you opened the window? (U2) – *VED'*, the child will get a cold (U1)! (V. Grossman)

In this case it would be impossible to replace *ved'* with the cause conjunction *potomu-čto*. This proves that *ved'* doesn't justify the propositional content of U2 but the speech act performed by it. In fact, it would be possible to use *potomu-čto* if we made the speech act explicit in a sentence like: "I tell you this because...".

In some more complex examples, *ved'* refers to an implicit reproach or objection. In this case we have only U1.

Let's consider the dialogue between a young woman, asking for the residence permit, and the apparatchik who should give her the document:

(9)

– Вызов нужен, – сказал он. – Без вызова не пропишу.

– Я *ведь* работаю в военном учреждении (U1), – сказала Женя.

– По вашим справкам этого не видно. (В. Гроссман)

– You need a formal invitation – he said. I can't give you the permit without an invitation.

– *VED'*, I work in a military Institution (U1) – said Ženja.

– There is no reference to it in your documents (V. Grossman).

In this case *ved'* reminds the hearer of common ground (Ženja does work in a military Institution) which justifies her implicit objection: "It is not necessary for me to have an invitation".

D) Question

The function of *ved'* in questions is very complex. Rathmayr says that "particles in questions express the speaker's attitude towards the presupposition and/or the hearer" (Rathmayr: 1985, 133).

In the following examples *ved'* seems to remind the hearer of a presupposition of U2, belonging to the common ground of both hearer and speaker:

(10)

Мне об этом сообщил Иван Иванович (U2). Вы ведь его знаете (U1 presupposition)?

It was I.I. who told me this. (U2) (*VED'*) You know him (U1 presupposition)? (Kiseleva & Paillard 1998)

- (11)
 У Маши завтра день рождения (U2). Ты ведь ее поздравил (U1
 presupposition)?
 Tomorrow it will be Maša's birthday (U2). *VED'* You'll wish her best
 wishes (U1 presupposition)? (Kiseleva & Paillard 1998)

In example (12) *ved'* occurs in exclamatives. Here the argumentative function (justification) is in the background and *ved'* just conveys the fact that the speaker suddenly realized something he had forgotten. Argument X (supposed common ground) is dominant.

- (12)
 – Ой ведь на лекцию опаздываю!
 Oh, *VED'* I'm late for my lesson! (Kiseleva & Paillard 1998)

3. *Že*

Let us now analyze our second particle *že*. Apparently its argumentative-dialogical function is very similar to *ved'* insofar as *že* emphasises given information, which is at the same time an argument for the previous speech act.

- (13)
 Куда ты собираешься идти (U2)? У тебя же температура (U1)!
 Where are you going (U2)? You have *ŽE* a temperature (U1)!
 (Kiseleva & Paillard 1998)

As there seems to be a close similarity with *ved'*, let us compare these two particles:

- (14a)
 Что ты лежишь (U2)! Петя же приехал (U1)! Тебя что ли это не
 касается!
 Why are you lying down? Petja *ŽE* arrived! Don't you care?
 (Kiseleva & Paillard 1998)

- (14b)
 Что ты лежишь (U2)! *Ведь* Петя приехал (U1)! Тебя что ли это не
 касается!
 Why are you lying down? Petja *VED'* arrived! Don't you care?
 (Kiseleva & Paillard 1998)

In (14a) the reproof is sustained by the argument that Petja has arrived and the interlocutor knows it, and should therefore react in an appropriate way. The given information to which he refers is something evident to both speakers. Instead, in (14b), the reproof is justified by the speaker by remembering given information which has been momentarily forgotten by the hearer. (14b) is undoubtedly more polite, less peremptory, and indicates the speaker's need to justify his own speech act (reproof); by using *že*, on the other hand, the speaker does not justify U2, but reiterates the reproof indicating the reason for it, thus reproving the hearer twice.

The way in which *že* is used in argumentation is thus more categoric (indeed, the particle is often defined as “reinforcing”) and explains or justifies less; more precisely we can say that while *vedʹ* is used to argue through justification, *že* argues by reiterating and thus intensifying the conflict with the interlocutor or at least expressing a certain impatience on the part of the speaker. Considering this difference, the causal link between U2 and U1 is of secondary importance, such that *že* is unlikely to be used in assertive contexts in which it emerges that *vedʹ* and the causal connector *potomu-čto* are almost synonymous (see eg. 1).

To confirm what has been said, the tendency to use *že* in negative contexts and *vedʹ* in positive contexts can be pointed out:

(15a)

– Наташа не умеет писать.

– Странно, ей же уже 8 лет.

– Nataša doesn't know how to write.

– That's strange, she is already 8. (Rathmayr: 1985, 274)

(15b)

– Наташа умеет писать.

– Естественно, ей ведь уже 7 лет.

– Nataša knows how to write.

– Of course she can, she's already 7 years old. (Rathmayr: 1985, 274)

Let's sum up the connective expressed by *že* indicating its arguments and conditions:

1. U2: speech act;
2. U1: = argument in favour of the speech act realised in U2 by referring to evidence; U2 precedes U1;
3. Speaker: reiterates and insists
4. Receiver: it is presumed that s/he remembers what is given and does not want to draw the due conclusions.
5. X: presupposition: the argument on the side of U2 is based on the evidence that it is reiterated to the listener.

4. Conclusion

If we compare the predicates conveyed by *vedʹ* and *že* it emerges clearly that the difference between these two particles concerns the characteristics imposed on the arguments more than the argumentative structure.

The concept of connective predicate turns out to be an excellent means of explaining the semantics of the dialogic-argumentative particles in Russian and opens the way to their future reclassification.

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ALCUNE CONSIDERAZIONI PRAGMATICHE SU “DOVERE” IN ITALIANO: USI DEONTICI ED ANANKASTICI

MARCO CARMELLO

Introduzione

Lo scopo del mio intervento è analizzare alcuni usi del predicato “dovere” in italiano. Concordando con una proposta avanzata da M.E. Conte (Conte, 1993, 1995) assumo come valida la differenza fra usi deontici ed usi anankastici del predicato. Definisco la differenza fra deontico ed anankastico come segue:

1. Il deontico predica un dovere normativo.
2. L'anankastico predica una necessità normativa.

L'esempio di Conte per l'anankastico è: “I candidati devono avere almeno 35 anni”; un esempio di deontico è: “Si devono pagare le tasse”. Nel primo caso viene definita una regola, nel secondo è posta una norma. La differenza riguarda quindi la possibilità di contravvenire: la regola non può essere contravvenuta – se infrango la regola che dice che il cavallo si muove a L, automaticamente smetto di giocare a scacchi (Wittgenstein 1953/58)–; la norma può invece essere contravvenuta da chi non la sente come dovere.

In entrambi i casi le due occorrenze di dovere sono pragmaticamente differenti, perché comportano implicature diverse, ma semanticamente indistinguibili, perché richiedono l'esistenza di un contesto di necessità (la traduzione logica di 1 e 2 è $\Rightarrow P(x)$: necessariamente $P(x)$).

1. Contesti di uso non normativi

Conte (1993, 1994) analizza testi normativo-legali: la mia proposta è che la differenza individuata da Conte (1993, 1994) sia estendibile a tutti gli usi linguistici del predicato dovere.

1.1 Skal-sætning (“enunciato in forma di dovere”)

Preliminarmente dobbiamo dire di più sulla forma logica degli enunciati che usano “dovere”. Propongo un argomento avanzato da Jørgen Jørgensen, filosofo del diritto danese, che ha studiato la logica delle asserzioni imperative. In Jørgensen (1938) si sostiene che solo apparentemente gli enunciati di “dovere” siano imperativi, in realtà gli “enunciati in forma di dovere” (*skal-sætning*):

sono enunciati indicativi – quindi valutabili in termini di vero/falso – il cui contenuto preposizionale è la descrizione di un obbligo imperativo,

che quindi “non esprimono un comando ma solamente narrano o descrivono che è presente un comando o una richiesta ... (Jørgensen 1938, trad. it. in Lorini 2003, p. 196).

1.2 Comando *vs* richiesta, una specificazione linguistica dell'argomento di Jørgensen

Credo che la descrizione degli *skal-sætning* proposta da Jørgensen descriva esattamente il contesto di necessità definito dal predicato “dovere”, tuttavia questa definizione mette in evidenza che “dovere” può esprimere comandi o richieste, quindi:

esiste un'ambiguità semantica strutturale del predicato, che può essere usato imperativamente, se descrive un ordine (uso deontico), o non imperativamente, se descrive una richiesta intesa come ineludibile (uso anankastico).

Alcune lingue sembrano risolvere lessicalmente questa ambiguità proponendo più entrate corrispondenti all'italiano “dovere”: il tedesco ha *sollen* e *müssen*, il greco antico ha *déōn*, *anághkē* e *chrē* (in tutti e tre i casi è sottintesa la copula *ēsti*).

Tuttavia, sia nelle lingue che hanno un unico predicato per esprimere l'idea di dovere, come l'italiano o l'inglese (*must*), sia in quelle che ne hanno più d'uno, la scelta del senso anankastico o deontico di “dovere” dipende dal contesto di elocuzione, dalla quantità e dall'adeguatezza dell'informazione.

1.3 Struttura pragmatica delle lingue ad entrata monolessicale

Mentre nelle lingue ad entrata plurilessicale la scelta lessicale restringe l'interpretazione pragmatica alle implicature pragmatiche ammesse dal predicato impiegato (si pensi, in tedesco, all'opposizione *sollen/müssen*, che si è parzialmente grammaticalizzata), nelle lingue ad entrata monolessicale, come l'italiano, è il solo contesto pragmatico a definire l'entrata lessicale. In queste lingue la scelta contestuale avverrà tenendo presenti le seguenti caratteristiche:

1. Quantità dell'informazione: per scegliere fra l'una e l'altra interpretazione il contesto deve essere sufficientemente ricco, come vedremo in questo senso l'anankastico è più dispendioso.
2. Pertinenza dell'informazione (qualità) che limita l'uso anankastico ai soli contesti in cui è rilevante. Potrebbe avere poco senso dire “tutti gli uomini devono morire”, perché è qualitativamente irrilevante descrivere l'esistenza di quest'obbligo, è invece qualitativamente utile dire “i senatori della Repubblica Italiana devono avere almeno 40 anni”.
3. Da 1 e 2 segue che: a) l'anankastico sia pragmaticamente dispendioso; b) che la dispendiosità dell'anankastico (conflitto con la massima di quantità) sia giustificabile solo se la qualità dell'informazione trasmessa autorizza la violazione della massima di quantità.

4. In conclusione, se il contesto non autorizza come pertinente l'informazione anankastica si adotta l'interpretazione deontica di “dovere”.
5. Possono darsi contesti ambigui, ossia contesti larghi ma non chiaramente interpretabili. Anche in questi casi, in accordo con 4, si propende per la scelta dell'interpretazione deontica.

2. Esempi italiani

Di seguito discuterò alcuni esempi. Tutti gli esempi, tranne uno, provengono dai *corpora* curati dal gruppo di studio in linguistica applicata coordinato da Carla Marengo e Manuel Barbera presso l'Università di Torino. La scelta non è né casuale né parrocchiale, ma dipende dalla possibilità, che solo questi *corpora* permettono, di ampliare fino ad un numero indefinito di parole gli *out-puts* della ricerca, consentendo così al ricercatore di ricostruire quel contesto pragmatico che, come ho detto, è necessario per valutare, particolarmente nelle lingue ad entrata monolessicale, il valore del predicato “dovere”. Per ragioni di *concinnitas* nel prosieguito gli esempi saranno dati in forma abbreviata, riportando solo l'enunciato saliente.

2.1 Enunciati deontici

1. Senza l'impiego delle mani che dovranno essere saldamente ancorate al manubrio
2. Ora devo andare, e, quando lei chiama, io corro
3. Similmente decretiamo...che le presenti lettere....stabili sempre e valide dovranno perseverare....

I *corpora* di provenienza sono i seguenti: NUNC-IT Motor per 1, NUNC-IT Generic per 2 e 3. 3 è la traduzione italiana proposta dall'utente di un News-Group di tematica religiosa per un passo della bolla di S. Pio V *Ad perpetuam Dei memoriam* che precede il Messale Romano post-tridentino. Escludendo 3, che non è tratto da un testo prettamente giuridico ed è una traduzione informale di un testo formale nella sua lingua originaria, gli altri esempi derivano da testi non formali.

Riporto 3 in questa sede come esempio prototipico di deontico: è possibile che la lettera del Messale sia alterata, ma l'atto è esplicitamente punito con specifiche sanzioni nel prosieguito del testo, quindi 3 implica la possibilità di contravvenire al contenuto proposizionale dell'enunciato, perciò definisce una norma e non una regola (come è chiaro uso regola in un senso wittgensteiniano). Perché non si concluda, come alcuni in ambiti extra-linguistici fanno, che la distinzione fra deontico ed anankastico sia data dalla punibilità, e che quindi vi sia un'uguaglianza fra contravvenibilità e punibilità, si considerino 1 e 2. Provenendo da testi altamente informali privi di ogni valore normativo, 1 e 2 chiaramente non comportano una “punizione” se il loro contenuto proposizionale non è rispettato. Tuttavia si è in presenza di enunciati normativi che possono esser contravenuti, si potrebbe evitare di tenere le mani “saldamente ancorate al volan-

te” oppure il locutore potrebbe evitare di andare. A proposto di 1 e 2 bisogna dire che, come è evidente, l’obbligo espresso dal deontico non deve essere per forza di cose universale -mentre l’anankastico è tendenzialmente universale-, anzi 2 è un deontico puramente soggettivo (tuttavia il parlante potrebbe violare la norma che si è dato). Un possibile test di parafrasi, proposto in Carmello 2007, chiarisce la questione: è sensato parafrasare tutti le occorrenze di dovere con espressioni imperative come “è vietato” o “si ha l’obbligo di...”, non così per le occorrenze anankastiche. Si noti che 1-3 presentano un contesto pragmatico semplice, in cui la massima di quantità è rispettata, permettendo all’interlocutore di intendere “dovere” come avente valore deontico in accordo con lo schema presentato in 1.3.

2.2 Enunciati anankastici

4. ...ogni composizione, per essere buona, deve avere tre requisiti...

5. Quanto devo pagare i caffè?

4 è tratto da Athenaeum Corpus, mentre 5 è stato performato da un parlante i cui buoni pasto non sono stati accettati in un bar torinese. Athenaeum Corpus raccoglie testi formali ma non normativi provenienti dalla rivista ufficiale dell’Università di Torino; 4 è tratto da un articolo che parla dell’estetica della forma sonata, in cui ci si dilunga sulle caratteristiche che definiscono questo genere musicale. Sebbene non sia possibile riportare in questa sede l’intero contesto discorsivo, è abbastanza chiaro che il valore di 4 è differente da quello di 1-3, come si può notare applicando il nostro “test” di parafrasabilità. Una composizione non contravviene alcuna norma se non ha le tre caratteristiche definite dall’autore dell’articolo, non vi è quindi un obbligo che deve essere adempiuto: ci sono invece tre caratteristiche imprescindibili senza le quali la composizione non può essere definita buona. In questo senso si potrebbe dire che 4 è un enunciato regolativo, nell’accezione di Wittgenstein (1953/58, 1969), oppure che esso descrive una richiesta, usando i termini di Jørgensen. L’enunciato 5 descrive l’anankasticità in termini ancor più chiari: la forma interrogativa e l’avverbio “quanto” definiscono il contesto pragmatico di “dovere” in maniera, per così dire, indipendente dal contesto di elocuzione. Il locutore dà per scontato di avere l’obbligo di pagare i caffè, ma non si limita a chiederne semplicemente il prezzo: informa piuttosto il suo interlocutore di essere a conoscenza di una regola che istituisce la necessità di pagare le consumazioni al bar e di condividere questa regola.

La formula interrogativa non può essere parafrasata come “Ho l’obbligo di pagare il caffè?”; essa deve piuttosto essere intesa come una richiesta di spiegazione riguardo una regola già condivisa fra locutore ed interlocutore, avrà quindi un significato così descrivibile: “Cosa prescrive in questo caso la regola sociale da me condivisa che vuole si paghino i caffè?”. Dunque, nonostante la sua brevità, il contesto pragmatico di 5 è forse più ricco di quello di 4, conferendo all’esempio un’alta “densità” pragmatica. In breve 5 dice: a) c’è un regola del gioco che vuole si paghino i caffè; b) io condivido questa regola; c) io non so in questo caso come applicare la regola (non conosco il prezzo);

d) ti chiedo di darmi gli elementi necessari per applicare correttamente la regola a questo specifico caso.

Credo che 5 rappresenti un tipo specifico di enunciato anankastico, che non pone una regola costitutiva, come 4, ma definisce un dovere di secondo grado dipendente dal sistema di regole adottato. Con 5 il locutore sta chiedendo come una regola accettata debba essere applicata, viene così ad essere definito un campo informativo che riguarda “doveri di doveri”. Questi “doveri di doveri” non sono deontici, essi non vietano e non pongono un obbligo, ma definiscono il modo corretto di applicazione di una regola, predicando così le condizioni che consentono di considerare un dato atto come valida applicazione particolare di una regola generale. Propongo di definire questo anankastico secondario *cretetico*, poiché definisce le corrette condizioni di applicazione di un dovere accettato (Carmello 2008).

Nella lingua quotidiana questo tipo di anankastico pare assai diffuso come conseguenza di una situazione in cui esistono norme costitutive generalmente accettate che però generano dubbi riguardo al corretto modo della loro applicazione, come sembra suggerire anche Searle 2001.

Rimandando ad altra sede ogni altra considerazione riguardo al *cretetico*, possiamo dire che 5 ci permette alcune considerazioni conclusive riguardo l’anankasticità:

- a) 5, come 4, dimostra che quanto detto sulla maggior specificità e sulla sistematica prolissità pragmatica dell’anankastico è vero
- b) che la minor frequenza dell’anankastico non è dovuta a differenze di stile, di registro o di tipo testuale, ma alla sua specificità pragmatica.

2.3 Una breve nota sui contesti normativi

Le considerazioni finali che abbiamo proposto in 2.2 ci obbligano a dare una definizione più particolareggiata del concetto di “contesto normativo”. Riprendendo la definizione di Jørgensen in 1.1 possiamo definire normativi tutti quei contesti nei quali occorrono enunciati che pongono regole o norme che a loro volta generano un campo di azione prima inesistente nella realtà. Per questo siamo convinti (Carmello 2008) che i contesti normativi rappresentino un caso particolare di teticità (Sasse 1987).

Contesti di questo genere sono strutturalmente ambigui fra interpretazioni deontiche ed interpretazioni anankastiche, ma se accettiamo che normalmente i parlanti condividano un sistema di regole e di credenze sul mondo che sono generalmente sottaciute, si comprende perché abbia definito come meno specifica e meno dispendiosa la scelta dell’interpretazione deontica.

Semplicemente l’uso dell’anankastico indica una segnalazione pragmatica con cui si avverte che si mette in discussione il sistema delle regole condivise o assumendo queste regole come oggetto di discorso, è il caso dei *cretetici* brevemente introdotti sopra, o introducendo nuove norme, è il caso dell’anankastico “puro”, o selezionando alcune realtà come criteri di definizione esistenziali, è il caso dell’anankastico esistenziale o aleticamente orientato.

Non abbiamo discusso precedentemente quest'ultimo tipo di anankastico, né è il caso di discuterlo particolareggiatamente qui, basti dire che un enunciato come "tutti gli uomini devono morire" è sensato solo se io assumo che il comune fatto di morire è una condizione ontologica rilevante dell'umanità, quindi posso usare l'enunciato solo in contesti che richiedano di definire esplicitamente le condizioni di esistenza degli uomini. Sarà certo chiaro al lettore che questo tipo di anankastico istituisce un ponte fra normatività e modalità aletica.

Prescindendo da una classificazione dei differenti tipi di anankastico, resta comunque sempre inalterata la necessità di una segnalazione pragmatica che introduca in maniera forte l'uso dell'anankastico.

Tale segnalazione non è richiesta per il deontico, che non assume come suo argomento né le regole né le corrette procedure di applicazione delle regole (*cretetico*), ma gli obblighi ed i doveri che dalle regole derivano.

Questa differenza permette di riconsiderare l'"ambiguità" strutturale dei contesti normativi come un'ambiguità di ambito: semanticamente i contesti normativi funzionano in maniera univoca, ma possono riguardare tanto regole (anankastico) che effetti di regole (deontico), sta alla pragmatica indicare quale sia la giusta area di applicazione.

3. *Alcune conclusioni provvisorie su "dovere"*

Le considerazioni sull'anankastico rivelano che il ventaglio interpretativo di "dovere" è vasto, estendendosi da interpretazioni iussive – è il caso di 2 –, fino ad interpretazioni che hanno un valore prossimo a quello aletico ed epistemico (vd. 2, 4). Questo ventaglio di usi, come aveva intuito Jørgensen, è molto più vasto di quello definito dai semplici enunciati imperativi, perché gli "enunciati in forma di dovere" (*skal-sætning*), pur definendo semanticamente un contesto di necessità, come quelli puramente imperativi, creano tuttavia un contesto pragmatico non univoco, differenziandosi in ciò dagli imperativi puri, in cui è possibile adattare l'espressione di necessità ai differenti contesti elocutivi aprendo la strada ad un'interessante ricchezza interpretativa. Per questo ritenengo che la corretta definizione della differenza linguistica fra interpretazioni anankastiche e deontiche sia un compito importante per la ricerca pragmatica.

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Corpora di riferimento:

Athenaeum Corpus: <http://www.bmanuel.org/projects/at-HOME.html>

NUNC-IT Generic: <http://www.bmanuel.org/projects/ng-HOME.html>

NUNC-IT Motor: <http://www.bmanuel.org/projects/ng-HOME.html>

Tutti i *corpora* curati dall’*equipe* di ricerca coordinata da C. Marellò e M. Barbera sono reperibili alle pagine:

<http://www.corpora.unito.it>, oppure <http://www.bmanuel.org>

L'EXAGÉRATION DANS LE ROUMAIN QUOTIDIEN. BREF REGARD SUR LES INTERACTIONS VERBALES

MIHAELA VIORICA CONSTANTINESCU

L'exagération dans les interactions courantes reflète un comportement marqué par l'émotion. Par émotion, on comprend tous les «fortes émotions», «les grands sentiments» et «les affects quotidiens» («micro-émotions interactionnelles») (Cosnier 1994); (Bouchard 2000: 236).

Dans notre corpus (*IVLRA* et *IV II*) nous avons recherché les cas où la présence de l'émotion (spontanée) était explicitement marquée par des hyperboles et des phraséologismes (expressions figées ou légèrement modifiées par les locuteurs). La dimension rhétorique de l'émotion a attiré notre attention parce qu'elle est parfois floue, difficile à encadrer, et, en plus, il y a des schémas qui se mettent en œuvre par l'intermédiaire des choix particuliers, sémantiques et syntaxiques.

Les phraséologismes ont une fonction expressive et descriptive, les énoncés qui les contiennent ou qui contiennent aussi des métaphores, des comparaisons exacerbées, des tautologies, déclenchent des implicatures de type superlatif (Ștefănescu 2007: 206-207), implicatures à polarisation.

Dans l'analyse des émotions dans les interactions, nous utiliserons quelques concepts de Plantin (1998, 1999, 2000) et de Traverso (2000, 2005): le *lieu psychologique*, les *termes d'émotion* et les *énoncés d'émotion* (Ee). Nous suivrons la désignation directe et indirecte (les termes d'émotion reconstruits) de l'émotion à travers les exagérations; nous considérons que le décodage des manifestations psychologiques et comportementales fait partie de l'*encyclopédie* des locuteurs, il constitue un cadre figé dans une culture (donc *common ground* pour les participants).

Les lieux psychologiques potentiels (présents dans les récits) et actuels (les participants à l'interaction) seront présentés dans leurs parcours émotionnels (l'évolution sera évidente dans l'observation des énoncés d'émotion); dans ces parcours on verra la mise en scène de l'exagération relevant d'une communication émotionnelle ou émotive (Traverso 2005, Bouchard 2000), conformément aux intentions manifestées dans les échanges. Dans la réalité interactive, il n'est pas toujours facile de discerner entre les deux formes (v. *infra*).

Nous nous proposons de surprendre la manière d'actualisation de l'exagération: a) un tour ou plusieurs appartenant à un seul locuteur, les autres participants ne manifestant pas explicitement leur attitude de support (activité unilatérale); b) un enchaînement où l'exagération du locuteur apparaît comme réaction à l'attitude de l'interlocuteur (comportement réactif); c) un enchaînement issu à la suite d'une activité jointe des locuteurs. Nous présenterons les pôles vers lesquels l'exagération est concentrée,

mentionnant le type d'enchaînement et la manière de distribution des hyperboles et des phraséologismes.

1. *Pôle positif*

1.1 L'hyperbole (+ les expressions familières)

1.1.1 Activité unilatérale

Dans la conversation avec une amie (exemple 1), A parle de sa voiture, en employant une formule utilisée notamment pour les humains – *finie* (*terminată*). Le terme plutôt familier *finie* apporte une polarité négative, mais qui offre la possibilité de faire apparaître la solution attendue:

(1)

A: ((vine înapoi în cameră)) este TERminată de MULtă vreme mașina noastră↓## iar eu N-AM destui bani ca să cumpăr o mașină adevărată ((zgomot de veselă))

A: ar fi: extraordinar să iasă chestia asta **atunci chiar** [că

B: [mh

+A: **ne-mbătăm.**

(IVLRA: 41)

(1)

A: ((revient dans la pièce)) elle est FINie depuis LONGtemps notre voiture↓## et je N'AI PAS assez d'argent pour en acheter une vraie ((bruit fait par la vaisselle))

A: ce serait formidable que ça marche **alors vrai**[ment

B: [mh

+A: **nous allons nous souler**

(IVLRA: 41)

La formule familière «ne-mbătăm» (*nous allons nous souler*) représente un type assez fréquent d'ellipse informationnelle : l'effet (polarité positive) est mis avant la cause; on ne vise pas toutes les étapes du processus de célébrer la nouvelle acquisition – il s'agit d'une désignation reconstruite d'un lieu commun descriptif comportemental. Pour les lieux psychologiques actuels (A et B) on aura l'énoncé d'émotion (Ee) suivant: {A, B: /joie/}.

1.1.2 Comportement réactif

Dans les interactions on peut rencontrer aussi des cas où il y a une compétition entre les locuteurs, soit pour attirer l'attention d'un autre participant, soit pour s'engager dans une «joute» oratoire/ rhétorique (trouver la meilleure expression pour transmettre l'émotion).

Le commentaire évaluatif (représentant aussi un énoncé d'émotion) peut être repris par la même personne (le lieu psychologique actuel). B et C rendent visite à A, récemment mariée et admirent son balcon.

(2)

4. B: loredana du-te să-mi vezi florile↓ eu am vrut să văd florile de pe balcon **mamă ce balcon mare ai#** i-a:ole[u:

5. C: [**mamă ce mișto e:**

6. B: **raiu vieții mele.**

7. C: e mai mare de[cît

8. B: [**ăsta-i raiu vieții** <@ **mele** silvia>

9. A: ă↑

10. B: **zic e raiu vieții mele balconu așa de mare.**

(IVII: 354-355)

(2)

4. B: loredana va voir mes fleurs ↓ j'ai voulu voir les fleurs du balcon **oh mais il est grand ton balcon #** i- [ah:

5. C: [**oh que c'est chouette** [cool] :

6. B: c'est **le paradis** [rêve] **de ma vie.**

7. C: c'est plus grand [que

8. B: [**ça c'est le paradis** [rêve] **de** <@ **ma vie** silvia>

9. A: hein↑

10. B: je dis que **c'est le paradis** [rêve] **de ma vie** d'avoir un balcon si grand.

(IVII: 354-355)

B apprécie les dimensions du balcon (4), C exprime son accord (5, Eec {C: /appréciation/}), mais B revient et supra licite: *c'est le paradis de ma vie* (6, 8, 10). L'autorépétition, dans l'exemple 2, n'est pas seulement une forme de soutenir sa propre évaluation, mais aussi une stratégie de s'imposer comme locuteur (la concurrence avec C). Dans le cas de B, il y a un parcours émotionnel dans les tours successifs, un Ee_{B1} {B: /surprise/} (4) et un Ee_{B2} {B: /exaltation/} (6).

Un peu plus tard, la conversation revient au sujet du balcon. Dans ce cas, c'est C qui donne le ton:

(3)

5. C: **eu îmi iau o saltea și mă mut la tine** [**<@ pe balcon>**

6. A: [haide

7. D: [hhă[hăhă

8. B: [hha <@ **auzi mă primești și pe mine?**> hhă

9. C: e-așa [**de mișto** pe balconu ei

(IVII: 357)

(3)

5. C: **je prends un matelas et j'emménage chez toi** [**<@ sur le balcon>**

6. A: [allons

7. D: [hha[haha

8. B: [hha <@ **écoute j' peux venir aussi?**> hha

9. C: **c'est tellement** [**chouette** [cool] sur son balcon

(IVII: 357)

C crée un scénario, emménager chez A (5), pour augmenter l'impacte de son opinion antérieurement exprimée ; B se rallie et supra licite: *est-ce que j'peux venir aussi?*. C reprend son idée de l'ex. (2), tour 5: Eec {C: /appréciation/}.

1.1.3 Activité jointe

On revient à la conversation entre deux amies, A et B, qui parlent de la voiture que A et son mari veulent acheter. Il y a une série construite ensemble par les interlocuteurs:

(4)

+A: pentru că dacă-mi spui că au vîndut-o azi↑ chiar pot să zic că e **un o soartă**.

B: asta ar fi așa **un una la un milion șansă**=

A: = **ar fi chiar un absurd**.

(IVLRA: 40)

(4)

+A: parce que si tu me dis qu'ils l'ont vendue aujourd'hui↑ vraiment je peux dire que c'est

une un sort.

B: ça serait **un une chance dans un million**

=

A: = **ce serait vraiment un absurde**.

(IVLRA: 40)

Après une courte hésitation de A pour trouver la formule évaluative: *c'est une un sort*, B offre sa propre variante, aussi hésitante: *un une chance dans un million*, et A finit le climax involontairement obtenu par cette activité coopérante: *ce serait vraiment un absurde*. Selon A. Ștefănescu (2007: 213), il s'agit ici d'une transformation du phraséologisme à fonction argumentative de justification. La transformation de l'expression figée *c'est absurde* est faite sur le même schéma nominal (de *c'est une chance dans un million* ou *c'est un sort*). L'orientation des répliques montre la convergence d'opinion. Il y a donc un parcours émotionnel de la surprise positive: *sort* → *chance* → *absurde* ({A, B: /surprise/}).

Dans l'exemple suivant, la conversation de C et D vise l'improbabilité de ce monde. C explique pourquoi notre monde est improbable du point de vue scientifique:

(5)

64. C: tot restu sînt derivate. dacă oricare din astea ar fi subtil # diferite puțin <î aș zice mă și dacă sînt CE> poate c-am fi **în loc s-avem un me[tru:]**:

65. D: [așa↑

66. C: [<_R șaptezeci în medie>

67. +C: **poate am avea: [doi metri↓**

68. D: [**am avea** <_{MARC} **doi metri↓**>

69. +C: sau eu știu ce altceva.

70. D: **și-am avea**

71. + C: [(xx)nu: că se pare –

72. + D: [**capu' pătrat↓**

73. +C: [/ochei ochei/.

(5)

64. C: tout le reste en dérive. si n'importe laquelle était # un peu différente <î je dirais bon et s'ils le sont alors QUOI > peut-être qu'on serait **au lieu d'avoir un mètre:**:

65. D: [ouais↑

66. C: [<_R **soixante-dix la moyenne**>

67. +C: **peut-être qu'on aurait: [deux mètres**

↓

68. D: [**on aurait** <_{MARC} **deux mètres ↓**>

69. +C: ou n'sais-je quoi d'autre.

70. D: **et on aurait**

71. + C: [(xx) non parce qu': il semble que –

72. + D: [**la tête carrée ↓**

73. +C: [o.k. o.k.

74. D: și-am avea: ↑

75. C: **unii-IAU**. se pare că prin î: extrapola-
rea uno:r î: calcule de genu ăsta: ↑ /ă: rezultă
că VIAța ar fi imposibilă ↑ lumea ar arăta atît
de diferit cum # în mod normal [în alte ↑
(IVII: 352)

74. D: et on aurait: ↑

75. C: **il y en a qui l'ONT**. Il semble que par
l'extrapolation de:s euh calculs de ce genre:
↑ euh: il en résulte que la VIE serait impossi-
ble ↑ le monde serait tellement différent
comme # normalement [dans d'autres ↑
(IVII: 352)

Les deux construisent ensemble un scénario où les données descriptives concernant l'espèce humaine seraient différentes: les tours 67, 68 et 72. D est le participant qui en ajoute des «nouveaux» détails physiques, C est le responsable avec la partie scientifique. Pour le lieu psychologique D il s'agit d'un parcours émotionnel qui a comme effet l'implication (lieu commun attitudinal/ micro-émotion interactionnelle): {D: /transport/}; pour la taille il y a l'accord et l'usage d'une figure assez fréquente d'exagération (+chevauchement 67 et 68); la forme de la tête en est une innovation. En plus, en roumain, il y a une expression sémi-figée: dire de quelqu'un qu'il a *la tête carrée*, c'est dire qu'il a la tête bornée, qu'il est sot. C exploite ce fait, avec sa remarque *il y en a qui l'ont* (carrée) (75), mais continue dans le sérieux.

2. Pôle négatif

Il y a deux sous-types: un pôle négatif réel et un autre feint, détourné (le point de départ est soit un terme qui peut être inclus dans le pôle positif, soit un usage (auto) ironique (dépréciatif)).

2.1 L'hyperbole

2.1.1 Activité unilatérale

Une structure énumérative construite sur le même schéma (parallélisme syntaxique) peut faire apparaître l'hyperbole: c'est le cas d'un schéma où on garde les mêmes connecteurs et on varie les noms – la structure peut se constituer dans un climax.

(6)

B: deci noi de de cînd (ne-)am conceput ca
ZOnă ↓ nu zic ca țară ↓ ca ZONĂ ↓ am fost
cotropiți. **ba de romani ↓ ba de turci ↓ ba de
huni ↓ ba de gepizi ↓ ba_de: ara[bi ↓ ba de**

(6)

B: donc nous depuis quand nous nous som-
mes conçus comme ZOne ↓ je ne parle pas
du pays ↓ comme ZONE ↓ nous avons été
envahis. **soit par les romains ↓ soit par les turcs
↓ soit par les hunes ↓ soit par les gépides ↓ soit
par_les: ara[bes ↓ soit par les**

A: [_R păi mă uit păn > <_F bucurești și turcii
 ăștia ce di tot felu de nații ca-n
 +B: turci ↓ ba de NEMți ↓ ba de ruși ↓ <_R și
 acuma și de americani >
 (IVLRA: 29)

A: [_R euh [dame] j'observe à > <_F bucares
 et ces turcs aussi que de toutes sortes comme
 +B: turcs ↓ soit par les allemands ↓ soit par les
 russes ↓ <_R et maintenant par les américains
 aussi >
 (IVLRA: 29)

L'ethnonyme est toujours précédé par une conjonction disjonctive et une préposition, et, bien que les ethnonymes ne respectent pas l'ordre chronologique des liaisons historiques entre les Roumains et les autres peuples, le climax vise le présent, la situation contemporaine. Le point maximum comme intensité est soutenu aussi par un tempo rapide de la phrase et emphatisé par le déictique temporel «maintenant» (*acuma*) et l'adverbe intensif *și*: «et maintenant par les Américains aussi». L'émotion reconstruite sur un lieu commun attitudinal serait – {B: /malheur/}.

Dans un autre texte, placer les numéraux cardinaux du plus petit au plus grand donne naissance à un climax, vu que le schéma est gardé (préposition + numéral):

(7)

A: (...) eram în crimeea și presim ȚTEAM
 când debarcă rușii. ei erau în taman. și din
 taman ↑ porneau câte trei patru vapoare ↓ **cu**
ZEce mii cu DOIșpe mii **cu CIN**șpe mii **de**
oameni care să debarce ↓ noi eram treizeci
 dă mii dă + cu nemții cu tot ↑ și cu ai noștri ↓
 treizeci dă mii pe litoral ↓ să așteptăm de-
 barcările astea
 (IVLRA: 47)

(7)

A: (...) nous étions en crimée et nous pres-
 sentions quand les russes débarquaient. ils
 étaient à taman. et de taman ↑ ils partaient
 avec trois ou quatre bateaux ↓ **avec dix mille**
avec douze mille avec quinze mille hom-
mes pour débarquer ↓ nous étions trente
 mille + y compris les allemands ↑ et les nô-
 tres ↓ trente mille au bord de la mer ↓ à at-
 tendre ces débarquements.
 (IVLRA: 47)

Dans ce cas, il s'agit d'une manière habituelle d'exagération, le schéma en étant fréquent. En remémorant des événements de la deuxième guerre mondiale, un vieil homme – A, pour amplifier l'effet sur les récepteurs, reprend l'idée en remplaçant le nombre de projectiles avec la durée du tir des ennemis:

(8)

A: și ei debarcau ↓ așa ↓ și CE se-ntîmplă ↓ trăgeau cu tunurile din taman ↑ că bat tunurile-atît ↓ ȘI după un om# <_P rușii ↓> dacă vedeau mișcîndu-se ceva ↑ <_{R,P} începeau > și **NU trăgeau o bombă ↓ trăgeau o juma' dă oră.**

B: aveau muniții ↓ dragă.
(IVLRA: 47)

(8)

A: et ils débarquaient ↓ comme ça ↓ et qu'est-ce qu'y se passe ↓ ils tiraient avec les canons de taman ↑ car les canons tirent à grande distance ↓ après un homme AUSSI # <_P les russes ↓> s'ils voyaient quelque chose bouger ↑ <_{R,P} ils s'y mettaient > et **ils NE tiraient PAS une bombe ↓ ils tiraient pendant une demie heure.**

B: ils avaient des munitions ↓ mon cher.
(IVLRA: 47)

Le changement TEMPS pour QUANTITE est une manière d'exagération dans un but argumentatif – mais aussi descriptif (une présentation en couleurs vives de la guerre). Dans le cas des exemples 7 et 8, il est évident que la communication émotive est imbriquée à/ avec celle émotionnelle: tout en essayant d'émouvoir son interlocuteur, A finit par s'émouvoir; il revit les exploits. On peut considérer que l'émotion reconstruite à travers l'histoire est, d'une part, l'émotion du personnage A {A: /peur/} et, de l'autre, l'émotion rétroactive du narrateur A (lieu commun attitudinal/ micro-émotion interactionnelle) {A: /implication/}.

2.1.2 Comportement réactif

La confession de A, dans ce fragment qui suit (9), concerne les événements précédant ses noces:

(9)

61. C: ești frumoasă peste tot așa că io nu știu [ce mai vrei.
62. A: [mă da' efectiv parcam fost **drogată bine! chiar eram drogată luasem: (.) în seara aia vreo patru distonocalme**
63. C: o:::
64. A: păi **am bocit nonstop** de ce credeți voi [că
65. B: [de nervi [de (xxx)
66. C: [de nervi (xxx) e tensiune
67. D: [de stres mai modern.

(9)

61. C: tu es belle en tout point donc je ne sais pas ce que tu veux [de plus.
62. A: [euh mais effectivement il me semble que j'étais **bien droguée! en réalité j'étais droguée j'avais pris: ce soir-là quatre calmants**
63. C: o:::
64. A: euh **j'ai chialé sans arrêt** pourquoi croyez-vous [que
65. B: [à cause des nerfs [de (xxx)
66. C: [à cause des nerfs (xxx) **il y a la tension**
67. D: [à cause du stress **c'est plus moderne**

68. A: toată săptămîna aia eu **am alergat**.
marți dinaintea nunții eu eram prin bucu-
rești **căutam disperată** <_R pantofi nam găsit
miam luat sandale am ajuns acasă am consta-
tat că numi intră> <@ stîngu în pi[cior.>
(IVII: 360)

68. A: toute la semaine **j'ai pas arrêté de**
courir. le mardi d'avant le mariage j'étais à
bucarest **je cherchais désespérée** <_R des
escarpins je n'en ai pas trouvé j'ai acheté des
sandales je suis revenue à la maison j'ai consta-
té que la sandale ne m'allait pas> <@ au
pied gauche.>
(IVII: 360)

On peut remarquer la désynchronisation entre la confession et la réaction des confidents. Le narrateur A présente le parcours émotionnel du personnage A: chronologiquement, le premier état est celui de désespoir ({A: désespoir}) lié aux achats de dernier moment; puis il s'agit de l'extériorisation par les larmes {A: /stress/} et le calme provoqué par les médicaments {A: /calme/}. A présente son parcours du calme au désespoir, pour dramatiser.

La mise à distance, la rationalisation sont réalisées par les confidents B, C et D dans leurs tours (65-67): ils donnent une explication aux larmes de A; les chevauchements des tours montrent l'implication, la co-participation, mais aussi la tentative de dédramatisation – (67), par une remarque un peu ironique. A continue sa confession dans la direction ouverte par B, C et D; son comportement apparaît donc comme réaction aux tours des confidents. Le rire qui accompagne la fin du tour 68 est une marque de la tentative de gestion des événements passés dérangeants (Maury-Rouan 2000: 193).

L'exagération de l'importance des histoires vécues contribue à stimuler la réaction du récepteur et, en même temps, peut devenir une stratégie narrative:

(10)

A: și CUM a fost la brăila↑ la: Vle?
B: no::: că dacă vă povestesc↓ faceți <@**un roman**.>
A: hă hă hă↓ <@poate că mă pregătesc să scriu romanu.>
A: <@da' CE s-a-nîmplat.>
B: s-a stricat locomotiva.
(IVLRA: 44)

(10)

A: et c'était COMMENT à brăila↑ aux VENDanges ?
B: ben::: si je vous raconte ↓ vous allez faire <@**un roman**.>
A: ha ha ha↓ <@ peut-être je me prépare à écrire le roman.>
A: <@ mais qu'est-ce qui s'est passé.>
B: la locomotive s'est cassée.
(IVLRA: 44)

La question de l'interlocuteur *C'était comment à Brăila, aux vendanges?*, prend comme paire adjacente (de relevance) la réponse *ben si je vous raconte vous faites un roman*. Le roman est la suite d'événements du moment du départ de Bucarest, jusqu'à la destination, un village près de Brăila – *roman* c'est l'autoévaluation de B pour sa narration. Le terme *roman* devient l'hyperonyme d'une suite d'événements réalisant, par l'agglomération des malchances, un pôle négatif. Pour le lieu psychologique B, les événements vécus sont extraordinaires – il y a de nouveau les deux communications, émotive et émo-

tionnelle, imbriquées: le désir d'influencer l'interlocuteur et l'émotion non intentionnelle, provoquée par le conte, qui offre la possibilité de re-vivre les actions.

L'évaluation de l'interlocuteur A montre la participation affective:

(11)

A: <@**E:xttraordinar.**>

B: și noi aveam legătură în: fetești↑ o Oră și jumătate am avut întârziere

A: [**m:::**↑

+B: [pînă a venit ALtă locomotivă↓ și am pierDUT legătura din fetești. era la cin_și Zece↑ și noi am ajuns pe la ȘAse # în fetești.

A: [**E:xttraordinar**↓

+B: [și nu mai aveam legătură decît la zece fără zece minute.

A: **u:::**↑

B: și din fetești pînă-n cireșu la soacră-mea↑ mai faci cam # aproape două ore

A: **phii**↑ ((**fluieră**))

+B: de mers cu=

A: =trenu↓

(IVLRA: 45)

(11)

A: <@**formidable.**>

B: et nous avons une correspondance à: fetești ↑ nous avons eu une HEUre et demie de retard

A: [**m:::**↑

+B: [jusqu'à ce que une AUtre locomotive soit venue ↓ et nous avons perDU la correspondance à fetești. c'était à cinq heures et DIX ↑ et nous nous sommes arrivés à six heures # à fetești.

A: [**formidable** ↓

+B: [et il n'y avait plus de train jusqu' à dix heures moins dix minutes.

A: **u:::**↑

B: et de fetești jusqu' à cireșu chez ma belle-mère ↑ on fait encore # presque deux heures

A: **phii**↑ ((A siffle))

+B: par le =

A: =train ↓

(IVLRA: 45)

Les formes d'évaluation externe sont verbales (*formidable*); il y a aussi les *m:::* ou *u:::* accompagnées par l'allongement) ou non verbales (le sifflement) – les Ee de A seraient {A: /intérêt + surprise/}. Le locuteur dramatise la narration et accentue toutes les nouvelles situations imprévues.

2.1.3 Activité jointe

La conversation des inconnus dans le train arrive au problème des patrons étrangers en Roumanie et aux malheurs infligés. C'est la suite d'une autre exagération, celle obtenue par le schéma énumératif (ex. 6):

(12)

+A: bucureștiul ăla>#↑ care toți sun ca:
 vermii ăia puși pă: plagă să tot tragă↓ [să tot
 B: [_FhiEne>↓ hiene le putem spune. ă:
 A: tragă↓ da:[# săracii tinerii ăștia
 B: [_Pmă rog>
 +A: muncesc la: patronii ăștia TURCI# pă
 cite-un milion di lei
 (IVLRA: 29)

(12)

+A: ce bucarest >#↑ **tous sont comme: ces
 vers mis sur la plaie pour sucer** ↓ [pour
 B: [_FhyEnes>↓ **on peut leur dire des hyè-
 nes.** euh:
 A: **sucer** ↓ oui:[# ces pauvres jeunes
 B: [_Penfin>
 +A: ils travaillent chez: ces patrons TURCS
 # pour un million de lei
 (IVLRA: 29)

La comparaison exprime l'intensité de l'émotion négative face aux patrons étrangers: *tous sont comme ces vers mis sur la plaie pour sucer*. L'intensité de l'émotion est amplifiée par la répétition du verbe *sucer*. B offre un autre nom, plus connu dans l'imaginaire moderne, de «l'exploiteur»: *des hyènes, hyènes on peut leur dire*. A et B offrent une image similaire, les animaux utilisés comme point de repère appartenant à une série connotée négativement: le bilan émotionnel offre donc la situation similaire – {A/B: /désapprobation v ressentiment/}.

2.2 Phraséologismes

2.2.1 Pôle négatif détourné

Les premiers exemples sont tirés d'une conversation entre amis, l'un d'entre eux essaye d'argumenter en faveur de son affirmation que le chemin qu'il avait fait a été long et désagréable; B doit faire lui aussi ce chemin pour aller à un colloque. Le langage familier et la présentation informelle ont un degré de persuasion très élevé. A présente les péripéties après l'arrivée dans la ville du colloque. Le verbe choisi pour illustrer la difficulté de trouver l'endroit désiré est *a orbecăi* (*aller à l'aveuglette*).

(13)

A: că așa am ajuns eu cu anamaria pe la nouă
 jumate↓ și <_Rvorbisem să ne aștepte cineva>
 și mi-a scris că nu au oameni și# **ne-am dus
 am orbecăit noi** și-am ajuns în altă parte↓
 (IVLRA: 39)

(13)

A: car c'est ainsi que nous sommes arrivés
 anamaria et moi environ neuf heures et de-
 mie ↓ et <_Rnous avons parlé avec quelqu'un
 pour qu'on nous attende> et on m'a écrit
 qu'ils n'avaient pas d'hommes et # **nous
 sommes allés à l'aveuglette** et nous sommes
 arrivés ailleurs ↓
 (IVLRA: 39)

La présentation de cette situation assez désagréable est faite à travers une comparaison, complétée avec le terme recherché après une courte pause.

(14)

A: c-aveau multe că[mine]↓
 B: [nu. ăștia ne-au zis că ne așteaptă.
 A: și-aveam toate bagajele-alea **așa ca # ne-
 mîncații** și-am ajuns pe la vreo zece jumate
 unde trebuia↓
 (IVLRA: 39-40)

(14)

A: car ils avaient beaucoup de ci[té U]↓
 B: [non. ceux-là nous ont dit qu'ils nous
 attendraient.
 A: et nous avons tous ces bagages **comme #
 les crève-la-faim** et nous sommes arrivés à
 dix heures environ là où il fallait ↓
 (IVLRA: 39-40)

Le terme *les crève-la-faim* se base sur les connaissances partagées entre les deux participants à la conversation, le terme ayant des attributs qui peuvent opacifier, pour un tiers extérieur à cette communauté A/B, le sens et l'image obtenue. A. Ștefănescu (2007: 216) affirme que le terme *les crève-la-faim* donne naissance à des implicatures à polarité négative qui contribuent à inscrire le topique dans un prototype narratif du voyageur pauvre et du voyage stressant. Pour le lieu psychologique B, personnage de l'histoire, on peut avoir les Ee {B: /agitation v inquiétude/}. Les termes choisis pour s'autodesigner et pour décrire ses actions constituent des FTA *on record*.

2.2.2 Pôle négatif réel

Dans d'autres cas (*infra*), l'usage est plutôt sarcastique, l'attitude du locuteur est beaucoup plus «raide», bien que les expressions utilisées fassent partie de la même catégorie familière et /ou argotique.

Dans les deux exemples suivants, deux personnes, A et B, expriment leur mécontentement; dans (15), le phraséologisme fait appel à l'imaginaire visuel des interlocuteurs:

(15)

A: acum a iar **îi ajunge burtă la gură**# ori-
 cum: scaunu ăla din față este (xxx) # noroc
 că-l mai ajută înălțimea că dacă mai era și
 mic↓# **il dădeai de-a dura**
 (IVLRA: 82)

(15)

A: maintenant il a de nouveau **le ventre à la
 bouge** # de toute façon le siège avant est:
 (xxx) # heureusement que la hauteur l'aide
 parce que s'il était petit par-dessus les autres
 ↓# **on aurait pu le faire rouler** (xxx)
 (IVLRA: 82)

A ({A: /mécontentement/}) est dérangée par le sédentarisme de son mari; elle le présente, visuellement, sous la forme d'un objet rond, qu'on peut rouler: *on peut faire rouler* le mari (ou *il peut faire des galipettes*).

Une autre expression familière représente la modalité de contra-argumenter d'une façon décisive:

(16)

B: a:: (apăi) tiroxina e două sute de mii e
flaconu ↓

A: eu CE vă spun.

B: a: nici vorbă ↓ **păi e apă de [ploaie**
(*IVLRA*: 84)

(16)

B: a:: (euh) la thyroxine est deux cent mille
le flacon ↓

A: c'est ce que je vous dis.

B: a: pas du tout ↓ **c'est de l'eau de [rose**
(*IVLRA*: 84)

B affirme assez explicitement son opinion ({B: /mécontentement/}) – dire d'un médicament que c'est de *l'eau de rose* ((fam.) *salades, du vent*) cela implique son inutilité.

3. *Observations sur le pôle positif*

Il y a des cas (comme dans les exemples (2), (4)-(5)) où les expressions familières sont imbriquées avec des schémas hyperboliques. Si on traite à part, dans ce cas, les expressions et les hyperboles, on perd l'ensemble qui forme le mécanisme de polarisation vers le positif. Dans notre corpus, les manifestations dans la direction du pôle positif ne sont pas tellement bien représentées. Une autre étude, plus riche en exemples de ce type, peut réaliser, sans doute, une division entre l'hyperbole et les expressions familières.

4. *Observations sur le pôle négatif*

La polarité négative est plus présente dans notre corpus. Pour les expressions familières, il n'y a pas, dans notre corpus, une activité jointe. Tous les exemples illustrent une activité unilatérale: l'exagération vise surtout sa propre personne (un comportement auto menaçant (FTA), à intention ludique) ou un tiers; rarement, la cible est l'interlocuteur.

En ce qui concerne la division pôle négatif détourné/réel, nous considérons qu'il est plus facile de la suivre pour les expressions familières. Dans le cas des hyperboles, nous pouvons affirmer que les exemples 9-11, 13-14 s'encadrent dans la catégorie du pôle négatif détourné – dans tous ces cas il s'agit d'un comportement stratégique. Quant aux exemples 6-8, 15-16, ils sont une illustration du pôle négatif réel (la cible étant un tiers).

Nous avons choisi de présenter les hyperboles du pôle négatif dans la même manière dont nous avons procédé avec le pôle positif pour mettre en valeur l'activité de co-participation émotive/émotionnelle des interlocuteurs.

5. *Conclusion*

L'exagération peut avoir comme sources la reprise d'un schéma syntaxique, la substitution des déterminants dans le groupe verbal, l'enchaînement des expressions figées, l'ellipse, l'amplification par agglomération, les expressions figées (non) transformées. Il semble, d'une part, que la sélection des phraséologismes reste un domaine de l'activité

personnelle, et, de l'autre part, que la réaction de l'interlocuteur soit très importante pour le choix du schéma hyperbolique.

En roumain, au moins selon les données de notre corpus, le pôle négatif est le mieux représenté, soit qu'il s'agisse d'un comportement stratégique ayant comme cible sa propre personne (pôle négatif détourné), soit qu'il s'agisse d'une attitude dirigée vers un tiers (rarement vers l'interlocuteur, mais le corpus ne contient pas beaucoup d'interactions conflictuelles). Nous avons vu que dans les cas d'auto-diegèse il y a un mélange de communication émotionnelle et émotive: tout en essayant d'impressionner l'interlocuteur, le locuteur s'émeut.

Dans le décodage des implicatures à valeur de pôle positif ou négatif le rôle du contexte est essentiel: sans connaître le contexte, la simple enregistrement d'une hyperbole ou d'un phraséologisme ne peut pas expliquer la direction de l'exagération.

Corpus

IVLRA – Ionescu-Ruxăndoiu, Liliana (coord.) (2002). Interacțiunea verbală în limba română actuală. Corpus (selectiv). Schiță de tipologie [L'interaction verbale dans le roumain actuel. Corpus (sélections). Typologie]. București: Editura Universității din București.

IV II – Ionescu-Ruxăndoiu, Liliana (coord.) (2007). Interacțiunea verbală (IV II). Aspecte teoretice și aplicative. Corpus [L'interaction verbale (IV II). Aspects théoriques et applicatifs. Corpus]. București: Editura Universității din București.

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Traverso, Véronique (2005). L'analyse des conversations. Paris: Editions Armand Colin.

Normes de transcription (IVLRA: 22-23; IVII: 311-312)

On utilise la minuscule pour l'initiale ou pour le début de la proposition/ phrase; la minuscule est employée aussi pour les noms propres. La majuscule marque l'emphase. Les mots dans les langues étrangères sont notés conformément à l'audition, entre les symboles « / / » (ex. /niiorc/ pour New York).

<i>Accent</i>	á	on le note seulement quand il diffère de l'accent courant
	TEXTE	accent emphatique (d'un mot ou d'une syllabe)
<i>Intonation</i>	.	contour mélodique descendant terminal
	↓	contour mélodique descendant non terminal
	?	contour mélodique montant terminal
	↑	contour mélodique montant non terminal
	!	intonation rejective
<i>Hauteur</i>	<Î >	hauteur élevée de la voix
	<J >	hauteur basse de la voix
<i>Tempo</i>	<L >	tempo lent
	<R >	tempo rapide
<i>Intensité</i>	<F >	intensité forte de la voix
	<P >	intensité faible de la voix
–		(ligne basse, entre les mots) prononciation legato
–		(ligne de dialogue) mot inachevé
u: / m:		allongement d'un son; le nombre de symboles (:) indique, d'une manière approximative, la durée du phénomène
'		l'apocope des sons; l'omission habituelle de « l » article défini est marquée systématiquement, sans utiliser l'apostrophe
ç		stop glottal
#		pause; le nombre de signes indique, d'une manière approximative, la durée de la pause
texte =		
= texte		enchaînement immédiat entre deux tours (<i>latching</i>)
[texte		le commencement du chevauchement des interventions successives
+A:		continuation du premier tour sans tenir compte de l'intervention chevauchée
texte ⊥		construction abandonnée (<i>false start</i>)
„ “		séquence de discours direct rapporté
<@ >		rire simultané à la prononciation
<Z >		sourire simultané à la prononciation
<OF >		séquence prononcée par un mouvement expiatoire spécifique au soupir

<MARC >	séquence mise en évidence par une prononciation rare (parfois syllabée) et forte
<IM >	imitation de la manière de parler d'une personne
<CIT >	le locuteur lit un texte
(())	indications « scéniques »
()	transcription probable
(xxx)	texte inaudible; le nombre de symboles (x) indique, approximativement, la longueur de la séquence inaudible
[...]	séquence non transcrite
{ }	intervention liée au contexte de la conversation (<i>aside</i>).

EXPRESSIONS USED BY YOUNG ARGENTINE SPANISH SPEAKERS: NEUTRALIZATION OF DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN INTERLOCUTORS

MARINA GRASSO

1. Introduction

We have grouped in this paper three expressions that, in our opinion, share important characteristics and are frequently used in the genre of informal conversations: the expressions *obvio*, *más vale* and *ni hablar* – that can be roughly translated as *obvious*, *of course* and *needless to say*. The basis for this analysis is a selection of argumentative fragments that form part of the corpus of the research project on “Genre in verbal interactions”, conducted at the University of La Plata, Argentina. This corpus is formed by twenty four informal conversations among university students between the ages of 18 and 26. We focused on the linguistic, discursal and interactive behaviour of the expressions mentioned. A qualitative analysis, starting from the theoretical perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistics, was carried out, taking van Eemeren *et al.* (2000) as the reference for the analysis of the argumentative fragments. Work was done on the location of these expressions with respect to the syntactic organization of the utterances where they occur, and particularly on their function in the conversational discourse. The comparison and contrast of the expressions mentioned is the topic of this paper.

2. Analysis of the expressions

Similarities

Expression # of occurrences	Linguistic behaviour		
	Inside a complete proposition	As the only component of the construction	Thematised with the conjunction “that”
<i>Obvious</i> : 16	12	2	2
<i>Of course</i> : 8	1	5	2
<i>Needless to say</i> : 9	7	1	1

Table I Linguistic behaviour of the analysed expressions

As the table shows, the expressions under analysis share the same linguistic behaviour: the three of them can be found as part of a whole proposition, in isolation as the only component of the construction, and thematized with the conjunction ‘that’.

They also share similarities as regards their interactive behaviour, since all of them are phoric constructions that “can only make sense in relation to a previous discourse” and “hence, can never appear inside the first turn of speech nor be the first part of an exchange, since they presuppose an anaphoric retroactive move” (Montolío 1996: 332-3).

The three expressions in question could be included inside the class of markers that Martín Zorraquino and Portolés Lázaro (2000: 4146) call *markers of epistemic modality* that are used in declarative statements and that “build, themselves, an assertion, that reflexes how the speaker focuses the message introduced by the marker – or where the marker is immersed-, whether this message is considered for example, ‘evident’ or ‘known through someone else’”.

The richest aspect to analyse is the discursive behaviour where we find similarities among the expressions but also some interesting differences. The three items project a context in which there is only one possible option – in comparison with expressions such as ‘who cares?’, ‘what’s the use?’ where it is possible to consider other alternatives: ‘does it matter or not?’, ‘is it useful or not?’, respectively. Moreover, these discourse markers reflect an attempt to neutralize, up to a certain extent, the challenge of facing possible controversies among speakers. They are frequently used to orient the relationship between the participants towards a shared view of the world – although this common ground might not be taken as such – as the first case shows.

Case 1. *Topic of the conversation*¹: Laura tells Romina about an evening out with friends to a pub called ‘Rektorado’

Argumentative chain:

Assertion: I don’t like ‘Rektorado’

Support: It’s stuffy – It’s expensive – The menu is not varied – the quality of the food is no good – Customers are not well treated

La: *Después fuimos a ... a Rektorado a comer.*

La: We then went to *Rektorado* to eat.

Ro: *Ah... las chicas fueron, con todo.*

Ro: Oh... the girls went, full of enthusiasm.

La: *Sí, yo re caliente, (risas) obvio.*

La: Yes, I was furious, (laughs) **obvious**.

Ro: *¿Por?*

Ro: Why?

La: *Porque no quería ir al Rektorado, no me gusta el Rektorado.*

La: Because I didn’t want to go to *Rektorado*, I don’t like *Rektorado*.

¹ Ungrammatical or odd versions in English might result from the fact that translation tries to respect the category of the word used in the original language.

Ro: *Yo este año voy a ir al comedor. A full.*

Ro: This year I'm going to the university canteen, for sure.

La: *Yo también. Bueno. Fuimos a Rektorado a comer. Obvio, que yo siempre "No, no"...*

La: Me too. Well, we went to *Rektorado* to eat. **Obvious**, I always "no, no..."

Ro: *Sí.*

Ro: Yeah.

Case 1. Discursive function of obvious shared with the other expressions: consensus

Rocío asks the reason of the affirmation 'I was furious, **obvious**' and it is necessary for her interlocutor to give more details so that she understands the context that Laura has projected. But the fact that Laura didn't want to go to *Rektorado* is presented as the only possible alternative which, in fact was the expected thing to happen given the circumstances. The same kind of projection applies, in our view, to the other two expressions under analysis, as number 2 and 3 try to illustrate.

Case 2. Topic of the conversation: Cecilia and Valeria talk about having a baby.

Argumentative chain:

Assertion: Having children now is inconvenient.

Support: She hasn't finished University yet – she has to find a job – she has to be independent.

Ce: [*No sé,*] *yo lo que pasa que por ahora no... Yo, Luis cada vez le están dando más ganas de [tener pero]...*

Ce: [I don't know]. In my case, not now. I, Luis is more and more willing to have one [but] ...

Va: [*¡Ah!, ¿sí?*]

Va: [Oh, really?]

Ce: *... igual yo por ahora no. No porque él, él: "¡Mirá qué lindo [bebé!]"*

Ce: All the same, not now, in my case. Not because he, he: "Look! What a cute [baby!]"

Va: [*Ceci*], *reci[bite y buscá...]*

Va: [Ceci], *fin[ish your studies and then find] ...*

Ce: [*No, más vale*]

Ce: [No, **of course**]

Va: *... un trabajo primero.*

Va: ... a job first.

Ce: *¡Más vale!*

Ce: **Of course!**

Va: *No seas, no seas una madre que no... sabés tener un hijo y tener trabajo.*

Va: Don't be, don't be a mother who doesn't... know how to have a child and a job.

Ce: *¡No, me muero, más vale!*

Ce: No, I kill myself, **of course!**

Case 2. Discursive function of of course shared with the other expressions: consensus

Case 2 also shows that what is expressed in the stretch of discourse where *of course* occurs, is expected to be taken as the only option – or the best option – and could be paraphrased as 'Surely, first I'm going to finish University and then look for a job.

Surely, I don't want to be only a mother and not work'. Case 3 presents an instance of *needless to say* that goes on the same line as the previous fragments analysed.

Case 3. *Topic of the conversation*: Romina and Laura talk about eating in the university canteen.

Argumentative chain:

Assertion: We must go to the university canteen.

Support: Everyone goes there – it's cheaper than other places – it's really cheap.

Ro: *Yo este año voy a ir al comedor. A full.*

Ro: This year I'm going to the university canteen. Definitely.

La: *Yo también.*

La: Me too.

Ro: *Aparte, los chicos van todos los días.*

Ro: Besides, the guys go there every day.

La: [*¿Por qué?*]

La: [*Why?*]

Ro: [*Van todos*] *los días a la una.*

Ro: [*They go every*] day at 1.

La: [*¿Viste los horarios?*]

La: [*Have you seen the timetables?*]

Ro: [*Se juntan todos.*]

Ro: [*Everybody gathers together*]

La: *Ah, ¿sí?*

La: Oh, really?

Ro: *Ah, ¿son distintos? No. No.*

Ro: Oh, are they different? No, no.

La: *No, pero... los horarios son, salís a las doce, viste, más o menos, de la facultad, entonces...*

Pero bueno, hay que ir al comedor, ni hablar.

Ro: No, but... the timetables are, you go out at twelve, you see?, approximately, from the university, so... Anyway, **needless to say**, we must go to the university canteen.

Ro: *Hay que ir al comedor. Un peso, es una ganga. Terrible.*

Ro: We must go to the university canteen. \$1 is a bargain. Terrific.

La: *Lo que pasa que... bueno.*

La: The thing is... well.

Ro: *Lo que pasa que te... te tienen que coincidir los horarios.*

La: The thing is that the canteen's timetables have to fit yours.

Case 3. Discursive function of needless to say shared with the other expressions: consensus

Case 3 could be paraphrased as: 'The fact that we must go to the university canteen is indisputable'.

In movements where the studied expressions are part of a feedback move, *obvious*, *of course* and *needless to say* share the absence of an instance of negotiation. A communion is created since the context of situation presented is accepted, and a high degree of intensification is shown. One participant manifests a certain way of seeing the world

and the other one does not question the validity of what has been said. We associate this with the function of manipulation inside evaluation (Hunston & Thompson 2003), that can appear in the development of the interpersonal function, of building and maintaining the relationship between speakers.

We could say that all the instances found used as part of a feedback move conform what Eggins & Slade call *registering moves* – in the sense of register of information – that is, “reactions that provide supportive encouragement for the other speaker to take another turn. They do not introduce any new material for negotiation, and they carry the strong expectation that the immediately prior speaker will be the next speaker” (1997: 204). To illustrate this, we introduce the following cases from our corpus:

Case 4. *Topic of the conversation:* Ana and Angelina talk about a friend’s new mobile phone

Argumentative chain:

Assertion: Clamshell phones are better

Support: They are beautiful – they are more secure

Ana: *Está bueno pero no, viste cuando decís, yo hubiera elegido el otro, el Samsung, el Samsung, ¿no?*

Ana: It’s nice, but no, you know when you say ‘I would have chosen the other one, the Samsung’, the Samsung, don’t you think?

Ang: *Sí, pero XXX es caro.*

Ang: Yes, but XXX it’s expensive.

Ana: *Y bueno, me gusta. (Risas)*

Ana: Well, I like it (laughs)

Ang: *Qué raro, qué raro ella, gustándole todo lo que es caro.*

Ang: How strange, how strange, she liking everything that is expensive.

Ana: *Y obvio. Bueno.*

Ana: Well obvious. OK.

Case 4. Obvious as part of a feedback move

There is not a change in the world view presented but a subscription and, sometimes, an enlargement of what has previously been said. This subscription to the interlocutor’s sphere, to the personal perception of the other speaker, allows for the development of strategies of positive politeness between the interlocutors, favouring mutual identification and solidarity (Martín Zorraquino & Portolés Lázaro 2000: 4156). In terms of the systemic functional linguistics, we would say that they contribute to the interpersonal function, creating affiliations. A fragment including another expression under analysis is number 5:

Case 5. *Topic of the conversation*: Belén, Mercedes, Paula and Romina talk about the requirements to pass a subject at the university

Argumentative chain:

Assertion: It's better to pass the subject with a final exam than by working with other students

Support: You don't need to meet other people – you don't have to coordinate timetables – the conditions of the place where the work should be done are no good – it's far away and it implies a long journey to get there

Bel: *Es feo, yo prefiero que me tomen antes que hacer un trabajo, a mí no me gusta.*

Bel: It's not nice. I prefer to give an oral presentation instead of writing a paper. I don't like it.

Mer: *Y no.*

Mer: Right, no.

Pau: *O rendir un final...*

Pau: Or sit for a final exam...

Bel: *Sí, o rendir un final.*

Bel: Yes, or sit for a final exam.

Pau: *...porque aparte es de a tres, entonces entre que conocés a las otras dos XXX*

Pau: because, besides, the work should be done in a group of three, so you have to meet the other two

Bel: *Los horarios.*

Bel: The timetables.

Pau: *XXX y además lo estamos haciendo en el Observatorio, entonces entre que la gente del Observatorio pueda, que nosotras tres podamos, que lo podamos hacer...*

Pau: XXX and besides we are doing it in the Observatory, so we have to combine timetables with the people from the observatory, among us three...

Bel: *Claro.*

Bel: Sure.

Pau: *...que no se corte la luz, que no...*

Pau: and there there are the power cuts...

Bel: *Nosotros para hacer una charla de anemia en ... y viajar hasta Berisso es un quilombo.*

Bel: In order to give a talk about anaemia we have to travel to Berisso. It's total chaos.

Rom: *Sí, ni hablar.*

Rom: Needless to say, yes.

Case 5. Needless to say as part of a feedback move

All these could be considered *boosters*, according to Holmes (1995), and *upgraders*, in House & Kasper's words (1981) – that is, expressions that reinforce the meaning of the proposition where they appear (Watts 2004: 185). In Eggin's (2004: 160) classification of modal adjuncts, the expressions analysed would be *mood adjuncts* which add interpersonal meaning to the clause, "that is they add meanings which are somehow connected to the creation and maintainance of the dialogue". We can talk here of an emphatic use – in terms of Zorraquino & Montolío Durán (1998:33) – that "reinforces the assertion developing the informative value that the utterance has, in the sense of emphasizing the orientation with which it has been uttered".

As a partial summary of what has been said up to now, the following chart is presented, with the similarities found among the three expressions in question:

Similarities among <i>obvious</i> , <i>of course</i> , <i>needless to say</i>	
Linguistic behaviour	→ The expressions appear: . inside a complete proposition . as the only component of the construction . thematized with the conjunction 'that'
Interactive behaviour	→ They all have a 'sequencial dependency' located in the previous discourse ²
Discursive behaviour	→ They are used in an attempt to find consensus among speakers

Table II Similarities among the expressions under analysis

We will now look at the differences in the discursive behaviour of each expression.

Peculiarities

Obvious

To the idea that it is clear that facts could not have been otherwise, in the case of *obvious* a generalization is added, applicable to people or facts, depending on the case. Cases #1 and #4 previously presented show occurrences that contain generalizations related to the personal experience of the speaker.

In Case # 1: When Laura says "Yes, I was furious, **obvious**" and "Well, we went to *Rektorado* to eat. **Obvious**, I always 'no, no' ..." the possible generalization related to the personal experience of the speaker could be: 'I always get angry if we go to *Rektorado*. I always reject going there.'

In # 4: When Ana replies "Well **obvious. OK.**" to Angelina's "How strange, how strange of her liking everything that is expensive" we could say that the generalization with focus on an individual experience can be paraphrased as: 'I always like expensive things.'

In these cases, through the use of *obvious* the individual situation of the speaker is evaluated. "As we tell a story of personal experience, we remember how we were, how we believe we are, or how we wish to be. Evaluation in narrative exposes mirrors of multiple senses of the self" (Cortazzi & Jin 2003:120) not only hypothetical but also dreamworld selves. Common ground with the hearer is projected. The speaker presents the situation under a structure that could be stated as:

'When X happens, I always react in Y way'

There are other fragments – as the following – in which, we believe, the use of *obvious* is related to a less individual idea, that can be generalized, in one way or another, to any person and not to a single one.

Case 6. *Topic of the conversation*: Paula talks with Belén about the changes in a subject at university as a consequence of a change in the curriculum

Argumentative chain:

Assertion: Some changes in the curriculum are negative

Support: Students are taken as guinea pigs – the reduction in the number of teaching hours does not help anyone – the division of some subjects does not help either.

Pau: ... *porque hay muchas materias, por ejemplo, que.. dicen.. en Contactología, se la pasaron diciendo “Hoy no llegamos, hoy no llegamos XXX que no llegamos”. Hay ocho horas en el.. en el plan de estudio y nos dan tres.*

Pau: ... because there are lots of subjects, for example that... they say.. in Contactology, they kept saying “Today, we won’t be able to cover all the topics, today we won’t be able XXX we won’t be able”. The curriculum establishes 8 hours and they teach us only 3.

Bel: *Claro, obvio que no van a llegar.*

Bel: **Obvious**, they won’t be able to cover all the contents, for sure.

Pau: *Es que sí, si no llegás, entonces dame las que te corresponden...*

Pau: It’s that, if you can’t make it, teach me the corresponding number of hours...

Bel: *Claro.*

Bel: Sure.

Pau: ... *no, no me digas “Ay, no llegamos” y te quedás de brazos cruzados. Hay mucha... no sé es todo un problema...*

Pau: ... don’t, don’t tell me “Oh, we won’t be able to cover all the syllabus” and remain with your arms folded. There’s a lot... I don’t know. Everything is a problem...

Case 6. *Obvious. Generalization with a focus on people – collective experience*

Unlike the previous case, here a collective scope is considered, that seems to manifest that what has been exposed is not only unquestionable but also applicable to any person. This generalization with focus on a collective experience can be paraphrased as ‘Nobody would find the given time sufficient to teach the complete subject’. Here the speaker presents the situation under a structure that could be stated as:

We /all react/ in X way every time Y /happens/
/would all react /if Y happened’

In the rest of the occurrences found, we believe that the focus is not on the people but on the facts that are presented, in some way, as an inevitable consequence.

Case 7. *Topic of the conversation:* Ana and Angelina talk about buying a new phone

Argumentative chain:

Assertion: Flip phones are better than the others

Support: They are beautiful – they are more secure

Ana: *Me gustan los de tapita, [son los que vimos.]*

Ana: I like flip phones [those that we've seen.]

Ang: [*Sí...*] *Sí, son hermosos. Aparte son más seguros.*

Ang: [Yes...] Yes, they are beautiful. Besides, they're more secure.

Ana: *¿Por?*

Ana: Why?

Ang: *Y... no se te marcan solos si están en la mochila.*

Ang: Well... their keys are not pressed by themselves when you keep the phone in your rucksack.

Ana: *Ah, sí, eso...*

Ana: Oh, yes, that...

Ang: *Esas cosas.*

Ang: Those things...

Ana: *No, está bueno.*

Ana: No, it's good.

Ang: *Vamos y compramos.*

Ana: Let's go and buy.

Ana: *Por ahí son los más caros.*

Ana: May be they are the most expensive ones.

Ang: *Y, obvio. (Risas) Y, obvio. Como el de Sil... ése, de los más, digamos, [menos caros,] menos caros de los de tapita.*

Ang: Well, **obvious**. (laughs) Well, **obvious**. Like the one Sil has... that one, one of the most, let's say, [least expensive ones,] least expensive with a flip top.

Case 7. Obvious. Generalization with focus on the facts

The generalization with focus on the facts could be paraphrased in this case as 'if the phone is more sophisticated, it will be necessarily more expensive'. Here the speaker presents the situation under a structure that could be stated as:

'When the facts are X, Y always happens'

The following table shows the peculiarities of *obvious* in relation to the other two expressions analysed:




Table III Peculiarities of obvious in its discursive behaviour

These generalizations implied by *obvious* are exclusive of this expression.

Of course

As said before, a similarity between the three expressions in question, is the lack of negotiation of the facts presented by one of the speakers. However, the meaning this marker suggests is different from the others. In case #2, Cecilia's words can be paraphrased as 'Surely I'm going to finish University and then I will look for a job before having a baby. Surely, I don't want to be only a mother who doesn't work'. The speaker presents the situation under a structure that could be stated as:

'X said before, is evident'

Apart from this one, we find other cases in the corpus where the controversy does not consist of deciding whether to agree with the interlocutor or not, but to question the facts themselves.

Case 8. *Topic of the conversation*: Enzo and Javier talk about passing a subject at university.

Argumentative chain:

Assertion: It's better to sit for the final exam instead of re-attending the subject to avoid sitting for the written test.

Support: It takes less time. You can attend other subjects.

En: ...*si vas a final, hay muchos que van a final y... y... cómo te puedo decir, meten la cursada tienen que dar el final, y lo que hacen es cuando agarra, arranca otra vez la inscripción se vuelven a anotar otra vez en esa materia y la vuelven a hacer entera [para no dar el final.]*

En: ... if you sit for the final exam and... and... how can I explain? There are people who pass the practical classes with a low mark and have to sit for the final exam, what they do is, when classes start again, they re – attend the subject to see if they can pass it with a higher mark so that they don't have to sit for the final written part.

Ja: [*Ah, para salvar...*]

Ja: I see, in order not to...

En: *Sí, para no dar el final, eso es al pedo igual. Más vale prepararlo una vez y listo.*

En: Yes, in order not to sit for the written part; that's useless anyway. **Of course** it's better to study for the written part XXXXX

Ja: *Y prepararlo por ahí te lleva un mes [si hacés la cursada te lleva XXX.]*

Ja: And studying for the final exam takes a month [if you re-attend the subject it takes XXX]

En: [*Y pero... no perdés seis meses.*]

En: [But...you don't waste six months.]

Ja: *Claro, por eso, no, no, por eso que por ahí es más conveniente hacer, eh, tirar el final que hacer toda la cursada de vuelta [el final...]*

Ja: **Sure.** That's why, no, no, that's why it's more convenient to study, er, sit for the final exam than to attend the subject again [the final exam...]

En: [*Sí, ni hablar.*]

En: [Yes, **needless to say.**]

Ja: *...lo prepararás en un mes o dos meses. [O menos, o menos.]*

Ja: ... you study it in a month or two. [Or less, or less.]

En: [*Aparte con la cursada ya te da, te da la posibilidad de seguir cursando la otra materia que son correlativas.*]

En: [Besides, with the completion of the practical classes you have the possibility of attending other subjects.]

Case 8. Of course. Consideration of more than one possibility

The context presented here could be paraphrased as 'It's better to prepare the exam than not to do so'. The other difference relies on the fact that in this case, more than one possibility is implicitly considered (the idea of sitting and not sitting for the exam), and that the option chosen by the speaker is shown as the most appropriate one according to him. Whereas in the previous case (#2) finishing university and getting a job before starting a family is presented as the only possibility. The following table shows the peculiarities of of course in relation to the other two expressions analysed.

<i>Of course</i>
Consideration of more than one possibility

Table IV Peculiarities of of course in its discursive behaviour

Needless to say

Fragment # 3 ("needless to say, we must go to the university canteen") exemplifies the similarity of *needless to say* with the other two expressions in question. The context

introduced here could be paraphrased as ‘It’s undoubtful that going to the university canteen is the best option’. In this case, the speaker presents the situation under a structure that could be stated as:

X previously said is indisputable’

On the other hand, the following fragment introduces an instance with a function of *needless to say* different from the rest of the corpus.

Case 9. Topic of the conversation: Enzo and Facundo talk about a football match with boys from another city called Pehuajó.

Argumentative chain:

Assertion: The boys from Pehuajó are stupid.

Support: They are all gays – they are slow to play

En: *Al final tenemos que hacer el partido con los pelotudos estos de Pehuajó.*

En: In the end we have to play the match with the stupid guys from Pehuajó.

Fa: *¿Sí?*

Fa: Really?

En: *Ni hablar.*

En: Don’t mention it. (1) **Needless to say**

Fa: *Se la comen.*

Fa: They are gays.

En: *Ni hablar que se la comen, toda, toda.*

En: (2) **Needless to say** that they are gays.

Fa: *Todos los de Pehuajó se la comen.*

Fa: All the boys from Pehuajó are gays.

Case 9. Needless to say. Invitation to continue talking about a certain topic

We believe that the instance of *needless to say* thematized with ‘that’ (2) responds to the description previously mentioned: an ‘alignment’ of the speaker with his interlocutor (Carranza 1998:78). However, the first case in this fragment (1), not necessarily intends to present an option as apparently indisputable. At first sight, it seems to announce the preference of not dealing with certain topics; but, in our opinion, it functions as an invitation to talk, more than as an invitation to close the conversation. What we understand the speaker must have expressed in this case, could be paraphrased as ‘No comments’ (possible subtext: let me tell you why I say this).

<i>Needless to say</i>
Invitation to continue talking about a topic that provokes dissatisfaction to the speaker

Table V Peculiarities of needless to say in its discursive behaviour

3. Conclusion

In the present work we have grouped three expressions that share the same linguistic and interactive behaviour: they appear inside a complete proposition, as the only element of the construction and thematized with the conjunction 'that'. Besides, they cannot be used at the beginning of a conversation because they are constructions dependent on previous moves. Regarding their discursive behaviour, we have seen that the three seem to cancel the option of considering other alternatives as possible in the same situation. They articulate what Ducrot calls *cooriented* members (Portolés 1998), that is, with the same argumentative orientation, and seek for concurrence – fostering the cooperation between interlocutors, politeness strategies in rapport management. It is in the discursive function where the most interesting differences are found. *Obvious* is the only expression that implies a generalization with different focuses, added up to the idea of lack of confrontation previously suggested. *Of course* and *Needless to say* also present a few cases that are different from the rest: one instance of use of *of course* that contemplates more than one implicit possibility and, in the second case, an invitation to continue speaking about a topic that has already been introduced into the conversation. The divergences in the discursive plane, are what make these expressions not necessarily interchangeable with one another.

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LE RÔLE DE LA RÉFÉRENCE PERSONNELLE DANS L'INTERACTION: LE CAS DU ROUMAIN

LILIANA HOINARESCU

1.

Dans le présent article, nous nous sommes proposé d'analyser les contextes communicatifs dans lesquels la fonction déictique de la référence personnelle (le pronom sujet) est doublée par des valeurs rhétoriques ou argumentatives. Nous aurons en vue exclusivement la référence personnelle (en particulier, les cas d'auto-désignation déictique) et nous utiliserons des extraits du corpus de roumain parlé contemporain, publié sous la coordination de Liliana Ionescu-Ruxăndoiu, *L'interaction verbale dans la langue roumaine actuelle*, ainsi qu'un autre exemple tiré d'un débat électoral télévisé (enregistré).

Il est bien connu qu'en roumain (tout comme en italien ou en espagnol), l'expression du pronom sujet n'est pas obligatoire, les désinences verbales indiquant sans équivoque les rôles communicatifs assumés par les participants à une interaction. On a également souligné le fait que la présence du pronom sujet est liée à la nécessité d'exprimer l'emphase et/ou l'opposition (cf. Ionescu-Ruxăndoiu 1999: 87; GALR II 2005: 334-335). À partir de ces remarques théoriques, à valeur axiomatique dans la linguistique roumaine, nous avons l'intention d'identifier les contextes où les locuteurs ressentent le besoin de renforcer leur engagement illocutionnaire, de les systématiser et, éventuellement, d'isoler certaines règles d'application discursive (évidemment, sans valeur absolue); si du point de vue grammatical l'utilisation déictique des pronoms est redondante et indifférente, du point de vue pragmatique, elle est significative et en conséquence implique une certaine récurrence.

2.

On sait bien que, dans la perspective des théories de politesse, une attitude auto-centrique ou égocentrique (exhiber sa propre personne) reflète un comportement communicatif déficient et, finalement, antisocial. Conformément à la «loi de modestie», subsumée au principe plus général de politesse, être poli consiste à valoriser la face d'autrui au détriment de la sienne propre (cf. Kerbrat-Orecchioni 1996: 62).

Dans cette étude, pour des raisons méthodologiques, nous désignerons comme égocentriques exclusivement ces situations susceptibles d'être sanctionnées du point de vue communicatif, et nous désignerons comme subjective ou réflexive toute forme discursive dans laquelle le locuteur se réfère avec insistance à soi-même, y compris par les moyens grammaticalisés, sans préjudicier par cela l'image publique ou la face de l'interlocuteur. Cette distinction nous semble nécessaire, étant donné que, dans un sens neu-

tre, étymologique, tout énoncé est intrinsèquement égocentriques, c'est-à-dire lié d'une manière indissoluble, à son énonciateur (par l'acte-même de prendre la parole, le locuteur exprime un point de vue personnel et s'assume une responsabilité discursive. Même les situations de polyphonie énonciative – les énoncés ironiques citationnels ou intertextuels – ne font exception qu'en apparence à cette évidence discursive; en ce qui concerne le problème envisagé, c'est l'intention discursive de l'énonciateur, sa décision de transmettre un contenu informatif quelconque qui importe, et non les moyens d'expression utilisés – directs ou indirects, clairs ou ambigus). Comme nous essayerons de le démontrer par l'analyse des contextes concrets d'énonciation, l'accumulation des marques grammaticales (pronominales) pour désigner l'instance énonciatrice – «une syntaxe égocentrique» pour citer un syntagme des grammairiens roumains (cf. GALR II 2005: 335) – n'exprime pas de façon univoque une manifestation de l'égocentrisme pragmatique ou communicatif.

3.1

Une première illustration significative pour ce que l'on peut prendre superficiellement pour 'narcissisme conversationnel' est le récit personnel, la confession ou la confiance, qui représente le prototype des narrations subjectives et leur forme la plus radicale, parce que, dans ce cas, toute l'orientation discursive est centrée sur l'énonciateur. L'acte confidentiel correspond à un besoin essentiel de l'être humain, au sens psychologique et social, de chercher la compréhension et la sympathie de l'autre. Comme modèle discursif, la confession ou la confiance suppose un cadre donné (il faut remarquer le fait que ce contexte stable est prouvé par l'existence de certaines variantes institutionnelles: la variante traditionnelle – ecclésiastique ou la variante moderne – la psychanalyse): les rôles des inter-actants sont préétablis, le locuteur sollicitant non seulement le droit à la parole, mais aussi une certaine réaction affective et intellectuelle de la part de l'allocutaire¹. Le corpus nous a permis d'isoler un exemple représentatif pour ce type interactionnel. On peut observer, en confrontant les deux versions, roumaine et française, qu'en français il faut doubler par la forme disjointe le pronom sujet, afin d'obtenir l'effet rhétorique de l'utilisation du pronom sujet en roumain.

Ex. 1: *Confessions* – interaction face à face, informelle; dominante coopérative; *moi je* (en roumain *eu*) – marque émotionnelle

B: [*e cazul clasic [al unei mame vitrege* // B: [c'est le cas classique [d'une belle-mère

A: [*nu nu* // A: [non non

+B: *copilu care află la UN moment dat că nu este copil* ↑ // +B: l'enfant qui apprend à UN moment donné qu'il n'est pas enfant ↑

A: *eu am știut* ↓ // A: *moi je* l'ai su ↓

¹ Pour une présentation théorique systématique et détaillée de la confiance comme type particulier d'activité discursive, voir Kerbrat-Orecchioni & Véronique Traverso 2007: 1-24.

B: *ai [știut dintodeauna? // B: tu l'as [depuis toujours su?*
 A: [*eu am știut dintodeauna↑ dar CE să vă spun↑ adică: starea asta a mea de copil adoptat adică:↑ nu mi-am pus F:OARte mari probleme cum: într-a-± cum este în filme. adică: fiind nepoată↑ N-AM considerat că <MARC ne desparte> adopțiunea asta. <R am considerat-o întodeauna ca pe mama.> dar DE la doisprezece ani când ea mi-a spus↓ deși eu știam↓ eu știam (xx)↓ totdeauna că eu n-o iubesc pe ea foarte mult↑ ca și cum: cum o iubesc eu pe mama↓ // A: [*moi je l'ai depuis toujours su↑ mais qu'est-ce que je peux vous dire↑ c'est-à-dire: cet état à moi d'enfant adopté c'est-à-dire:↑ je ne me suis pas posé TROP de questions comme: vraiment ± comme il se passe à la télé. c'est à dire: étant la nièce↑ JE N'AI pas considéré que cette adoption <MARC nous sépare>. <R je l'ai toujours considérée comme ma mère.> mais À l'âge de douze ans quand elle me l'a dit ↓ bien que moi je le savais ↓ moi je le savais (xx)↓ toujours que moi je ne l'aime pas beaucoup↑ comme si: comme moi j'aime ma mère↓*
 (Ionescu-Ruxândoiu 1999: 50-51)*

Comme on peut le remarquer, la forte subjectivité de l'énoncé (induite aussi par le biais de la deixis personnelle) n'indique pas l'opposition entre les interlocuteurs ou encore l'emphase, mais au contraire la forte charge émotionnelle du récit, par laquelle le locuteur réclame la réaction affective de l'interlocuteur. C'est le contrat de confiance institué entre les deux partenaires qui est spécifique à ce type discursif: on dévoile son intimité devant quelqu'un que l'on considère capable de comprendre et d'approuver, capable d'accorder attention et sympathie et, non en dernier lieu, capable de discrétion. Par l'acte même de sélectionner son confident, le locuteur le valorise, en lui attribuant implicitement ces qualités. Bien qu'il parle de soi-même, le locuteur ne transgresse pas la loi de modestie (en d'autres termes, il ne commet pas une infraction pragmatique), bien au contraire, il flatte son interlocuteur et se place soi-même dans une position d'infériorité, le dévoilement de soi étant un acte menaçant pour sa face négative.

3.2

Dans les contextes communicatifs à dominante compétitive, l'auto-désignation déictique a, de façon naturelle, un rôle important et systématique. Se référant à sa propre personne, le locuteur souligne, d'une part, l'opposition avec le point de vue avancé par son interlocuteur et, d'autre part, tente de soutenir et imposer sa propre thèse. Le degré de compétitivité de l'interaction, qui marque une progression à partir de la *conversation* → *discussion* → *discussion conflictuelle (en contradictoire)* → *débat (expression de la divergence)* → *dispute*, n'influe pas sur l'application de cette règle, qui reste relativement constante et générale. Ce sont les types de stratégies discursives utilisées qui diffèrent et qui entraînent consécutivement une nuance pragmatique sensiblement différente de l'expression du pronom sujet. Ainsi, dans une interaction face à face, informelle, où le statut social des participants est relativement symétrique et le dialogue a une finalité interne (les participants font connaissance dans le train et ont une discussion sur des

questions générales), la principale stratégie argumentative est le récit autobiographique (dans un cadre institutionnel ou entre des personnes ayant un degré d'instruction plus haut les arguments sont plutôt d'ordre théorique).

Ex. 2: *Conversation dans le train* – interaction face à face, informelle; dominante compétitive; *moi je* (en roumain *eu/io*) – rôle argumentatif persuasif

a)

A: *eram în brăila↓ sînt brăileancă↓ și ă# timpurile care le trăim acum le-am trăit io atunci în brăila. TOT așa cu criza asta financiară↓ cu LIPSURI multe. [...] și tot așa cu + și cu toate astea lumea ă totuși își făcea: viața: așa cum o putea↓ își făcea copii↓ // A: j'étais à Braïla↓ je suis de Braïla↓ et euh# les temps qu'on vit à présent **moi je** les ai vécus à + cette époque-là à Braïla. DE MEME il y avait cette crise financière↓ avec beaucoup de privations [...]. et il en était de même avec + et pourtant on euh toutefois on menait: sa vie: chacun comme il pouvait↓ on faisait des enfants↓
B: **io nu vă contrazic**↓ [...] // B: **moi je** ne vous contredis pas↓ [...]*

b)

B: *io vă spun ALTĂ chestie. io sînt bugETAR↓ și TOT nu iau bani. adică: lucrez în mi:ni:sterul să:- sănătății, și n-am luat banii dă trei luni. [...] deci io n-am luat banii din# iu- iul-iulie [...] eu nu mai am ZI de salariu de un an jumate eu iau + // B: **moi je** vous dis une AUTRE chose. **moi je** suis fonctionnaire. et CEPENDANT je ne touche pas mon salaire. c'est-à-dire: je travaille au mi:ni:stère de la sa:-santé. et j'ai pas touché de sou depuis trois mois. [...] donc **moi j'**ai pas touché de sou depuis #ju – juillet. [...]. **moi je** n'ai plus le JOUR de paie depuis une année et demie **moi je** touche +*

A: # [E nu↓ da' da:' vorbeam pentru copil și pentru dumneavoastră în geneRAL // A: # [Euh mais non↓ mais mais : je disais cela de l'enfant et de vous en générale.

B: [dacă eu n-am (securitatea unui) salariu↓ nu mai zic de alte chestii [...]
// B: [si **moi j'**ai pas (la certitude d'un) salaire↓ pour ne pas parler d'autres affaires [...]

c)

B: [doamnă↓ eu eu lucrez și n:ici nu vreau să vă impresionez↓ ni:ci nu vreau să mă dau cum se spune# rotund. dar în sănătate la momentul actual e un HAOS toTAL. [...] eu am avut ocazia să să să dau un eXEM-plu. deci am plecat într-o dimineață la serviciu↓ [...] și era un# bătrîn↓ căzut↓ de dimineață↓ i-a venit rău și ă mă rog↓ l-a(u) luat cineva cu mașina și i-am zis HAI domle (xxx) la policlinica [...] ei↓ vreau să spun că l-a luat cetățeanu ăla-n mașină↓ am mers și eu cu el↓ l-am dus la CINCI MEDici. [...] <R așa>↓ și: l-am dus și io la↑# MEDici [...] m-a plimbat.#

*can final# la un – la al cincilea mi-a venit dreacii. [...] i-am zis ↓ dom doctor ↓ sînteți al CINcilea domne ↓ [...] al cincilea zice# <J du-l și tu că eu n-am timp ↓ am treabă ↓ am mu–mulți pacienți. [...] <FIM lasă-mă-n pace># <R du-l de-aici># <R n-am nevoie de el>. și i-am zis. domle: ↓ dac-aveți nevoie: de PLAtă: ↓ pentru a:– a:cordarea unui ajutor ↓ cît de banal și micuț ar fi ↓ vă plătesc **io**. știți ↑ fac **io** chestia asta ↓ cît costă plătesc **io** ↓ da' n:u să poate. _păi **io** trebuia(m) să fiu și **io** la muncă. _dumneata crezi că **io** mă plimb cu el pîn la doișpe ziua ↑ și pîn la urmă l-a luat. // B: [madame ↓ **moi moi je** travaille et j'ai pas non plus l'intention de vous toucher ↓ ni de passer pour quelqu'un d'important. Mais dans le domaine de la santé à l'heure actuelle c'est un CHAOS toTAL [...]. **moi j'**ai eu l'occasion voilà je je je vous donne un eXEMple. Donc je suis parti un beau matin au boulot ↓ [...] et il y avait un# vieil homme ↓ tombé ↓ tôt ↓ il a eu une malaise et euh bon ↓ quelqu'un l'a emmené avec sa voiture et je lui ai dis ALLONS-Y monsieur à l'hôpital [...] donc ↓ ce citoyen l'a emmené avec sa voiture ↓ **je** suis allé avec eux **moi** aussi ↓ on l'a fait voir par CINQ MÉdecins. [...] <R voilà> ↓ et: **moi** aussi **je** l'ai accompagné chez les ↑# MÉdecins [...]. on m'a promené.# pour qu'à la fin# chez le – chez le cinquième j'ai pété les plombs. [...] je lui ai dit ↓ docteur ↓ vous êtes le CINquième ↓ [...] le cinquième m'a-t-il dit# <J emmène-le d'ici parce que j'ai pas de temps ↓ je suis occupé ↓ j'ai beaucoup de patients [...] <FIM fiche-moi la paix># <R emmène-le d'ici ># <R j'ai pas besoin de lui>. et je lui ai dit. écoutez docteur: ↓ si c'est une question: d'ARGENT ↓ pour lui do:: – donner votre aide ↓ quelque banale et modique elle soit ↓ **moi je** vous paye de ma poche. voilà ↑ **moi je** le fais ↓ combien ça coûte **moi je** paye ↓ mais c'est pas possible. euh **moi je** devais être au boulot **moi** aussi. vous imaginez que je vais me promener avec lui jusqu'à midi ↑ et finalement il l'a reçu. (Ionescu–Ruxandoiu 1999: 28-32).*

Dans ce fragment, on constate une poly-fonctionnalité de l'auto-désignation déictique. Dans les exemples 2a et 2b au début du dialogue, le recours aux formes pronominales (des deux partenaires) reflète, en plus du désir de souligner le point de vue personnel, la tendance à restreindre le champ thématique, du général au particulier (notamment en ce qui concerne le locuteur B). Ce glissement est naturel, dans la mesure où toute conversation entre deux personnes qui ne se connaissent pas va des considérations générales jusqu'aux considérations personnelles; ainsi, les interlocuteurs s'offrent des informations contribuant à l'élargissement du territoire commun de discours. Orientant la conversation vers l'expérience personnelle, les deux partenaires montrent leur attitude coopérative, leur intérêt pour le sujet de la discussion et leur désir de continuer le dialogue.

Dans les répliques de B, surtout dans l'exemple 2c ci-dessus, quand le récit est plus long, l'auto-désignation déictique soutient l'éloquence du locuteur, fonctionnant comme un marqueur de son implication émotionnelle. La narration acquiert un pathos

particulier, par sa forte valeur personnalisée et continuellement authentifiée par le locuteur. Nous ne croyons pas qu'il s'agisse d'un auto-centrisme ou égocentrisme communicatif, étant donné que le locuteur oriente le discours vers son interlocuteur, cherchant à gagner sa bienveillance et sa compréhension (il s'agit d'une stratégie de la politesse positive). En d'autres termes, le locuteur garantit par l'insistance sur la référence personnelle la vérité de ce dont il parle, adhère à son propre discours et le certifie, obtenant de la crédibilité dans la construction de son message. En outre, le récit personnel permet au locuteur de se présenter soi-même, avec ses motivations et ses réactions, ce qui entraîne de manière implicite la coparticipation de l'allocutaire, sa réaction émotionnelle, créant ainsi les prémisses d'un accord tacite entre les partenaires. Comme stratégie argumentative, le récit personnel ou autobiographique n'a donc pas un effet de nature logique-rationnelle, mais empathique-affective ; d'ailleurs, on l'utilise avec la même efficacité tant dans le discours public (c'est-à-dire le discours des médias, le discours politique, le discours publicitaire) que dans le discours littéraire. Elle permet au locuteur de soutenir fermement son point de vue et de maintenir, en même temps, une relation de bienveillance et de coopération avec l'interlocuteur. De façon paradoxale, l'emphase n'exprime pas l'intention de dissociation, mais d'identification (affective) avec l'interlocuteur. Tout récit personnel a cet effet, mais, comme nous l'avons mentionné plus haut, on rencontre le plus haut degré d'implication affective dans les confessions, parce que, dans ce cas, le locuteur cherche exclusivement à se présenter soi-même, et non à défendre en subsidiaire un argument.

3.3

Dans l'exemple donné sous 3, nous prendrons en considération la fonction différente acquise par la référence personnelle dans une interaction télévisée, de type conflictuel. Les deux interlocuteurs, le président et le vice-président de la Fédération Roumaine de Boxe, s'accusent réciproquement de mauvaise gestion de la fédération. La dispute a une finalité publique, externe, et la transmission télévisée augmente son caractère formel et sa charge symbolique.

Ex. 3: *Conflict verbal* – interaction télévisée, formelle; dominante nettement compétitive; *moi je – toi tu* (en roumain *eu/io – tu*) – l'opposition; la négociation de l'identité sociale/de rôle

B: ruDEle↓ *dă' vreau să te-ntreb ceva*↓ *acu:ma:: NU știi:*↓ <*z io văd așa*↓ <@ *că toate*> *proble:me:le sî:nt bu:ne:*↓ > *greșesc și io:*↓ *greșești și tu:*↓ *normAL deci eu nici n-am ZIS că sînt un_om perfect*↓ *și nici nu pot să susțin*↓ *că nu este* <*R nimeni*>↓ ((*inspiră*)) *dar vreau să te-ntreb ceva*↓ ((*inspiră*)) *de CE ții așa tu NEAPĂrat*↓ *deci tu ești în stare să faci ORIce ca s-ajungi președintele acestei federații.* // B: ruDEL↓ *je veux te demander quelque chose*↓ *main:tenant:: je NE sais PAS*↓ <*z moi je* vois les choses ainsi↓ <@ *que tous*> *les problè:mes son corrects*↓ > *je* peux me

tromper *moi* aussi: ↓ *toi tu* peux également te tromper: ↓ c'est bien normal donc d'ailleurs *moi je* n'ai pas DIT que je suis parfait ↓ et de même je ne peux pas soutenir ↓ que <_R personne> le soit ↓ ((inspire)) mais je veux te demander quelque chose ↓ ((inspire)) pourquoi EST-CE que *toi tu* tiens À TOUT prix ↓ donc *toi tu* es capable de faire N'IMPORTE quoi pour devenir le président de la fédération.

A: *nu: nu: // A: non: non:.*

B: *ba DA ↓ // B: mais SI ↓*

A: *știi bine. am discutat asta // A: tu le sais bien. nous en avons déjà discuté*

B: [*NU-I adevărat. // B: [c'est PAS vrai. [...]]* (Ionescu–Ruxandoiu 1999: 191) [...]

B: *ruDEle ↓ ruDEle ↓ cred că tu nu-nțelegi un lucru ↓ <z tu NU-nțelegi un lucru>. tu nu TREbuie să mă INVI:ȚI pe mine ↓ // B: ruDEL ↓ ruDEL ↓ je crois que tu ne comprends pas une chose *toi* ↓ <z *toi tu* ne comprends pas une chose>. *toi tu* N'AS PAS À m'INVI:TER *moi* ↓*

A: *nu te-am invitat la: [inaugurarea hotelului ↑ // A: je t'ai invité à [l'inauguration de l'hôtel n'est pas ↑*

B: [*deci tu nu nu trebuie să mă inviți pe MINE. tu tre:be să mă anu:nți pe mi:ne:: ↓ [...]] EU la RÎNdu me:u ↓ trebe s-anunț TOT biROu federal ↓ tu NU poți să faci de CApu tău # NIMIC. [absolut nimic. // B: [donc *toi tu* n'as pas à m'inviter *MOI. Toi tu* dois me l'annoncer à *moi*. [...]] *MOI* à mon TOur ↓ *je* dois le dire à TOUT le buREAU fédéral ↓ *toi tu* NE peux RIEN faire à ta TÊte #. [absolument rien.*

A: [*eu nu fac de capu meu nimic ↓ eu- // A: [*moi je* fais rien à ma tête ↓ *moi je**

(Ionescu–Ruxandoiu 1999: 193)

La dissociation nette entre les interlocuteurs est exprimée tant par le désaccord brutal, sans moyens d'atténuation – les études sur les corpus attestent le fait que l'expression du désaccord est, en principe, accompagnée d'une excuse (cf. Kerbrat-Orecchioni 1992: 235) –, que par la désignation pronominale des instances communicatives. De cette manière, les deux protagonistes précisent leur position discursive. On a souligné le fait que la dispute constitue un type interactionnel instable, qui débouche soit sur la violence, soit sur la rupture de l'interaction, soit vers la résolution par le retour à la discussion, voire à la conversation (Vion 1992: 139). Dans l'exemple analysé, le cadre discursif se maintient relativement constant, aucun des interlocuteurs ne se montrant prêt à céder. L'alternance des pronoms *je/moi* – *tu/toi* (en roumain *eu/io* – *tu*) est corrélative à la dynamique des échanges et également à une logique argumentative à double sens, par le biais de laquelle les locuteurs doivent, d'une part, protéger leur image, en réfutant les accusations reçues, et, d'autre part, discréditer l'image de l'adversaire. Cependant, la logique offensive prévaut, les adversaires répondant à une accusation par une autre accusation ou, ce qui est plus intéressant pour ce qui nous concerne, en démontant ironiquement les prétentions de l'adversaire.

Ex. 4: *Conflict verbal* – interaction télévisée, formelle; dominante nettement compétitive; *moi je* – *toi tu* (en roumain *eu/io* – *tu*) – le sarcasme

A: *mi-ai sp- + m-ai întrebat CE vei face. <R vei fi preşedintele-> şi <R io ți-am spus> NU: nu-mi trebui AŞA ceva::↓ însă nu am încoTRO în momentu_ă:sta↑ federația NU POAte # să rămînă neconDU:să↑ ştii că SÎNT probleme la nivel internațional↓ ştii din auzite↓ **eu** ştiu [la modul conCRET // A: tu m'as di + tu m'as demandé ce QUE tu vas faire. <R tu seras le président-> et <R **moi je** t'ai dit> JE N'EN ai PAS besoin::↓ mais je n'ai pas le CHOIX en ce_mo:ment↑ ON NE PEUT PAS # laisser la fédération sans direcTI:on↑ tu sais bien qu'IL Y A des problèmes au niveau international↓ tu le sais par ouï-dire↓ mais **moi je** le sais [concrÈTEMENT
B: *şi tu te <Fşi tu te sacri:fici> // B: et toi tu <F et tu te sacri:fies toi >*
A: *exact. // A: c'est exact.*
B: *şi tu te sacrifici // B: et tu te sacrifies toi*
A: *exA:CT. // A: c'est exA:CT.*
B: [*şi-o vei conduce tu. // B: [et tu vas la diriger toi.*
A: [*exA:ct. exA:CT. [...]* // A: [c'est exA:CT. c'est exA:CT.
(Ionescu–Ruxandoiu 1999: 192)*

On remarque que la composante ironique est soutenue par la désignation déictique de l'interlocuteur et bien sûr par des moyens paraverbaux (l'intonation et l'intensité forte de la voix) et très probablement extraverbaux (mimo-gestuels).

Les trois derniers échanges presque identiques marquent une augmentation de l'intensité ironique jusqu'au sarcasme, des deux côtés, parce que A repousse l'attaque de l'adversaire adoptant immédiatement le même registre expressif. Certes, ce contexte illustre l'égoïsme communicatif, mais les conflits et, plus généralement, les interactions hautement compétitives (les débats électoraux, par exemple), par leur structure discursive, génèrent une telle attitude, les protagonistes étant obligés de défendre ou de négocier leur identité de rôle/sociale (voir aussi Ionescu-Ruxandoiu 2006: 349-353).

3.4

L'analyse du corpus semble attester la récurrence de la structure pronom sujet à la première personne du singulier associé à un verbe d'opinion (voir aussi GALR II 2005: 335). La présence du pronom a la valeur d'un signal, à l'aide duquel les locuteurs attirent l'attention soit sur l'originalité de leur point de vue, soit qu'ils s'assument la responsabilité de l'énoncé, renforçant sa force persuasive.

Ex. 5: *moi je* (en roumain *eu*) + verbe d'opinion; marque d'atténuation (politesse négative)

D: [_{<P} **eu cred că eu cred că** *Ăla e cel mai bun pentru tine* ↓ *ăla* ↓ > // D: [_{<P} **moi je crois que moi je crois que** CELUI-LÀ est le meilleur pour toi ↓ celui-là ↓ > (*L'appareil de massage*, p. 55)

B: **eu așa să zic** că s-aranjează da' **eu cred** că fiind subțiri așa s-ar putea să:
// B: **moi je** dirais qu'ils te vont bien mais **je crois moi** que étant si fins il
peut arriver que: [...] (*Chez la couturière*, p. 127)

B: **eu ↓ eu cred** că [...] nimeni nu poate să pună o condiție ↓ # în respectarea
ORDInii publice în capitală [...] deci ↓ cred că # cred că # atunci când v-ați
asumat aceste efecte negative **eu cred** că ați studiat și legea // B: **moi je ↓**
moi je crois que [...] personne ne peut imposer une condition ↓ # dans le
respect de L'ORDre publique dans la capitale [...] alors ↓ je crois que # je
crois que # quand vous avez adopté ces effets négatifs **moi je crois** que
vous avez étudié aussi la loi (*Proteste estudiantin*, p. 166; 168)

II: <↓ **eu cred** că e cel mai bun ambasador pe care la numit la numit
românia după decembrie o mie_nouă_sute_optzeci_și_nouă>. //
II: <↓ **moi je crois** qu'il est le meilleur ambassadeur que la rouma-
nie a nommé a nommé après décembre mille_neuf_cent_qua-
tre_vingt_neuf >. (*Des journalistes en entretien avec le Président*, p.
152) (cf. p. 50; 56; 57; 83; 146; 209; 237)

Ce qui nous semble intéressant c'est que l'on enregistre les constructions où les formes déictiques accompagnent le verbe d'opinion non seulement dans des contextes formels, mais aussi informels; dans le corpus, les contextes où le pronom est absent sont relativement égaux statistiquement à ceux où le pronom est présent. En ce qui nous concerne, nous considérons que cette modalité d'expression est justifiée du point de vue pragmatique par le respect de la loi de modestie. L'atténuation de la force illocutionnaire de l'énoncé par le recours aux modalisateurs du type **je crois, je soupçonne, à mon avis** constitue une stratégie de la politesse négative (dans la conception de Brown et Levinson). Exprimer une opinion sans adoucisseurs c'est l'apanage des instances d'autorité, de tels énoncés, qui ont un fort caractère prescriptif, étant spécifique en particulier au discours juridiques, où, en outre, l'instance énonciatrice est impersonnelle. Or, bien au contraire, dans la communication courante, mais aussi dans d'autres formes discursives, y compris dans le discours scientifique, les locuteurs ressentent le besoin de renforcer leur engagement illocutionnaire, par l'auto-désignation déictique, justement pour relativiser leur point de vue et diminuer son potentiel menaçant intrinsèque.

3.5

En examinant les exemples précédents, nous avons voulu insister sur le fait que, du point de vue pragmatique, la multiplication des marques de subjectivité de l'énoncé (par l'expression du pronom sujet) ne reflète pas nécessairement un comportement auto-valorisant, étant plutôt imposée par la logique argumentative et par la nature de l'interaction. En revanche, l'escamotage de la première personne nous semble extrêmement significatif comme marque d'une attitude présomptueuse et égocentrique. Cet

effacement référentiel à la valeur d'un taxème², à l'aide duquel l'émetteur exhibe une supériorité réelle ou prétendue. Si en roumain, dans le langage infantile, se référer à soi-même à la troisième personne est un moyen fréquent d'auto-désignation «Jeanne a faim»³, dans le cas d'un sujet adulte (s'adressant à un autre adulte) ce glissement déictique indique justement le manque de modestie et l'affectation. C'est pourquoi dans la communication courante cette manière est doublement fâcheuse: elle génère des confusions et menace, par l'asymétrie, la face positive de l'interlocuteur.

Ex. 6: *Débat électoral* (1996). Participants: Emil Constantinescu et Ion Iliescu. Interaction télévisée; dominante nettement compétitive; auto-désignation à la troisième personne – emphase, auto-éloge dissimulé; négociation de l'identité sociale/de rôle⁴

a)

I.I. *Eu cred că tocmai acești ani au arătat că **președintele Iliescu** a căpătat o mare credibilitate pe arena internațională, lucru exprimat de oamenii politici responsabili.* // I.I. *Moi je crois que ce sont justement ces années qui ont prouvé que **le président Iliescu** a acquis une grande crédibilité sur la scène internationale, ce qui est aussi exprimé par les hommes politiques responsables.*

b)

I.I. *Constituția României nu a fost redactată de **Iliescu, de președintele Iliescu.*** // I.I. *La constitution de la Roumanie n'a pas été rédigée par **Iliescu, par le président Iliescu.***

² Voir Kerbrat-Orecchioni 1990: 74 «Nous appelons «taxème» [...] tout comportement, verbal ou non verbal, susceptible de marquer une relation hiérarchique entre les interactants [...]».

³ En roumain, la situation inverse est également possible, les adultes (femmes) s'adressant souvent à leurs enfants à la troisième personne (celle-ci peut substituer la I^{ère} personne «Maman vient immédiatement» ou la II^{ème} personne «Jeanne a faim?»). Ce type de mimétisme langagier connote fortement l'affectivité; ainsi on y recourt fréquemment pour atténuer les énoncés directives «Maman te prie de manger».

⁴ Cet effet antisocial provient, le plus probablement, du fait que l'auto-désignation du locuteur par d'autres formules que le pronom personnel de I^{ère} personne singulier est, à l'origine, un signe de royauté (sur le plan politique, mais aussi symbolique), un moyen conventionnel pour souligner le pouvoir et l'autorité [absolue] du locuteur, reconnue officiellement par les autres. D'où la forte note auto-valorisante des formules d'auto-désignation atypiques et leur caractère foncièrement impoli (du point de vue pragmatique), qui rend leur utilisation très restrictive, voire interdite dans les relations égalitaires, démocratiques (bien sûr, nous avons en vue le registre sérieux, parce qu'une utilisation ironique, citationnelle, en réplique, est toujours possible et bien naturelle). Katie Wales (1996: 70) relève le même effet de distanciation et d'autorité lorsque l'on substitue une autre personne à la première personne du singulier en anglais: «When non-first person singular forms are used for [+ego], the 'distancing' that results is a social one of 'power', confirming the speaker's authority: [...] *Her Majesty* is not amused».

Ex. 7: *Interview* – interaction complémentaire télévisée; dominante coopérative; auto-désignation à la troisième personne; emphase/ironie; définition de l'image publique

A: *bun. DOMnule tudoRAN↓ # MArele public deci NU_ȘTie despre dumneavoastră nimic↓ VREAU să le prezentăm personajul dorin [tudoran // A: bon. MONsieur tudoRAN↓ # alors le GRrand public NE_CONNâit rien de vous↓ JE VEUX qu'on leur présente le personnage dorin [tudoran*

B: [*să nu vă-* // B: [ne vous

A: *CIne SÎNteți dumneavoastră. // A: QUI Êtes vous.*

B: *să nu vă-nchipuiți că există un singur î: persoNAJ dorin tudoran↓ //*

B: n' imaginez pas *qu'il existe un seul euh persoNNAGE dorin tudoran↓* (p. 233-234)

Dans l'exemple donné sous 6, le locuteur recourt stratégiquement à la substitution pronominale pour souligner de façon impersonnelle sa propre valeur; la troisième personne crée l'impression d'objectivité et lui permet non seulement de dissimuler un auto-éloge, mais aussi de rejeter une critique. Dans l'exemple 7, tiré d'une interview à la télévision, la composante auto-valorisante est plus atténuée; une utilisation ironique est également possible, le locuteur citant (mentionnant)⁵ la formule de présentation à la troisième personne utilisée par le modérateur. L'égo-centrisme dissimulé dans ces deux exemples est pourtant motivé du point de vue situationnel: dans l'exemple 6, le locuteur est obligé de négocier son identité sociale/de rôle, dans le cadre d'un débat électoral, pendant que, dans l'exemple 7 (l'interview), B est invité à se présenter soi-même et à définir son image publique.

4.

Certes, nos observations n'ont pas une valeur absolue; nous avons eu seulement l'intention d'isoler quelques contextes où l'usage de la référence personnelle s'explique notamment par des critères pragmatiques. Nous nous sommes penchés surtout sur les formes plus subtiles et ambiguës où le pronom sujet «je» (en roumain «eu») acquiert un rôle argumentatif ou rhétorique: signaler l'implication émotionnelle, l'empathie, l'emphase, l'ironie ou le sarcasme. Nous avons également analysé les cas d'escamotage référentiel pour la première personne, fonctionnant soit comme indicateur taxémique, soit comme signal de l'(auto)ironie.

⁵ Pour la théorie de l'ironie comme mention, voir Sperber, D. & D. Wilson 1978: 399-412; Ducrot 1984: 171-233.

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Normes de transcription

On utilise la minuscule pour l'initiale ou pour le début de la proposition/ phrase; la minuscule est employée aussi pour les noms propres. La majuscule marque l'emphase. Les mots dans les langues étrangères sont notés conformément à l'audition, entre les symboles </ / > (ex. /niiorc/ pour New York).

<i>Accent</i>	á	on le note seulement quand il diffère de l'accent courant
	TEXTE	accent emphatique (d'un mot ou d'une syllabe)
<i>Intonation</i>	.	contour mélodique descendant terminal
	↓	contour mélodique descendant non terminal
	?	contour mélodique montant terminal
	↑	contour mélodique montant non terminal
	!	intonation rejective
<i>Hauteur</i>	<Î >	hauteur élevée de la voix
	<J >	hauteur basse de la voix
<i>Tempo</i>	<L >	tempo lent
	<R >	tempo rapide

<i>Intensité</i>	<F >	intensité forte de la voix
	<P >	intensité faible de la voix
–		(ligne basse, entre les mots) prononciation legato
–		(ligne de dialogue) mot inachevé
u: / m:		allongement d'un son; le nombre de symboles (:) indique, d'une manière approximative, la durée du phénomène
'		l'apocope des sons; l'omission habituelle de «l» article définit est marquée systématiquement, sans utiliser l'apostrophe
ç		stop glottal
#		pause; le nombre de signes indique, d'une manière approximative, la durée de la pause
texte =		
= texte		enchaînement immédiat entre deux tours (<i>latching</i>)
[texte		le commencement du chevauchement des interventions successives
+A:		continuation du premier tour sans tenir compte de l'intervention chevauchée
chée		
texte ⊥		construction abandonnée (<i>false start</i>)
„“		séquence de discours direct rapporté
<@ >		rire simultané à la prononciation
<Z >		sourire simultané à la prononciation
<OF > s		équence prononcée par un mouvement expiatoire spécifique au soupir
<MARC >		séquence mise en évidence par une prononciation rare (parfois syllabée) et forte
<IM >		imitation de la manière de parler d'une personne
<CIT >		le locuteur lit un texte
(())		indications 'scéniques'
()		transcription probable
(xxx)		texte inaudible; le nombre de symboles (x) indique, approximativement, la longueur de la séquence inaudible
[...]		séquence non transcrite
{ }		intervention liée au contexte de la conversation (<i>aside</i>)

IL DIALOGISMO NELLE POSTILLE DELL'ASCOLI

CELESTINA MILANI

1.

In questa ricerca si presentano alcuni risultati dell'analisi condotta su varie postille scritte da G.I. Ascoli nella sua copia dell'*Archivio Glottologico Italiano* (= AGI), voll. 1-15 (1873-1900); i volumi sono stati donati alla Biblioteca Comunale di Milano, dove tuttora si trovano. Come già ricordato (Milani 1983: 219), A. Brambilla ha riconosciuto nella scrittura delle postille la grafia stessa dell'Ascoli, cfr. *Rivista di Letteratura italiana* 1 (1983): 187-192. Molte di tali postille costituiscono riflessioni o aggiunte dell'Ascoli ai propri lavori, ma si trovano anche annotazioni a lavori di altri studiosi.

2.

Nelle postille dell'Ascoli si verifica una situazione di dialogicità col testo di AGI, che viene chiosato nel contesto della ricerca scientifica, producendo un'interpretazione nuova del problema e della realtà dei dati, non sempre riconducibile all'insieme dei punti di vista già espressi dall'Ascoli o da altri autori.

In questo tipo di dialogo il proponente è Ascoli che porta delle correzioni o dei completamenti al testo e al tema trattato. Si tratta quindi di una rielaborazione del proprio o altrui punto di vista. Le note cooperano alla ricerca, approfondendo i tratti comuni e quelli differenziali che il metodo ermeneutico propone.

Le note respirano nell'esperienza storica e comparativa dell'autore secondo il principio dialettico della compensazione e del contraddittorio (Galli 1983). Esse sono inserite nel contesto degli articoli glossati dall'Ascoli, che vengono così completati e aggiornati. L'oggetto del discorso viene ripreso e convalidato o modificato. Talora si riscontrano ripetizioni lessicali e variazioni, ma generalmente si tratta di elementi nuovi. Nell'insieme si trova un orientamento discorsivo più completo. Si instaura così un discorso dialogico con linee sobrie ed essenziali (Sitri 2003; Armosy 2005: 13-54; Perin 2006: 5).

Nelle note dell'Ascoli non si trovano mai connettori argomentativi; si tratta generalmente di enunciazioni riferite al testo accanto al quale si trovano.

Il dialogo è col testo, con i lettori, con se stesso. Tramite le glosse, Ascoli crea un rapporto tra parlante e ascoltatore mediato dal testo. Gli elementi del dialogo sono quindi quattro: il parlante (Ascoli), l'ascoltatore (il destinatario delle note e del testo), le note e il testo che viene così completato e corretto (Spitzer 2007: 103-254).

3.

Passiamo quindi ad analizzare alcune postille presenti nel primo numero della rivista. Per queste note relative ad AGI 1 si rimanda a Milani (1984: 271-273).

In AGI 1 (1873) si notano le seguenti postille all'introduzione dell'Ascoli. A p. x "Glottologia: la questione della lingua e gli studi storici in Italia del m.e. prof. G.I. Ascoli (suarci estratti dall'autore)". Da questa annotazione appare chiara l'intenzione dell'Ascoli di pubblicare almeno le pagine introduttive di AGI 1 o parti di esse in una Memoria o saggio autonomo (Dardano 1974).

A p. XII, a proposito delle differenze che caratterizzano i vari dialetti italiani e francesi, si trova il rimando "Mém. de Ling. I 364". Si tratta dell'articolo di A. Brachet, *Dictionnaire des doublets de la langue française*, suppl., *Mémoires de la Société de Linguistique* 1 (1874): 358 ss.; a p. 363 ss. l'autore discute del trattamento delle vocali latine nelle lingue romanze in rapporto all'accento con particolare riguardo ai dialetti francesi.

A p. XIII in fondo, a proposito della lingua tedesca che appare molto unitaria diversamente dall'italiano e dal francese frammentati in molti dialetti, l'Ascoli scrive "toccare nella seconda edizione dei rimpianti di Fernow e del de Bois Reymond". Evidentemente egli vuole accennare a Carl Ludwig Fernow, autore dei *Römische Studien*, 3 voll., Zurich: Gessner 1806-1808, e a Emil Heinrich Du Bois-Reymond fisiologo e letterato tedesco. In fondo alla pagina si trova anche l'annotazione "V.v. Kohl, ap. Hasdeu, Cuv. d. Bătr. III 84", per cui cfr. Bogdan Petriceicu Hasdeu, *Cuvente den Bătrăni, III Istoria limbii române*, Bucaresti: Editura Cultura Nationala 1881.

A p. XIV riferita alla nota nella quale l'Ascoli accenna al problema della traduzione degli idiotismi latini nel tedesco del '700, si legge questa postilla: "V.v. Saalfeld, Über die Fremdwörter, besonders in Deutschen (Sammlung gemeinnütziger Vorträge), Prag 1882".

A p. XV, accanto alla nona riga dall'alto, si legge: "Cfr. De volg. Eloq. I, VIII, v. f.". Tale passo tratta dell'interscambio delle lingue, cfr. Dante, *De vulgari eloquentia*, ediz. a cura di Pier Vincenzo Mengaldo, Padova: Antenore 1968. Tale postilla illustra il passo di AGI 1: "Dice stupendamente il *Vocabolario Novo* che il laboratorio in cui la natura fa le lingue, le raffina e le perfeziona non può essere che una mera agglomerazione di uomini viventi in uno scambio continuo e obbligato di pensieri e di uffici".

A p. XVIII, riferito a "ad-mactatorio" si legge l'integrazione "t-i-rat-orio", per cui si può richiamare *tiratoio* entrato nella lingua italiana nel 1332 e indicante "stanzone in cui si tirano i pannilani" dal latino medievale *tiratorium* (Piacenza, XIII secolo) (Battisti-Alessio 1975: s.v.).

A p. XX, a proposito dei proverbi dialettali indicanti "trovare il pelo nell'uovo", troviamo annotato "prov. còrso, Tomm. 375, va sempre circhendu u pelu in l'ovo". Si rimanda a Nicolò Tommaseo & Bernardo Bellini, *Dizionario della lingua italiana* III/2, Torino & Napoli: Unione Tipografica Editrice 1971, 870; IV/2, Pisa & Roma & Napoli, Unione Tipografica Editrice 1879, 1681.

A p. XXI, a metà, si legge “Ognuno direbbe e di certo anche il Manzoni avrebbe ditto e scritto, con priorità etimologica e letteraria, *intenzione innovatrice* e non *intenzione innovatoria*, perché a Firenze pur si dice *la lavoratora*, ecc.”. L’aggiunta tende a chiarire le scelte lessicali convalidate dall’uso per cui “*determinarsi un piccolo vano* sia modo più naturale o consentaneo che non sia il venircisi a formare un bucolino”.

A p. XXVIII, circa a metà, a proposito dell’apprendimento della lingua italiana, quasi idioma straniero per coloro che sono abitualmente dialettofoni, si trova la nota “Non si nega la sincerità, ma v’è grande esagerazione, ed è, come istintivamente, un discorso disforme dal pensiero. Pare il fervore di un padre, che raccomanda al figlio una cosa buona senza volergli dire dei pregi che più egli ne ammira”.

A p. XXXI, riferito ad “infilare”, si trova “s’infilarono i loro cappotti, Grandi, *L’abbandono*, Firenze ’78, p. 214”. L’aggiunta chiarisce l’uso del termine. Nel testo infatti si ha “L’Arte ... intende il linguaggio, non come una cute che sia il portato dell’intiero organismo della vita nazionale, ma come una nuova manica da infilare (modo veneto questo ...)”.

A p. L, accanto alla quinta riga dall’alto, si ha “cfr. Norcia: *te ico* ti dico ecc. ma *ch’è n’ dicia*, Pap. 534. E Livorno Pap. 247”. La citazione è desunta da Giovanni Papanti, *I parlari italiani in Certaldo alla festa del V centenario di Messer Giovanni Boccaccio*, Livorno: Tipi Francesco Vigo 1875, pp. citate.

L’aggiunta è relativa alle alterazioni transitorie del suono interno di un tema o nominale o verbale, come dice l’Ascoli a p. L, e in particolare riguarda l’influsso (o no) del suono finale di una parola sul suono iniziale della parola successiva, e nel caso della postilla riguarda la conservazione o meno di /d-/. Il passo di Papanti comprende una serie di note al testo livornese che le precede e che presenta parecchi casi di “alterazioni transitorie dei suoni”.

Sotto si trova questa nota di Ascoli: “cfr. la mia *vart* ecc. 100-101”. Lo studioso si riferisce alla sua analisi di *vart-part* nel dialetto ladino dei Grigion di Sopraselva, cfr. *Saggi Ladini*, AGI 1: 100-101.

A p. LIV, accanto alla quindicesima riga dal fondo, si legge “E il genov. e il francese (questo dinanzi a cons.) hanno *au* per *allo*; ma l’*au* genovese risale ad *aru* laddove nel franc. si tratterà di *aul* (*aul-tien*, *aul-mien*)”. Per le forme genovesi cfr. Ascoli, *Del posto che spetta al ligure nel sistema dei dialetti italiani*, AGI 2 (1873): 122 (/l/ > /r/) ed E.G. Parodi, *Studi liguri*, AGI 15 (1901): 6. Quanto ad *aul* si tratta di ipercorrettismo grafico sorto da basi etimologiche, cfr. *aulx*, *chevaux*, *consaulx*, *eulx*, *faulx*, ecc. grafie del XV secolo (Brunot 1924: 495); la forma *aul* è puramente grafica e ipercorretta.

4.

In AGI 2 (1873) si leggono le seguenti postille all’articolo di G.I. Ascoli, *Del posto che spetta al ligure nel sistema dei dialetti italiani*, pp. 111-160. A proposito della continuazione di /ã/ del latino nei dialetti italiani, a p. 113 tra le note 1 e 2, l’Ascoli aggiunge: “cfr. *su’ anceddu de strania*, Canti delle prov. mer. p. 290”; a p. 114, vicino all’ultima

riga del testo, a proposito del ligure *repuero* (*ripar-io?* Cfr. *d'accord-io* d'accordo) si legge "s'accordio (Arch. di Lucca 1546 in Bonari, Francesco Burlamacchi, Napoli 1874, 56 e 58) e cfr. il Diz. it. 'accordo' e 'discordia', sardo merid. *accordiu* = ant. ital. *accordo* B. Bianchi, cfr. *concordio* Mon. Muss. 106". L'opera di Bianco Bianchi qui richiamata è *Storia della preposizione a e de' suoi composti nella lingua [...] Saggio di un dizionario etimologico e sintattico della lingua comune e dei dialetti toscani*, Firenze: Tipografia della Gazzetta d'Italia, Acc. Crusca 1877. Quanto a *concordio* dal lat. *concordium* si trova nelle *Rime genovesi* v. 494.58 nella frase "Chi per no vorer concordio"; quanto a "Mon. Muss." si tratta di Adolfo Mussafia, *Monumenti antichi di dialetti italiani*, Sitzungsberichte der Wiener Akademie der Wissensch. Phil.-hist. Klasse 46: 113-235, ma la citazione di *concordio* non si trova a p. 106, bensì a p. 211, G 441 nel poemetto in volgare intitolato *De Jerusalem celesti et de pulchritudine eius et beatitudine et gaudium sanctorum*. Per queste note ad AGI cfr. Milani (1983: 219ss).

A p. 116, a proposito del dittongo /je/ esito in antico provenzale di /ě/ tonico del latino, accanto alla nota 3, si legge "*tiers*, cfr. *cierge cereus*"; la prima forma è provenzale, mentre *cierge* è francese, fatto derivare dal Bianchi da *ceriō*, cfr. AGI 13 (1893): 227; REW 1829 *cēreum*, cfr. sic. *cilio*, logud. *kiriu*, prov. cat. *ciri*, ecc.

Alla p. 116 è stata unita la parte finale di una lettera di Mussafia con un'aggiunta dello stesso datata al 3 ottobre 1873; si trascrive l'aggiunta del Mussafia: "a p. 116 badate che c'è un errore di stampa: un'arbitraria variante di *ie*. Le ultime due linee della stessa pag. fanno supporre che prov. *veills* si pronuncii *veils* e prov. *vielhs* si pronuncii *viets*. In verità la differenza di pronuncia consiste solo nel dittongo; la prima forma si pronuncia *vels*. Il provenz. e per *l* e per *ñ* vacilla fra *il (ill) in e lh, nh*. Date un'occhiata altresì al I volume delle *Mém. de la Soc. de Linguist.* e troverete un bello studio del Meyer sulle formule a cui in prov. si limitano *ie* ed *uo (ue)*. Se non avete il vol., posso mandarvi un sunto della dissert.". Sul carteggio Ascoli-Mussafia, cfr. Prosdocimi (1969).

A p. 119 di mano dell'Ascoli si legge "*terbo*, torbido (turbolo?), ma *ghemo* gomito come si spiega? V. St. cr. I 24". Come si nota, *terbo* e *ghemo* sono voci del dialetto piemontese notate con la grafia *tërbo* e *ghëmo*¹ in G.I. Ascoli, *Studi critici*, I, Milano 1861, estratto da *Studi orientali e linguistici*, 3 (1861), cfr. REW 8994 e 2354. A p. 128 si trova "piem. *cadlé* ecc. all. al prov. *cadelá* ecc. 'mettere in bell'assetto', *capitellare (Nigra, nov. 99)". Si ha così un evidente termine *post quem* per datare la postilla che chiarisce con questo esempio il problema della palatalizzazione e della conservazione di lat. /k-/ in piemontese. Nella stessa pagina, alla nota 3, si trova una postilla che corregge il genovese *noria* da *nutrica*: "difatti è *noriga* p. 213" come si legge nel testo n. 40, 12 a p. 213 di AGI 2, presentato da N. Lagomaggiore, *Rime genovesi della fine del secolo XIII e del principio del XIV*, pp. 161 ss.

¹ Col grafema ɛ l'Ascoli indica probabilmente il suono [œ] ed è probabile che tale suono sia designato anche dal grafema ɛ̃.

A p. 132, all'altezza della quattordicesima riga, si legge "v. Della Barba, *Sul parlare dei sardi*, Reggio d'Emilia, 1880"; si tratta di un'aggiunta alla nota 1 che è una rapida presentazione dei dialetti sardi. A p. 134, par. 4-12 del sardo settentrionale "vocale tonica del latino" del testo appare corretto in "appaja continuaz. di". A p. 141, riferito al logudorese *ušai* = *usjai* da *ustulare*², si legge "-are". Sotto si trova "cfr. $\chi = rc$ ecc. Spano ort. 28"; l'esempio *maxu* per *maschio* si trova in Giovanni Spano, *Ortografia sarda*, Cagliari: Reale Stamperia 1840, 28. L'esempio chiarisce logud. *chišū* "cerchio", *chirġu*, *chiššū* del testo che presentano un esito diverso del nesso /-rk-/ del latino.

A p. 143, a proposito dei fenomeni del sardo centrale, si legge "cfr. campid. *ghiáni* e logud. *morighessa* (*morus celsa*), Arch. XV 487". Il campid. *ghiáni* "morello" deriva dal lat. *cyaneus* prestito greco, il logud. *-ghessa* è opposto al campid. *gessa*; la citazione bibliografica è un rimando a C. Nigra, *Postille lessicali sarde*, AGI 15 (1900), pp. 481-493. A p. 144, in relazione ai fenomeni fonetici del sardo centrale, dalla riga dodicesima della nota si legge "cfr. es. *chenza* = **cénsa* (ristud.) = senza"; *chenza* è forma del logudorese. Sempre a p. 144, dalla riga ventesima della nota in poi, a proposito del sardo centrale *átta* = merid. *azza* da *acies*, *érittū* da *ericius*³ ecc., si legge questa postilla dell'Ascoli: "*putu piatta* Caix 91". Si tratta delle forme logudoresi *putu* dal lat. *puteus* (cfr. REW 6567) e *piatta* dal lat. *platea* (cfr. REW 6583); la citazione "Caix 91" si riferisce a N. Caix, *Saggio sulla storia della lingua e dei dialetti d'Italia con un'introduzione sopra l'origine delle lingue neolatine*, Parma: Tipografia Pietro Grazioli 1872, 91, cfr. Santamaria (1981: 123 ss.) e Renzi (1969: 596-597). Sotto a tale glossa si trova "*litos* licci *fariniatu corriattu*": si tratta di esempi dell'esito in dentale sorda breve o lunga del nesso latino /cj/ in logudorese; tuttavia tale esito non è chiaro nel logud. *corriattu* "flessibile", campid. *korriátsu*, cfr. Wagner (1960: I, 33).

A p. 146 si legge "mōns tria [tempora] sunt quando post vocalem natura longam duae consonantes sequuntur vel na dulex ut 'mōns' 'rēx' (Priscian. lib. V, de syll. in fin.)"; la frase di Prisciano illustra casi di /o:/ latino in cui l'allungamento è dovuto alla posizione. A p. 147, riferito a *negghia* del siciliano, si trova "sarà pari al nap. *neglia*?".

A p. 148, accanto al par. 22 della nota che tratta dei dialetti siciliani, a proposito del sicil. *vénca* da *vendí[c]a*, *perca* da *perti[c]a*, che l'Ascoli sospetta essere voci straniere, si legge "*vencia* Avolio 209, *miliasti* Avolio 172 cfr. *ca percia qui perce* Avolio 155": si tratta di voci siciliane tratte da Corrado Avolio, *Canti popolari di Noto*, Noto: Tip. Zammit 1875.⁴

A p. 151 il genov. *me[ũ]n* "mani" è corretto dall'Ascoli in *m[ũ]en*⁵.

A p. 158 si trova un foglio inserito, sempre scritto dall'Ascoli: "Come *asino* (pronunc. *ašgino*) si pronunciano da' Massesi (di Massa ducale o di Carrara) le seguenti parole nelle quali trovasi la *s* proferita come la *g* de' toscani e anzi tutto la parola dell'af-

² Non si trova in Wagner (1960: II, 564) ma cfr. REW 9097.

³ Cfr. Wagner (1960: I, 151): logud.. *átta*, campid. *áttsa* e REW 107; cfr. inoltre Wagner (1960: 492): logud. *árittū*, *érittū*, *irittū* e REW 2897.

⁴ Cfr. ultima edizione a cura di Antonino Buttitta, Palermo, Ed. Regione Siciliana 1974.

⁵ Il termine appare con la grafia *moen* in Casaccia 1964: 488.

fermazione: *si* pron. *šgi*; avverto però che la *s* di *si* somiglia un poco all'*sc* toscano; ma è assolutamente *sg* nelle voci *spasimo* pron. *spašgimo*, *quasi* pron. *quašgi*, *biasimo* pron. *biašgimo*." A p. 158 l'Ascoli tratta della realizzazione del fonema /z/ in Liguria, Sardegna, Corsica e nella pagina successiva accenna al fonema /ʃ/ in genovese, dialetti ladini e la nota riportata si inserisce appunto nel discorso della realizzazione delle sibilanti.

Qui termina per ora il discorso di analisi delle postille ascoliane. Sebbene non manchino lavori dell'Ascoli (o paragrafi di lavori) dedicati alle lingue indoeuropee negli aspetti genetici e comparativi, l'attenzione più viva dello studioso è dedicata alle lingue e ai dialetti romanzi, come appare da AGI, rivista fondata dall'Ascoli nel 1873.

Il *Proemio*, con cui si apre AGI I, era "uno scritto di guerra con cui l'Ascoli, respingendo le esagerazioni del manzonismo fiorentineggiante (il manzonismo degli stenterelli, diceva Carducci), riproponeva con successo e con solide argomentazioni un ritorno alla lingua letteraria italiana quale si era venuta costituendo in secoli di una fiorente letteratura italiana facente capo a Dante" (Pisani 1972: 94). Con queste parole del grande maestro Vittore Pisani, chiudo questa breve ricerca sulle glosse dell'Ascoli ad AGI.

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“TODAY, WE'RE ALL DANES”. ARGUMENTATIVE MEANING OF THE 1ST AND 2ND PERSON PRONOUNS IN NEWSPAPER EDITORIALS ON THE MUHAMMAD CARTOONS

MARTINA TEMMERMAN*

1. *The use of 1st and 2nd person pronouns in argumentative discourse*

This paper explores the use of 1st and 2nd person pronouns in newspapers' argumentative discourse. The pragmatic meaning of these pronouns has already been studied in numerous articles. Some investigate the relation between text and context which is generally being established by the pronoun(s) (e.g. Bazzanella 2002), others focus on the meaning in specific kinds of discourse, like business communication (e.g. Dieltjens & Heynderickx 2003), political interviews (e.g. Bull & Fetzer 2006) or academic writing (e.g. Harwood 2005, 2007). Most of these articles limit their discussions to the 1st person pronouns.

In this paper we want to investigate the *argumentative meaning* of the pronouns. We will show that not only 1st person pronouns, but also 2nd person pronouns play an important role in the argumentative meaning of a text. We have based our analysis on a corpus of newspaper opinion articles, and as a special case, we have chosen the articles in Flemish newspapers that were written in the aftermath of the publication of some satirical cartoons depicting the prophet Muhammad in the Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten* in 2005. This case has seemed to us specially relevant, as editorialists of other newspapers, writing about the publication in the Danish newspaper, must have been forced to consider the meaning of the personal pronouns they were using, thus taking a stance in whether they wanted to identify with their Danish colleagues or not and in how far they wanted their readers to identify with their viewpoints. The language the newspaper articles in our corpus are written in, is Dutch.

According to Fowler (1991: 221), in newspaper editorials,

[V]arious techniques are deployed to make salient the illusion of utterance by an authoritative speaker, addressing a particular kind of reader embraced in an 'us' relationship and taking a particular marked stance in relation to the persons and topics referred to.

This *us* relationship Fowler mentions is very interesting. The author will try to convince the reader of a proposition, so that both will reach a common viewpoint, a *we* stance. Or, as Fowler (1991: 214) states: “Readers are implicated in the ideological posi-

*The author wishes to thank Marit Trioen, who has carried out part of the research for this paper. The *we*-form this paper is written in, is therefore not to be interpreted as an *authorial we*.

tion of the ‘we’ to the extent that they accept these propositions.” The use of *us* and *we* here already indicates the importance of personal pronouns in argumentation. As long as the reader does not have the same viewpoint as the author, there is no *we*, but only an *I* and a *you*, i.e. a first and a second person. That is why we will also include the second person pronouns in our analysis.

2. The traditional approach to the meaning of 1st and 2nd person pronouns: an overview

The designation *1st and 2nd person pronouns* covers three strongly related subclasses of pronouns: personal pronouns, possessive pronouns and reflexive pronouns. Their interrelatedness results from the fact that the grammatical categories of *person*, *number* and *gender* apply to the three of them: they all distinguish between 1st, 2nd and 3rd person¹; between singular versus plural; and between personal versus non-personal gender, with a further distinction between masculine and feminine within the former. As a consequence, grammars often discuss these three subclasses under the same heading, presenting the personal pronouns as the prototypical class, which then has corresponding possessive and reflexive forms (see for instance Biber *et al.* 1999; Leech & Svartvik 2002). Table I offers an overview of Dutch 1st and 2nd person pronouns (the English forms are between brackets):

Person	Personal pronoun		Possessive		Reflexive pronoun
	Subject	Object	Determiner	Pronoun	
1 st Sg.	ik (<i>I</i>)	mij/me (<i>me</i>)	mijn (<i>my</i>)	mijne (<i>mine</i>)	mijzelf/mezelf (<i>myself</i>)
1 st Pl.	wij/we (<i>we</i>)	ons (<i>us</i>)	ons/onze (<i>our</i>)	onze (<i>ours</i>)	onszelf (<i>ourselves</i>)
2 nd Sg.	jij/je/u (<i>you</i>)	jou/je/u (<i>you</i>)	jouw/je/uw (<i>your</i>)	jouwe/uwe (<i>yours</i>)	jezelf/uzelf (<i>yourself</i>)
2 nd Pl.	jullie (<i>you</i>)	jullie/u (<i>you</i>)	je/jullie/uw (<i>your</i>)	uwe (<i>yours</i>)	jullie zelf/uzelf (<i>yourselves</i>)

Table I: *1st and 2nd person pronouns in Dutch and English* (after Biber *et al.* 1999: 328)²

As Wales (1996: 12) points out, tables “listing the different persons and cases” clearly dominate the overviews of personal pronouns, thus “reflecting the continuing preoccupation of grammarians with *form*”. Indeed, when it comes to a discussion of the *meaning* of 1st and 2nd person pronouns, grammars (even if they are called *communicative* grammars) remain rather silent. Haeseryn *et al.* (1997), which is a reference work for Dutch grammar, describes the primary meaning of the first person pronoun as *referring to the speaker(s) and those s/he-they is-are related to in one way or another*, and gives the same definition for the meaning of the second person pronoun but then referring to the hearer(s) (Haeseryn *et al.* 1997: 231ff – translation ours).

¹ Hence the ambiguity of the term *personal* pronoun: both possessive and reflexive pronouns are also ‘personal’, taking their orientation from the speaker’s perspective (1st, 2nd and 3rd party).

² Unlike English, Dutch distinguishes between a formal (*u, uw*) and an informal form (*je, jou(w), jullie*) of the 2nd person pronoun.

Nevertheless, various corpus-based linguistic studies have shown that 1st and 2nd person pronouns have strongly divergent uses which go way beyond their primary meanings of referring to speaker(s) and/or hearer(s). Particularly those studies analyzing the use of 1st and 2nd person pronouns in persuasive discourses have paid a considerable amount of attention to the variety of meaning of the 1st and 2nd person pronouns. For instance, different analyses of the use of *we* in academic discourse (Harwood 2005, 2007); in political discourse (Wilson 1990; De Fina 1995; Bull & Fetzer 2006); and in business discourse (Dieltjens & Heynderickx 2003; Van de Mie-roop 2006) have pointed out that 1st and 2nd person pronouns are

[...] open symbolically to rhetorical manipulation and negotiation of meaning in different kinds of discourse, in the pragmatic interests of power, and subjectivity (speaker orientation), or modesty, empathy and politeness (addressee orientation). Just as politics is a question of pronouns (Middleton 1993: 118), so pronouns are a question of politics. (Wales 1996: 84)

In the following sections, we will give an overview of the secondary meanings of the pronouns.

2.1 Secondary uses of the 1st person pronoun – plural form

In most grammars, attention is paid to the atypical uses of the 1st person plural *we*. It is then argued that, in comparison with the 2nd person singular, the use of *we* seems far more complicated, and that this extensive polysemy is to be explained by its referential ambiguity, since *we* embraces not only the three person categories (Wales 1996: 63), but also all possible *combinations* of person categories.

Despite their general acknowledgment of the broad referential potential the pronoun *we* has, the different authors diverge strongly in their respective approaches to these secondary uses, particularly with respect to the amount and classification of the mentioned uses. Biber *et al.* (1999: 329-30), for instance, solely mention the use of *we* “in academic prose, where *we* may refer to a single author [often called *authorial we* (M.T.), ex. 1], a group of authors, to the author and the reader [often called *inclusive we* (M.T.), ex. 2], or to people in general [often called *generic we* (M.T.)]”. Leech & Svartvik (2002) discuss two secondary uses of *we*: the *we* in “formal writing”, exclusively referring to the writer (ex. 1); and a “playful, condescending use of *we*, referring to the hearer” (ex. 3):

- (1) **We** will explain this theory in the next chapter.
- (2) As **we** saw in Chapter 3, ...
- (3) How are **we** feeling today? [doctor to patient]

Quirk *et al.* (1985: 350-51) overview finally lists five secondary uses. Their “inclusive authorial” (ex. 2) is to be found in “serious writing”, where it involves the reader “in a joint enterprise”. From their point of view, this inclusive authorial is not to be confused

with what they call an “editorial *we*” (ex. 1), the latter being used in scientific writing “in order to avoid an egoistical *I*”. The “rhetorical *we*” (ex. 4) comprises a “specific use of generic *we*” and is said to refer “to the nation”. Quirk *et al.* also mention “condescending *we*” in doctor-patient or teacher-student relations (ex. 3). The fifth and final use Quirk *et al.* distinguish is a *we* with reference to “a third party” (ex. 5):

(4) **We** have to be proud of this country.

(5) **We** don’t look happy today. [secretary about her boss]

Although this rudimentary overview contains excerpts from only three grammars, it gives an indicative impression of the traditional treatment of the secondary meanings of *we*. In this concern, particularly the two following observations deserve attention. First, the lack of systematicity and coherence is to be pointed out, both within one single approach and across the various authors. This problem is partly explained by the lack of a consistent criterion for classification. For instance, at least three different perspectives play a role in Quirk *et al.*’s overview of the secondary uses: the discursive context, the intended referent and the rhetorical function (which explains the difference between their inclusive authorial and editorial *we*). Secondly, these overviews strongly tend to be restricted to mere enumerations, in which the particular uses are approached as random, individual cases, “even oddities” (Wales 1996: 63). The actual meaning of the particular instances is generally discussed only in relation to the specific context in which they occur. As a consequence, no attention is paid to “general principles at work” *behind* the various atypical instances (Wales 1996: 63).

2.2 Secondary uses of the 2nd person pronoun – singular form

An examination of the different grammars mentioned above leaves us with one secondary meaning of the 2nd person singular *you*³. Besides its (standard) referential use, *you* may also be used generically. It then becomes an impersonal pronoun which refers to people in general, as in:

(6) **You** never know what the future will bring.

In such instances where structural knowledge and general truth are expressed, the personal overtone of *you* disappears.

3. *An answer to the traditional approach to the 1st and 2nd person pronouns: the pragmatic approach*

If we want to use the analysis of 1st and 2nd person pronouns in order to say something about argumentative techniques in newspaper editorials, a consistent and systematic approach to these pronouns is an absolute condition. Since various empirical studies

³ In Dutch, this use is restricted to the reduced form *je*.

that approach personal pronouns from a rhetoric point of view have shown that 1st and 2nd person pronouns, when not used in their prototypical ways, indeed do more than simply *refer* to the specific individuals for which they stand (Spiegelberg 1973: 132), and that, moreover, the particular secondary uses show recurring patterns of meaning which transcend the individual uses, this section is devoted to a systematic mapping of the pragmatic and argumentative functions of *we* and *you*. An analysis of personal pronouns from this point of view takes as its starting point an approach to personal pronouns as strategic devices rather than as purely “economy devices” (Biber *et al.* 1999: 327): a speaker does not only select a particular pronoun in order to *refer* to a specific (group of) person(s), but his/her choice may also be motivated by certain *communicative aims*.

On the basis of a thorough examination of the various secondary uses of the pronouns *we* and *you* as described both in traditional grammars and in empirical linguistic studies which pay attention to the occurrence of personal pronouns as rhetorical devices, four general rhetoric functions can be distinguished. In what follows, we will discuss these functions in more detail.

3.1 The establishment of solidarity

A first communicative aim the speaker may have by using the 1st person plural is to express ingroup solidarity. This particular rhetorical function is the one most closely related to the primary function of *we*, i.e. referring to “a *group* of people, including the speaker” (Leech & Svartvik 2002: 57 – our emphasis). Also in its prototypical use, the 1st person plural characteristically implies a certain degree of relatedness (Haeseryn *et al.* 1997): in using *we*, the speaker inherently sets up a connection between himself and the person(s) he involves in the reference. Nevertheless, the rhetorical function of establishing solidarity goes further than the simple declaration of a link between two or more people. The use of *we* enables the speaker to define social groups: not only does the speaker state membership, and thus emotional and/or social connection to the group, but s/he also has the power to decide who else belongs to this ingroup, and, with the same token, who doesn’t (Helmbrecht 2002: 42). As Wilson (1990: 58, 76) argues, such ‘otherization’-strategies are inextricably related to the establishment of a communal identity: a definition of one’s supporters implies an identification of one’s enemies – *us* being “basically everyone but them”. Moreover, the use of the 1st person plural enables the speaker to designate group indexicality without the need for a confirmation of this “social bonding” (Mühlhäusler & Harré, 1990: 174) on the hearer’s side. Hence, Pennycook (1994: 176 – our emphasis) concludes that this particular rhetorical function is in essence related to a “covert *assumption* of shared communality”.

3.2 The mitigation of face threatening acts

A second argumentative function of *we* is rooted in the theory of *face threatening acts* as developed by Brown & Levinson (1987). According to these authors, speakers con-

stantly negotiate face in linguistic interaction, with the maintenance of face being the main concern (Brown & Levinson 1987: 61). Their notion of face, derived from that of Goffman (1981), is to be interpreted as “the public self-image every member wants to claim for himself” and is further developed in the notions of positive and negative face (Brown & Levinson 1987: 61-2). Every person wants to claim for him/herself two related things: first, a “positive consistent self-image”, and secondly, a “freedom of action and freedom for imposition” (Brown & Levinson 1987: 61). However, in everyday interaction there will always be “face threatening acts”: acts that intrinsically “run contrary to the face wants of the addressee and/or of the speaker” (Brown & Levinson 1987: 65). For instance, orders and requests typically threaten the freedom of imposition on the side of the hearer. In such face threatening situations, the speaker needs to employ linguistic strategies in order to avoid, or at least minimize, the potential face threat (Brown & Levinson 1987: 68). One of these linguistic strategies is the use of 1st and 2nd person pronouns. *Let's* constructions are a typical example of such a strategy. Consider for instance the following request:

(7) *Let's not digress.* [chairperson in meeting] (Wales 1996: 67)

Here, the speaker includes him/herself in the request in order to minimize the threat to the hearer's negative face which the request may cause. In this sentence, the speaker wants the hearer to perform an action that is mainly in the speaker's own interest. But in using the 1st person plural instead of the 2nd person, a “surface meaning of modesty” or “joint activity” is generated, and the authoritative voice of the speaker is covered (Wales 1996: 66). This use of the 1st person plural in order to disguise a direct instigation makes the request more acceptable.

A comparable use is the use of generic *we* or *you* in order to mitigate a face threatening act. In kindergarten, children might be taught:

(8) *We don't eat meat with our fingers.*

By using the *we* form, the distance between speaker and hearer is reduced and the utterance does not take the form of a direct order. Generic *you* can be used in the same way:

(9) *You don't eat meat with your fingers.*

This use seems to be more face threatening than the one in example (8), but less than a direct order. However, drawing up a scale of the degree of face threat would lead us too far for the scope of this paper.

3.3 The evasion of personal responsibility

In persuasive discourses, both inclusive and generic *we* as well as generic *you* are often used in order to downgrade authorial responsibility (see for instance Harwood 2005; De Fina 1995; Wilson 1990). In such linguistic situations, the pronominal system is used in order to distribute, if not to project personal responsibility “from the *I* to the *we*” (Wilson 1990: 58), or from the *I* to humanity in the case of indefinite reference. A

prototypical example of this particular rhetoric function of *we* is the ‘academic *we*’, where “responsibility for what is said, suspected and so forth is diminished” (Mühlhäusler & Harré 1990: 175).

3.4 The enhancement of persuasion

In this last strategic use of the pronominal system, the speaker claims the hearer as an associate in order to enhance the persuasive power of the argument. This effect can be elaborated both by *we* and by *you*. Following Spiegelberg (1973: 131), the intended effect of an ‘editorial *we*’ for instance is – amongst others – to “overwhelm one’s audience by persuasion, not giving it even a chance to test, accept, or reject one’s opinions”. The speaker thus involves the audience in the elaboration of a personal, subjective argument in order to enhance the persuasiveness of the assertion. A similar strategy, though built up in a different way, is to be found in the use of generic *you* or *we*. In using an indefinite agent, a maximum degree of objectivity and generalization is generated, again in order to conceal the subjective tone in the argument. In both substrategies, the speaker not only downgrades his/her own presence, but moreover elaborates the argument on behalf of the audience, and the rhetorical implication of this strategy is that the audience must share the speaker’s view as being the only correct and possible view (Wales 1996). In doing so, the weight of the argument is enhanced to a maximum degree – in the end even to a degree of universality.

4. *Presentation of the data*

We have collected 25 newspaper editorials which were published between February 1 and February 15, 2006, in all Flemish newspapers. The editorials all deal with the publication of a number of satirical cartoons, some of them depicting the prophet Muhammad, in the Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten* on September 30, 2005 and the worldwide reactions to this publication in the beginning of 2006. Newspapers all over the world had to decide for or against (re)publication of the cartoons, and journalists were forced to take up an explicit standpoint in the debate. Due to the highly explosive context, these viewpoints had to be firmly substantiated and communicated to the readers. This makes the corpus we have collected very suitable for investigating argumentation. We would also expect argumentation on freedom of speech and freedom of press from an authoritative stance: journalists, being the executors of the rights of freedom of press, might be expected to defend this right in the case of the publication of satirical cartoons.

Table II gives an overview of the number of pronouns in the corpus. All personal, possessive and reflexive pronouns have been included in the count.

Pronouns				
Newspaper (# articles)	1st person	2nd person	Total	Average
<i>De Morgen</i> (7)	58	19	77	11
<i>De Standaard</i> (5)	28	8	36	7
<i>Het Laatste Nieuws</i> (3)	56	9	65	21
<i>De Tijd</i> (3)	4	1	5	1
<i>Het Nieuwsblad</i> (2)	9	4	13	6
<i>Gazet van Antwerpen</i> (2)	15	0	15	7
<i>Belang van Limburg</i> (2)	14	2	16	8
<i>Het Volk</i> (1)	11	0	11	11
Total	195	43	238	

Table II: Number of 1st and 2nd person pronouns in the corpus

A first point to be made is that pronouns of the 1st person occur a lot more often than those of the 2nd person. In the category of the 1st person pronouns, the plural forms occur more often than the singular forms. The 2nd person pronoun, on the other hand, is always used in the singular form.

4.1 Pragmatic meaning of the pronouns in the *corpus*

In order to find out the rhetorical functions of the 1st and 2nd person pronouns in the corpus, we always have to take the discursive context and the intended referent(s) into account.

4.1.1 Pragmatic meaning of the 1st person pronouns: singular form

Out of the 195 occurrences of 1st person pronouns in the corpus, only 34 are in the singular form. Mostly, the 1st person pronoun is referring to the author of the article, as in the following examples:

(10) **Ik** weiger om te geloven dat moslims anders zijn⁴.
I refuse to believe that Muslims are different.

(11) **Ik** sprak met imams, leden van de moskeeën en verenigingen.
I talked to imams, members of mosques and associations.

The author explicitly formulates a personal conviction here (ex. 10), or describes a personal anecdote (ex. 11) (which is a well-known rhetorical technique). In one instance

⁴ All examples are quoted in their original Dutch form and translated into English as closely as possible.

(ex. 12), the author gives a free translation of a quote which is attributed to Voltaire, in order to make his own standpoint clear:

- (12) “Ik verafschuw uw mening, maar ik zou mijn leven geven opdat u ze zou kunnen blijven uiten.”
“I detest your opinion, but I would give my life to make it possible for you to continue to express it”.

Citing somebody else’s words is a rhetorical technique, which we can consider as a case of shift in footing (Goffman 1981). Conversational footing is the degree of commitment the speaker expresses in connection with the message. By adopting the utterance of somebody else, the speaker makes a statement without taking the full responsibility for it. Still, in example (12) the *I* in the quote refers to Voltaire, but at the same time it stands for the journalist writing the article.

4.1.2 Pragmatic meaning of the 1st person pronouns: plural form

For the pronouns in the plural form, we find the same meanings as in examples 10 and 11, i.e. the author expressing a personal conviction/hope (ex. 13) or describing a personal anecdote (ex. 14):

- (13) **We** hopen dat het bij woorden blijft.
We hope that it won’t go further than words.
- (14) Het was een mopje waar **we** als communicantjes om giechelden tijdens de mis.
It was a joke we giggled about during mass when making our first communion.

Here the pronoun only refers to the author him/herself and possibly to his or her personal sphere. We have found that the meaning of the 1st person plural form can also refer to a number of groups the author belongs to. The use of the 1st person plural here is the so-called *exclusive* use (the reader is not included in the reference). This use applies to the previous two examples and also to examples where the author refers to (the editors of) the newspaper, as in:

- (15) Om duidelijk te maken hoe belangrijk de redactie van deze krant die waarden vindt, hebben **we** besloten om een aantal van de gewraakte cartoons vandaag opnieuw af te drukken.
In order to make clear how important the editors of this newspaper find those values, we have decided to reprint a number of the contested cartoons today.

The author uses an argument of authority here. The newspaper has the capacity of reproducing the cartoons and spreading them to a larger audience, and it does so, in order to make a statement.

In a few cases, *we* refers to a group the reader might or might not be included in. The first is the group of women in general. A female journalist writes mockingly:

- (16) Zowel aan de top van de bedrijfswereld als in de academische wereld zijn **wij** ruim vertegenwoordigd [...]
We are amply represented at the top of the business world as well as in the academic world.

The author states ironically that a society which treats its women as equals, can boast of a certain superiority.

In other cases, *we* refers to groups to which both author and reader belong. Here the 1st person pronoun is used *inclusively* (cf. section 2.1). Examples are:

- (17) **Wij** begrijpen de Franstaligen niet, zoals we de moslims niet begrijpen.
We don't understand the French-speaking, just like we don't understand the Muslims.
- (18) Want eerst mag de profeet niet meer afgebeeld worden, daarna mogen we niet meer lachen met prins Filip.
Because first the prophet cannot be depicted anymore, next thing, we're not allowed to laugh with prince Filip anymore.

These examples are rather specific for the Belgian situation, Belgium being a country which is split up in three linguistic communities, and where the general feeling of alienation and bad understanding between the Dutch-speaking and the French-speaking communities increases. What still unites the country is the monarchy, but as example (18) shows, for a number of Belgians, the royal family is an object of derision. The author tries to convince the reader of his/her standpoint by dragging the reader in into a certain group, as in the following examples:

- (19) Als het aankomt op de verdediging van de vrijheid van mening en de vrijheid van drukpers, zijn **wij** vandaag allemaal Denen.
If it comes to defending freedom of speech and freedom of press, today, we're all Danes.
- (20) Gevoeligheden waar **wij** al lang niet meer mee zitten, zijn nog intact in de moslimwereld.
Sensitivities we don't know anymore for a long time, still exist in the Muslim world.
- (21) Vandaar ook dat **wij** de hele polemiek in het westen nogal over het paard getild vinden.
That is why we in the West think the whole polemic goes over the top a little.

In these examples, *we* refers to the Western world, as opposed to the Muslim world. Here the authors revert to the *us/them* thinking which was also reported by Fowler (1991). Fowler has analyzed editorials in British newspapers after a bombardment in Libya and subsequent attacks and he found that authors often used the *us/them* contrast, where *we* (the British people) were represented as being completely different from and opposed to *them* (the terrorists).

Though there are at least 350 000 Muslim people in Belgium⁵, the editorialists never seem to think of their readers as possibly being Muslims. There are only two instances in the corpus where a 1st person pronoun refers to Muslim referents:

- (22) “Het is alsof ik [...] je vader en je moeder een klap zou verkopen [...]. Zo diep zit het bij **ons**.”
*“It’s as if I [...] would deliver your father and your mother a blow [...]. That’s how deep it goes for **us**.”*
- (23) In Vlaanderen [...] stelt niemand de vrije meningsuiting of de persvrijheid in vraag. Ook **onze** moslims niet.
*In Flanders, nobody questions freedom of speech or freedom of press. Neither **our** Muslims.*

In the first example, the author quotes a young Muslim explaining what impact the cartoons had on Muslim readers. In the second example, the Muslims living in Flanders are called *our* Muslims. They are being represented as belonging to the Flemish society, and thus being opposed to *them*, the extremist Muslims.

Both uses imply that the reader cannot be Muslim. The Muslim world is being represented as completely separated from the group of readers of the newspaper.

A last type of instances are those uses where *we* refers to mankind in general. This is the generic use of *we*, but still in these examples two camps are involved. The Western world and the Muslim world are summoned to work together, as two separate entities:

- (24) Dat **we** hier zonder dialoog niet uit zullen geraken, is duidelijk.
*It is clear that **we** won’t get out of this without a dialogue.*
- (25) Een toekomst die **we** hoe dan ook samen zullen moeten opbouwen.
*A future **we** will have to build up together anyhow.*

4.1.3 Pragmatic meaning of the 2nd person pronouns

All 2nd person pronouns are used in the singular form. It is interesting to note that when the authors address their readers directly, they address them as individuals, not as groups. In most cases, the use of the 2nd person pronoun is rather straightforward, as in the following examples:

- (26) Uiteraard kent **u** als verstandige lezer het antwoord op deze vraag.
*Of course **you**, as an intelligent reader, know the answer to this question.*
- (27) “Het is alsof ik in **uw** huis zou binnenstappen zonder te bellen.”
*“It is as if I would enter **your** home without ringing the doorbell.”*
- (28) Er waren net die bloedige aanslagen in Londen geweest, **je** wist dus maar nooit.
*There had just been those gory attacks in London, so **you** never knew.*

⁵ Interdisciplinary Centre for the Study of Religion and World View. “Islam in Belgium”, http://www.kuleuven.be/icrid/religies/wr_nl_islam.htm#moslimsbelgie (accessed August 24, 2008).

In example (26), the author addresses the reader directly. Moreover, this is done in a flattering way, which is a frequently used rhetorical technique (the so-called *captatio benevolentiae* in ancient rhetorics). In example (27), the author is quoting a Muslim friend, who describes the impact the cartoons had on Muslim readers. This again can be considered as a case of shift in footing (Goffman 1981, see also section 4.1.1 above). Example (28) is an instance of the most frequent use of the 2nd person in the corpus, i.e. the generic or impersonal use (cf. section 2).

A few cases of the generic use of the 2nd person pronoun deserve special interest. Examples are the following:

(29) Je kunt ook in de tegenaanval gaan en tot je eigen stomme verbazing merken dat je de dreiging de baas kunt.

You can also launch a counterattack and notice – to your own astonishment – that you can handle the threat.

(30) Respect toon je niet door te vuur en te zwaard je eigen gelijk af te dwingen.

You don't show respect by exacting your own right by fire and sword.

In both examples, the 2nd person pronoun does not refer to *anyone* in general, but to a specific group. Example (29) describes a debate in the Flemish parliament on the publication of the cartoons and how the democratic parties were perceived to win the debate from the Flemish extreme right party. *Je* in the example refers to the Flemish democratic parties (a *we*-stance). Also in example (30), *je* refers to a very specific group, i.e. the extremist Muslims. We have found two instances of this use in the corpus, and both contain a negation. The generic phrase here defines what *the others* should not do. We can conclude that the generic form of the 2nd person is used here in order to mitigate the *us/them* contrast (cf. Fowler 1991). This is a use we haven't found reported in the grammars and literature discussed in section 2.

5. Discussion of the data and conclusions

The following general conclusions can be drawn from the use of the 1st and 2nd person pronouns in the newspapers' editorials in our corpus. First of all, it should be noted that it is possible to write an argumentative editorial without any pronouns of the 1st or 2nd person. In our corpus we found 3 out of 25 articles like this. This may allow us to say that, when pronouns of the 1st and 2nd person are used in newspaper editorials, this is done in a purposeful or even deliberate way. We also have to remark that we always need the context in order to pin down the exact meaning of the pronoun. Pronoun and context together can form a persuasive unit. Apart from the cases where we found the pronouns in well-known rhetorical usage like recalling a personal anecdote, uttering a personal conviction or quoting another source, we also found a number of instances where we can apply the general rhetorical functions of the pronouns described in section 3. *The evasion of personal responsibility* (3.3) is a strategy which is less at stake here, but the other strategies do apply.

5.1 Establishment of solidarity

Using pronouns for the establishment of solidarity is a technique which is applicable to the 1st person pronouns in the plural (“we, ons, onze” / *we, us, our*) (cf. section 3.1). In our corpus, we have found a number of instances where *we* refers to groups the author and the reader belong to and which are being represented as being opposed to the Muslim world (Flanders, Belgium, the Western world). In the cases where *we* refers to the Western world as well as the Muslim world, the two entities are still represented as being separate, while having to cooperate (e.g. ex. 24). So a first strong argument which is being made by using *we* in the corpus, is that authors and readers belong to the same group, a group which must stand strong against an ‘otherized’ (cf. section 3.1) Muslim group.

5.2 Presenting the argument as a general truth

The inclusive and or generic use of the 1st person plural and the generic use of the 2nd person singular allow the speaker to present an argument as a general truth. The techniques we discussed in sections 3.2 and 3.4 apply here. Inclusive *we* generates a maximum degree of objectivity. The rhetorical implication of this strategy is that the audience must share the speaker’s view as being the only correct and possible view (Wales 1996: 66). Whether the group of women, Flemish people, Belgian people or the Western World is referred to, the reader will identify him/herself as belonging to the group, and thus there is a chance that s/he will go along in the argumentation of the author.

This also holds for the use of generic *you*, but here in a few instances we have seen that generic *you* was used to mitigate the *us/them* distinction (cf. section 4.1.3). The opposition of the Western world versus the Muslim world is again stated, but not in an explicit way (cf. ex. 29-30).

5.3 Authoritative argument

The argument we would have expected to be made by the use of the 1st person plural, i.e. the authoritative stance of “we as newspapers and defenders of the free press” is an argument we did not encounter very often in our corpus. Ex. 15 is one of the few instances where the author makes a statement referring to the freedom of press. But on the whole, we must conclude that the Flemish newspapers in the period we have studied considered themselves to be the voice of the Western world and the defenders of Western values as opposed to the extremist Muslim world and values. Everywhere in the editorials, the *us/them* distinction is present, sometimes in an explicit, sometimes in a more blurred way. The main value that is being defended is freedom of speech and there is very little reference to freedom of press.

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DIALOGICAL OCCURRENCES OF *BEM* IN EUROPEAN PORTUGUESE. ENUNCIATIVE STABILITY AND DEFORMABILITY

HELENA VIRGÍNIA TOPA VALENTIM

In this paper I intend to describe the plurality of values that the linguistic unit *bem* can assume in dialogical contexts in European Portuguese.

Concerning the problem of the relation between linguistic signification and the construction of referential values, it is evident that there is a relevant dependence between the variability of sense affected to a unit and the linguistic and discourse context. The linguistic units change its meaning depending on the linguistic sequence in which they occur. Sometimes the modification of a single element of the linguistic context is enough to change, radically or imperceptibly, the semantic value assigned by a linguistic unit. For instance, in Portuguese, the order in which *bem* occurs in the utterances *eu vi-te bem* and *eu bem te vi* is a condition not only to its semantic values but also to each utterance's meaning as a whole.

In addition to this reciprocal dependence between any linguistic units that integrates the utterance and its linguistic context, each utterance acquires a meaning through its construction in reference to a situation, namely to a situational context. In other words, each utterance's meaning is generated through those contextual features which are pertinent to its interpretation and which can be verbally explicit or not.

Simultaneously, each utterance determines its occurrence's situational context. We can consider, as in Franckel's suggested formulation (see, for instance 2006), that the situational context isn't defined only exteriorly in considering the utterance (as we notice in the pragmatic theoretical proposals); the situational context is the very condition itself for the interpretation of the utterance. Therefore, the situational context is also a construction.

This fact seems evident given that each utterance is absolutely singular and strictly connected to a prosodic expression and to a certain contextualization. Besides, before the necessity to make explicit the difference between two sequences with an apparently close sense (A and B), it is common to resort to a contextual contrast ("we say A when... and B when..."). Sometimes this contextualization is even essential to give an account on the intrinsic difference of sense.

Returning back to both sequences *eu vi-te bem* and *eu bem te vi*, we can say that the speaker produces an utterance as *eu vi-te bem* when he intends to signify the way in which he views the interlocutor, "clearly", "well seen" (even if, with a particular prosodic modulation, it may include a rectifying value). The speaker produces an utterance as *eu bem te vi* to introduce an adversative, a contrary sense, or, with a strongly marked prosody, for intensifying the linguistic event, the "seeing you".

In its most frequent occurrences, *bem* expresses a circumstance of mood. In the sequences 1 and 2 it functions exactly as a modal adverb¹.

1. *A Sara expressou-se bem*
(Sara expressed herself well)
2. *Eles fizeram bem os trabalhos de casa*
(They did their homework well)

Yet, the modal adverb's syntactic behaviour in each of these sequences is different. In 1, *bem* corresponds to a phrasal constituent. It is included in the phrase's structure. As a phrasal complement – thus, non-optional – it takes part in the expressed propositional content. The impossibility of the modal adverb suppression is a good test to prove that *bem* is subcategorized by the verb². In the sequence 2, the suppression of *bem* doesn't bring about any un-grammaticalness. The adverb has an optional nature and, thus, it corresponds to a VP adjunction.

In a semantic perspective, *bem* can be paraphrased in both utterances by “in an appropriate way”, “in a satisfactory way”, or even, “in an expected way”. These glosses allow us to identify a particular “enunciative” value in terms of modality, more specifically, an appreciative value³.

The appreciative value is a conformity value: the specified value is considered as a speaker's desirable value, and it can eventually correspond to an expected value. Thus, considering the theoretical presupposition that every relation is a complex relation, we can localize the linguistic occurrence as constructed in relation to another term – a pre-constructed one, a term which corresponds with a subjective origin. There is, therefore, a comparison of an occurrence in relation to the previously and subjectively constructed reference.

The occurrence *pi* is not primary distinguishable from the other occurrences which set up *P*. But, because an occurrence is constructed in reference to an enunciative situation, *pi* is located in relation to the referential situation, namely, to a subject's “previously fixed standard”. This relation is an identification. There is an identification or a conformity between the occurrence *pi* and the previously subjective construction as a reference point. So, the values affecting *bem* are the result of some operations, *bem* being its linguistic marker. When *bem* has an appreciative value, it marks two metalinguistic operations: the course through the different occurrences *p*, *p'* and the identification of *pi* in relation to *p* (see Pérez, 1992: 40ss).

In the next examples, *bem* is exchangeable with *muito* and hasn't an appreciative value.

¹ See Costa (2008), about the adverb in European Portuguese.

² In Lopes (2004), some other syntactical tests are proposed, confirming the functioning of *bem* in sentences as 1 and 2.

³ It was Antoine Culioli who proposed the classification of this kind of modality as an appreciative one (“modalité appréciative”, 1968: 112). It is characterized by the construction of a “[...] um juízo de valor, [...] uma apreciação sobre uma relação predicativa já constituída e validada (ou validável)” (Campos & Xavier 1991: 341).

3. *Ele é bem alto*
(He is very tall)

4. *Eles são bem capazes de faltar*
(They are really capable of missing the lesson)

It functions as an intensifier, as the traditionally classified quantifier of degree (see Lopes, 2004: 439). Consequently, the sequences modified by *bem* with an intensive value are interpreted in terms of a scalar propriety.

Therefore, *bem* only assumes an intensifying value when co-occurring with qualifying adjectives, and not with relational adjectives (**Este sistema é bem digital* – “This system is very digital”). When *bem* modifies a deverbal adjective, it carries an appreciative value (*Esta parede está bem pintada* – “This wall is well painted”). There seems to be some restrictions in terms of the category of the processes which are compatible with the intensive value of *bem*: they correspond always to proprieties.

The correspondence of an appreciative or an intensive value to *bem* depends on the way the notional domain to which the process is associated is structured. In the case of the appreciative value, the notional domain is organized in reference to a type or pattern occurrence, with the course through a class of discrete occurrences. In the case of the intensive value, the notional domain is organized in reference to the attractor centre, with the course through the different degrees of the propriety ordered through a gradient which begins in the attractor centre and finishes on the boundary of the notional domain (see Péroz, 1992: 71).

But in certain occurrence contexts, in which *bem* doesn't integrate the predicative syntactic domain, it displays a wide spectrum of semantic and pragmatic values.

These linguistic contexts are, mainly, question / answer adjacent pairs, integrated in a colloquial conversation. But we can also have monologue examples. For the purposes of this paper – the identification of dialogical values of *bem* in European Portuguese –, a corpus of spoken and colloquial conversations, including a corpus of literary occurrences, is to be analysed. Most of the sample occurrences belong to the Davies, Ferreira Corpus of the European Portuguese⁴, but we considered also a more restricted set of examples, collected in different communication situations.

Let's start by the next two examples:

5. – *Então, posso concluir que só te deram o emprego porque falas alemão...*
– *Bem, eu também tenho bons conhecimentos de gestão e de informática...*
(– So, I can conclude that you got the job because you speak German...
– well, I also have some management and computer knowledge)

⁴ The Davies, Ferreira Corpus of the European Portuguese has been funded by the US National Endowment for the Humanities, and is freely available online (<http://www.corpusdoportugues.org>). This corpus allows the search of more than 45 million words in more than 50,000 Portuguese texts from the 1300s to the 1900s.

6. *Aquele foi um dia importante para mim. Bem, só no dia seguinte é que as coisas se definiram e se soube quem iria integrar a equipa.*
 (That was an important day for me. Well, only in the day after things were defined that it was known who would integrate the team.)

We can recognize a rectifying function in these utterances and the consequent reformulation or change of an element of the previous intervention (5) or period (6). The linguistic forms *também* (“also”) (5) and *só* (“only”) (6) mark, through its semantics, this “revision” of the previous propositional content – in 5, through the enlargement of the extent of the reference; in 6, through its restriction.

In a dialogical context, in which the interlocutor is the responsible for the previous intervention (5), *bem* introduces a retort that implies a certain disagreement with respect to the propositional content proposed by the co-enunciator. *Bem* marks a non-conformity value (in contrast to what we saw in relation to the examples 1 and 2 to whose appreciative value corresponds to a conformity value). This non-conformity value is simultaneously a concessive value. An evidence of this is the frequency of utterances with *bem* preceding the adversative conjunction *mas* (“but”). See the example 7:

7. – *Eu nunca faria aquilo de que me acusam. Até tenho pena desse senhor... Acha que eu lhe faria mal, que eu ia mandar matá-lo?*
 – *Bem, mas há várias provas documentais de que ele trabalhou para si e de que terá participado em situações que o comprometem.*
 (– I would never do what you are accusing me of. I even have pity for that man... Do you think I would issue orders to hurt him?
 – Well, but there are several documentary proofs that he worked for you and that he participated in situations that compromise you.)

Mas introduces an anti-orientation argument which expresses a speaker’s reticence or discordance, towards the forward intervention’s propositional content. But the co-occurrence of *bem*, as a linguistic resource that serves to attenuate such a disagreement (here as in the example 5), has an evident pragmatic effect that lessens the confrontation that comes upon that installed disagreement and the subsequent rectification. It is a mark of positive courtesy, a linguistic form that confirms the cooperation between the enunciator and the speaker and the interlocutor. It serves to reinforce the speaker’s positive image, protecting the interlocutor’s (negative) image.

This kind of utterances starts with an agreement which is typically a dialogical feature, as pragmatic category, for expressing something non-compromising, i.e., a disagreement. As Borderia’s affirmation of similar linguistic contexts in Spanish, in these cases, “agreement is part of an argumentative move to express a hedged disagreement” (2003: 222). In this hedging operation, we have some modal determination operations. *Bem* hedges the previous propositional content by lowering the speaker’s epistemic compromise with it.

Bem can occur with another associated value. Once again, this value is clearly constructed in reference to the speaker. This value is, therefore, a modal one. Take a look at the follow examples:

8. – *Professora, não fiz os trabalhos de casa.*
 – *Bem. Temos que conversar*
 (– Teacher, I didn't do my homework
 – Well, we must talk)
9. – *Sabes quem vem connosco? O João.*
 – *Bem! Que alegria!*
 (– Do you know who's coming with us? John!
 – Well! What an unspeakable joy!)

This is a meta-discourse value, which signals the reception of the message, but can associate a negative appreciative value (adjacent pair 8) or a positive appreciative value (adjacent pair 9). The enunciator expresses himself relative to the bad or good, unfavourable or favourable character of the last sequence's propositional content.

The construction of these values – negative or positive appreciation – depends above all on the prosodic characteristics which are less easily formally tractable⁵. The first value with which it is associated is a certain disenchantment (in the adjacent pair 8), which is marked by an intonation characterized by a voice tone that maintains the low levels. The second value (in the adjacent pair 9) is marked by an intonation characterized by an ascent of the voice tone in the production of *bem*, followed by a decrease that finishes in a suspension. In both cases, we have a very close usage of *bem* to that one when *bem* introduces a conclusive sequence (see after).

We can also admit that a usage of *bem* through which the speaker introduces an intensifying value with the possibility of an ironical interpretation that entails a construction of the positive appreciative value. Here, once again, we have an ascendant intonation and a syllabic enlargement. See the example 10:

10. – *O João é mesmo simpático*
 – *Bem!*
 (– John is a really nice person.
 – Well!)

In another type and very frequent contexts, *bem* is used in association with question/answer contexts, introducing the answer to a question, and, as a consequence, pragmatically assigning it.

11. – *Está satisfeito com os serviços prestados pela empresa X?*
 – *Bem, não.*
 (– Are you satisfied with the enterprise X services?
 – Well, no.)

⁵ The recognition of the prosodic features which characterize each utterance is essential to the description of its determination values. We subscribe the idea expressed in Campos (1998: 39): “[...] ao visar uma análise exaustiva da significação, a linguística não dará conta do fenómeno modal se não puder distinguir os esquemas de entoação específicos de cada valor, relacionando-os com os marcadores sintácticos com que esses esquemas se combinam”.

12. – *Então, como é que é? Vens almoçar connosco?*
 – **Bem, sim.**
 (– So, are you coming to lunch with us?
 – **Well, yes.**)

In interviews and inquiries (11), as well as in colloquial conversation, this using of *bem* has to do with the fact that the total interrogative pre-supposes a validation of the speaker's pre-constructed propositional content. In other words, it anticipates a yes-or-no answer. Because of the impossibility of corresponding in that way, the speaker doesn't answer categorically, expressing hesitation in the first moment. Thus, in the examples 11 and 12 it comes to be again very evident the *bem*'s concessive value and the fact of *bem* being orientated towards a hedged agreement (11) or acceptance (12).

Sequences such as *bem, sim / não* are usually uttered with a pause between *bem* and *não / sim*. And we have, in fact, two moments in terms of modal determination. In this sequence the speaker constructs what is called a "modal slide" (Campos, 1997: 155). *Bem* corresponds, in the first moment, to a hesitation, falling upon the propositional content. *Sim / não*, in the second moment, marks the assumption of the speaker of the previous propositional content validation, with an affirmative or a negative value. Thus, we have a modal phenomenon of "remodalization" (*idem*), through which two modal values result from two different modal operations: non-assumption and assumption of the propositional content validation. In this case the second operation always deconstructs the value constructed in the first operation.

Through this use of *bem* – introducing an answer whose question the speaker, thus, denounces orientated in a different sense of what himself preconizes – the speaker can also express a greater complexity associated to the question's topic. With this sense, in the following contexts, *bem* introduces a sort of a divergent answer, and its value results from the speaker's attempt not to impose his opinion.

13. – *Há muitos professores que, com metade dessa idade, se reformavam, se pudessem. Trata-se de um caso de coragem e de resistência às agruras da profissão?*
 – **Bem, por um lado, as pessoas são diferentes umas das outras. Por outro, como sabe, tenho estado a dar aulas com licença especial.**
 (– There are several teachers who, being half as old as you, would retire, if they could. In your case, is it courage or a resistance?
 – **Well, in one side, people are all different. On the other side, I have been teaching with a special licence.**)
14. – *Que geração era a sua? Como classifica a família ideológica que a envolvia e inspirava?*
 – **Bem, era confuso. Éramos uma geração muito anarquista. Cada um ia ao supermercado e abastecia-se daquilo de que gostava.**
 (– Which generation is yours? How do you classify the family ideology that inspired you?
 – **Well, it was confused. We were a very anarchist generation. Each one used to go to the supermarket and provided himself with what he liked.**)

15. – *Para além da concepção havia alguma ideia sobre quem faria a montagem e o delinear do aspecto gráfico?*
 – *Bem, nós tínhamos a sensação de que a Revista com a missão que lhe tinha sido atribuída, foi fundada para não ser mais daquilo que ela é...*
 (– Beyond the conceptualisation, was there some idea about who would do the setting and would outline the graphic image?
 – Well, we had the feeling that the Magazine, with the kind of mission it had, was founded not to be more than what it was...)

This way, *bem* occurs in utterances that constitute what pragmatically are reactive interventions and whose speaker refers the antecedent intervention's propositional content and comment on it. See the next adjacent pair:

16. – *O maior, o maciço apoio que a Renamo recebeu, de facto, foi o da própria população de Moçambique. Apoio interno! Em que moldes esse apoio se traduziu?*
 – *Bem, a Renamo expressava a revolta da própria população moçambicana.*
 (– In fact, the major support that Renamo received was that of the Mozambican population. Domestic support! How was this support in concrete terms?
 – Well, Renamo expressed the Mozambican population's indignation.)

In a great majority of the contexts in which *bem* marks a discourse value in an answer to a question, it precedes a subjective verb that marks the construction of an “uncertain” epistemic value – for instance *crer* (“to believe”), *achar, pensar* (“to think”), *presumir* (“to presume”), *supor* (“to suppose”). Less frequent is the co-occurrence of a verb like *saber* (to know), which marks the construction of a “certain” epistemic value.

17. – *O que é bonito é ela ter alma, não é?*
 – *Bem, suponho que sim.*
 (– The beauty about this is the fact that she has a soul, isn't it?
 – Well, I suppose yes.)

In 17, the co-occurrence of two linguistic forms with a role in the modal determination of the utterance configures an “overmodalization” operation (see Campos, 1997: 151). Belonging to different categories, both linguistic forms (*bem* and *suponho*) co-occur marking the same modal value.

Let's examine another type of occurrence context and another kind of values that affect *bem*, namely, the meta-discourse values. The meta-discourse values very frequently affect *bem*. They are associated with the way in which the discourse is structured at an informational level and make part of a wide set of available procedure that the speaker uses in order to build up the subjective adjustment which is a cross dimension to all the linguistic expression, but much more evident in the conversation. The occurrence of *bem* corresponds in these cases to a linguistic marker of an inter-subjective regulation effort. It is a determinative for the informational structure of the dialogical exchange.

Thus, as a discourse marker and, more specifically, a conversational marker, *bem* can also signal the opening of a conversation, as it is illustrated in the next examples:

18. – (the doctor to the patient) *Bem, vamos lá a ver o que temos aqui*
(Well, let's see what we have here)
19. – (an adult to children, even not knowing them) *Bem, meninos, acabou a bricadeira*
(Well, children, the game is over)

Bem is always a reactive linguistic form which opens the conversation as seen in both examples. It signals the acceptance of the use of the word, introducing, in each of these sequences, cordial nuances.

In the following examples, *bem* marks firstly the reception of the message and, secondly, the turn change associated with the theme change. Again, introducing cordial nuances, it signals a cooperation effort with the interlocutor.

20. – *Cheguei também a escrever que a terra deveria ser nacionalizada e entregue – sem indemnização! – aos trabalhadores*
– *Bem, então o que o separava da esquerda?*
(– It happened to me being writing that the land should be nationalized and given – without any indemnification! – to the workers.
– Well, so, what separated you from the left?)
21. – *Mas a sua embaixada aqui em Lisboa era favorável a uma situação revolucionária em Portugal.*
– *Bem... para voltar à sua questão sobre a nossa derrota, devo dizer-lhe que os militares também 'borregaram'*
(– But your embassy here in Lisbon was in favour of a revolutionary situation in Portugal.
– Well... coming back to your question about our defeat, I shall tell you that the military also renounced to a token decision)

Preceding a theme change, *bem* marks a sequential rupture, often introducing the “pre-conclusion” of the conversation.

22. *Tive contactos directos com ele e percebi que não tinha capacidade para estar à frente de coisa nenhuma! Bem, para finalmente lhe responder, perante o impasse criado pelo recuo do PC e as reticências dos militares [...], houve uma reunião no Palácio Foz*
(I had direct contact with him and I understood that he had no ability to lead whatever it was! Well, finally, in answering you, before the impasse created through the PC's retreat and the military hesitation [...], there was a meeting in the Palácio Foz)
23. [...] *para além dos 'velhos do Restelo' que diziam que nós não éramos capazes de fazer e manter uma revista, a 'nossa revista' afinal tinha sido e continua a ser um sucesso. Bem, em resumo, esta era a ideia inicial do Ministro...*
([...] beyond the “Velhos do Restelo” saying that we weren't able to make and to maintain the magazine, finally, ‘our magazine’ had been

and continues to be a success. **Well**, in short, this was the Minister's initial idea.)

Very often this pre-conclusion anticipates a farewell.

24. – *Atão! Já anda para aí muita caloirada.*
 – *Bem, ainda ficas?*
 (– So, there is already a lot of “caloirada” around
 – **Well**, do you still remain?)
25. – *Bem, a ver se nos encontramos para conversar mais.*
 (– **Well**, we'll meet again to talk more)
26. – *Bem, vou-me embora.*
 (– **Well**, I'm going)
27. – *Bem, adeus, até ao meu regresso.*
 (**Well**, goodbye, till my return.)

As a meta-discourse marker, *bem* can establish a thematic continuity instead of a rupture. It serves the conversation progress when it processes the information, introducing a synthesis, a resume (28) or a systematization (29).

28. – “*Last but not least*”, *o sector financeiro.*
 – *Sim, com o Banco Totta e a companhia de seguros Império. Bem... no essencial, em 74 era isso.*
 (– Last but not least, the financial sector.
 – Yes, with the Totta Bank and the insurance enterprise Império.
Well... essentially, in 74 it was like this.)
29. – *...e tresleu?*
 – *Bem, há duas coisas: a primeira foi tudo o que lhe acabei de dizer sobre África [...]*
 (– ... and did you read backwards?
 – **Well**, there are two things: the first was everything I just told you about Africa; the second [...])

When *bem* establishes the thematic continuity through the information accumulation, it can introduce sequences that, in a discourse perspective, allow the recapture of the central theme (30) or, in contrast, that are in some respect a digression (31).

30. *Ia com eles, atenta ao caminho e com pouca atenção ao que se passava ao nosso redor. Bem, o certo é que eles julgaram tê-lo visto...*
 (– I was with them, attentive to the road and not paying attention to what was happening around. **Well**, the fact is that they thought they saw him...)
31. *Bem, para nós isso não interessava nada, o importante era competir...*
 (*Well*, for us it has no importance, the most important was to contest).

The introduction of a sequence which is, at a discourse level, digressive or lateral in relation to the preceding sequence can include a more precise expression. Therefore, we can consider that *bem* shares some functional properties with other “reformulators”.

Besides, this function and the one (already mentioned) that indicates the thematic continuity coincide because both introduce in the communicative context a sequence which the speaker considers more adequate.

32. *Recordo-me que as palavras do meu tio me fazia sentir... bem, me fez sentir algumas vezes que seria capaz de superar aquele fracasso...*
 (I remember that my uncle's words used to make me feel... well, made me feel once that I should be able to excel beyond [...])

In the example 33, *bem* marks the recapture of previously introduced theme, after some side remarks or digression:

33. *Havia de tudo na vila: uma bela biblioteca, uma sala de espectáculos... Todas as semanas assistia a um concerto, uma performance... Como eu gostava. Bem. Tomar era o sítio ideal para se viver.*
 (There was everything in that small town: a good library, an auditorium... I used to go to a concert or a performance on a weekly basis ... How nice it was. Well, Tomar was the ideal place to live.)

Before the conclusion, I would like to make reference to the fact that the discourse marker *bem* can occur in duplication (*bem, bem*) and accepts a gradation (*muito bem* "very well"). In this case it implies a modal appreciation of the sequence it affects. This possibility comes from the appreciative value that the homonymous adverb marks (see sequences 1 and 2).

The proposed description allows us to conclude that there is a strict relation between the discourse functions of *bem* and the variability of its semantic values, namely its modal values. Every time that *bem*, as a reactive form, expresses a cooperation strategy between the interlocutors and every time that it expresses the non-acceptance of a preceding sequence (contributing, thus, to the conversation progress and structure), the different values that *bem* assumes are constructed either in reference to the speaker either in reference to the discourse sequence, defining its degree of validation and its discourse orientation.

In a theoretical level, these descriptive observations allow us to conceive a semantic approach about the meaning of the linguistic units:

1. The linguistic units meaning is not exclusively inherent; it is constructed in and through the linguistic context, at the same time, it determines the signification of the entire sequence. In other words, the meaning of a linguistic unit doesn't exist by itself; but it is defined via the several ways in which it is related to the linguistic context.
2. The identity of a linguistic unit doesn't correspond to any basic sense; it has to do with the specific role it plays in the interactions that constitutes the general meaning of the linguistic sequences. In other words, the sense of a linguistic unit is not apprehensible as the sense of the unit itself, but through the variation of the outcome of such interactions.
3. A linguistic unit does not possess proper sense and figurative sense. We have, consequently, the hypothesis of a multidimensional organization of sense.

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SENS LEXICAL ET PROCESSUS ARGUMENTATIFS: LE CAS DU CONNECTEUR FRANÇAIS *C'EST-À-DIRE* (*QUE*)

HÉLÈNE VASSILIADOU

Introduction

Alors qu'une structure du type *X à cause de Y* signale explicitement qu'il s'agit d'une relation de cause à effet (ou l'inverse), il n'en va pas de même avec *X c'est-à-dire Y*. La seule chose qu'un locuteur ordinaire puisse spontanément comprendre de cette relation est que *Y est à dire à propos de X*. La plupart du temps, il peut lui associer également une valeur explicative. Or, *c'est-à-dire (que)* (ci-après *càd*), même s'il semble avoir un sens descriptif neutre, peut prendre des valeurs qui varient selon le type de contexte dans lequel il apparaît et le type de constituants qu'il relie (Vassiliadou 2004 et à par.). Dans cet article, nous essaierons de faire ressortir les valeurs de *càd* qui s'éloignent de la simple reformulation des contenus propositionnels et qui se rapprochent des valeurs argumentatives. Il est ainsi difficile de parler d'orientation argumentative pour un énoncé comme (1), car, selon les études qui portent sur l'argumentation dans le discours, un tel exemple ne présente pas d'«échelles» (Ducrot 1980) qui sont mises en rapport l'une avec l'autre comme c'est le cas de (2):

- (1) C'est une coccinelle, *c'est-à-dire* une bête à bon Dieu (Authier-Revuz 1987: 58).
- (2) Pierre travaille jour et nuit pour un salaire misérable, *c'est-à-dire* qu'il se fatigue pour rien.

Par ailleurs, en (1), on peut parler à l'instar d'Anscombe (1995) de blocage de l'utilisation de *X* en tant qu'argument pour *Y* à cause de la relation de synonymie entre *X* et *Y*. En revanche, plus la ressemblance entre *X* et *Y* est modérée, voire faible, plus le glissement vers la dissemblance peut avoir lieu, comme c'est le cas dans l'énoncé (2) où *càd Y* ne fournit qu'une conclusion parmi le nombre virtuellement infini de conclusions («*càd que* c'est un brave type» ou «*càd qu'*il doit avoir besoin d'argent» ou encore «*càd qu'*il a vraiment besoin de ce travail», etc.). En outre, *càd* exploite les deux *topoi* présentés en *X* (Carel et Ducrot 1999 & Norén 1999: 52-53):

- a) Il travaille jour et nuit, *donc* il se fatigue.
- b) Il travaille pour un salaire misérable, *donc* il se fatigue pour rien.

Dans le cadre de ce travail, nous porterons notre intérêt sur l'examen de quelques types d'argumentation (Stati 1990) signalés par *càd* (que ce soit uniquement grâce à ses instructions sémantiques ou grâce à la combinaison de son sens codé et communiqué). Chemin faisant, nous tâcherons de répondre à des questions comme par exemple: *est-ce*

que càd entre dans un schéma classique argumentatif du type «résolution d'un conflit»? ou encore dans quelle mesure ses traits sémantiques lui permettent (ou pas) d'intégrer des configurations causales directes telles que $X \rightarrow \text{cause } Y$? (Bach 1996; Doury 2003; van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004; Dascal *et al.* 2005). Notons enfin que notre analyse se situe à un niveau local ou micro-textuel et ne prend pas en considération un cadre de communication précis. Elle fait en revanche appel à un panel de théories sur l'argumentation et le discours en général et à leur impact sur l'emploi des marqueurs discursifs en particulier (cf., entre autres, Perelman et Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958; Plantin 1990; Bazzanella 1990; Rossari 2000; Stati 2002; Carston 2004; Walton 2004).

1. *Quel type d'argumentation pour c'est-à-dire?*

Càd entre dans une relation argumentative qui correspond globalement à trois grands types de cas:

- (a) Inférences, conclusions, abductions (§ 2);
- (b) Introduction d'un argument pour une conclusion à venir:
 - (3) (...) qu'ainsi la décision comportant déclaration d'utilité publique et modification du plan d'occupation des sols ne pouvait intervenir que par décret en Conseil d'Etat en application de l'article L. 11-5 du Code de l'expropriation; que le décret attaqué est intervenu le 22 juin 1980 *c'est-à-dire* dans le délai imparti en ce cas au gouvernement par les dispositions précitées de l'article L. 11-5 du même code; que, dans ces conditions, le comité de défense des expropriations des deux rives du Fémur n'est pas fondé à soutenir que le décret attaqué est intervenu après l'expiration du délai légal» (arrêt du Conseil d'Etat, Bourcier et Bruxelles 1995: 4).
- (c) Justification (ou *càd* au début d'une réponse):
 - (4) A: Ça te va Christine la semaine prochaine?
B: *Càd que* la semaine prochaine je me fais opérer à l'épaule. (*càd* oral)

Dans tous les cas, les orientations argumentatives marquées par *càd* indiquent que le segment Y est un argument plus fort pour la conclusion visée et que X et Y sont co-orientés (Y ne constitue pas un contre-argument pour X). Il signale ainsi une implication (X entraîne l'acte Y) et indique qu'un acte est rendu possible (ou, pour reprendre les termes de Berrendonner 1983, X rend légitime, autorise l'énonciation de Y). Pour des raisons évidentes de place, nous n'examinerons ici que la première catégorie d'emplois argumentatifs de *càd*, celle qui va de la 'reprise' d'un implicite, d'une inférence jusqu'à l'établissement des liens abductifs entre une cause et un effet.

2. *Inférences, conclusions, abductions*

Dans cette triple configuration, il s'agit, selon Hybertie (1996), soit de présenter l'état des choses décrit dans l'énoncé introduit comme une conséquence de l'état des choses

décrit dans l'énoncé antérieur (§ 2.1), soit d'inférer un fait, non donné dans l'expérience de l'interlocuteur, d'un fait donné dans son expérience (§ 2.2), soit enfin d'introduire une conclusion présentée comme une conséquence logique des différents moments d'un raisonnement exposé antérieurement (§ 2.3). Il y a toutefois un fil conducteur qui unit ces opérations: *càd* introduit une forme d'inférence qui va des faits constatés vers une hypothèse explicative (Dendale et De Mulder 1996: 308). Ainsi, l'énoncé *càd Y* doit être compris soit comme une explication plausible de X implicite, soit comme une conclusion qui nécessite une construction mentale préalable.

2.1 *C'est-à-dire* introduit une conséquence factuelle

Les relations argumentatives instaurées peuvent être du type:

- (5) Il y a des nuages, *c'est-à-dire* qu'il va pleuvoir.¹

où c'est la connaissance du monde qui permet au locuteur de conclure qu'il va pleuvoir, ou du type:

- (6) A: Ah, j'en ai marre. Tous les hommes sont des salauds.
 B: *C'est-à-dire* que ton mari est un salaud aussi?
 A: Lui le premier. (*càd* oral)

auquel cas argumenter peut aussi signifier démontrer la vérité d'une assertion *via* un syllogisme, un raisonnement logique: «le locuteur B est obligé de conclure que le mari de A est un salaud, puisque c'est un homme et que A a dit que tous les hommes sont des salauds». On observe que le discours (6) ci-dessus fait apparaître une prise en charge du locuteur, en ce qui concerne l'événement introduit par *càd*, plus forte que celle en (5). Cette différence dépend du type de raisonnement sur lequel s'appuie la relation exprimée ici par le connecteur *càd*. Par ailleurs, il n'est pas toujours aisé de «distinguer, au moins dans un premier temps, entre une identification faible, type récapitulation, et une différenciation, cas où [le connecteur] introduit une conclusion: est-ce qu'on résume en concluant, ou est-ce qu'on conclut en résumant?» (Hybertie 1996: 10). La comparaison entre (7) et (8), d'une part, et (9) d'autre part, va permettre de distinguer entre ces deux valeurs de la relation:

- (7) Tu parles des chômeurs, *c'est-à-dire* / *donc* des demandeurs d'emploi.
 (8) D'une part, vous avez beaucoup de diplômes, d'autre part votre travail est très intéressant. *C'est-à-dire* que / *donc* vous avez toutes vos chances d'être engagé.
 (*càd* oral)

¹ Signalons qu'il s'agit ici d'un des rares exemples où nous pouvons enlever *càd* en gardant la relation argumentative intacte. Ce n'est pas *càd* qui crée la relation; il ne fait que l'expliciter.

En (7), *càd* établit une relation métadiscursive de type conclusif à la manière de *donc*² en faisant appel à une norme qui légitime le processus opéré. L'instruction donnée par les marqueurs est que les chômeurs sont potentiellement des demandeurs d'emploi³ ce qui légitime leur mise en équivalence. Il s'agit donc bien d'une relation d'*identification*. En (8), le locuteur récapitule les raisons pour lesquelles le candidat a ses chances d'être embauché et présente sa conclusion avec *càd* (ou *donc*) comme l'inférence légitime de X; la conclusion est présentée comme une synthèse des états de choses X (cf. aussi Roulet *et al.* 1985: 149). En revanche, en (9) ci-dessous, *càd* marque une relation de cause à conséquence. Il ne s'agit plus d'une *équivalence* entre les termes mis en relation, mais d'une *différenciation* (Hybertie 1996: 13):

(9) Il n'est ni énarque, ni polytechnicien, *càd* qu'il apporte un peu d'air frais dans l'entreprise (Hybertie 1996: 14 sans *càd*)

Toutefois, l'assertion de Y est nécessairement légitimée, et cela permet, en outre, tous les coups de force argumentatifs, dont (9) constitue un bel exemple.

En somme, dans ce premier cas de figure, l'instruction de *càd* est de présenter la structure de consécution comme se fondant sur une relation plus générale, valant pour toute occurrence des relations prédicatives de X et Y, et de l'imposer de ce fait comme prise en charge par l'énonciation. Il ne s'agit pas cependant d'une spécificité de *càd*: l'effet visé dans les exemples examinés est d'imposer une conclusion subjective et/ou objective comme une vérité qui se tire nécessairement de la proposition précédente. *Càd* est compatible avec ce genre de raisonnement, car son instruction 'Y est à dire à propos de X' lui permet de présenter Y comme une conclusion légitime de X. En outre, le contexte, dans son ensemble, conduit à cette conclusion, indépendamment de la présence du marqueur.

2.2 L'emploi inférentiel

Ce deuxième emploi se distingue du précédent (même s'il n'est pas toujours aisé de distinguer entre l'un et l'autre de ces emplois) par le fait que *càd* intègre des opérations inférentielles qui consistent à remonter d'un fait donné dans l'expérience du locuteur à l'énonciation d'un autre, non donné. Ce type d'opération se fonde sur une connaissance du monde, en l'occurrence sur la connaissance des deux états de choses représentés dans les propositions mises en relation. Contrairement aux emplois où il marque l'énoncé d'une conséquence factuelle, il s'agit ici moins d'énoncer la conséquence d'un fait que d'énoncer la conclusion d'un raisonnement et de clore ainsi un mouvement discursif. Les exemples qui appartiennent alors à cette catégorie ne se laissent pas gloser par 'un

² Il est intéressant de noter que, dans ce type d'exemples, *donc* peut-être traité comme un marqueur de glose (Leroy 2005). Quelle est alors la frontière entre glose et argumentation? Il s'agit d'une question qui mériterait d'être creusée.

³ On perçoit, toutefois, que dans cet exemple *donc* établit une relation argumentative plus forte que *càd*. D'ailleurs, l'impossibilité de *càd* dans certains enchaînements argumentatifs dans lesquels *donc* apparaît tient au fait que sa valeur fondamentale n'est pas de signaler une argumentation.

fait X entraîne un fait Y', mais plutôt par 'les idées X, Y... permettent de conclure Z' (Hybertie 1996). Dans ce cas, *càd* introduit une conclusion à partir de la reconstruction de deux prémisses implicites et la relation établie par ce marqueur prend une valeur d'identification. De ce fait, le marqueur conserve sa valeur métalinguistique, puisque c'est par l'identification construite par *càd* entre le terme X et le terme Y que Y peut être effectivement conçu comme explicitation ou commentaire de X. Ainsi, un énoncé comme (10) peut, en surface, prendre les allures d'une équivalence. Toutefois, après un examen attentif, nous nous rendons compte que le résultat final ne va pas de soi, mais qu'il découle d'un raisonnement implicite:

- (10) Au cours du week-end, la célèbre braderie de Lille a connu son succès habituel,
càd immense (Charolles et Coltier 1986: 55)

Charolles et Coltier (1986: 55) considèrent que le sens de *habituel* est spécifié par *immense*, et « bien que la définition n'ait rien de canonique et qu'elle fasse l'objet d'une mise à distance ironique », elle pose l'identité entre X et Y. Les auteurs glosent l'exemple (10) comme suit: « À Lille, pour parler du succès de la braderie, *habituel* veut dire *immense* ». Ils rajoutent également que *càd* crée une relation d'équivalence de signification qui tend à se présenter comme ayant « une valeur conjoncturellement conventionnelle ». Il est vrai que ce qui est mis en relation, en surface, c'est « habituel *càd* immense ». Or, ce n'est pas 'habituel' qui est 'immense' et ce n'est en aucun cas le 'sens' de 'habituel' qui est spécifié. *Càd* entre dans un syllogisme que nous pouvons présenter comme suit:

- Nous avons une vérité générale qui est: « La braderie de Lille connaît habituellement le succès »;
- Ce succès est un succès immense;
- Cette année, la braderie de Lille a eu lieu et a connu son succès habituel;
- Ce succès est donc immense.

Nous pouvons illustrer ce syllogisme avec le schéma suivant:

Si X (braderie de Lille) → X (habituellement succès immense).

Càd nous oblige à reconstruire deux prémisses implicites et introduit la conclusion d'un raisonnement qui découle de ces deux prémisses reconstruites. En d'autres termes, *càd* construit une relation fondée sur une vérité, sur une connaissance qui peut être ou ne pas être partagée. Dans le cas contraire, on aurait une espèce de décrochement du type: 'La braderie de Lille a connu son succès habituel, *càd* nul'. On observe ainsi que *càd* entre dans une relation argumentative et marque en même temps une équivalence entre X et Y, d'où sa qualification de *métalinguistique*. La présence du marqueur signifie que l'énoncé introduit est le second terme d'une relation. Il faut préconstruire le premier terme et considérer le deuxième comme équivalent au premier. À la valeur d'identification peut s'adjoindre éventuellement une nuance conclusive et, dans ce cas, nous ne serions pas loin d'une fonction résumante.

Dans les exemples du type inférentiel, on observe également que *càd* (comme c'est le cas de *donc*) peut indiquer que le locuteur prend en charge l'énonciation de 'l'acte directeur'. Toutefois, *càd* se distingue de *donc* dans les cas où le locuteur indique qu'il se distance de l'acte qu'il reprend tout en prenant en charge l'acte directeur de l'énoncé:

- (11) Tu dis que Paul s'est marié? *C'est-à-dire que* ça m'étonne quand même qu'il ne nous ait pas invités. (*càd* oral)

Comme le notent Roulet *et al.* (1985: 149), *donc* n'est pas compatible avec un énoncé comme (11), car «ce sont des motifs indépendants du raisonnement de l'énonciateur qui légitiment le processus déductif opéré»: le locuteur considère que X n'est pas possible, car il aurait été informé, si Paul s'était marié. En revanche, *càd* peut prendre en charge le doute exprimé en X et signaler la raison pour laquelle le locuteur est étonné. *Càd* reprend, dans ce cas, la situation créée par l'énonciation de X, et légitime ainsi la production de Y et de l'acte illocutoire que réalise cette énonciation (Hybertie 1996: 30-32). Ainsi, *càd* peut introduire un segment Y qui renvoie à de l'implicite et gloser l'acte illocutoire latent en l'explicitant:

- (12) A: La poubelle est pleine.
 B: Oui, je sais je l'ai vu.
 A: *C'est-à-dire que* tu devais la vider. Mais enfin tu ne fais rien dans cette maison.

Dans cet exemple, *càd* explicite l'inférence que le locuteur B aurait dû tirer de l'énonciation de «la poubelle est pleine». En contexte monologique, on peut paraphraser par un marqueur davantage argumentatif, *donc*:

- (12') La poubelle est pleine. Il faut *donc* la vider.

Toutefois, si on passe en contexte dialogique, *donc* paraît moins naturel:

- (12'') A: La poubelle est pleine.
 B: Oui, je sais je l'ai vu.
 A: ? *Donc* tu devais la vider. Mais, enfin, tu ne fais rien dans cette maison.

Il apparaît clairement que *donc* suit un cheminement déductif du type *quand une poubelle est pleine, on la vide*. *Càd* en revanche reprend l'inférence de façon directe en l'explicitant et enchaîne sur le «non-dit» (Ducrot *et al.* 1980: 10). Du coup, il peut introduire l'inférence réelle de *la poubelle est pleine*. On s'aperçoit que le locuteur B n'a pas compris l'implicite et que c'est *càd* qui déclenche l'inférence *il faut la vider*.

Cette caractéristique, à savoir pouvoir légitimer l'énonciation de Y, différencie aussi *càd* d'un connecteur davantage argumentatif comme *de ce fait* (Roulet *et al.* 1985: 140-145):

- (13) Alex ne répond pas au téléphone. *C'est-à-dire qu'*il a déménagé.
 (13') ?Alex ne répond pas au téléphone. *De ce fait*, il a déménagé.

On peut gloser (13) par *le fait qu'il ne répond pas au téléphone veut dire qu'il a déménagé*. *Càd* présuppose que le locuteur est au courant d'un éventuel déménagement d'Alex, ce qui permet au locuteur d'inférer *il a déménagé* et de prendre comme justification le

fait qu'il ne réponde pas au téléphone. La réalisation du fait *Alex-ne pas répondre-téléphone* entraîne qu'il devient *possible* de poser que le fait *il-avoir déménagé* est réalisé. Il est intéressant de signaler que la caractéristique de *càd* d'être compatible avec des énoncés où le locuteur prend en charge son énonciation est largement exploitée par les interviewers. Il n'y a par ailleurs rien d'étonnant à ce que *càd* soit fréquemment employé dans les interviews comme un récapitulatif (*càd que vous pensez que...*), car il permet d'indiquer que l'énoncé de l'interlocuteur est inféré de l'énoncé produit par le locuteur. En somme, ce type d'emplois de *càd* peut être caractérisé comme une «reformulation inférentielle synthétisante»⁴ : le raisonnement inférentiel permet d'introduire aisément en Y un récapitulatif de X (Zenone 1983 et Rossari et Jayez 1996).

Càd, dans un contexte dialogique peut porter sur l'assertion de X et introduire en Y une conclusion à valeur généralisante et/ou restrictive. Le marqueur se greffe, le plus souvent, sur une interprétation personnelle du locuteur inférée à partir d'un implicite :

- (14) A: La belle voix, c'est un don divin, mais par la suite soit on la met en valeur, soit on la laisse inexploitée. Quelqu'un peut naître avec une voix magnifique, mais il peut finalement ne pas devenir un artiste.
 B: *C'est-à-dire que* ça ne suffit pas d'avoir une belle voix, il faut la cultiver aussi.
 (càd oral)

Comme cela se sait, dans le contexte spécifique des interviews, l'interviewer peut avoir recours à des énoncés paraphrastiques pour 'obliger' l'intervu(e) à expliquer, à décrire, à rendre plus clair, à approfondir ses paroles ou encore à admettre explicitement quelque chose qui est resté sous-entendu. D'une manière générale, selon Labov et Fanshel (1977: 100), l'interviewer connaît déjà les réponses, mais il agit toujours en ayant en tête la présence d'un troisième 'sujet', c'est-à-dire du lecteur ou de l'auditeur qui est invisible, mais fort présent. Les paraphrases devraient être neutres en surface, sans la marque de l'interviewer, ce qui n'est pas toujours le cas. En (14), l'interviewer reste effectivement neutre et reprend l'énoncé du locuteur A pour en donner une synthèse conclusive dans le discours Y. La paraphrase n'est pas polémique puisqu'elle va dans le même sens que les propos du locuteur A. *Càd* introduit la synthèse de X et marque que le locuteur B décide, par sa propre initiative, de procéder à une reformulation de X. En revanche, en (15):

- (15) A: Quand par exemple certains se sont rassemblés autour de lui, euh, lui, il en a éloigné d'autres qui étaient des proches collaborateurs depuis longtemps. Il avait déclaré à l'époque que cela était nécessaire pour le soi-disant renouvellement du gouvernement. Enfin, il a essayé de faire ce qu'il croyait être bon pour la France, selon son jugement.

⁴ On peut voir, à l'aide d'un autre exemple, que *càd* introduit une conclusion explicite (marquée par *j'arrive à ma conclusion*) tout en indiquant que *X est à interpréter ainsi*: «Le taux de chômage n'arrêtera pas de baisser, Monsieur Poivre d'Arvor, *càd*, et j'arrive à ma conclusion, que toutes les Françaises et tous les Français doivent travailler dans le même sens que notre gouvernement» (càd oral).

B: *C'est-à-dire* qu'il s'est lancé dans des actions précipitées et qu'il a fait le mauvais choix

A: Ce n'est pas moi qui dis ça. C'est votre constat et celui de la presse. (càd oral)

la conclusion proposée par l'interviewer a un caractère polémique dans le sens où la valeur énonciative de *càd* est de mettre en cause l'opinion de celui auquel le discours est adressé en lui faisant endosser la validation de la proposition reformulée. La marque reste en surface plus neutre avec *càd* qu'avec un *vous voulez dire* par exemple. Toutefois, le locuteur A réagit en refusant de prendre en charge l'énoncé de l'interviewer: «c'est votre constat et celui de la presse».

La spécificité de *càd*, par rapport aux autres marqueurs de raisonnement, tient au fait que sa valeur fondamentale n'est pas d'introduire une conséquence. Cette spécificité tient à la fois à sa valeur sémantique (elle indique la conformité à ce qui vient d'être énoncé ou à ce que l'on constate dans la situation d'énonciation) et à sa valeur anaphorique. Il assure par conséquent des emplois consécutifs d'une manière différente de celles des autres marqueurs de consécution. Dans le cas de *càd*, l'opération de l'anaphore qu'il marque induit qu'il ne met pas seulement en relation deux énoncés; il reprend X dans Y et offre à Y la légitimité de son assertion en reprenant le contexte antérieur auquel il confère un statut de preuve ou de «raison de comprendre Y» (Zenone 1983). Cette valeur de *càd* est encore plus claire dans les enchaînements abductifs dont il est question dans la section suivante.

2.3 *C'est-à-dire* et les enchaînements abductifs

D'une portée voisine à celle des deux emplois que nous venons d'examiner, nous trouvons le cas de figure où *càd* annonce une conclusion qui découle d'un X (implicite et/ou explicite). Ce troisième emploi se distingue des deux précédents par le fait que *càd* introduit un segment qui découle d'un raisonnement inférentiel de type abductif. Eggs (1994) explique que, dans le cas de l'abduction, l'argumentation passe par des indices tandis que pour la déduction, elle passe par le vraisemblable (Walton 2001). De même, le propre du type d'opérations marquées par *càd* est de présenter Y comme *plausible* et non pas comme un fait *certain*: Y est l'une des causes possibles qui fait que l'on peut énoncer X (Rossari 1996 et 2000). *Càd* qualifie l'état de choses précédent comme entretenant une relation sémantique de raison, de motif avec celui introduit. Autrement dit, *càd*, en n'acceptant que la relation effet-cause, est sensible à la direction sémantique intervenant entre les états de choses représentés. On peut vérifier que l'emploi du marqueur est plus naturel quand la direction de la relation va de l'effet à la cause que quand elle va de la cause à l'effet à l'aide des énoncés (16) à (18):

(16) Son permis lui a été retiré. *C'est-à-dire* qu'il a commis plusieurs infractions routières.

(16')?? Il a commis plusieurs infractions routières. *C'est-à-dire* que son permis lui a été retiré.

(17) Il boit trop, *c'est-à-dire qu'*il est malheureux.

(17')?? Il est malheureux, *c'est-à-dire qu'*il boit trop (Rossari 1996 sans *càd*)

(18) Vous avez voté pour Le Pen, *c'est-à-dire que* vous acceptez sa politique. (*càd* oral)

(18')??? Vous acceptez la politique de Le Pen, *c'est-à-dire que* vous avez voté pour lui.

On remarque que *càd* mobilise la récupération d'une inférence pour obtenir Y: «quand on boit trop, c'est en général qu'on est malheureux» (Rossari 1996: 274-275). Il établit ainsi une relation d'implication qui permet de passer de la vérité de X à celle de Y *via* le recours à une prémisse implicite. En (18'), par exemple, quelqu'un peut accepter la politique de Le Pen sans forcément voter pour lui. On peut envisager à la place de *càd* un connecteur typique des relations effet-cause, *donc*. À la différence de *donc* qui peut figurer dans des configurations causales directes du type X→cause Y, où X est la cause et Y la conséquence, *càd* apparaît beaucoup plus facilement dans des configurations causales inversées du type abductif, X→abduct. Y, où X est la conséquence et Y la cause:

(18'') Vous avez voté pour Le Pen, *donc* vous acceptez sa politique.

(18''') Vous acceptez la politique de Le Pen, *donc* vous avez voté pour lui.

S'il est plus naturel de trouver *càd* dans des raisonnements abductifs, c'est parce qu'il est censé fournir une explication, une justification à propos du segment X: l'état de choses décrit par l'énoncé X est une «manifestation de la conséquence et l'état de choses décrit par l'énoncé Y est une manifestation de la cause» (Rossari 2000: 49). Par ailleurs, *càd* implique que l'opération à gauche du connecteur garantisse le succès de la seconde, (à droite du connecteur): pour que l'opération soit réussie, la mise en relation entre les deux opérations doit être fondée sur un cheminement causal abductif. Si on essaie d'utiliser une conjonction telle que *parce que* pour expliciter le rôle justificatif et la légitimité de *càd*, on s'aperçoit que cela n'est possible que dans le cas de l'abduction:

(19) Vous avez voté pour Le Pen, *parce que* vous acceptez sa politique.

(19')?? Vous acceptez la politique de Le Pen, *parce que* vous avez voté pour lui.

Il est important de noter que *càd* obéit à un principe d'informativité qui postule que *càd* Y doit être toujours plus informatif que X (Vassiliadou 2004: 314) et que, selon les observations d'EGGS (1994: 52), «accomplir un argument par l'indice» n'est pas «trivial», mais «apporte évidemment une connaissance nouvelle». Ainsi, un argument du type déductif paraît trivial, car la conclusion est déjà incluse dans l'énonciation de X. En revanche, dans le cas des opérations abductives, la conclusion est toujours présentée comme une connaissance nouvelle, ce qui est en accord avec le principe de l'informativité auquel obéit *càd*. Dans les exemples (16)-(18), *càd* ne porte pas sur le fait X, mais sur «l'acte directeur» de l'énoncé pour reprendre la terminologie de Roulet *et al.* (1985) où l'argument *càd* Y vient appuyer le fait énoncé et/ou inféré X. On aurait affaire, selon Roulet *et al.* (1985: 130-132), à une «fonction interactive d'explication». L'argument introduit par le marqueur est présenté comme à la fois nouveau et pris en charge par le locuteur. Toutefois, cela ne dépend pas de *càd*, mais du type de raisonnement sur lequel s'appuie la relation causale (ici de type abductif). Rossari *et al.*

(2004: 58) signalent aussi que les discours de type abductif font « apparaître une prise en charge du locuteur en ce qui concerne l'événement introduit par [le marqueur] plus forte que dans les discours déductifs ». Enfin le locuteur, en employant *càd*, évalue l'acte d'intervention et le présente comme une justification de X. On observe alors que *càd* ne se contente pas de se greffer sur une inférence implicite afin d'annoncer une conclusion, mais il explicite, il justifie l'inférence en question. Par ailleurs, un cheminement de type abductif s'appuie souvent sur les croyances du locuteur. Il n'est ainsi pas étonnant de trouver *càd* avec des emplois illocutifs comme dans (20) où *càd* marque le lien entre un fait et un énoncé: le fait X « il n'arrête pas de dire qu'il veut changer de travail » justifie l'énonciation de Y qui est, en quelque sorte, une conclusion du locuteur concernant l'état de Pierre:

- (20) Pierre n'arrête pas de dire qu'il veut changer de travail. *C'est-à-dire qu'il ne doit pas être très content de ce qu'il fait.*

3. C'est-à-dire et l'argumentation: discussion

Il va sans dire que notre marqueur sous-tend souvent une relation de discours plus spécifique qu'un simple enchaînement reformulatif. Il y a en effet une dépendance forte entre *càd* (et ce qu'il implique) et les constituants qu'il relie. Il peut ainsi, dans le discours argumentatif, scander les enchaînements discursifs et intervenir là où le locuteur prend appui sur lui-même (ou sur son interlocuteur) dans un mouvement à la fois *explicatif*⁵ et *justificatif*. Or, comme le notent fort bien Murat et Cartier-Bresson (1987: 13), *càd* ne peut que donner une consigne; « encore faut-il pour l'appliquer, pouvoir reconstruire une relation plausible entre les termes ». En effet, même si *càd*, en tant que mot du discours, est pourvu d'une fonction communicative minimale, il n'accepte pas pour autant n'importe quelle combinaison entre X et Y. En résumé, *càd*, comme tous les connecteurs, impose des contraintes non seulement sur le type des entités qu'il connecte (on a vu par exemple que, contrairement à *de ce fait*, il accepte que l'unité gauche soit pourvue d'une valeur illocutoire autre que l'assertion), mais aussi sur la nature de la relation d'implication (déduction *vs* abduction). Par ailleurs, *càd* comprend dans son sens descriptif l'instruction dynamique de *à dire* et cela lui permet de se greffer sur des inférences, sur des actes illocutoires ainsi que de présenter un discours à venir comme une explication, une justification ou encore une conclusion. Reste à voir plus en détail ses spécificités par rapport à d'autres marqueurs davantage argumentatifs.

⁵ Pour une discussion sur la différence entre argumentation et explication, voir Walton (2004).

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CROSS-LINGUISTIC PERSPECTIVES

RINFORZO ARGOMENTATIVO E ATTENUAZIONE ARGOMENTATIVA IN FRANCESE, ITALIANO, RUSSO, SPAGNOLO E TEDESCO: UNA PROPOSTA DI ANALISI CONDOTTA SULLA BASE DI FORUM DI DISCUSSIONE ON-LINE

VAHRAM ATAYAN

Introduzione

L'obiettivo del presente contributo è la presentazione di alcuni procedimenti e mezzi linguistici che permettono il rinforzo o l'attenuazione del potenziale argomentativo di un enunciato, e in particolare di certi meccanismi frequentemente usati nei forum di discussione on-line. La scelta di questo tipo di testi è legata al loro carattere intermedio influenzato sia dal medium scritto che dalla relativa vicinanza comunicativa tipica della particolare situazione comunicativa. Tali fattori caratterizzano i forum come appartenenti alla classe di testi che manifestano il tratto dell'oralità concettuale nel senso inteso da Koch & Oesterreicher (1997)¹. Gli esempi discussi sono stati tratti dai forum di discussione del *Nouvel Observateur*, di *Die Zeit*, di *El País*, di *La Repubblica* e delle *Известия*, uno dei più grandi quotidiani nazionali russi. La scelta di tre lingue romanze, una germanica e una slava dovrebbe permettere una certa generalizzabilità dei risultati, che in tal modo potrebbero essere validi in una qualche misura per i fenomeni argomentativi discussi nel contributo al di là dei limiti di una lingua naturale specifica. Nel presente saggio si discuteranno quattro punti:

- la necessità di introdurre nella teoria dell'argomentazione i concetti di forza/di rinforzo e di debolezza/di attenuazione del potenziale argomentativo di un enunciato,
- i procedimenti del rinforzo e dell'attenuazione argomentativi,
- i meccanismi e i marcatori linguistici del rinforzo,
- i meccanismi e i marcatori linguistici dell'attenuazione, in particolare i mezzi linguistici che permettono il passaggio dall'attenuazione argomentativa all'inversione dell'orientamento argomentativo (cfr. Ducrot 1983).

1. I concetti di rinforzo e di attenuazione argomentativa

Gli studi sull'argomentazione sembrano essere soggetti a una continua diversificazione terminologica e concettuale, dovuta in gran parte a fattori oggettivi, quali ad esempio la forte interdisciplinarietà del campo legato a retorica, filosofia, linguistica, scienze del-

¹ Cfr. Pirazzini 2006 per un'analisi di procedimenti retorico-argomentativi usati nei forum di discussione.

la comunicazione, logica ecc. Dato che tali situazioni creano di solito difficoltà e ostacoli per lo sviluppo della ricerca, un'ulteriore estensione concettuale e terminologica non ci pare accettabile se non è dovuta a una precisa e motivata necessità. Ora, se optiamo qui per l'introduzione di tali concetti accanto a quelli abitualmente usati per la descrizione micro- o macrostrutturale dell'argomentazione (cioè *argomento*, *conclusione*, *argomentazione a grappolo*, *argomentazione multipla*², *controargomentazione* ecc.), è perché questa decisione sembra essere fondata su una serie di considerazioni che provengono da diversi campi:

- L'intuizione metalinguistica dei parlanti pare permettere senza alcuna difficoltà valutazioni del genere "un argomento forte/debole". Questo fatto non può di per sé essere considerato come argomento decisivo a favore della ripresa degli stessi termini come elementi del metalinguaggio descrittivo³, però può corroborare le intuizioni del linguista riguardo al valore funzionale di certe sequenze linguistiche partecipanti all'argomentazione.
- Relazioni di forza argomentativa vengono usate in un'ottica semasiologica nella descrizione semantica di numerosi connettori testuali, tali *mais* (Ducrot *et al.* 1980: 97) o *même* (Anscombe & Ducrot 1983: 58) e di operatori come per es. i *modificateurs réalisants* e *déréalisans* introdotti in Ducrot (1995).
- L'idea di forza argomentativa viene utilizzata inoltre al livello più astratto delle funzioni argomentative generali, come nel caso della categoria *rinforzo* di Lo Cascio (1991: 191) o anche nelle considerazioni più intuitive di Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958: 661-662) sull'ordine tipico della presentazione di argomenti per la stessa tesi, il quale può dipendere dalla loro forza relativa.
- Le considerazioni semasiologiche e funzionali sembrano essere confermate infine dalla frequenza di costruzioni linguistiche che, strutturalmente, sono sufficientemente indipendenti per poter verbalizzare componenti di un'argomentazione, ma non paiono ciononostante corrispondere agli elementi di strutture micro- o macroscopiche "classiche", né costituire strumenti di presentazione di una funzione modale nel senso di Toulmin (1958: 105). Le sequenze linguistiche atte ad essere utilizzate nell'argomentazione costituiscono un insieme abbastanza eterogeneo (cfr. Stati 2002: 30) e non possono essere ridotte a singole strutture sintattiche. Sembra essere potenzialmente argomentativa infatti qualsiasi sequenza linguistica la cui apparizione nella linearità testuale possa essere messa in relazione a un'intenzione separata del parlante, che non risulta obbligatoriamente dal co- e contesto. Questa visione corrisponde anche alla definizione di Ducrot (1984: 174-175) dell'enunciato come unità risultante da una scelta relativamente autonoma del parlante. In ge-

² Riprendiamo qui per alcuni concetti la terminologia italiana di Lo Cascio (1991: 128-129), che corrisponde in parte alle categorie della scuola pragma-linguistica (cfr. van Eemeren, Grootendorst & Snoeck Henkemans 1996).

³ Cfr. Ducrot (1984: 117) sulla necessità di evitare la confusione tra il livello linguistico e quello metalinguistico.

nerale, sequenze di questo tipo costituiscono strutture linguistiche in grado di realizzare un'azione comunicativa, cioè un'illocuzione nella terminologia della teoria degli atti linguistici, ma anche un'unità informativa (cfr. Ferrari 2003: 28-29; Brandt 1990: 79). Ovviamente, strutture del genere possono essere realizzate da un ampio spettro di costruzioni sintattiche che sono perciò in grado di fungere per esempio da argomento in un'argomentazione. Nella sequenza costruita 1 una frase relativa non-restrittiva (prendiamo in considerazione questa categoria a titolo d'esempio) realizza un argomento per la conclusione verbalizzata nella principale:

1. Paolo, *che attualmente è troppo occupato*, probabilmente non potrà venire con noi.

Ora, le stesse strutture sembrano spesso partecipare a un'argomentazione minimale, costituita da una tesi e un argomento, senza però assumere il ruolo dell'argomento o della conclusione:

- 2a. La situazione economica dell'UE sembra essere soddisfacente: persino la Banca Centrale Europea, *che di solito è molto prudente*, ha pubblicato una previsione positiva per questo anno.
- 2b. Certo, la BCE, *che di solito è molto prudente*, ha dato una previsione piuttosto negativa, ma io penso che lo sviluppo economico dell'UE sia soddisfacente, dato che abbiamo un'inflazione molto bassa.

Nell'esempio 2a la frase relativa sembra far apparire l'argomento – il parere della BCE – come particolarmente forte, il che è anche compatibile con le istruzioni del marcatore *persino* (questa analisi corrisponde anche alla categoria di *rinforzo* introdotta da Lo Cascio 1991: 191). In 2b invece la concessione – un argomento potenziale per la conclusione contraria – sembra essere resa più debole dalla relativa. Possiamo perciò constatare che strutture linguistiche potenzialmente in grado di verbalizzare argomenti o conclusioni possono anche avere una funzione che corrisponde all'intuizione della forza/debolezza argomentativa. E proprio per descrivere tali procedimenti nei testi argomentativi reali ci sembra utile introdurre a livello teorico i concetti di rinforzo e di attenuazione del potenziale argomentativo di una sequenza⁴.

2. I procedimenti del rinforzo e dell'attenuazione argomentativi

L'analisi degli esempi autentici tratti da diversi tipi di testo ci ha permesso di identificare tre procedimenti semantico-pragmatici utilizzati per rinforzare o attenuare un argomento (cfr. Atayan 2004, 2006 e in stampa):

- Sembrano essere considerati come forti argomenti quelli nei quali l'elemento lessicale argomentativamente più importante (spesso nella posizione di focus dell'enun-

⁴ Parliamo qui di "potenziale argomentativo" nel senso ampio previsto nel quadro dell'*Argumentation dans la langue* (Anscombe & Ducrot 1983), cioè della capacità di un enunciato di favorire certe sequenze conclusive (*enchaînements*) e escluderne altre.

ciato) è modificato nel senso di un'intensificazione, legata spesso al posizionamento nella parte superiore di una scala concreta o astratta. Elementi del genere corrispondono almeno in parte alla categoria lessicale dei *modificateurs réalisants* (MR) di Ducrot (1995). Nella sua analisi Ducrot ha constatato in particolare che tali modificatori permettono la costruzione di sequenze accettabili di tipo [elemento lessicale + *et même* + MR (+ eventualmente l'elemento lessicale)]⁵. Tali casi sono legati spesso a un paradigma di gradi che una qualità può assumere, dando origine in tal modo a una relazione di forza argomentativa tra enunciati argomentativamente coorientati: "Paolo è molto intelligente/intelligentissimo" è, *ceteris paribus*, un argomento più adatto per giustificare la conclusione "Sarà in grado di risolvere questo problema" rispetto a "Paolo è intelligente", e questo sembra valere – in assenza di condizioni contestuali molto particolari come "Abbiamo bisogno di qualcuno che sia intelligente, ma non troppo" – per tutte le conclusioni che possono essere corroborate da "Paolo è intelligente". Ovviamente argomenti che fanno riferimento al grado inferiore di una qualità vengono considerati deboli, spesso anche insufficienti a giustificare le conclusioni potenziali della stessa sequenza priva del marcatore di posizionamento sulla scala (*modificateurs déréalisants* nella terminologia di Ducrot 1995): "Sono un po' malato" o "Paolo è un parente lontano" sembrano essere meno adatti o addirittura non più idonei a giustificare le conclusioni possibili di "Sono malato" o "Paolo ci aiuterà".

- Il secondo gruppo di argomenti rinforzati è costituito da sequenze nel cui contesto vengono verbalizzate circostanze che normalmente dovrebbero rendere improbabile la realizzazione dello stato di cose citato nell'argomento. Tale è il caso in 2: la generale prudenza della BCE dovrebbe rendere improbabile, controimplicare, una previsione positiva. Nell'esempio 2b invece viene presentato un fattore che normalmente dovrebbe implicare il contenuto dell'argomento rendendolo più debole⁶.
- Il terzo procedimento consiste nell'asserzione del carattere sorprendente – per un argomento forte – o normale – per un argomento debole – dello stato di cose verbalizzato nell'argomento. Tali procedimenti possono anche apparire insieme in una sequenza di tipo [A1 + normale (A1)] – marcatore di contrasto – [A2 + sorprendente (A2)] con possibili variazioni nell'ordine. L'esempio 3, tratto dal sito internet *animafrika.net*, illustra il procedimento in questione:

3. Qui a Isiro tutte le comunità sono in fermento per preparare degnamente la festa della Mamma di tutti. (A1) Già da una settimana ci si prepara con preghiere e Messa, e questo è normale, ma ciò che è sorprendente (A2) è l'orario.

⁵ Cfr. "Paolo è intelligente, e persino/anzi *molto* intelligente". "È un parente, e persino *molto vicino*".

⁶ Per il legame generale tra controimplicazione e forza argomentativa cfr. la categoria di *rinforzo* in Lo Cascio (1991: 189) nonché Blumenthal (1990: 37-38), Carel (1995), Kalokerinos (1995: 82, 96), García Negroni (2001: 50, 2003: 61, 78), Atayan (2004, 2006: 317), per il legame tra implicazione e debolezza argomentativa Ducrot *et al.* (1980: 166), Lötscher (1988: 83), Anscombe (1996: 255), García Negroni (2003: 20), Atayan (2004 e 2006: 317).

Alle 5.30 del mattino, è buio la chiesa si riempie di fedeli, piccoli, grandi, donne, uomini [...] come alla domenica. (Sequenza di ricerca: “sono in fermento per preparare degnamente”)⁷

Nell'esempio 3 la valutazione “tutte le comunità sono in fermento” viene illustrata da due sequenze: la prima che menziona le attività che si svolgono da una settimana – il cui effetto argomentativo viene attenuato dal riferimento alla normalità, e la seconda che riguarda gli orari insoliti dell'attività, presentati appunto come sorprendenti. Il marcatore contrastivo *ma* permette anche una gerarchizzazione argomentativa: il primo argomento attenuato dalla constatazione di normalità non vale più come tale per la conclusione, mentre la seconda sequenza realizza, secondo le istruzioni di *ma*, un argomento anti-orientato, cioè corroborante la conclusione e più forte.

Nei paragrafi seguenti discuteremo, vista la loro frequenza nel corpus analizzato, due procedimenti di rinforzo, legati all'intensificazione e alla controimplicazione. Per quanto riguarda l'attenuazione analizzeremo qualche esempio di passaggio tra l'attenuazione argomentativa e l'inversione dell'orientamento argomentativo segnalato dai marcatori di focalizzazione retrospettiva. Per i procedimenti analizzati presenteremo i meccanismi semantico-pragmatici più specifici e i marcatori linguistici che possono introdurre sequenze rinforzanti o attenuanti.

3. Meccanismi e marcatori del rinforzo

3.1 Meccanismi di intensificazione

Oltre ai casi di intensificazione scalare realizzata da *modificateurs réalisants* generali quali quantificatori di alto grado, nel corpus analizzato sono frequenti i casi in cui il rinforzo argomentativo viene realizzato tramite un meccanismo più specifico, legato ai tratti spazio-temporali dello stato di cose menzionato nell'argomento e ad altri fattori. Frequentemente tali informazioni vengono introdotte retrospettivamente, immediatamente dopo l'argomento, e segnalate da un marcatore costituito dalla congiunzione coordinante e un pronome dimostrativo generico (*et ce/ceci/cela, e questo, u emo, y eso, und das/dies*)⁸. Le indicazioni di tipo spazio-temporale sembrano in particolare essere di carattere sufficientemente generico per fungere da rinforzo per una classe abbastanza ampia di potenziali argomenti. La durata (es. 4a, 4b) o l'estensione spaziale (4c) di uno stato di cose sembra per esempio valorizzarlo dal punto di vista argomentativo:

4a. Je pense que le Kosovo mérite l'indépendance non seulement parce que les albanais du Kosovo sont majoritaires et opprimés *et cela depuis des siècles* mais aussi car ce sont des gens motivés à avancer, à créer des projets d'améliorations des conditions de vie non seulement des albanais mais également des serbes du Kosovo. (Sequenza di ricerca: “majoritaire et opprimés et cela depuis”)

⁷ Gli esempi dalle fonti on-line vengono ripresi senza correzioni. Invece del sito internet vengono indicate le sequenze di ricerca con le quali gli esempi possono essere ritrovati tramite il motore di ricerca www.google.de.

⁸ Per altri marcatori di rinforzo cfr. Lo Cascio (1991: 191) e Atayan (2006: 381-402).

4b. Hi @ll Ehe ist prima, nur sollte nicht vergessen werden das sie sehr häufig in die Brüche geht. Tatsache in dem Zusammenhang ist, das der Mann bei einer Scheidung der komplette Depp ist. Er muss einer Frau Unterhalt zahlen, die von ihm nichts mehr wissen will, *und das* wenn es dumm läuft *ein Leben lang*. (Sequenza di ricerca: “und das wenn es dumm läuft ein Leben lang”)⁹

4с. Антон Захаров, МНЕ не надо лишний раз демонстрировать Вашу полнейшую правовую безграмотность. По закону (*и это ВСЕМИРНАЯ*¹⁰ *практика*) ПО приравнивается к песне, или, например, фильму. (Sequenza di ricerca: “Антон Захаров, МНЕ не надо лишний раз демонстрировать”)¹¹.

Possono inoltre avere l'effetto di rinforzo, soprattutto nel quadro di una valutazione, anche i riferimenti a una “circostanza aggravante” interpretati come indicatori di un atteggiamento morale riprovevole:

4d. Come al solito “Il Giornale” dà prova di alta obiettività, *e questo senza neanche arrossire*. Prodi, i ministri e sottosegretari si diminuiscono il salario del 30% (Prodi = 37.000 euro) e lo straccio di Berlusconi titola: “Ci aumentano le tasse e si aumentano i salari” (Sequenza di ricerca: “obiettività, e questo senza neanche arrossire”)

Qui il rimprovero, formulato ironicamente, viene intensificato dalla sequenza “e questo senza neanche arrossire” che sembra poter essere considerata come una specie di *modificateur réalisant* generale per azioni riprovevoli. Infatti, per qualsiasi azione A di questo tipo la sequenza “Ha fatto A, e questo senza neanche arrossire” sembra accettabile senza ipotesi contestuali particolari, il che corrisponde al criterio di Ducrot (1995: 147).

3.2 Meccanismi di controimplicazione

I casi di controimplicazione rinforzante costituiscono, nel corpus, tre sottogruppi. Il primo comprende argomenti nei quali viene descritto uno stato di cose che esiste nonostante una causa o un motivo che normalmente dovrebbero impedirne l'esistenza. Essi vengono spesso introdotti dai marcatori menzionati sopra (congiunzione coordinante + pronomi dimostrativi) e un connettore concessivo. Negli esempi 5a e 5b possiamo osservare che gli stati di cose usati in funzione di argomento – un cambiamento minimo della temperatura o il mancato successo dell'Eolo – si verificano nonostante i fattori controimplicanti, cioè rispettivamente una maggiore emissione dell'anidride carbonica o i finanziamenti dell'UE.

⁹ Bruxelles (2002) constata che anche un'indicazione sulla velocità o immediatezza di un'azione o un evento possono avere un effetto di rinforzo sul potenziale argomentativo della sequenza nella quale l'azione o l'evento vengono verbalizzati.

¹⁰ Maiuscoli nell'originale.

¹¹ Anton Zakharov, IO non ho bisogno di dimostrare ancora una volta la Sua incompetenza totale in questioni legali. Stando alla legge (*e questo* è la prassi MONDIALE) il software viene trattato come le canzoni o per esempio i film. (Traduzioni dal russo dell'autore).

- 5a. Wie selbstverständlich wird hier behauptet, dass der Klimawandel sich beschleunigt. Ein Blick auf die globalen Temperaturkurven der Bodenstationen zeigt aber nun, dass sich die weltweiten Temperaturen seit 1998 nur geringfügig verändert haben und keinen positiven Trend mehr zeigen. Ebenso gilt dies für die Messungen durch Satelliten. **Und dies trotz stark gestiegenen CO2-Werten.** (Sequenza di ricerca: “Und dies trotz stark gestiegenen CO2-Werten”)
- 5b. La Eolo si è dimostrata una bufala per un motivo molto semplice: nessun prototipo ce l’ha fatta a superare i problemi tecnici [...]. **E questo nonostante i fortissimi finanziamenti della UE**, dati praticamente a fondo perduto. (Sequenza di ricerca: “E questo nonostante i fortissimi”)

Il secondo caso, complementare al primo, di controimplicazione rinforzante contiene azioni o stati di cose che si realizzano nonostante una causa o un motivo insufficiente. Nell’esempio 6a il carattere insufficiente del motivo (il potere) viene marcato dal tipico *modificateur déréalisant* nur, mentre in 6b la causa che normalmente dovrebbe impedire la raccolta di una somma particolarmente alta (il fatto che si tratti di una sola persona) è segnalata dal corrispondente russo *только*:

- 6a. Koste es was es wolle, auch um den Preis der Rehabilitierung des Herrn Oskar Lafontaine, gibt die Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands alle gültigen Vorstellungen von Ehrlichkeit, von Respekt vor dem Souverän (Wähler) auf. Sie ist sich nicht zu schade, ihre eigenen Grundsätze aufzugeben **und dies nur wegen des Preises der Macht.** (Sequenza di ricerca: “und dies nur wegen des Preises der Macht”)
- 6b. Грызлов и его дружок Володин ну никак не могут найти денег для приличной пенсии старикам [...]. Если бы Абромович платил в год налог хотя-бы 30-40 млрд. руб., то никакого кризиса с лекарствами не было бы. **И это только с одного олигарха.** (Sequenza di ricerca: “И это только с одного олигарха”)¹²

Un uso specifico del rinforzo argomentativo di questo tipo è costituito infine dai casi in cui la controimplicazione risulta da una contraddizione tra le dichiarazioni e le azioni in particolare nel campo politico (7a) o tra l’importanza di un mezzo di informazione e le posizioni da esso sostenute (7b). Le due situazioni sono particolarmente frequenti nella critica dei politici o dei media, sul cui sito si svolgono le discussioni, il che corrisponde ovviamente anche a una funzione di base dei forum di discussione dei grandi quotidiani: dare la possibilità ai lettori di esprimere la loro opinione, anche critica, sul giornale. Generalmente la posizione o l’azione in sé riprovevole – cioè un argomento a favore di una valutazione negativa dell’attore – viene presentata come particolarmente grave a causa dell’esistenza di tali elementi controimplicanti:

¹² Gryslov e il suo amico Volodin non riescono proprio a trovare i soldi per una pensione di vecchiaia degna di questo nome. Se Abramovich pagasse almeno 30-40 miliardi di rubli di tasse all’anno non ci sarebbe una crisi delle medicine. **E questo** per uno solo degli oligarchi.

7a. Au lendemain du Grenelle de l'environnement, il est choquant de voir se tenir un conseil des ministres décentralisé, avec tous les déplacements et la pollution que cela engendre. *Et ceci en prétendant défendre l'écologie en Corse!* Ou Sarko et sa clique se fichent de nous et les Français apprécieront, ou ils n'ont rien compris et c'est encore pire. (Sequenza di ricerca: "Et ceci en prétendant défendre l'écologie en Corse!")

7b. Ну, совсем уже докатились. *И это центральное издание...* Позор Известиям! Янине Соколовской тоже! (Sequenza di ricerca: "докатились. И это центральное издание")¹³

Possiamo constatare nel complesso che i marcatori (congiunzione coordinante + pronome dimostrativo generico: *et ce/ceci/cela, e questo, и это, у eso, und das/dies*) sono in grado di introdurre un rinforzo retrospettivo del potenziale argomentativo di una sequenza, rinforzo che può basarsi su meccanismi semantici molto diversi.

4. Meccanismi e marcatori dell'attenuazione

Nell'ultima parte della nostra analisi ci limiteremo alla presentazione di un fenomeno particolare legato all'attenuazione argomentativa. Si tratta dell'effetto di possibile ambiguità argomentativa delle sequenze che contengono elementi attenuanti il potenziale argomentativo del resto dell'enunciato. Ducrot (1995) ha osservato che le sequenze che contengono combinazioni (*modificateur déréalisant* + elemento lessicale) possono essere sia coorientate che anti-orientate rispetto alla stessa frase senza il modificatore. L'effetto di inversione dell'orientamento è legato alla posizione rematica/focale del modificatore: mentre "Possiamo constatare un leggero CALO dell'attività economica" sembra essere orientato verso una conclusione come "La situazione è difficile", la stessa sequenza con "un LEGGERO calo"/"un calo LEGGERO" diventa un argomento piuttosto per le conclusioni come "La situazione non è (particolarmente) difficile". Ovviamente, nel caso delle coppie aggettivo + sostantivo in certe lingue (per es. in quelle romanze) questo effetto può essere marcato nella superficie dall'ante- o posposizione dell'aggettivo, mentre nelle altre l'unico marcatore sembra essere l'intonazione ("ein leichter RÜCKGANG"/"легкое СНИЖЕНИЕ" vs. "ein LEICHTER Rückgang"/"ЛЕГКОЕ снижение"). Si intende che, sia in casi come quelli appena discussi, che in presenza di altri elementi attenuanti, per i quali il sistema linguistico non prevede tali libertà posizionali, soprattutto nei testi scritti – come i forum – può rivelarsi necessario disambiguare l'orientamento argomentativo. Nel corpus analizzato tale funzione viene realizzata spesso da sequenze metalinguistiche che forniscono una precisazione¹⁴ della focalizzazione (*je dis bien/j'ai bien dit, (e) sottolineo, подчеркываю, (y) subrayo, die Betonung liegt auf/ich betone*). L'analisi dell'uso di queste sequenze permette anche di identificare i meccanismi specifici dell'attenuazione argomentativa. Il primo tipo di ele-

¹³ È proprio impossibile! *E questo* in un giornale nazionale... E vergognoso per le Izvestia! E per Yanina Sokolovskaia!

¹⁴ Tale precisazione può avvenire retrospettivamente o essere parenteticamente integrata nell'enunciato.

menti attenuanti è costituito, come nel caso del rinforzo, dalle indicazioni di quantità/ grado (8a), estensione (8b) o dimensione temporale (durata o frequenza – 8c) relative allo stato di cose descritto nell'enunciato precedente:

- 8a. Bitte wahren Sie das Urheberrecht. Kurzzitate sind zulässig – **die Betonung liegt auf kurz** (daher gekürzt). Die Redaktion (Sequenza di ricerca: “die Betonung liegt auf kurz daher”)
- 8b. J'ai mis moi-même des années, et je ne plaisante pas, à admettre que, parmi ceux pour lesquels je prenais fait et cause, certains professaient une idéologie parmi celles qui sont à mes yeux les plus odieuses. **J'ai bien dit “certains”**. Ou “un certain nombre”. (Sequenza di ricerca: “odieuses. J'ai bien dit certains”)
- 8c. Los asesinos son asesinos, pero a veces nos devuelven una imagen de la justicia muy poco justa. Léase a Nietzsche. **A veces**¹⁵ es de un clarividente que asusta. **Subrayo a veces**. (Sequenza di ricerca: “asusta. Subrayo a veces”)

Il secondo tipo di attenuazione che può, nel caso di focalizzazione retrospettiva, creare l'effetto di inversione è legato all'inattualità dello stato di cose citato nella sequenza-argomento. Tale inattualità può derivare dalle indicazioni sul carattere approssimativo (9a), dalle modalità, in particolare epistemica (9b) e aletica (9c), dalle informazioni strumentali (9d) oppure anche dall'indicazione della soggettività (9e).

- 9a. Millionen Moslems leben zusammen, auch mit anderen, ohne sich jeden Tag zu prügeln. Irak, Afganistan [...] auch Gewalt in Deutschland als Islamproblem darzustellen ist nicht nur kurzsichtig sondern DUMM! Das ist fast (**ich betone fast**) so ein Geschätz wie von den “Slavischen “Untermenschen” von vor 33. (Sequenza di ricerca: “ich betone fast so ein Geschätz”)
- 9b. C'è stato un omicidio perpetrato da un poliziotto ai danni di uno che forse, **e sottolineo forse**, si è dato un paio di sberle con altri ragazzi (forse ultrà). Ciò è inammissibile [...]. (Sequenza di ricerca: “e sottolineo forse, si è dato un paio”)
- 9c. Die Kinder können ihm fast straflos entzogen werden, obwohl Umgangvereitelung sehr wohl sanktioniert werden kann.
Die Betonung liegt auf *kann* weil kaum ein Richter das Instrumentarium was er zur Verfügung hat, gegen Frauen auch anwendet. (Sequenza di ricerca: “Die Betonung liegt auf *kann* weil kaum ein Richter”)
- 9d. Да, дорогая, ЕБН косвенно подтолкнул Шevi к началу акции. **Подчеркиваю – косвенно**. (Sequenza di ricerca: “акции Подчеркиваю косвенно”)¹⁶

¹⁵ Sottolineato nell'originale.

¹⁶ Sì, mia cara, Eltsin ha indirettamente spinto Shevardnadze a iniziare questa azione. **Sottolineo indirettamente**.

- 9e. Aunque, ya que lo dices, si tú las aprecias y valoras, si tú crees en esas cosas, pues seguro que tienen todas las papeletas para ser otro disparate pseudo-científico de los que gustas.
Esa ya es para mí (*subrayo lo de mi subjetividad*) una hipótesis provisional bastante consistente. (Sequenza di ricerca: “subrayo lo de mi subjetividad”)

Gli esempi discussi ci permettono di constatare la molteplicità e la varietà dei fattori semantico-pragmatici utilizzabili nell’attenuazione argomentativa. Essi possono essere immediatamente legati allo stato di cose in questione ma anche avere un carattere più generico e rispecchiare diversi atteggiamenti del parlante nei confronti del proprio enunciato.

5. Conclusioni

Nella nostra analisi di una scelta di esempi autentici abbiamo constatato che i procedimenti linguistici generali del rinforzo e dell’attenuazione argomentativi, legati a fattori di (de)intensificazione in senso ampio, alla (contro)implicazione cotestuale e al carattere normale o sorprendente dello stato di cose, si possono manifestare tramite diversi meccanismi particolari, che abbiamo studiato in dettaglio per i primi due procedimenti. Abbiamo potuto identificare anche certi marcatori linguistici di tipo ‘congiunzione coordinante + pronomi dimostrativo generico’ o indicatori metalinguistici di focalizzazione retrospettiva che segnalano frequentemente nei testi analizzati l’applicazione del rinforzo argomentativo o la disambiguazione tra l’attenuazione e l’inversione argomentativa. A conclusione riassumiamo i procedimenti e i meccanismi identificati nella seguente tabella:

<i>Fenomeno</i>	<i>Procedimento</i>	<i>Meccanismi identificati nel corpus</i>
<i>Rinforzo</i>	<i>Rinforzo scalare</i>	- Indicazione dell'alto grado - Durata, estensione ecc. (es. 4a-4c) - Valutazione dell'atteggiamento (es. 4d)
	<i>Controimplicazione nel cotesto</i>	- Realizzazione dello stato di cose nonostante una causa contraria attuale (es. 5) - Realizzazione dello stato di cose dovuta a una causa insufficiente (es. 6) - Contrasto tra la posizione/il ruolo e l'opinione espressa/l'azione (es. 7)
	<i>Constatazione del carattere sorprendente</i>	
<i>Attenuazione</i>	<i>Attenuazione scalare</i>	- Indicazione del basso grado (8a) - Durata, estensione ecc. (8b, 8c) - Inattualità approssimativa (9a), epistemica (9b), aletica (9c), strumentale (9d), soggettiva (9e)
	<i>Implicazione nel cotesto</i>	
	<i>Constatazione del carattere normale</i>	

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INTRODUCTORY 'IT' PATTERNS IN ENGLISH AND ITALIAN ACADEMIC WRITING: A CROSS-GENERIC AND CROSS-CULTURAL ANALYSIS

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1. *Introduction*

Biber and Finegan's (1989) work in the area of interpersonal meaning suggests that academic discourse is characterized by the relative absence of markers of stance – “the lexical and grammatical expression of attitudes, feelings, judgments, or commitment concerning the propositional content of a message” (Biber & Finegan 1989: 93). But recent research has suggested a growing recognition that there is room for negotiation of personal stance within academic writing (e.g. Hyland 1999; Bondi 2002). As noted by Hyland (1999: 120), “the use of stance is an important aspect of professional academic discourse, conveying the field-specific expressive and interpersonal meanings which help readers to evaluate information and writers to gain acceptance for their work”.

As Conrad and Biber (2000) note, studies into the ways that speakers and writers mark their personal stance have been carried out from many different perspectives, i.e. from descriptions of a single text type to investigations of large computer-based corpora. Much work has been devoted to the examination of the ways indicators of stance are employed in specific disciplines (e.g. Peck McDonald 1994; Bondi 1999; Hyland 2000; Charles 2004; Samson 2004a; Diani 2006). The expression of stance has also been investigated, with several studies specifically focusing on particular lexicogrammatical elements contributing to evaluation function within and across genres (e.g. Bondi 2002; Silver 2003, 2004). However, little attention has been paid to the relationship between disciplinary and cultural variation in the expression of stance in academic discourse. One of the extremely interesting effects of such a comparative research is to contribute to understanding how far the expression of stance is influenced by national “disciplinary culture” (Hyland 2000), or by national academic culture in general. It is from these latter considerations that the present study takes its lead.

An analysis of personal stance may focus on different lexical or grammatical items (e.g. Hyland 1998; Hunston & Thompson 2000; Biber *et al.* 1999). First-person markers, for example, would be the most obvious subjective forms of authorial stance in both spoken and written academic discourse (e.g. Hyland 2001, 2002; Fortanet-Gómez 2004; Samson 2004b; Fløttum 2005; Bondi 2007a).

The focus of this paper is on a less obvious marker of personal stance. Following Francis, Manning and Hunston (1988), and Hunston and Sinclair (2000), we will

examine the introductory ‘it’ patterns *it v-link ADJ that-clause* and *it v-link ADJ to-inf. clause* in comparable corpora of research article openings, i.e. “the opening section up to and including the second paragraph of each article” (Silver & Bondi 2004: 121), and book review articles in English and Italian in the discipline of history¹.

The context of this analysis is provided by a number of previous studies (e.g. Biber, Conrad & Reppen 1998; Biber *et al.* 1999; Charles 2000; Hewings & Hewings 2002; Murphy 2004; Groom 2005), which looked at these phraseological patterns as particularly salient in academic English. These patterns are commonly used to express evaluations, and one aspect considered here is that although they may appear to be impersonal, “in a way that allows the writer to remain in the background”, as Biber *et al.* (1999: 976) put it, we understand quite well that the writer is the source of the comment. This is not a new finding: as Charles (2000: 48) points out, “although these patterns appear on the surface to be impersonal, the adjective choice opens up a space which the author can use to indicate the nature of his/her comment on what follows”. And as Murphy (2004: 213) notes,

in this type of pattern the speaker does not ‘assume explicit responsibility’ for the attitude expressed towards the proposition that follows, so the evaluation may have an aura of objectivity about it rather than personal resonance. While the evaluation is not explicitly averred, there are nevertheless some reasons why on occasions there is no aura of objectivity around the pattern. This happens when the evaluator is modified by an adverbial [...]. Subjectivity creeps back into the text through these adverbials.

The aim of this study is to extend these observations to cross-generic and cross-cultural analysis, with a view to illuminating generic and cultural variation in the use of these phraseological patterns. Given the now significant body of work demonstrating linguistic variation within and across disciplines and genres, and given the broad consensus that such variation is not arbitrary but always rhetorically motivated (Hyland 2000), it is plausible to suppose that different genres and cultures might make differential use of these phraseological resources. It is precisely this possibility that the present study aims to investigate.

After a brief presentation of the materials and the procedures adopted for this study, we will provide a preliminary overview of the pattern/meaning associations for these patterns across genres and cultures. The overview will include a cross-cultural comparison of selected lexical elements.

¹ These patterns are phraseological units in which the dummy subject pronoun *it* is followed by a link verb such as *be*, *become* or *seem*, and adjective or noun group, and a finite or non-finite *that*-clause, *to*-infinitive clause, *wh*-clause or *-ing* clause. (Francis, Manning & Hunston 1998; Hunston & Sinclair 2000). For reasons of length, only the first two patterns are discussed here.

2. *Materials and methods*

The analysis is based on four small specialized corpora of book review articles and research article openings, which have been designed to study academic writing in the discipline of history in different cultural contexts – English and Italian. We made use of the following corpora:

- a) a corpus of 76 Historical Book Review Articles in English (Eng. HIBRA) published in five British and American academic journals spanning the years 1999-2005 (consisting of 304,981 words)².
- b) a corpus of 41 Historical Book Review Articles in Italian (It. HIBRA) published in three Italian academic journals spanning the years 1999-2005 (consisting of 189,346 words)³.
- c) a corpus of 280 historical research article openings in English (Eng. Openings) published in ten British and American academic journals spanning the years 1999-2000 (consisting of 95,682 words)⁴.
- d) a corpus of 310 historical research article openings in Italian (It. Openings) published in eight Italian academic journals spanning the years 1999-2001 (consisting of 97,513 words)⁵.

The corpora are of different sizes because they were originally compiled for other purposes. All frequency data reported in this paper will be presented as normalised figures, calculated per thousand words.

The two genres selected for analysis were judged suitable for present purposes as their very specific status in the field of genre studies. Keeping in mind the basically dialogic and argumentative nature of academic discourse, both the book review article and the research article represent the most distinguished channel of knowledge dissemination within the specific scientific community. Within an academic context, they play a crucial role in the process of knowledge construction and discussion by providing a forum in which academics can set out their views in the form of arguments. More specifically, focusing on the status of the research article openings in terms of the main function of the research article, Bondi (2007b: 72) sees the first two paragraphs of the research article introduction as offering “material that showed the starting point of the article, but also the direction taken, the dynamics of the beginning section of the text”. Like a book review article, a research article opening identifies a ‘research space’ for the writer’s own views within a disciplinary debate, and the creation of a research space

² The journals considered are: *Labour History Review*, *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, *American Historical Review*, *Gender & History*, *Journal of American History*.

³ The journals considered are: *Meridiana*, *Passato e Presente*, *Quaderni Medievali*.

⁴ The journals considered are: *Labour History Review*, *Historical Research*, *Gender & History*, *Journal of European Ideas*, *Journal of Medieval History*, *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, *Journal of Social History*, *Studies in History*, *American Quarterly*, *American Historical Review*.

⁵ The journals considered are: *Passato e Presente*, *Quaderni Medievali*, *Il Pensiero Politico*, *Intersezioni*, *Meridiana*, *Società e Storia*, *Studi Medievali*, *Dimensioni e Problemi della Ricerca Storica*.

is realized by a variety of voices that indirectly help establish the writer's voice and construct a "niche" for his/her claims (Swales 1990).

The choice of the disciplinary area for this study – history – is linked to its position in the field of disciplinary discourses. As Bondi (2007b: 68-69) observes,

history stands out for the obvious tensions between narrative and argument in the basic structure of discourse. [...] The writer does not only interpret events: he or she also argues for his or her own position in the context of a disciplinary debate, in a complex dialogic pattern with the reader. History is not just account and interpretation of events, but also dialogic argumentation of the interpretation put forward.

The methodology adopted for this study combines a discourse and a corpus perspective. Discourse analysis contributes to the definition of pragmatic functions of introductory 'it' phraseological patterns under investigation, whereas corpus linguistics offers ways of looking at lexical patterns: in particular, using Scott (1998), we studied wordlist frequencies and concordances. These were worked out by comparing corpora to each other.

Large-scale corpus research has established that the adjectives that occur in the introductory 'it' patterns fall into broad evaluative semantic meaning groups described by Francis, Manning and Hunston (1998) as "true/untrue, likely/unlikely, obvious, good/desirable, bad/undesirable, important/necessary, interesting/surprising", and relabelled by Groom (2005) in terms of "adequacy, validity, desirability, difficulty, expectation, and importance".

Our cross-cultural comparison of evaluative adjectives in the patterns was conducted according to the evaluative semantic meaning groups indicated with the patterns in Groom (2005), who followed Francis, Manning and Hunston's (1998) categories, and are reproduced here as Table I. It should be underlined here that adjectives were not assigned to particular meaning groups on an *a priori* basis. Rather, each attested phraseological sequence (i.e. attested strings of words describable by such formulae as *it v-link ADJ that/to-inf.*) was examined by looking at the co-text. The semantic values attached to each adjective by Groom (2005) were found to be appropriate for our data as well. As space does not permit detailed analysis of all finite verbs occurring in these phraseological patterns, the discussion presented here focuses on the most frequent in the data – *is/was* – and compares it with its equivalent in Italian: *è/era*.

<i>Evaluative category</i>	<i>(Engl.) it v-link ADJ that/ (It.) verbo+AGG+che</i>	<i>(Engl.) it v-link ADJ to-inf./ (It.) verbo+AGG+infinito presente</i>
ADEQUACY	–	(Engl.) It was broad enough to incorporate ...; (It.) È opportuno precisare...
VALIDITY	(Engl.) It is possible that...; (It.) È probabile che...; È chiaro che...	(Engl.) It is quite possible to write...; (It.) È dunque possibile rivedere...
DESIRABILITY	–	(Engl.) It is fair to characterize...; (It.) È giusto continuare a riflettere...
DIFFICULTY	–	
EXPECTATION	(Engl.) It is not surprising here that...	(Engl.) It is hard to believe...; (It.) È difficile negare ...
IMPORTANCE	(Engl.) It is significant that...; (It.) È significativo che...	(Engl.) It is not therefore surprising to find...; (It.) È interessante notare... (Engl.) It is important to look...; it is not necessary to have...; (It.) Ed è importante osservare...

Table I: A classification system of pattern/meaning associations for *it + is/was + ADJ + that/to-inf.* and their Italian equivalents across the corpora (based on Groom 2005).

In Table I, we see that not all the meaning groups occur in both patterns across the corpora. In particular, 'adequacy', 'desirability' and 'difficulty' are restricted to the *it v-link ADJ to-inf./verbo+AGG+infinito presente* patterns in both cultures. The fact that the *it v-link ADJ to-inf.* pattern is associated with the evaluative meaning groups 'desirability' and 'difficulty' echoes the findings by Biber *et al.* (1999: 720) in the *Longman Grammar*, who note that the most common adjectival predicates controlling extraposed *to*-clauses are (*im*)possible, difficult, hard, good, better, best, nice⁶.

⁶ Biber *et al.* (1999) talk of "extraposed complement clauses" rather than introductory 'it' patterns, and although they analyse and label meaning groups somewhat differently, their categories are sufficiently analogous for the above observations made.

3. *Introductory 'it' patterns across genres and cultures: the case of it + is/was + ADJ + that/to-inf. and their Italian equivalents*

The present analysis found significant variation in the distribution of the patterns under investigation across all four corpora. Space does not permit a full treatment of findings, so the present discussion will be restricted to dominant pattern/meaning associations for these phraseological patterns for each corpus only, and are reproduced as Table II.

Table II: *Distribution of dominant pattern/meaning associations for it + is/was + ADJ + that/to-inf. and their Italian equivalents across the corpora (per 1,000 words).*

<i>Corpus</i>	<i>Dominant pattern</i>	<i>Dominant meaning</i>	<i>Occurrences per 1,000 words</i>
HIBRA (English)	<i>It v-link ADJ to-inf.</i>	Difficulty	0.19
HIBRA (Italian)	verbo AGG che/infinito presente	Validity	0.15
Openings (English)	<i>It v-link ADJ that</i>	Validity	0.19
Openings (Italian)	verbo AGG che/infinito presente	Validity	0.14

As Table II shows, 'validity' is the dominant meaning for the patterns *it is/was ADJ that/è-era+AGG+che* in historical research article openings in both cultures. If this finding is broadly in line with expectations – in registers which construct knowledge, such as research articles, the expression of degree of certainty is important: the "certainty parameter" (Hunston & Thompson 2000: 23), defining how certain the writer is of what is to follow – the finding that 'difficulty' is the dominant meaning for the pattern *it is/was ADJ to-inf.* in English historical book review articles is somewhat more unexpected. Given the evaluative purpose of the genre, it would be reasonable to expect the 'desirability' meaning group to be prominent here, which covers the basic *good/bad* evaluative polarity. But the present data find 'desirability' to be relatively dispreferred in the corpus, only constituting a frequency of 0.07 per 1,000 words in the pattern *it is/was ADJ to-inf.* in the whole corpus. Also the 'validity' meaning is not prominent (only a frequency of 0.12 per 1,000 words in the patterns *it is/was ADJ that/to-inf.* in the whole corpus). But this is not the case of the Italian HIBRA corpus where 'validity' is the main meaning group in both phraseologies.

3.1 Focus on the patterns in English and Italian historical book review articles

When considering evaluative adjectives in the dominant pattern *it is/was ADJ to-inf.* in the English HIBRA corpus, we find that the most frequent items are associated with the notion of 'difficulty' like *difficult* (it is attested 23/60 times – the percentage

amounts to 38.33%), *impossible* (12 occurrences/60 – 20%), *not possible* (12 occurrences/60 – 20%), and *hard* (7 occurrences/60 – 11.66%).

Closer analysis reveals that this phraseology is frequently used for both negative assessments of specific theories:

- (1) Urton attempts to solve these problems by arguing that any given decimal khipu supported two readings, one numeric and one binary. *It is difficult to imagine how* these two functionally different yet materially isomorphic, overlapping semiotic systems could operate simultaneously on the same khipu. (Engl. HIBRA)

and for negative assessments of the reviewed book author's argument:

- (2) Without such examinations, however, *it is difficult to know* what to make of Lu's broadest arguments about how Old Shanghai's traditions helped to facilitate the city's new global status. (Engl. HIBRA)

Our data support the study by Hyland (2000: 61), which finds that "unlike research articles, outright criticism is not avoided in book reviews, indeed it is an integral feature of the genre, substantiating its claim to be a scholarly form of writing". Along the same lines, Giannoni (2002: 356) points out that "conflict is the common thread that holds this genre together". In explaining this finding, we cite evidence from our analysis, which shows that these adjectives frequently occur within the vicinity of some marker of counter-claims, such as *however*, *but*, *yet* so as to create pattern of contrast/conflict. This result provides a particularly clear illustration of the role of the reviewer as academic arguer.

- (3) Top-down planning on a large scale did, of course, occur during World Wars I and II. But the postwar reaction to the distended wartime state made it clear that Seeing Like a State Scott-style was an anomaly born of emergency conditions, and it found little nourishment in American cultural soil. Aside from wartime, the American state-led programs that come closest to Scott's high modernist model are the Interstate Highway System and NASA. *But*, for all their scale and cost, *it is difficult to see* either as an oppressive instance of top-down state planning. (Engl. HIBRA)

If we move to cross-cultural comparison, Italian HIBRA shows a different trend. The data reveal that 'validity' rather than 'difficulty' (where only 2 occurrences of the sequence *non è più possibile + inf.* occur) is the main meaning group in the corpus, with a frequency of 0.15 per 1,000 words in the patterns *verbo+AGG+che/infinito presente* in the whole corpus, followed by both 'desirability' and 'importance', showing a similar frequency (0.05 per 1,000 words). The analysis reveals that the most frequently occurring evaluative adjective in the *verbo+AGG+che* pattern is *vero* that is attested 13/22 times (59.09%). Interestingly, the data show that the 'validity' sequence *verbo+vero+che* often pairs a concessive clause with a counter-claim:

- (4) Ci sono però altri risvolti del panarabismo che vanno segnalati. AJ è causa ed effetto dell'individuazione di un bacino economico e politico di estrema rilevanza. *Forse non è del tutto corretto, come fa Della Ratta, affermare che* soltanto dalla seconda metà degli anni novanta nella regione si è iniziato a ragionare in termini di mercato. *È, però vero che* solo allora si sono create quelle condizioni sociali, politiche, economiche, che hanno permesso di fare del "popolo arabo" un mercato unico a tutti gli effetti, di grande interesse per i governi e per le imprese, per il suo potenziale politico e per la possibilità di sfruttare le economie di scala a livello distributivo. (It. HIBRA)

The examples indicate that, although there is a significant variation across the two comparable corpora in terms of parameters of evaluation (English HIBRA seems to privilege the notion of 'difficulty', whereas Italian HIBRA favours 'validity'), both English and Italian historical reviewers display a greater concern with long sequences of argumentative dialogue between the reviewed book author and themselves. From the point of view of the argumentative development of discourse in the genre, counter-claiming or pointing out gaps in existing research (including, of course, the book under discussion) contributes to representing the debate reviewers build not only with reviewed authors but also within the disciplinary area.

3.2 Focus on the patterns in English and Italian historical research article openings

As Table II shows, 'validity' is the dominant meaning for the patterns *it v-link ADJ that/ verbo+AGG+che* in the two comparable corpora of openings in both cultures. In the Italian corpus 'validity' is also the dominant meaning for the pattern *verbo+AGG+infinito presente*. In English openings, the 'validity' sequence *it is clear that* is the most frequent (is attested 8/19 times – 42.10%), followed by *it is (un)true that* (3/19 – 15.78%), confirming the findings by Biber *et al.* (1999: 672) in the *Longman Grammar*, who note that "*clear, (un)likely, (im)possible, true* are the four most common adjectival predicates controlling extraposed *that*-clauses in LSWE Corpus". In Italian openings, on the other hand, the 'validity' sequences *è vero che* and *è possibile+infinito presente* are the most frequent (*è vero che* is attested 4/7 times – 57.14%; *è possibile+infinito presente* 7/8 – 87.5%). These results point to the possibility of a common English and Italian pattern involving markers of epistemic stance (evaluators of truth, certainty or likelihood).

Cross-cultural comparison provides a particularly clear illustration of how English and Italian use the *it v-link ADJ that* and *verbo+AGG+infinito presente* patterns, respectively, to give two different types of 'validity' assessment, confirming the distinction made in Francis, Manning and Hunston (1998) between 'likely' and 'obvious':

- a) one providing evaluations based on appeals to *possibility/likelihood* that characterize the Italian corpus of openings:

(5) Utilizzando una serie di testi che coprono un arco di tempo che va dall'XI al XX secolo, è possibile osservare la costante presenza di questo santo nella credenza popolare e la sua fortuna nel corso dei secoli. (It. Openings)

b) the other based on evidence and appealing to notions of *obviousness* that characterize the English corpus of openings:

(6) [...] On Crimes and Punishments appealed alike to sovereigns, statesmen and philosophes. In this regard, the work held great importance for the English intellectual environment, where Beccaria's arguments drew wide and sustained acknowledgement from many sections of society. This is not to say that criticism of English penal practice and theory was unheard of before Beccaria's work appeared. There are many examples of criticism being levelled both at the practices of English punishment and at the principles which supported them before 1764. *Nevertheless, it is clear that* the work was eagerly adopted, *most obviously* by lawyers and the rising middle classes, as a declaration of the fundamental principles that ought to underpin the application of the penal sanction in an 'improved' civilisation. (Engl. Openings)

If we consider (6) above, where the use of the contrastive connector *nevertheless* signals a counter-claim, allowing the writer to show contrast and signalling his opinion, we can see that in the research article opening, as Bondi (2007b) puts it, the writer is not only involved in interpreting historical sequence events, but in dialogically arguing a claim, so as to place it in the context of a debate, signalling the importance of his/her interpretation, rather than that of the subject matter.

3.3 A lexical case study: the lemma *surprise* in English

Further reflections on cross-cultural analysis can be offered by studying the concordances of selected lexical elements. The choice of the lemma to be analysed falls on *surprise* (i.e. *it is not surprising that, it is not a surprise that, surprisingly*).

When we analyse the evaluative adjectives used in the patterns across the two cultures, we find that most of them are equivalent (i.e. *true/vero, possible/possibile, clear/chiaro* etc.). But this is not the case of *surprising* that occurs only in the two English corpora, with a frequency of 0.12 per 1,000 words in HIBRA corpus and 0.11 in English Openings.

Both genres show a preference for negative polarity (*not surprising, no surprise, not surprisingly*), constituting 73.68% of all occurrences of the lemma *surprise* in the whole corpora (28 occurrences/38 occurrences) against 26.31% showing positive polarity (10 occurrences/38).

(7) The list of Butterfield's accomplishments and services to the field is so long that *it is perhaps not surprising that* he is generally also believed to have founded the Cambridge history of science committee, the body in whose activities the institutionalization of the subject at Cambridge is ultimately rooted. (Engl. Openings)

- (8) *It is no surprise that* those of us who make it our business to study the distant past should dwell so obsessively upon the written word. Written texts, after all, are far and away our most abundant resource for understanding the long defunct people and societies that constitute the subject of our investigations. (Engl. Openings)
- (9) *Not surprisingly*, books in these two categories differ from each other markedly on such basis issues as the influence of imperialism on China's modern history. What must be stressed, *however*, is that [...] (Engl. HIBRA)

As can be seen, the main function of the various modalizations of the lemma *surprise* is that of highlighting the expectedness of the statement in itself as in (7); it also, however, predicts that the obvious nature of the statement will lead to further elaboration or explanation that may be derived from it as in (8) and also contrasts sequences as in (9).

The adjective *surprising* is also used to indicate a gap in the literature, by emphasizing it. An illustration is provided in example (10).

- (10) *It is rather surprising here that* a chronology of urbanization is not clearly related to a similar chronology of economic history. For example, *little* is made of the past role and heritage of the oil industry, of the military, both U.S. Navy and armaments industry, and of L.A. (Engl. HIBRA)

On the whole, such results support Bondi and Mazzi's (2007) view that markers of (un)expectedness are crucial in English academic discourse. In terms of writer's positioning, they observe, "markers of (un)expectedness can be used meta-discursively to signal 'engagement', i.e. resources by which the author negotiates (engages with) the various convergent or conflicting positions activated in the text" (2007: 131).

One interesting question still unanswered is why no Italian equivalent of *surprising* occurs in the Italian corpora. We would presume the persuasive intent of reviewers and researchers is the same in both cultures, yet obviously their strategies for convincing readers of the plausibility of their interpretations may differ.

4. Conclusions

The brief overview of academic phraseology across genres and cultures has shown that the evaluative meaning associations with the two grammar patterns *it is/was ADJ that* and *it is/was ADJ to-inf.* and their Italian equivalents vary across the four corpora studied here.

We have seen that in historical book review articles parameters of evaluation in the two patterns under examination are different across the two cultures. On the whole, the English corpus privileges the notion of 'difficulty', that is frequently used for negative assessments. English reviewers present themselves as struggling to be both appropriately critical and fair. The Italian corpus, on the other hand, favours 'validity'. Italian reviewers predominantly use these patterns to assess the validity of the reviewed

book author's ideas of the historical record.

Both English and Italian writers in historical research article openings, in contrast, show a greater concern with 'validity'. Italian historians tend to provide evidence on notions of 'likelihood', while writers in English on notions of 'obviousness'.

We have attempted to show how the patterns under investigation contribute to the construction of the reviewer's or researcher's argumentative position, in a way that, though apparently impersonal, you can discern their voices. This seems to confirm Murphy's (2004: 219) remark that "it is largely impossible for a writer to remain in the background [...] and what appears to be impersonal is merely a mask which the writer soon sheds".

In both corpora of book review articles and openings, history is placed under discussion within a disciplinary debate: both reviewers and writers interpret historical events and argue their claims in a debate within the discourse community.

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THE VERBAL MEANS IN GERMAN AND JAPANESE ARGUMENTATION

MARION GREIN

Introduction

The article aims at a comparison of the linguistic means of argumentation in German and Japanese. The first chapter will give definitions of both, argument and argumentation. Furthermore, some basics of argumentation theory are summarized. The second chapter is concerned with the means of language used in argumentation. These can be differentiated into several linguistic devices or markers, i.e. the lexical selection, the topic-comment or thematic structure, illocutionary markers and various connectors. Here, I will confine myself to the analysis of various connectors or discourse markers used in argumentative action games.

The goal of my study was to compare these devices within the languages of German and Japanese. Due to my ample data set consisting of German and Japanese refusals (Grein 2007a), the study will be limited to justificatory argumentation in which one person at a time seeks to justify his or her refusal to undertake a specific action. The given role-play situation consists of a directive in which the test persons are asked to do some extra non-paid work on a weekend. The argumentation being that extra non-paid work is acceptable under special circumstances. Altogether 200 German and 200 Japanese test persons refused to work voluntarily and almost 70% of them, however more Germans than Japanese, argued why they would not work during their leisure without (financial) compensation. Both, German and Japanese, possess equivalent causal conjunctions, yet, next to using conjunctions, Japanese makes frequent use of conjunctive converbal constructions and nominalizations.

1. Arguments, Argumentation and the Minimal Action Game

Within the field of linguistics, there are numerous definitions for the concepts of argument and argumentation (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992: 60ff.). In the year 1990, Lumer had already outlined a number of 18 diverging definitions (Lumer 1990: 26ff.).

The most prominent definition harkens back to van Eemeren, Grootendorst & Kruiger (1987: 7), who define argumentation as

a social, intellectual, verbal activity serving to justify or refute an opinion, consisting of a constellation of statements and directed towards obtaining the approbation of an audience, a form of interaction. An argument is, thus, often defined as "any exchange of information centered on an avowed disagreement" (Gilbert 1997: 104).

Or as van Eemeren *et al.* (1996: 5) put it:

Argumentation is a verbal and social activity of reason aimed at increasing (or decreasing) the acceptability of a controversial standpoint for the listener or reader, by putting forward a constellation of propositions intended to justify (or refute) the standpoint before a rational judge.

Taking this definition into account, most propositions, oral and written, can be interpreted as a kind of argumentation. Weigand (1999: 54) argues:

From a functional point of view it seems absurd to deny that we would not always try to achieve our communicative purposes by more or less effective means. Thus language use in dialogic action games would always be inherently persuasive from the very beginning.

Typical situations are the request of a child to stay up late, the attempts of an employee to increase his salary, the efforts of a politician to convince the opposition of any innovations or the endeavour of a lawyer to find an accused not guilty. Thus, most dialogic conversations or dialogic action games are arguments justifying one's actions.

Just as we are confronted with numerous definitions of argument and argumentation, there are frequent theoretical approaches. Van Eemeren & Grootendorst (1992: 6ff.) outline ten theoretical approaches. Bückler (2004: 16) summarizes thirteen approaches.

In Weigand's (2003, 2006, 2008, *forthc.* this volume) holistic approach argumentation is not interpreted "as a game in the abstract, but starts from human beings' mind" (Weigand, this volume). Weigand (this volume) distinguishes between *games* of argumentation and *moves* of arguing. She considers the classical game of argumentation as a representative game of negotiation about the world between thesis and antithesis:




Fig. 1: Representative game of argumentation

Weigand (this volume) conceives moves of arguing, i.e. of providing reasons, as representative subordinate moves which can appear in every game, not only in support of representative claims but also in support of claims to volition:



Fig. 2: Arguing in representative and directive games

Both, the speaker with his or her specific interest as well as the hearer who either accepts or refutes the position of the speaker, verbalize their positions with the means of arguments. In any argumentative dialogic action game, the speaker is aware that the hearer might have a divergent opinion concerning the content of his or her argumentation. Thus, the speaker tries to verbalize his or her statements, his argumentation, by such means that the hearer will consider the argumentation as comprehensible, acceptable or at least admissible (van Eemeren *et al.* 1996). He or she needs to be convincing.

The minimal action game analyzed here could be considered as a directive action game, in which a superior requests an employee to work during the weekend, nil-paid. The analysis, however, concerns the following representative game:

thesis	antithesis
<p>argument of the superior: It is perfectly all right to ask an employee to work on weekends in case of a special occasion.</p>	<p>argument of employees:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - not ethical - impossible without financial compensation - impossible when other obligations or engagements exist - indirect argument

Fig. 3: The game of argumentation analyzed

Argumentation is understood as a process in which speakers, with their very own cognition, emotions, cultural backgrounds, beliefs etc., depict a specific situation with verbal means. Weigand (this volume) states: "Argumentation starts from divergent views. Different claims to truth are expressed by representative speech acts and then negotiated in argumentative dialogues". Argumentation is not only subject to semantic content; it also exhibits a particular linguistic structure, including particular verbal means. Both, semantic content and linguistic structure are primarily dependent on contextual and pragmatic factors, i.e. the specific situation and the social distance between the speakers. Thus, the argumentation of the child who wants to stay up late, the attempts of the employee and the endeavour of the lawyer mentioned above will surely have a different structure and different verbal means. Furthermore, nonverbal communication is accompanied with verbal communication in argumentation but will be disregarded in this article.

Van Eemeren & Grootendorst (1992: 6ff) – like many other approaches – operate with argument schemes. They differentiate symptomatic, analogical and causal argumentation. Without going into the controversial debate between philosophical ideals and rhetoric, I will confine myself to four basic types of argumentation schemes: moral, plausible, rational and tactic argumentation which are often discussed as fallacies (van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2008).




Fig. 4: Types of argumentation

It is possible to appeal purely on moral or ethical grounds. Common values and principles of society are mentioned. Moreover, ethical argumentation predominantly mentions persons of high standing as prominent examples of public opinion ('argument of authority'). Moral argumentation is often found in China when people refer to Confucius.

In plausible argumentation, arguments can be based on the possibility of adverse publicity or potential damaging effects of a particular action. Plausible evidence is often based on published data, observed experiences of others, public opinion and common sense ('sanity and reason'). Plausible argumentation is difficult to distinguish from rational argumentation.

In rational argumentation, however, the persuasiveness of facts (statistics, research data, and verifiable hypotheses) is predominant. In due form, the speaker suggests several competing counter-positions and then proceeds to make a rational choice between those positions, based on factual evidence. The conclusion often is not offered as the ultimate truth but rather as the most likely one out of several choices. Rational argumentation appeals to the listener's intellect and appears to be objective.

Again, tactical and rational argumentation is difficult to distinguish. Tactical argumentation, in fact, seems to be close to some types of fallacies. Instead of arguing the speaker emphasizes his or her alleged supremacy. He or she pretends to consider counter-positions objectively, yet, dismisses all counter-arguments as incomparable exceptions to the rule.

2. Verbal Means of Argumentation

The means of language used in argumentation can be differentiated into a several linguistic devices or markers, i.e. the lexical selection, the topic-comment or thematic structure, illocutionary markers and various connectors (van Eemeren & Grootendorst

1992; Eggs 2001). Furthermore, the argumentative function can be implicit, and thus linguistically unmarked (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1981). On top of that, non- and paraverbal devices can supersede the necessity for explicit marking of the argumentative function.

Here, I will take a look at the various connectors used in argumentative discourse. These markers are markers of adverbial subordination, i.e. conjunctions, causal adverbs and prepositional noun phrases. They link two propositions, usually indicating a causal relation. The argumentative function can, however, be implicit and thus overt marking is unnecessary. Moreover, non- and paraverbal means can be sufficient when the relation can be implied.

Some examples will illustrate the verbal means:

Conjunctions:

- (1) Ich möchte abends eine Stunde länger aufbleiben, *weil* alle meine Freundinnen auch erst um 21 Uhr ins Bett müssen.
I wanna go to bed late *because* all of my friends don't have to be in bed before 9 o'clock!

Causal adverb:

- (2) Ich möchte abends eine Stunde später ins Bett. Meine Freundinnen müssen *nämlich* auch alle erst um 21 Uhr ins Bett. [further German adverbs: *daher*, *deshalb*, *darum* ('that's why') *trotzdem* ('in spite of it, nevertheless')].
I wanna go to bed late. *You see/you know*, all my friends don't have to go to bed before 9 o'clock.

Prepositional noun phrase:

- (3) *Aufgrund meines 12. Geburtstages* wäre es nur fair auch bis 21 Uhr aufbleiben zu dürfen
Because of my 12th birthday it would only be fair if I could stay up till 9

Juxtaposition (not overtly marked):

- (4) Ich möchte abends eine Stunde später ins Bett. Meine Freundinnen müssen auch alle erst um 21 Uhr ins Bett.
I wanna go to bed late. All my friends may stay up till 9 o'clock.

Simple construction:

Due to the fact that all these utterances are part of a dialogic action game, it is perfectly all right just to give the justification in a simple construction. The justification is given in reference to an initially uttered proposition.

- (5) Meine Freundinnen müssen auch alle erst um 21 Uhr ins Bett.
All my friends may stay up till 9 o'clock!

Question:

Just as the argument might consist of a simple declarative sentence, a question can be interpreted as an argument.

- (6) Warum dürfen alle anderen länger aufbleiben als ich?
 Why may all my friends stay up late? (later than I do)

In Japanese, next to conjunctions, adverbs and juxtaposition, causal subordination can be marked with two further means: nominalization – which is different from prepositional noun phrases – and converbial constructions (Grein 1998).

Nominalization (Japanese):

- (7) Tomodachi mo 9ji made mesamete iru *wake*,
 friend too 9 o'clock till be awake reason

 watashi mo sô shitai.
 I too so do: DES I
 Because my friends may stay up till 9 o'clock, I wanna do that too.

The complete first sentence 'tomodachi mo 9ji made mesamete-iru' is desentialed by the noun *wake* ('reason') and has the status of a regular NP.

Converbial construction:

- (8) Tomodachi mo 9ji made mesamete *itekara*
 friend too 9 o'clock till be awake: CONV

 watashi mo sô shitai.
 I too so do: DES I
 Because my friends may stay up till 9 o'clock, I wanna do that, too.

3. Comparison of the Data

As mentioned before, the data are taken from my ample data-set on German and Japanese refusals (Grein 2007a). This study will be limited to justificatory argumentation in which one person at a time seeks to justify his or her refusal to undertake a specific action¹.

The verbal means listed in chapter 2 are presented within the chapters 3.1 to 3.8 for German and Japanese.

¹ For details and critique of the research design cf. Grein (2007a: 151-159).

3.1 Conjunctions




Fig. 5: Conjunctions

Although Japanese has a more elaborated set of markers than German (i.e. converbs and nominalization), the Japanese use more conjunctions than the Germans. It is furthermore notable that in 67,9% of all conjunctive constructions the conjunction *node* ('because') is used. Actually, *node* has been grammaticalized into a conjunction, historically being the nominalization marker *no* and the converbal form *de* of the copula *desu*. A second causal conjunction, next to *node*, is *kara*. Yet, constructions with *node* are considered to be more objective than those with *kara*, and thus are, obviously, more frequent. Constructions marked with *node* put their emphasis on the result whereas constructions with *kara* focus on the reason or cause (Grein 1998: 158f). In German, the conjunctions *weil* and *da* ('because') are most frequent.

3.2 Causal Adverbs

Neither the German nor the Japanese data displayed any causal adverbs. This might be due to the (hierarchical) constellation of employee and employer. Causal adverbs seem to lack the appropriate politeness. Within different interpersonal constellations causal adverbs were used in both languages.

3.3 Prepositional Noun Phrases




Fig. 6: Prepositional noun phrase

Prepositional – or rather postpositional in Japanese – noun-phrases were equally rare in both languages.

3.4 Juxtaposition (unmarked)




Fig. 7: Juxtaposition

Whereas juxtaposition is the third most frequent means in German with 18,4%, it is hardly used in Japanese at all. In Japanese, a conversation between equals is strongly dependent on context and thus arguments and connectors are omitted. Yet, when talking to a superior the arguments and thus the verbal markers are obligatory (Grein 2007a, b). This is also reflected in the usage or rather the absence of simple declarative sentences in Japanese that will be presented in the next chapter.

3.5 Simple declarative sentence




Fig. 8: Simple declarative sentence

As mentioned in section 3.4, the Japanese are obliged to mark their argumentation with connectors in the given situation. Thus, the employment of simple sentences – in which the causal context is implicit – is frequent in German (37,2%) and scarce in Japanese (12,5%).

3.6 Nominalization (Japanese)




Fig. 9: Nominalization

In German there are no nominal constructions like the ones found in Japanese. In Japanese a complete clause can be turned into a regular noun phrase. The NP can then be assigned with a case marker and be considered as a grammatical complement (cf. Grein 1998: 135). Most often the nouns *tame* ('reason') oder *toki* ('time') are used². Actually, these constructions are comparable to German prepositional noun phrases. Since, however, Japanese has both, nominalized constructions and pre- or rather postpositional noun phrases, they were analyzed separately. Examples (9) and (10) will illustrate the nominalization construction, example (10) being a Japanese gap-type relative clause.

- (9) *konshuumatsu wa shinyou no atsumari ga*
 this weekend TOP confidential GEN meeting NOM
aru tame
 have:PRES reason
 Because I have a confidential meeting this weekend

Konshuumatsu wa shinyou no atsumari ga aru is an independent finite declarative clause that can be translated 'This weekend I have a confidential meeting.' Example (10) illustrates the NP status of the clause:

- (10) $\left[\begin{array}{l} \left[\begin{array}{l} \textit{konshuumatsu} \quad \textit{wa} \quad \textit{shinyou} \quad \textit{no} \quad \textit{atsumari} \quad \textit{ga} \\ \textit{this weekend} \quad \textit{TOP} \quad \textit{confidential} \quad \textit{GEN} \quad \textit{meeting} \quad \textit{NOM} \end{array} \right] \\ \textit{aru} \quad \textit{otoko} \quad \left[\begin{array}{l} \textit{wa} \\ \textit{TOP} \end{array} \right] \quad \left[\begin{array}{l} \textit{shujin} \\ \textit{husband} \end{array} \right] \quad \textit{desu} \\ \textit{have:PRES} \quad \textit{man} \quad \left[\begin{array}{l} \textit{TOP} \\ \textit{1} \end{array} \right] \quad \left[\begin{array}{l} \textit{husband} \\ \textit{2} \end{array} \right] \quad \textit{COP:HON:PRES} \end{array} \right.$

1 = noun; 2 = NP

NP is my husband.

The man, who has a confidential meeting this weekend, is my husband.

² A listing of these nouns can be found in Grein (1998:137-156).

3.7 Converb




Fig. 10: Converb

Converbs are verb forms which are neither finite nor nominal (Grein 1998: 84). They are used in coordinative sequences of clauses or subordinate adverbial clauses. Tense, aspect and modal categories are dependent on the final finite verb.

Coordinative sequence

- (11) Asa ni okite kofi o nonde,
 morning TEMP wake-up:CONV coffee ACC drink:CONV
 gohan o tabete, shibun o yonde,
 rice AKK eat:CONV newspaper ACC read:CONV
 kaisha ni ikimasu.
 company DIR go:HON: **PRES.**
 I wake up in the morning, have some coffee, eat breakfast, read the newspaper
 and go to the company.

- (12) Asa ni okite kofi o nonde,
 morning TEMP wake-up:CONV coffee ACC drink:CONV
 gohan o tabete shibun o yonde,
 rice AKK eat:CONV newspaper ACC read:CONV
 kaisha ni ikimashita.
 company DIR go:HON: **PAST**
 I woke up in the morning, had some coffee, ate breakfast, read the newspaper and
 went to the company.

The change of tense refers to all prior given converbs.

Adverbial subordination:

- (13) Sushi o tabetekara hon o yomu.
 Sushi ACC eat:CONV book ACC read:PRES
 After having eaten Sushi, I will read a book.

- (14) Sushi o tabetekara hon o yomu.
 Sushi ACC eat:CONV book ACC read:PRES
 While I am eating Sushi, I will read a book.
- (15) Sushi o tabetekara hon o yomu.
 Sushi ACC eat:CONV book ACC read:PRES
 If I eat Sushi, I will read a book.

Grein (1998) differentiates altogether 13 converbs in Japanese. In fact, German provides two infinite verb forms that can be considered as converbs: present participle and present perfect participle.

- (16) Von ihren Tanzfähigkeiten singend betrat sie
 about her abilities to dance sing:CONV enter she
 den Saal (present participle)
 ART hall.
 While singing about her dancing abilities she entered the hall.
- (17) Von ihren Tanzfähigkeiten überzeugt betrat sie
 about her abilities to dance convince:CONV enter she
 den Saal (present participle)
 ART hall.
 Being convinced that she could dance she entered the hall.
 (Grein 1998: 84)

Within the data-set, there were no converbal constructions in German but 33 (16,5%) occurrences in Japanese. Semantically, most of these constructions do not offer an antithesis but rather the speaker puts up an argument why he or she will not be able to work on the weekend. Indirectly, the speaker thereby indicates that his or her argument is superior to the employer's argument.

Direct argumentation:

thesis	↔	antithesis
argument		argument
claim to truth		claim to truth
REPRESENTATIVE		NON-ACCEPTANCE
It is perfectly all right to work honorary at special occasions		Extra work has to be paid

Fig. 11: Representative game of direct argumentation

Indirect argumentation:

DIRECTIVE	↔	NON-CONSENT
'You have to work this weekend'		'No'
thesis		thesis
argument		argument
claim to truth		claim to truth
REPRESENTATIVE		REPRESENTATIVE (NUNTIATIVE)
It is perfectly all right to work honorary at special occasions		I have an important engagement My mother is sick

Fig. 12: Representative game of indirect argumentation

Indeed, one could argue that these cases are no argumentations. Yet, I conceive them as indirect argumentation. The employee, by uttering his or her argument, implies that the employer's argument is of less importance or even non-discussable.

- (18) haha no joutai ga warukute
 my mother GEN health NOM bad:ADV:CONV
- sono hi wa ikesou ni arimasen
 that day TOP go:POT:HON:PRES:NEG
 Since my mother's health is quite bad, that day won't work.
- (19) sono hi wa doushite mo ikanai
 that day TOP how too go:NEG:PRES
- t o ikenai youji ga atteka ra
 COM P go:POT:NEG:PRES plan NOM have:CONV
- dekin dekimasen
 work can:HON:NEG:PRES
 Since on that day I have plans that can by no chance be cancelled, I can't work.

3.8 Question




Fig. 13: Question

Again, this type of argumentation is considered as indirect argumentation.

thesis ↔ questioning the thesis

argument ↔ question

claim to truth ↔ claim to knowledge

REPRESENTATIVE ↔ EXPLORATIVE

It is perfectly all right to work
honorary at special occasions

Considering my salary, just a
joke, right?

Fig. 14: Explorative game of indirect argumentation

Within the German data 13 employees put forward their argumentation by means of a question. In Japanese only two occurrences were found. Questions are not sufficiently marked for politeness. Concerning the contents of utterances, the Japanese examples are diplomatic, not really giving any argument, while in the German examples the antithesis is easily recognizable.

(20) sore wa watashi ni shika dekinai
that TOP I DAT alone can:NEG:PRES

koto na node shimau ka.
thing because finish:PRES QU
Is that a job that can only be done by me?

(21) Bei meiner Bezahlung wohl eher ein Spaß?
With my salary probably rather a joke
Considering my salary rather a joke, right?

(22) In meiner Position? Ist das ein Witz?
 In my position? Is that a joke?
 In my position? Are you joking?

4. Comparison




Fig. 15: Comparison verbal means

The Japanese prefer complex constructions and employ overt verbal markers, i.e. conjunctions and converbs (83%). In German, however, simple constructions, i.e. simple declarative clauses, juxtapositions and questions, are preferred. Within the German data merely 37,8% of the sentences are complex and overtly marked with an adverbial subordinator.

Whereas we find ‘real’ argumentation within the German data, the Japanese rather employ the indirect strategy given in Fig. 12:

DIRECTIVE	↔	NON-CONSENT
‘You have to work this weekend’		‘No’
thesis		thesis
argument		argument
claim to truth		claim to truth
REPRESENTATIVE		REPRESENTATIVE (NUNTIA-TIVE)
It is perfectly all right to work honorary at special occasions		I have an important engagement My mother is sick

Fig. 12: Representative game of indirect argumentation

A first glance at the types of argumentation displays that Germans tend to argue plausible and tactical while the Japanese favour implicit moral argumentation. What exactly is implicit moral argumentation? When talking to superiors, the social distance has to be taken into account. Thus, in the given interpersonal constellation, many Japanese do not argue against the employer's proposition that working on an honorary basis is permissible on special occasions but rather adhere to society's moral conventions of non-acceptance by using set phrases in which further obligations or even liabilities are mentioned. The establishment and maintenance of harmony is the most important value of Japanese society (cf. Grein 2008a: 195), in order to preserve or maintain harmony, each individual has to adhere to his or her obligations (jap. *giri*). Obligations are of greater moral value than other arguments. As mentioned before a set phrase like 'the circumstances are a bit bad, but I have another obligation' is considered a stronger argument than the superior's argument. Therefore, Japanese games of argumentation need further analysis within different interpersonal relations, especially in constellations where the arguers possess the same social status.

5. *Relevance*

The study has shown that both, semantic contents (argumentation type) and linguistic devices differ within the analyzed languages German and Japanese. Further analysis and comparison is indispensable since the given interpersonal constellation had an impact on the argumentation types.

These findings are of relevance for argumentation theory, interactional linguistics and cross-cultural pragmatics, where speech acts uttered in identical interaction settings are compared (Blum-Kulka *et al.* 1989; Grein 2008b: 21). Results of cross-cultural pragmatics are of relevance for second language research. The findings of the present study could and should be considered in second language instruction and textbooks. Structure, contents and devices diverge. Not considering these differences in a cross-cultural argumentation would lead to miscommunication.

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Glossary

ACC	Accusative	HON	Honorifics
ADV	Adverb	NEG	Negation
ART	Article	NOM	Nomination
CONV	Converb	PAST	Past tense
COP	Copula	POT	Potential
DAT	Dative	PRES	Present tense
DESI	Desiderative	QU	Question marker
GEN	Genitive	TEMP	Temporal marker
		TOP	Topic

A CONTRASTIVE STUDY OF THE INTRODUCTION SECTION GENRE OF ENGLISH AND PERSIAN MEDICAL RESEARCH ARTICLES

AVISHAN MAHZARI

Introduction

It has been difficult to avoid the word genre in language education in recent years. Many studies have been carried out to investigate the effect of genre awareness on producing straightforward and sound types of research articles. University students need to both write and comprehend research articles. Within this text type, the introduction section of research article is a genre in itself (Swales 1990, Bhatia 1993) as distinct from other sections of research articles. The introduction sections of research articles have been widely studied because, as Swales (1990) puts it, they are the most difficult part for writers, because they are forced with numerous options and decisions in this section: the amount of background knowledge, the authoritative *versus* sincere tone, the winsomeness of the appeal to readers, and directness of the approach they should incorporate into their writing. This study is an attempt to investigate the introduction section genre of American-English and Persian medical research article. The study aims to find out whether there is any difference in the introduction sections of these two languages as far as the frequency of moves and steps are concerned.

Method

Swales' (1990) CARS model was utilized for the analysis. The model could effectively explain the introduction section genre of English and Persian medical research article. Swales (1990:141) posits a three move pattern for article introduction, as shown below.

MOVE 1:	ESTABLISHING A TERRITORY
Step 1	Claiming centrality and/or
Step 2	Making topic generalization and/ or
Step 3	Reviewing items of previous research
MOVE 2:	ESTABLISHING A NICHE
Step 1A	Counter-claiming or
Step 1B	Indicating a gap or
Step 1C	Question-raising or

Step 1D	Continuing a tradition
MOVE 3:	OCCUPYING THE NICHE
Step 1A	Outlining purposes or
Step 1B	Announcing present research
Step 2	Announcing principal findings
Step 3	Indicating RA structure

The Corpus

Two hundred introduction sections of research articles were randomly extracted from three English and three Persian medical journals, (100 per each language). The data obtained for analysis were drawn from the English journals namely, *American Journal of Medicine, Pain, Medicine* and the Persian Journals namely, *Pazboohande* (Research Medical Journal of Shahid Beheshti University), *Research Medical Journal of Ahvaz University, Research Medical Journal of Kerman University*.

Criteria for Article Selection

To choose the articles, the following criteria were taken into account. First due to dynamic nature of genre, the corpus was restricted to a period of seven years (1997-2003). Second, all English journal articles were published in the US and all writers assumed to be English native speakers as far as it could be inferred from their names, affiliations, and occasionally biographical notes attached to the articles, and their native-like command of English. On the other hand, the Persian articles were written by Iranians, so we expect Persian to be the writers' native language. It should be noted that there was no instance of translation in the Persian articles. Third, experts of this field (medicine) were consulted to choose journals with high importance, reputation, and readership. Their suggestions were of great help in deciding on the number of articles to be included in the study. For example, 57 articles were selected from one journal, but only 8 from another. Fourth, to keep the naturalness of the sampling, the length of the introductions was not controlled. Fifth, the introduction sections were from articles which had the traditional Introduction, Method, Result, and Discussion (IMRD) sections.

The Identification of Moves

To find the communicative purpose of each sentence, the texts were meticulously read sentence by sentence, because sentences were considered to be the unit of analysis and communicative purpose was the identifying feature of each move (Bhatia, 1993). The process of identification of moves involved focusing on formal clues such as explicit

lexemes and expressions, verb forms, discourse conjuncts, etc. and focusing on function of sentences. Of course in some cases there were some instances of discrepancy between the two formal and functional approaches. In such cases, priority was given to the function of the fragment.

Results

Move and step frequency across the corpus were statistically analyzed. Then inter-rater and intra-rater reliability of the judgments were estimated.

Move and Step Frequency

The frequency of moves and their constituent steps were analyzed in the corpus. Tables 1 and 2 show the move and step frequencies in the corpus.

Moves	Move 1	Move 2	Move 3
English	155	109	104
Persian	153	102	96

Table 1: Move frequency of introduction section of medical research articles

Steps	1.1	1.2	1.3	2.1A	2.1B	2.1C	2.1D	3.1A	3.1B	3.2	3.3
English	87	133	116	11	98	0	3	41	93	12	4
Persian	94	169	140	24	81	9	2	51	83	2	0

Table 2: Step frequency of moves in the introduction section of medical research articles

Chi-squares showed no significant difference between introduction sections of English and Persian medical research articles as far as their move frequency were concerned. But the results of chi-square tests for step frequency showed that there is a significant difference between introduction section genre of English and Persian medical research articles concerning the frequency of steps. Tables 3 and 4 show the results.

	Significance	D.F	χ^2 . Value	χ^2 . Critical
Moves	.05	2	.163	5.99

Table 3: The Chi-square indicating the significant difference of move frequency across the corpus

	Significance	D.F	χ^2 . Value	χ^2 . Critical
Steps	.05	10	32.128	18.3070

Table 4: The Chi-square indicating the significant difference of step frequency in the moves across the corpus

The results showed that there is no significant difference between move frequency of introduction sections of English and Persian medical research articles, but there is a significant difference between their step frequencies. This means that both English and Persian writers utilized the three moves with similar frequencies, but the realization of these three moves was different in these two languages. In order to realize the three moves, both English and Persian writers utilized the Eleven steps, but with different frequencies. In order to gain a better understanding of the issue a review over the features of each move and its constituent steps along with examples from each language are presented here.

Move 1

Every research to be reported needs to create the general territory in which it operates. The analysis revealed that 100 percent of English and 100 percent of Persian RAs included move 1 in order to establish a territory. Percentage of occurrence of move 1 and its steps are summarized in the following table.

Move 1: Establishing a Territory	Percentage of occurrence	
	English	Persian
Establishing a Territory	100	100
1) claiming centrality and/or	87	94
2) making topic generalizations	86	99
3) reviewing items of previous research	79	85

Table 5: Percentage of occurrence of move 1 and its steps

To establish a territory of the research to be reported, both English and Persian authors tried to assure the readers of the importance, relevance, and recency of their research project. To achieve this, they made centrality claims, topic generalizations, and reviewed items of previous research. The ultimate goal was to re-establish the significance of the research field for the discourse community.

Examples of steps of move 1 across the corpus

Step 1.1: Claiming Centrality

English RA.No. 85: Diagnostic and Interventional procedures using radiocontrast media are being performed with increasing frequency.

مقاله پژوهشی شماره 84: روغن ذرت یکی از موادی است که بطور روزافزون مورد استفاده مردم قرار می گیرد.

Step 1.2: Making topic generalization

English RA.No. 2: Because of the efficacy of multiagent combination chemo therapy, a significant proportion of patients are cured by current approaches.

مقاله پژوهشی شماره [3]: امروزه معتقدند که علاوه بر علائم اصلی پنجگانه فوق، بیماری کلبوی نیز در سندروم باردت - بیدل یک گرفتاری تقریباً ثابت است که در 15 تا 55 درصد موارد، این درگیری شدید است.

Step 1.3: Reviewing items of previous research

English RA. No. 76: Initial studies found that IL.1B produces hyperalgesia, following either peripheral or central administration. (Ferreira *et al.*, 1988; Oka *et al.*, 1993; Watkins *et al.*, 1994)

مقاله پژوهشی شماره 15: برخی تحقیقات ارتباط بین ناخوابسته بودن حاملگی را با میزان مرگ و میر نوزادان، اسکیزوفرنی در کودکان، سوء استفاده و آزار کودکان نشان داده اند. (دکتر علی رضا سینا، 1372 و دکتر مزگان میدایی، 1373)

Move 2

In move 2, there is a transition from the generally established context by focusing on inadequacy in previous research that needs new investigation. Percentage of occurrence of move 2 and its steps are presented in table 6.

Move 2: Establishing a niche Steps	Percentage of occurrence	
	English	Persian
Establishing a niche	79	72
1A) Counter-claiming	11	20
or 1B) Indicating a gap	73	58
or 1C) Question raising	0	9
or 1D) Continuing a tradition	3	2

Table 6: Percentage of Occurrence of Move 2 and its steps

As shown in table 6, 79 percent of English and 72 percent of Persian authors established a niche for their study. To attain this objective, they resorted to one or to a combination of steps included in move 2. Considering both English and Persian RAs,

indicating a gap (step 1B) was the most favorite step, while question raising (step 1C) for English RAs and continuing a tradition (step 1D) for Persian RAs were the least. A possible interpretation can be that the authors avoid direct, explicit, and strong challenges to previous research, and they try to state the necessity of current research indirectly. 21 percent of English and 28 percent of Persian RAs did not include move 2 at all. In other words, the authors of these RAs have not stated any negative attitude or challenge to the previous research because they did not feel any need.

Examples of steps of move 2 across the corpus

Step 2.1.A: Counter-claiming

English RA.No. 37: However, a cross-sectional PCR-based study reported a high prevalence of common respiratory viruses, which was not clearly related to the fatal attack.

مقاله پژوهشی شماره 64: اما در مورد نقش بالا رفتن سن بر ابعاد حفره رحمی اختلاف نظر وجود دارد

Step 2.1.B: Indicating a Gap

English RA.No. 19: Surprisingly, the effects of late life anemia have not received much research attention.

مقاله پژوهشی شماره 19: تا به امروز هیچ مطالعه تشخیصی با استفاده از مصاحبه مستقیم بر اساس DSM-IV انجام نشده است.

Step 2.1.C: Question-raising

مقاله پژوهشی شماره 1: بنابراین این سوال مطرح می شود که آیا نمونه گیری از خون مویرگی را می توان جانشین نمونه گیری از خون شریانی کرد؟

Step 2.1.D: Continuing a Tradition

English RA. No. 12: These analyses were necessary since psychological factors may be related to MFP and bruxism in the absence of disease.

مقاله پژوهشی شماره 78: این مطالعه به منظور تعیین نقش هلیکو باکتریلیوری و درمان آن در افراد مبتلا به NUD.

Move 3

After establishing a territory and niche which are achieved through move 1 and move 2, authors find themselves in a better position to occupy the niche. In fact, by using previous moves, authors pave the way for putting forward their own research. Now

that the reader is convinced about the importance and necessity of the current research, he may wish to be informed briefly about the exact goals of the research, procedure and methodology of the research, principle outcomes, and the structure of the present research. The results showed that 97 percent of English and 91 percent of Persian writers included this move in the RAs. Table 7 shows the percentage of occurrence of move 3 and its steps.

Move 3: Occupying the niche Steps	Percentage of occurrence	
	English	Persian
Occupying the niche	97	91
1A) Outlining purposes	37	51
or 1B) Announcing present research	82	81
or 1C) Announcing principle findings	12	2
or 1D) Indicating RA structure	4	0

Table 7: Percentage of occurrence of move 3 and its steps

Move 3 is typically presented as the final move of the introduction section. In one English RA, this move appeared at the beginning of the introduction. In other words, the writer occupied the niche at the very beginning of the RA. To Swales (1990), this refers to the fact that the author of the RA does not worry about the appreciation of his/her product by the reader. This confidence could be because of the popularity of the author and well establishment of the importance and necessity of the research. In other words, the writer may be a well-known expert member who is reporting an issue which is very significant for other members.

Examples of steps of move 3 across the corpus

Step 3.1.A: Outlining purposes

English RA. No. 18: The aim of our study was to assess the long-term association of C-reactive protein levels with the risk of death, nonfatal myocardial infarction, and repeat revascularization after coronary angioplasty.

مقاله پژوهشی شماره 18: با توجه به موارد بالا، هدف اصلی این پژوهش، بررسی اثر عامل چاقی بر کمر درد است.

Step 3.1.B: Announcing present research

English RA. No. 7: We report the results of a cross-sectional analysis of the association between glycemic control and prevalent cardiovascular disease in patients with NIDDM.

مقاله پژوهشی شماره 45: در مطالعه حاضر اثر ورا پامیل روی رشد طولی استخوان های دراز در دوران رشد در موشهای صحرایی به طور تجربه ای مورد مطالعه قرار گرفت.

Step 3.2: Announcing principle findings

English RA. No. 5: We found no case in which *A.nidulans* was a pathogen in patient without CGD, despite the fact that the patient population at NIH is heavily weighted towards immunocompromised groups. These observations show that *A.nidulans* has distinct mechanisms of pathogenesis that are clinically important in patients with CGD.

مقاله پژوهشی شماره 8: موردی از وجود باکتر آمینون در دهان و حلق جنین و بلع آن وجود نداشت.

Step 3.3: Indicating RA structure

English RA. No. 5: *Characteristic morphologic features of A.nidulans are shown in figure 1.*

Reliability

The next step was taking care of the reliability in order to avoid subjectivity in the analysis.

Intra-rater reliability

To this end, a sample of 60 articles (30 from each language) was extracted out of the corpus and was analyzed by the researcher two weeks after the first rating.

The results of spearman rank-order correlation showed that there was high correlation between the researcher's two counting of moves and steps. The details of the correlational analysis are presented in Appendix A.

Inter-rater reliability

In order to avoid subjectivity in the analysis of the data, a sample of 60 articles (30 from each language) were randomly extracted and were analyzed by an MA holder of TEFL, who was familiar with genre analysis (her own thesis was on genre analysis). The results of her analysis were correlated with those of the researcher. The results of spearman rank-order correlation showed that there was high correlation between the frequency of moves and steps counted by the researcher and the second rater. The details of the correlational analysis are presented in Appendix B.

Discussion

The results of this study shed some light on the generic organization of the introduction section of medical research articles across English and Persian and showed that there is no significant difference between them as far as the move frequency is concerned. The results also showed that the frequency of steps in the introduction section of English and Persian medical research articles is radically different. The findings revealed that the introduction section of a journal article serves a set of communicative purposes which could be presented in a specific order: Establishing a Territory, Establishing a Niche, Occupying the Niche.

Introductions are organized in such a structure to persuade the discourse community that the present research is something worthy of attention. In addition, the results obtained in the study show that the moves of the introduction section across the two languages are not of equal frequency. That is Move 1 appeared to be the most frequent moves across the corpus. Move 2 places second, while move 3 is the least frequent move to be presented in the corpus.

The findings also focus on the linguistic features the writers utilize to serve their communicative purposes. For example, Move 2 usually includes some negative forms (negative or quasi-negative quantifiers, lexical negation, negation in the verb phrase) because the writers try to imply that the previous research suffer some limitations, that there is a problem that has not been dealt, and that a question remains unanswered.

Results of this study can help students to write research article introduction in a correct genre. University students need to both comprehend and produce academic prose of various related disciplines. Genre analysis can be of great help to instructors to make learners well-aware of how genres differ from and within each other and how learners can go about discovering these differences. The findings of this study may also contribute to the field of syllabus design because to solve the problem of academic isolation, syllabus designers must also include genre awareness courses to sensitize the students to the features that make the text a good and standard product. Raising genre-consciousness is a key factor in solving the problems that are barriers for scholarly, academic communication.

In addition, it may be of great value if medicine practitioners tend to send the report of their research to medical journals and tend to know the generic organization of introduction section of their field.

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*Appendices**Appendix A**Table 8: Intra-rater correlation of English moves*

<i>English moves in first and second rating</i>	<i>Significance</i>	<i>D.F</i>	<i>ρ Value</i>	<i>ρ Critical</i>
	.01	1	1	.99

Table 9: Intra-rater correlation of English steps

<i>English steps in first and second rating</i>	<i>Significance</i>	<i>D.F</i>	<i>ρ Value</i>	<i>ρ Critical</i>
	.01	9	.99	.73

Table 10: Intra-rater correlation of Persian moves

<i>Persian moves in first and second rating</i>	<i>Significance</i>	<i>D.F</i>	<i>ρ Value</i>	<i>ρ Critical</i>
	.01	1	1	.99

Table 11: Intra-rater correlation of Persian steps

<i>English steps in first and second rating</i>	<i>Significance</i>	<i>D.F</i>	<i>ρ Value</i>	<i>ρ Critical</i>
	.01	9	.99	.73

*Appendix B**Table 12: Inter-rater correlation of English moves*

<i>English moves by second rater and researcher</i>	<i>Significance</i>	<i>D.F</i>	<i>ρ Value</i>	<i>ρ Critical</i>
	.01	1	1	.99

Table 13: Inter-rater correlation of English steps

<i>English steps by second rater and researcher</i>	<i>Significance</i>	<i>D.F</i>	<i>ρ Value</i>	<i>ρ Critical</i>
	.01	9	.98	.73

Table 14: Inter-rater correlation of Persian moves

<i>Persian moves by second rater and researcher</i>	<i>Significance</i>	<i>D.F</i>	<i>ρ Value</i>	<i>ρ Critical</i>
	.01	1	1	.99

Table 15: Inter-rater correlation of Persian steps

<i>Persian steps by second rater and researcher</i>	<i>Significance</i>	<i>D.F</i>	<i>ρ Value</i>	<i>ρ Critical</i>
	.01	9	.99	.73

THE ROLE OF NONVERBAL EXPRESSIONS AS PRECURSORS TO ARGUMENTATIVE DISCOURSE IN FRENCH, JAPANESE AND AMERICAN ENGLISH CONVERSATION

CAROLINE ELISA NASH

1. *Introduction*

Numerous studies have been done on nonverbal communication with attention focused primarily on gaze behavior patterns. Extensive work has been done on the role of gaze and “gaze shift” in the “turn” of turn-taking in English (Duncan & Fiske 1977, 1985; Goodwin 1981; Schegloff *et al.* 1984). It is now widely accepted that the division between language and gestures is not as distinct as previously believed (Kita 2003; Kita & Ide 2007; McNeill *et al.* 2005). Studies in conversation analysis that incorporate the nonverbal component reveal important facts about the relationship between language and gesture.

The use of gestures in a natural and interactive conversation requires observable contextual phenomenon as well as assumptions or inferences about the speaker's beliefs and intentions. The mutually-shared background information of the speaker and addressee depends to a great extent on their cultural background. Although studies on gaze behavior describe observed patterns of predominantly American subjects, studies on culture-specific gaze behavior have been conducted since the early 20th century that reveal distinct cross-cultural differences in certain patterns of gaze behavior between interlocutors engaged in interactive conversation. Most notably, Whiffen (1915), who conducted studies on gaze behavior of American Indians, attested that Indians do not look at each other while speaking – neither the speaker at the listener, nor the listener at the speaker (Whiffen 1915: 254).

Yet, ethnocentric studies still dominate kinesic research and the constructed models and postulated rules are often generalized to apply to the social behavior and organizational structure across languages and cultures. Speakers and addressees across cultures do not use the same techniques in gaze behavior patterns and hand and head gestures that regulate the conversation as will be revealed by our study of argumentative discourse in French, Japanese and American English. We further seek to show that the role of the gesture as a conversation marker is significant in any model of talk-interaction, due to the fact that overt linguistic cues to regulate natural conversation and express interlocutors' attitudes are not usually expressed during natural conversation.

This study addresses the following research questions:

1. How do interlocutors communicate *intent* to disagree or argue?
2. Since nonverbal expressions convey more than is actually said, are there certain gestures which signal that the forthcoming discourse is argumentative? (i.e. non-verbal *regulators* that function as a precursor to argumentative discourse?)
3. Are there cross-cultural differences or similarities (perhaps universals) in the nature of these preverbal regulators?

In this paper I examine the means by which the addressee signals forthcoming argumentation as they effect their turn transition, and the means by which the speaker averts argumentation by the addressee. I discuss the role of gaze and assert that gaze avert is crucial in the argumentation process.

2. *Regulators defined*

Schiffrin (1987) uses the term *discourse markers* to cover a wide spectrum of discourse functions including those in the areas of pragmatics and conversation analysis. *Discourse markers* have defined functions in both written text and verbal communication. In conversation, the “participation framework” (Schiffrin 1987: 27) includes “the way in which speakers are related to their turns: claiming them, fighting for them, and relinquishing them”. Fraser (1996: 168) defines *pragmatic markers* as “linguistically-encoded clues which signal the speaker’s potential communicative intentions”. According to Fraser, these *pragmatic markers* correspond to four different types of messages but he clearly makes a distinction between the first three: *basic*, *commentary*, and *parallel markers*, and the fourth: *discourse markers*. For Fraser, *discourse markers* are only those markers that specify how the message is related to foregoing discourse. Based on this refinement of the definition of *discourse markers*, regulators cannot be classified accordingly.

Manoliu (1999) argued for the necessity of further refining the categories of pragmatic markers and proposed the term *conversation markers* as a sub-category of pragmatic markers whose functions are to organize the talk-interaction. These functions include their role in negotiating the turn, their role in controlling the addressee’s attention and understanding, their role in accepting or rejecting the speaker’s topic, and crucial to this study, their role in conveying speaker-addressee attitude. Since regulators function to control and maintain the flow of natural conversation, in my view, regulators fit under the rubric of *conversation markers*.

3. *Data collection and method*

The data for this study were collected via video recordings of native French speakers residing in various regions throughout France, Japanese native speakers residing in Japan and American English native speakers residing in California in the United States.

All participants were taped while engaged in natural interpersonal and interactive conversations and were not at any time aware of the nature of the study and the specific topic of research prior to or during the taping. The subjects are of five different sociolinguistic groups: 1. French speakers 30-65 years of age; 2. Japanese speakers 30-65 years of age; 3. Japanese speakers 20-25 years of age; 4. American English speakers 30-65 years of age and 5. American English speakers 20-25 years of age.

4. *Addressee signals of argumentative discourse*

In this section we examine some nonverbal expressions displayed by the addressee that serve as precursors to argumentative discourse. These signals communicate intent to disagree or argue on the part of the addressee. The abbreviations used in this section and their corresponding referents are as follows: S = Speaker; A = Addressee; A→s = Addressee-turned-speaker (i.e. addressee took the speaker-turn); GD = Gaze Direct; GA = Gaze Avert; HT = Head Tilt.

4.1 The French addressee

The French addressee displays the head tilt as a turn-taking strategy but crucially, the head tilt bears the meaning of a certain degree of disaccord. The head tilt gesture conveys the addressee's intent to argue or disagree to the speaker, and precedes verbal expressions of disaccord. In example (1), a French addressee displays the head-tilt preceded by gaze avert prior to his argumentative discourse.

1. (A averts his gaze, displays head-tilt, then interjects S)
 A→s: (GA→HT) "Oh...mais je me fous de ce que vous et les autres en pensent! Ça vous regarde pas! Il m'a dit ce matin même: (GD) "J'aime bien ma vie ici à Paris avec toi!"

 A→s: (GA→HT) 'Oh ... but I don't give a damn about what you and the others think! It's none of your business! He said to me this very morning, (GD) "I like my life here in Paris with you!"

The addressee-turned-speaker redirects his gaze at his interlocutor as he quotes an absent referent.

In example (2) shown in Image I, a French addressee uses the head-tilt to signal forthcoming argumentative discourse in response to what the speaker has just said and prior to explaining or justifying his disagreement. The addressee averts the gaze just prior to uttering "mmm...", then pauses, and begins to tilt his head prior to uttering "ah" and continues tilting his head as he utters "non!". The addressee-turned-speaker then commences his argumentative discourse.

Image I.

2.

A→s: (GA) “mmm...”



(HT) “ah”

(→ HT→ HT) “non!” (‘no!’)

Other French verbal expressions that signal forthcoming argumentation preceded by the addressee head-tilt extracted from the data are “alors, là...” (‘now that there...’); “ben, écoute...” (‘oh now, listen...’); “pas forcément...” (‘not necessarily...’); “pas spécialement...” (‘not particularly’); “oui, mais...” (‘yes, but...’). These utterances respond to what a speaker has just said and prior to explaining or justifying his disagreement.

Addressee gaze avert and head-tilt may also bear the additional meaning of negative attitude on the part of the addressee as shown in example (3). In this example there are two addressees who take the speaker-turn argumentatively and clearly express a negative attitude towards the speaker’s discourse:

3. S: (GD) “En tout cas [unintelligible]... de venir récupérer tes affaires!”

(GD) ‘In any case [unintelligible]... to come get your things!’

A¹→s: (GA→HT) “C’est bon! Commencez pas!”

(GA→HT) ‘That’s enough! Don’t start!’

A²→s: (GA→HT) “Ohhhh!”

(GA→HT) ‘Ohhhh!’

Other French expressions of negative attitude uttered by the addressee preceded by gaze avert and head-tilt extracted from the data are as follows: “n’importe quoi” (‘(you just say) whatever/anything!’); “tu te racontes!” (‘you daresay!/oh really?’); “je m’en fous!” (‘I don’t give a damn!’); “c’est pas beau!” (‘that’s not nice!’); “il comprend rien!” (‘he doesn’t understand anything!’); “j’avais rien compris de ce que tu as dit!” (‘I hadn’t understood anything you said!’); “moi, j’aime pas trop!” (‘I don’t like it much!’).

Gaze avert followed by the head tilt performed by the French addressee are also displayed preceding expressions of sarcasm such as, “ah bon!?” (‘oh really!?’) and “ah... tu vas prendre ça là-bas!?” (‘oh... you’re going to take that over there!?’).

French verbal expressions of disagreement, negative attitude and sarcasm on the part of the addressee are almost always uttered in conjunction with gaze avert followed by a head gesture, one of which is the head tilt as presented in this discussion.

4.2 The Japanese addressee

A side head tilt by the Japanese addressee conveys disaccord to the speaker. The addressee is in disagreement with the speaker’s opinion, comment or topic. If the speaker yields the floor at the head tilt display, then the addressee has succeeded in taking his turn to counter the speaker. Otherwise, the head tilt is held longer and firmer until the addressee successfully takes his turn. The initial head tilts may be unaccompanied by verbal utterances, or pre-verbal followed by the utterances, “mmm...”, “saa...” (expression of doubt) or “demo...” (‘but...’), as shown in example (4) and Image II.

The expressions “saa...” and “mnn...” are never uttered without first averting the gaze then tilting the head, whereas “demo...” is uttered either following gaze avert or the head tilt, or both.

Image II



4. “mnn...”



“saa...”

In example (5) shown in Image III, the addressee who is in disagreement with the speaker, averts the gaze and displays the head tilt just prior to his discourse.

Image III



(a)

(b)

5. (a) S: “Meiji ka nan ka.”
 ‘Like Meiji or something.’
- (b) A→s: “Meiji ja naku te yo,…”
 ‘Not Meiji…’

The Japanese addressee head tilt and gaze avert are also displayed when expressing negative attitude and sarcasm. Some expressions extracted from our data with approximate glosses are as follows: “ii jyanai!” (‘so what!/you should be pleased!’); “jyoodan jyanai yo!” (‘you’ve got to be kidding! /no way!’); “yoku yuu yo!” (‘you exaggerate!/you just say whatever!’); “kankei nai yo!” (‘that’s got nothing to do with it!’); “komaru yo!” (‘that’s problematic!/that’s an imposition!’); “mata yuu!” (‘there you go (saying that) again!’).

4.3 The American addressee

A very common American gesture used by members of certain socio-linguistic groups is the “Talk to the Hand” open palm gesture displayed by the addressee preceding the utterance, “Whatever!” to convey to the speaker that she or he wants the speaker to stop talking, and is usually followed by another contentious utterance leading into mutual argumentative discourse. This gesture is performed by a twist of the wrist and circular hand motion, partially extending the arm towards the speaker’s face, positioning the tense open hand between the interlocutors as illustrated in Image IV. The addressee precedes the hand display with gaze avert.

Image IV

Gaze avert is the primary means by which an addressee signals forthcoming argumentation in American English. In example (6), when the speaker offends the addressee by uttering "...show off your talents...", the addressee immediately averts his gaze and then counters by denying that he was showing off, all the while averting his gaze. He redirects his gaze towards his interlocutor when he corrects the statement made by the speaker.

6. S: "... show off your talents..."
 A → s: (GA) "I didn't want to show off, (GD) I just wanted to stay awake."
 ← Gaze Avert →

American English verbal expressions of negative attitude, sarcasm and discord on the part of the addressee are often uttered following gaze avert. Some examples extracted from the data are as follows: "what is her problem?", "I have a problem with what she's wearing!", "hell no!", "who cares?", "what the heck?" "you're/she's hella dumb!", "you're retarded!", "you're smoking dope!", "in your dreams!", "oh yeah, I forgot, you were dropped on your head when you were a baby!", "yeah, right!", "don't think so!".

5. Speaker means of averting the argument

In the previous section, we examined certain nonverbal expressions that serve as precursors to argumentative discourse. These signals communicate intent to disagree or argue on the part of the addressee. In this section we examine some means by which the speaker averts the addressee's forthcoming argument which oftentimes serves a dual purpose, i.e. not merely to avert an argument, but also to signal forthcoming argumentation on the part of the speaker. The abbreviations used in this section and their corresponding referents are as follows: S = Speaker; A = Addressee; GD = Gaze Direct; HD = Hand Display.

5.1 The French speaker

A regulator used by the French speaker to signal that it is still his or her turn to speak and that he or she is not yet willing to yield the floor to another participant at a transition relevance place, comprises the index finger vertically placed in between the speaker and the addressee with the arm bent at a 45 angle, elbow forward and slightly raised. A variation is the open palm held vertically between the speaker and the addressee, the palm facing the addressee.

In example (7) shown in Image V, prior to the first frame (a), the speaker utters, “...parce que si vous donnez de trop, vous avez un contrôle fiscal.” She continues to say, “On vous dira...” while at the same time the addressee interjects with “Tu exagères...” resulting in overlap. At this juncture in frame (a), the speaker, anticipating an argument on the part of the addressee, displays her index finger gesture and continues to speak, countering with “...on dira... on vous dira: ‘Mais vous avez servi deux repas. Vous n’en avez déclaré qu’un. Donc, vous volez l’État!’”, all the while maintaining the display of her hand gesture as well as gaze direct towards her addressee. Still in Frame (a), the addressee interjects again with the utterance “Tu exagères! Peser tous... chaque... chaque...” while the speaker is still holding up her index finger and overlaps with “Il y a eu un restaurant... Il y a eu...”. It isn’t until frame (b) after the speaker restarts her argument with the utterance “Il y a eu un restaurant...” when she no longer anticipates an argument from the addressee, i.e. quells the argument and succeeds in denying the addressee his speaker-turn, that she terminates the gestural hand display.

Image V



(a)

(b)

7.

(<a) S: "... parce que si vous donnez de trop, vous avez un contrôle fiscal."
'... because if you give too much, you're audited.'

S: ["On vous dira..."
'They'll tell you...']

A: ["Tu exagères..."
'You exaggerate...']

(a) S: (HD/GD) "on dira...on vous dira: 'Mais vous avez servi deux repas'.
-----> maintaining gesture and gaze direct ----->

(HD/GD) 'they'll say... they'll tell you, "But you only served two meals"'.
'Vous n'en avez déclaré qu'un. Donc, vous volez l'État!'

'You only declared one. So you're stealing from the State!'

-----> maintaining gesture and gaze direct ----->

'You only declared one. So you're stealing from the State!'

(a) A: "Tu exagères! Peser tous..."

'You exaggerate! To weigh all...'

[chaque... chaque...]

[each... each...]

S: (HD/GD)

(HD/GD)

["Il y a eu un restaurant...il y a eu..."]

['There was a restaurant...there was...']

(b) S: "Il y a eu un restaurant..."

In the following example also shown in Image VI, the addressee first silences the speaker (Speaker 1) and signals forthcoming argumentation. Upon taking the speaker-turn, the addressee-turned-speaker (Speaker 2), anticipating a counter from Speaker 1 following what she is about to say, gestures using the open palm variation which she displays vertically between herself and Speaker 1, the palm facing Speaker 1, thereby averting Speaker 1's counter. In Image VI, Speaker 1 is on the right and Speaker 2 is on the left. Gaze direct is maintained during the gestural display.

Image VI

8. S¹: “Si tu veux être décontractée, il faut fumer le bédo tous les deux et tu seras plus comme ça (gesturing hands trembling motion).”
 ‘If you want to destress, you have to smoke the bedo, the two of us together and you won’t be like this (shaking) anymore.’
- S²: (HD/GD) “Après! Après! Si tu veux, après... après les examens, si tu veux... mais avant, non.”
 (HD/GD) ‘After! After! If you want, after... after the exams, if you want... but before, no.’

Speaker 2 then continues to defend her position by expressing the seriousness of the exam-taking process that Speaker 1 dismisses as an almost frivolous undertaking, thereby perpetuating further argument that ensues between these two participants.

5.2 The Japanese speaker

A tense nod held 2 to 3 seconds by the Japanese speaker performed in sentence-final position, functions to avert a forthcoming argument by the addressee. This head gesture conveys to the addressee that the speaker wants to change the topic or terminate the conversation. Attempts on the part of the addressee to further contribute to the conversation are usually futile. This gesture conveys negative attitude in essence saying: “I am having the last word on this topic and now it’s the end of this conversation!”

With regard to gaze patterns, Japanese speakers do not maintain gaze direct in the process of averting an argument as do the French. The Japanese speaker averts the gaze just prior to the head nod display.

5.3 The American speaker

One nonverbal means by which the American speaker averts an argument is by averting the gaze. In the sequential organization of the turn-at-talk, gaze direct is a turn-yielding regulator for Kendon (1990). According to his model, during the speaker-

turn, the speaker averts the gaze; therefore in displaying gaze direct, the speaker is signaling a response from the addressee. Our data support Kendon's turn-taking model for American English speakers. However, in the argumentation framework, I find that when the speaker anticipates argumentative discourse from the addressee, she or he redirects the gaze towards the addressee for a brief moment and then averts the gaze just prior to an attempt by the addressee to counter the speaker's discourse.

The hand gesture, "Talk to the Hand!," discussed in Section 4.3. and shown in Image IV is also used by American speakers to avert an argument. This hand gesture differs from the addressee signal in that the purported meaning does not necessarily bear a negative attitude on the part of the speaker. Here again, the speaker first redirects the gaze to the addressee, then averts the gaze followed by the display of the hand gesture.

6. *The significance of the role of gaze avert*

In English, the "nod" is a back-channeling regulator used by the addressee with utterances such as "uh-huh", "I see", etc., to signal to the speaker that she or he is listening, following and/or is in agreement with the speaker's opinions, comments and/or topic. This gesture maintains the conversation flow and conveys "positive attitude". The nod is always displayed while gazing at the speaker. We find the "nod" to be a back-channeling regulator also used by addressees in French and in Japanese.

Regulators perform other functions, however, such as convey negative attitude, request or reject further information, control the addressee's attention and understanding, accept or reject the speaker's topic, confirm the speaker's hypotheses about the addressee's background knowledge via tag questions and negotiate turn-taking.

In this study we found that the addressee back-channels utterances that 1. convey disagreement with the speaker's discourse and possibly interjecting or taking the speaker turn to explain or justify the disagreement; 2. convey negative attitude; 3. express sarcasm and 4. express disaccord. *Negative back-channeling*, therefore, is expressed with gaze *avert*¹, while *positive back-channeling* is always uttered with gaze *direct*.

The expression of disagreement and negative attitude can also be viewed as a departure or detachment from the mutual engagement and from the progression of the topic. As such, gaze avert functions in a similar manner to digress from the here-and-now with the intent of cooperating in the natural course of the conversational exchange in order to arrive at a resolution or conclusion of sorts. Thus, the detachment from the mutual engagement and the digression from the here-and-now – this discourse feature is manifested by the aversion of gaze.

¹ This is not to say that one never displays gaze direct in negative back-channelling. Certainly in confrontational situations this would be the case; however, we are working within the context of an ordinary conversation which follows the Gricean maxims and the Cooperative Principle.

Crucial to this study is accounting for cultural differences which I find to be significant with respect to gaze behavior patterns and the form of the head or hand gesture. As the data have shown, French speakers maintain gaze direct prior to, during, and after the gestural signal; whereas Japanese and American speakers avert the gaze prior to and during the gestural display. Perhaps of greater significance is the pattern that is observed across all three of these languages and cultures. This study yields results that suggest that gaze avert functions across these three languages as a precursor to argumentative discourse but with the following condition:

Only when it is the *addressee* who displays a nonverbal signal that functions as a precursor to argumentative discourse, is the precursor displayed in conjunction with *gaze avert*.

Hence, gaze avert is an addressee precursor to argumentative discourse.

Assuming that the interlocutors are adhering to the principles and parameters of the turn-taking model for American English conversation which stipulates that the addressee is gazing at the speaker during the speaker turn, gaze avert does not indicate a lack of interest in or disapproval of the speaker's topic on the part of the addressee as previously suggested by Argyle and Cook (1976) and others, but on the contrary, the addressee is expressing his or her vested interest in the topic by virtue of the disagreeing, disputing and disproving of the speaker's discourse. Although it may be argued that the former is found to be true in expressing negative attitude and sarcasm, the lack of interest or disapproval is actually not in the speaker's topic when expressing disagreement, rather, it is with the speaker's comment, opinion or utterance, i.e. discourse, that the addressee is in disagreement.

Further, according to the French turn-taking model proposed by Nash (2001), speaker-addressee mutual gaze (i.e. gaze direct by both interlocutors) is high during the speaker turn. Hence, gaze avert on the part of the addressee has a functional purpose, and one such function is that in conjunction with utterances that express disagreement, negative attitude, or sarcasm, gaze avert signals forthcoming argumentative discourse.

Finally, the Japanese exhibit low mutual gaze, i.e. high gaze aversion during a conversation. The Japanese model in and of itself belies the notion that gaze avert indicates a lack of interest.

7. Preliminary models

The data from this study suggest that as interlocutors engaged in argumentative discourse, we exhibit a predictable pattern, i.e. we adhere to specific rules in the interactive exchange from which we can construct a model of behavior for the addressee and the speaker.

I propose here a 3-tiered model that accounts for the effecting of the addressee's argumentative discourse. First and foremost we *presuppose* that there is no speaker ex-

pectation of a forthcoming argument by the addressee. Secondly, the addressee performs an act that functions to signal to the speaker his or her intent to argue. Finally, the act is successful if the intended result is achieved, i.e., the addressee takes the speaker-turn and initiates his or her argumentative discourse.

- I. Premise: There is no speaker expectation of a forthcoming argument by the addressee.
- II. Performance: The addressee signals with gestural display.
- III. Result: The addressee takes the speaker-turn interrupting the speaker with a contentious comment.

I propose another 3-tiered model that accounts for the effecting of the speaker's averting the addressee's argumentative discourse (and secondarily, effecting the speaker's argumentative discourse). First and foremost we *presuppose* a forthcoming argument by the addressee. Secondly, the speaker performs an act that functions to block the addressee's argument. Finally, the act is successful if the intended result is achieved, i.e. the addressee does not realize his or her argumentative discourse.

- I. Premise: The speaker has the expectation of a forthcoming argument from the addressee.
- II. Performance: Anticipating the argument, the speaker gestures thus denying the addressee the speaker-turn to counter.
- III. Result: Any attempt on the part of the addressee to counter are futile hence the argument on the part of the addressee is not realized.

8. Conclusion

Nonverbal regulators as conversation markers perform various functions in the organization of the talk-interaction. The goal of Pragmatics is to account for those mechanisms that are employed in communicating more than is actually said or conveyed by a verbal utterance; hence the principles and parameters that account for pragmatic competence in native speakers are not delimited to linguistic expressions.

On the contrary, a comprehensive account of native speaker pragmatic competence cannot preclude nonverbal behavior, particularly in the form of gestural patterns that are displayed in conjunction with verbal utterances, as these features of the language system are observed in the interaction of native speakers which only occur within socio-cultural contexts.

This paper addressed this issue by identifying those nonverbal expressions that regulate conversation, focusing on signals that serve as precursors of argumentative discourse which encompass negative attitude and disagreement in French, Japanese and American English conversation. We sought to reveal cultural differences and in so doing we discovered a cross-linguistic pattern, i.e. gaze avert displayed by the addressee functions across these three languages as a precursor to argumentative discourse.

We proposed models that account for the speaker-addressee realization of argumentation in a conversational exchange that necessarily incorporates the gestural code due to the fact that the verbal code is not sufficient in describing the actual exchange in all of its intricacies.

This is merely a first study and in view of the now widely-held belief that language and gesture function together as one unit – inseparable and indispensable in communicating in any language, further research in the role of nonverbal expressions as they relate to argumentative discourse is surely warranted.

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THEORETICAL ISSUES IN ARGUMENTATION

JEU ET ENJEU DU DISCOURS RAPPORTÉ POUR LE DISCOURS ARGUMENTATIF

PRISQUE BARBIER

Introduction

Cette étude s'intéresse au rôle joué par les procédés polyphoniques dans les discours argumentatifs. Elle s'appuie sur notre travail de thèse qui interroge l'influence du contexte sociolinguistique de la Côte d'Ivoire sur les pratiques discursives de locuteurs et scripteurs ivoiriens, et notamment sur les procédés de prise en charge. Tout d'abord, afin d'exposer le cadre dans lequel se situe notre étude, nous commencerons par la description du contexte sociolinguistique de la Côte d'Ivoire. Ensuite, nous présenterons le cadre théorique sur lequel elle s'appuie, à savoir celui de la polyphonie. Enfin, nous consacrerons la troisième partie de cet exposé à la présentation des résultats de notre analyse des procédés polyphoniques observés dans notre corpus d'étude, à savoir des entretiens et des débats.

1. Situation sociolinguistique de la Côte d'Ivoire

La Côte d'Ivoire est le creuset de plusieurs langues vernaculaires, mais comme l'indique la constitution adoptée en 1960 à l'indépendance, la langue officielle de la Côte d'Ivoire est le français. Cette langue est, comme beaucoup d'autres institutions en Côte d'Ivoire, un héritage de la colonisation française, introduit historiquement à travers le système scolaire.

Duponchel (1979) explique que «dans cette optique le français paraît devoir jouer pour l'essentiel en Côte d'Ivoire, le rôle qu'il joue pour un Français de souche». Par là, il souligne toute l'ambiguïté du rôle assigné au français, non seulement canal de diffusion de la «Connaissance» et de la Culture, mais aussi langue «seconde» et non pas langue maternelle. En outre, il constate que malgré son importance, le français, langue officielle, n'est pas senti comme une réalité nationale. En effet, il observe que les Ivoiriens revendiquent «le droit de parler le français à leur manière». Ainsi, pour lui, «ces faits ... semblent montrer que la langue seconde n'est plus tout à fait sentie comme un corps étranger et intouchable, mais comme une réalité vivante pouvant s'adapter à un contexte socio-culturel très spécifique». Lafage (1980) pense elle que pour comprendre la manière dont se construit le «français populaire», il faut d'abord faire une analyse sociolinguistique de la communication entre locuteurs d'une langue africaine. Ainsi, elle observe que la communication en français se calque sur les modèles communicatifs africains, notamment en ce qui concerne la stratification de la société.

Simard (1994) considère lui que aujourd'hui «il ne fait aucun doute que le fran-

çais de Côte d'Ivoire se soit ivoirisé. C'est-à-dire qu'il y a une norme locale, endogène qui y régit maintenant les usages» au point que l'on puisse même parler d'un «français de Côte d'Ivoire». Pour lui, la langue française s'est fondue dans le moule de la société ivoirienne, pour en arriver à «une symbiose entre la langue et la société», et il ajoute qu'on peut même parler de «vernacularisation» du français, car «cette langue est le reflet et l'expression de la société ivoirienne, tant au plan de sa structure sociale qu'à celui de sa façon d'appréhender le monde et d'en rendre compte». Pour lui, ceci s'explique par le fait que la variété centrale de français pratiqué en Côte d'Ivoire, bien que fortement marqué par la norme académique a aussi pour origine le Français Populaire Ivoirien et la structure des vernaculaires ivoiriens, ainsi que «le mode de conceptualisation propre à une civilisation de l'oralité». Il remarque donc que lorsqu'un Ivoirien parle français, même s'il emploie les règles de la grammaire française, il utilise aussi le français «selon son propre mode de production de sens en fonction de son identité culturelle».

D'après Kouadio (1998), le français tel qu'il est pratiqué en Côte d'Ivoire s'est même tellement particularisé qu'on peut dire aujourd'hui qu'il est devenu une variété autonome par rapport au français central. En effet, il souligne qu'en Côte d'Ivoire «plusieurs variétés de français coexistent, se concurrençant souvent, s'interpénétrant parfois correspondant toujours à des besoins et à des situations de communication spécifiques». Manessy (1990) pense également que cette norme endogène vient de «la culture traditionnelle» sur laquelle s'appuie la société africaine d'aujourd'hui, et notamment sur le statut particulier qui y est reconnu à la parole, dont les règles se reflètent dans une rhétorique et une stylistique spécifique. Il reconnaît lui aussi que ces spécificités sont à la fois d'ordre phonétique et prosodique, mais aussi lexical (dans les calques et les emprunts), ainsi qu'au niveau de la phraséologie, et constituent «un lieu d'exercice privilégié pour la fonction identitaire du langage» car «les traits y acquièrent aisément une signification sociale» et permettent de catégoriser l'expérience et d'organiser le message et l'énonciation.

Ainsi, comme nous venons de le voir, le contexte sociolinguistique de la Côte d'Ivoire paraît jouer un rôle important dans le mode de construction des discours des Ivoiriens. Pour notre part, nous étudierons plus particulièrement ici les procédés énonciatifs par lesquels les Ivoiriens véhiculent dans leurs énoncés différents points de vue, et les finalités stratégiques de ces différents modes de prise en charge discursive.

2. *Théorie de la polyphonie*

Notre analyse s'appuie sur les recherches en pragmatique qui s'intéressent à l'étude des phénomènes linguistiques en contexte, c'est-à-dire en tenant compte de l'usage qui en est fait par l'utilisateur, et des effets que celui-ci a l'intention de produire, et notamment aux travaux concernant l'énonciation qui s'attache à décrire l'emploi des procédés linguistiques (embrayeurs, déictiques, modalisateurs, procédés polyphoniques) par lesquels un émetteur imprime sa marque à son énoncé, et les relations qui se tissent entre l'énoncé et les différents éléments constitutifs du cadre énonciatif.

Nous nous intéresserons ici plus particulièrement au phénomène de la polyphonie, qui désigne la présence de voix différentes à travers une même énonciation. Bakhtine (1929), et à sa suite Ducrot (1980) utilisent la notion de polyphonie pour décrire le caractère dialogique du discours. Pour Ducrot, il y a polyphonie quand on peut distinguer dans une énonciation deux types de personnages: le locuteur et les énonciateurs. Le locuteur est la personne responsable de l'énoncé (le producteur physique de l'acte), les énonciateurs sont les différentes voix présentes dans l'énoncé, et l'énonciation permet d'exprimer leur point de vue. Ducrot a parlé lui de polyphonie énonciative, et Authier-Revuz (1995) d'hétérogénéité montrée, pour parler des multiples traces dans l'énoncé de la présence d'une autre source énonciative.

Nous ne présentons dans cette étude que les procédés polyphoniques observés lors de l'analyse de notre corpus: l'emploi du discours rapporté, de la citation, du pro-verbe, de la polyphonie, et de la présupposition.

2.1 Le discours rapporté

Le discours rapporté est la manifestation la plus classique de l'hétérogénéité énonciative, par le biais de l'emploi du Discours Direct et du Discours Indirect qui sont deux modes de citation indépendants. Maingueneau (1991; 1999) décrit le fonctionnement de ces deux types de discours.

2.1.1 Le Discours Direct

Dans le DD les deux actes d'énonciation se trouvent parfaitement disjoints, étant rapportés à leurs situations d'énonciation respectives car le Discours Citant (DCt) et le Discours Cité (DCé) possèdent chacun un repérage distinct pour leurs embrayeurs. À l'écrit cette disjonction est manifestée par des guillemets (ou le tiret, s'il s'agit d'une réponse) qui sont le plus souvent renforcés par un verbe introducteur (dire, parler...). À l'oral, ces verbes sont souvent indispensables, associés à une pause, une variation dans le débit, l'intonation... lors du passage du DCt au DCé. Puisque le DD rapporte les propos tenus, sa principale qualité doit être une très grande fidélité, car une loi du discours voudrait que le rapporteur soit sincère et ne trahisse pas l'énoncé originel, mais rien ne l'empêche de rapporter des propos différents de ceux émis, et le fragment de DCé peut même paraître conforme à l'original et être déformé par l'intonation, une mise en contexte tendancieuse, etc. Ainsi, le DD demeure du discours rapporté et ne saurait constituer du discours au sens strict puisque la plupart du temps les propos cités ne sont pas assumés par leur énonciateur effectif, et même s'il s'agit du même énonciateur la situation d'énonciation est distincte. En outre, cette mise à distance du DCé par le DCt peut avoir différentes significations: un souci de respecter à la lettre le DCé, une volonté de ne pas prendre à son compte un énoncé que l'on rejette, un désir de paraître objectif, ...

2.1.2 Le Discours Indirect

Concernant le DI, l'invariance entre énoncé originel et énoncé rapporté est au niveau de l'interprétation de l'énoncé originel, car il s'agit de la version qu'en donne le rapporteur. Ainsi, il n'y a plus d'autonomie syntaxique du DCé à l'égard du DCt, puisque dans le DI le DCé a le statut d'une simple complétive complément d'objet du verbe du DCt, où il n'y a de place que pour le DCt, cela impliquant que toutes les traces de l'énonciation du DCé (embrayeurs, tournures expressives, interrogations, etc.) soient effacées au profit de celles du DCt. De plus, étant «distant» de l'énoncé originel, le DI permet des contractions, ou des extensions de celui-ci car rien n'interdit de rapporter avec une seule phrase de DI un énoncé de plusieurs heures. Donc, un énoncé peut être rapporté au DI d'un nombre infini de manières selon les désirs de l'énonciateur du DCt, et en prenant en charge les propos d'autrui le rapporteur donne une certaine image de lui-même, renvoie à ses positions idéologiques, affectives, personnelles, ... Il n'y a pas de différence importante entre le DI oral et écrit. Il introduit le DCé par un verbe introducteur suivi d'une complétive objet et il n'a donc pas de structure syntaxique qui lui soit propre. Ces verbes ne sont pas forcément ceux du DD, même si la majorité d'entre eux sont employés pour les deux types de discours rapporté (dire, avouer, crier...), mais certains ne sont utilisables qu'au DD («Enfin», soupira Elise). Ils apportent également divers types d'informations sur l'acte linguistique effectué, qui conditionnent la manière dont le récepteur interprétera le DCé. Certains verbes présupposent la vérité ou la fausseté du DCé qui les suit (prétendre), certains situent le discours rapporté dans la chronologie discursive (répondre, répéter, conclure), certains explicitent la force illocutoire (supplier, promettre, ...).

2.2 La citation

Concernant la citation, Maingueneau (1976; 1991) repère différents types de citations ayant chacune leur fonction.

- *Les citations-preuves* qui interviennent au cours d'une argumentation, soit pour réfuter, soit pour défendre, soit pour étayer un argument. Elles sont utilisées en raison de leur contenu ou de leur auteur, dans ce dernier cas on parle de «citation-autorité».
- *Les citations-reliques*, servent elles à incarner un fragment de «discours vrai», authentique, afin d'authentifier le discours citant, de lui conférer de la validité.
- *Les citations-épigraphes* sont destinées à relier le discours nouveau à un ensemble textuel plus vaste, à l'intégrer dans un ensemble d'énoncés antérieurs (l'inter-texte).
- *Les citations-culture* fonctionnent comme signe de connivence, signe de «culture». Elles varient selon les communautés, et de par leur fonction phatique provoquent une adhésion presque automatique.

2.3 Les proverbes

Concernant les proverbes, Maingueneau (1999) explique que lorsque quelqu'un dit un proverbe, il accomplit un acte de discours singulier, car il pose une assertion qu'il donne pour validée par une entité aux contours indéfinis, la «sagesse des nations». Il présente son dire comme l'écho d'un nombre illimité d'énonciations antérieures. *On*, l'asserteur du proverbe ne peut pas être considéré comme une instance vraiment distincte de l'énonciateur, car ce dernier fait partie de la communauté linguistique. Or les proverbes appartiennent au stock de savoir partagé par l'ensemble de la communauté linguistique, et c'est justement ce qui confère sa force au proverbe: alors que les citations d'autorité habituelles sont rapportées à des sources particulières (le Christ, tel savant, tel philosophe, etc.), l'autorité qui valide le proverbe coïncide avec l'ensemble des locuteurs d'une langue.

2.4 La diaphonie

Au sujet de la diaphonie, Roulet (1985) introduit ce terme afin de préciser le concept de polyphonie. La diaphonie est «un des cas particuliers de voix dans l'énoncé, la reprise et l'intégration du discours de l'interlocuteur dans le discours du locuteur» (p. 70). La parole diaphonique s'oppose à la simple citation des paroles de l'interlocuteur en ce sens qu'elle suppose leur interprétation, et en ce sens «La structure diaphonique est ainsi une des traces privilégiées de la négociation des points de vue qui caractérise toute interaction» (p. 71).

2.5 La présupposition

Pour Kerbrat-Orecchioni (1986), la présupposition réoriente la «vérité» des énoncés. Ce qui se passe au premier plan, c'est l'instance qui valide l'énoncé et comme elle le dit «toute assertion est prise en charge explicitement ou implicitement par un sujet énonciateur et c'est pour ce sujet d'abord qu'elle est vraie» (p. 56). Par le présupposé l'énoncé ne semble pas pris en charge par le locuteur, mais est présenté seulement comme une croyance.

3. *Présentation des procédés polyphoniques relevés*

Nous allons maintenant passer à la présentation de l'analyse des procédés polyphoniques observés dans notre corpus d'entretiens et de débats. Nous présenterons tout d'abord l'analyse de l'utilisation du discours rapporté à partir de la présentation des différentes citations relevées, et ensuite nous passerons à celle de l'analyse des emplois des présuppositions.

3.1 L'emploi du discours rapporté

Concernant l'emploi du discours rapporté nous avons relevé dans les entretiens comme dans les débats des citations en Discours Direct et en Discours Indirect.

3.1.1 En Discours Direct

3.1.1.1 Dans les entretiens

- Les citations par reprise

Dans les citations par reprise, les locuteurs reprennent des énoncés d'autres énonciateurs fictifs ou réels.

1. lorsqu'ils viennent aborder une fille il dit [...] je vais t'envoyer dans tel endroit; lorsque je l'ai il me dit [...] je vais passer
2. j'ai rencontré un homme de Dieu qui [...] m'a dit Dieu fera je connais la peur de ton cœur
3. ma petite sœur [...] m'a dit tu as vu ce que ce monsieur t'a fait ...
je dis non c'est pas grave de toute façon c'est la vie c'est comme ça
il me dit [...] je regrette de t'avoir abandonné mais je ne sais pas comment faire
je dis non parce que si tu m'aimais tu n'allais pas me réveiller à minuit trente ...
ma petite sœur dit ah les mariages d'Abidjan c'est comme ça
4. elle ira dire à sa copine mais écoutez mon gars ne travaille pas alors bon celui-là [...] celui-là ne lui donne rien moi mon gars m'a acheté tant

Dans les énoncés de I6 et I11, on a affaire à des citations d'autorité, car l'énonciateur du discours cité est une autorité reconnue par le locuteur (un homme de Dieu, ma petite sœur). Ces citations ont pour objectif de conférer de la crédibilité aux énoncés rapportés et donc au locuteur.

- La citation d'une maxime

5. *comme on le dit* à l'école on va pour lire écrire et aussi on doit nous éduquer

Citer une maxime sert à rapporter un discours provenant d'une source indéfinie, et reconnu comme vrai. Ce type de citation fonctionne comme signe de connivence (Maingueneau 1991: 137). La maxime est donc utilisée pour provoquer une adhésion presque automatique de l'auditoire, car elle semble s'adresser à tout le monde.

3.1.1.2 Dans les débats

- La diaphonie

La majorité des énoncés repris par les locuteurs sont ceux d'autres énonciateurs participants au procès d'énonciation.

Débat 1: Les jeunes et la politique

6. *comme le camarade l'a dit* il doit mériter le jeune doit mériter sa place dans la vie politique
7. *y a l'un des amis qui est un intervenant qui a dit* la question d'être Ivoirien ou pas c'est un faux débat pourvu que la personne ait l'amour du pays
8. *comme tout le monde on l'a dit* la paix et que tout soit transparent

Débat 2: Les relations filles-garçons

9. euh parler des relations entre filles garçons *comme certains l'ont déjà dit* au delà des relations fraternelles on a aussi la camaraderie [...]
10. je voudrais ajouter à ce qu'*elle a dit* s'il vous plaît je voudrais ajouter à ce qu'elle a dit c'est que l'amitié entre une fille et un garçon ça existe vraiment [...]
11. moi je voudrais intervenir s'il vous plaît je suis d'accord avec Marcel *quand il dit* non qu'il faut d'abord établir une confiance entre les deux partenaires parce que les relations
 - Les citations
 - Les citations par reprise
12. *c'est ces mêmes gens qui ont dit* si ils veulent pas aller à l'école laissez-les dans la rue nous on s'en fout déjà nous on mange
 - Les citations-preuve
13. excuse-moi ce que je voulais dire c'est que nous deux ça n'a jamais été le cas ça n'a jamais été le cas d'ailleurs *c'est lui qui m'a dit* Zénab t'es trop seule [...] il a dit Zénab t'es tout le temps seule tout le temps seule c'est pas bien et tu donc je voudrais te présenter à un ami pour que tu sortes avec lui et tout *j'ai dit* non ça va pas marcher
14. mais si il revient et on discute de tout et de rien il me parle de ses problèmes il me demande des conseils *il me dit* ah voilà je vais prendre telle décision quel est ton avis? *je dis* ah voilà un tel il veut être un ami il cherche une amitié [...]
 - Les citations-autorité
15. *y a un leader politique africain qui a dit* dis-moi quelle jeunesse tu as je te dirais quel peuple tu seras
16. oui je suis chrétien donc je suis *la bible – qui dit* pour qu'il y ait une véritable entre une fille et puis un garçon il faudrait que ces deux-là s'inspirent aussi de la bible il faudrait que ils prennent exemple sur ce qui a été écrit dans la bible

17. une fois que les rapports sexuels entre deux individus tout de suite il y a échange ces deux individus deviennent un une même chair alors que *la bible nous dit* l'homme quittera son père et sa mère pour ne s'attacher que à sa femme et tous deux ne feront qu'un

- Les citations-culture

18. on a besoin toujours du plus petit que soi *comme on le dit* on a besoin aussi également des idées des autres [...]

19. *il ne faut pas dire* que parce que on est des amis on ne doit pas par la suite devenir des amoureux puisqu'on dit l'amour naît au fil des temps [...]

20. *comme on le dit* souvent sa bouche ne porte pas caleçon donc tes petits secrets que tu vas venir lui dire c'est sûr qu'elle va dire ça à quelqu'un d'autre [...]

Ainsi, comme nous venons de le voir, les locuteurs se servent du discours direct pour intégrer soit des citations internes au procès d'énonciation pour corroborer leur thèse ou réfuter celle d'un autre participant, soit des citations issues d'une autorité ou de la culture générale pour étayer un argument. Par l'emploi des citations-autorité, le locuteur se sert de la crédibilité de la source de l'énoncé rapporté (ici le leader politique ou la bible) pour entraîner l'adhésion de l'auditoire à son argumentation.

3.1.2 En Discours indirect

3.1.2.1 Dans les entretiens

- Les citations par reprise

Dans la citation suivante, la locutrice reprend les énoncés d'énonciateurs réels.

21. *cet homme m'a dit qu'il* ne voulait plus de moi; (il) *m'a dit que* il était l'homme que Dieu a envoyé pour moi; *on me dit qu'il* n'y a pas d'enfant dans mon ventre

- Les citations par paraphrase

22. je suis d'accord pour ce que *Savan Alla dit* dans sa chanson disant que l'homme est un loup pour la femme

23. *comme l'a dit mon ami* c'est dû au fait que / les femmes surtout sont de plus en plus sont beaucoup matérielles

Dans ce cas, les Ivoiriens se servent de la paraphrase pour reprendre le discours d'énonciateurs absents ou présents (diaphonie) au moment du procès d'énonciation pour étayer leur argumentation et ainsi la renforcer.

3.1.2.2 Dans les débats

- Les citations

Les locuteurs se servent également de ce procédé pour citer des discours d'énonciateurs extérieurs au procès d'énonciation: dans le Débat 1 ils emploient des citations-culture, et dans le Débat 2 des citations-autorité.

Débat 1: Les jeunes et la politique

24. *on nous a toujours dit* depuis l'école primaire qu'*on* ne doit pas faire la politique à l'école
25. je pense que *on dit souvent* que la femme est fait partie de la tranche de population la plus marginalisée la plus pauvre

Débat 2: Les relations filles-garçons

26. *la bible dit* que c'est normal c'est intéressant qu'une fille et un garçon aient des échanges – *la bible dit* qu'il faut être sincère il faut être sincère avec autrui donc si dès le départ tu es sincère avec la fille et que cette même fille-là est sincère avec toi vous êtes sûrs de ne pas déborder et *c'est ce que la bible dit la bible dit aussi que c'est c'est l'homme l'homme il est appelé forcément à changer à vivre avec une femme [...]*

- La diaphonie

Dans ces exemples, les énoncés repris par les locuteurs sont ceux d'autres énonciateurs participant au procès d'énonciation. Nous avons ce type de reprise seulement dans le débat sur la politique.

27. pour ceux qui n'avaient pas suivi l'émission si Marius tenait à réfléchir sa qualité c'est parce qu'*il avait dit* qu'il avait derrière lui tout le peuple
28. voilà en fait je pense que dire *le fait qu'elle dit que* le président ou je sais pas doit avoir le l'amour du pays c'est un fait qui doit être pris en compte

3.2 L'emploi de la présupposition

3.2.1 Dans les entretiens

29. *faudrait* pas seulement voir le côté négatif des choses (comme certains)
30. on *pourrait* s'interroger d'abord sur / heu le mobile réel même de // disons l'intention profonde de Savan Alla

3.2.2 Dans les débats

Débat 1: Les jeunes et la politique

31. l'idéal *voudrait* que le bon politicien soit celui-là même qui soit en mesure / d'écouter le peuple / d'être à la merci du peuple (sous-entendu: mais il n'est pas comme ça)
32. il *faudrait* pas qu'*on* se mette en l'idée que il faut forcément avoir des millions des milliards pour pouvoir briguer un poste politique (sous-entendu: mais certains le pensent)

Débat 2: Les relations filles-garçons

33. je pense que sur ce point *faudrait* pas avoir de position tranchée (sous-entendu: comme certains)
34. qui dit pour qu'il y ait une véritable entre une fille et puis un garçon il *faudrait* que ces deux là s'inspirent aussi de la bible il *faudrait* que ils prennent exemple sur ce qui a été écrit dans la bible (sous-entendu: ce n'est pas toujours le cas)

On voit donc que dans les entretiens comme dans les débats, les locuteurs utilisent la présupposition pour invalider le point de vue d'énonciateurs fictifs, et ainsi introduire implicitement leur point de vue, mais sans l'assumer, notamment par l'emploi du marqueur générique *On* et de la modalisation passive *faudrait*, qui servent à généraliser les propos du locuteur afin d'impliquer l'auditoire.

Conclusion

Grâce à cette étude nous avons ainsi pu rendre compte du fait que les procédés polyphoniques sont utilisés dans un discours argumentatif pour exprimer l'opinion du locuteur de façon détournée. En outre, pour exprimer leur éthos, les Ivoiriens ont tendance à préférer un certain type de discours rapporté, notamment la citation de sources faisant autorité. Cette observation nous laisse à penser que cette forme de recherche de l'adhésion aux valeurs proposées, résulte d'un éthos hiérarchique dominant, d'une soumission aux valeurs religieuses, et également d'une surpolitisation du vécu des locuteurs. En effet, ce style discursif, corrélé à l'effacement énonciatif du Je, n'est pas étranger au statut de l'individu dans une société aux fondements collectivisants. Par conséquent, cette étude nous permet de dire que tout discours, et à plus forte raison encore un discours argumentatif, est le reflet des normes culturelles qui régissent le fonctionnement de la société dans laquelle il est construit et mis en œuvre.

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APPROACHING ARGUMENTATIVE DIALOGUE WITH FORMAL MODELS

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1. *Introduction*

From the linguistic point of view, dialogue can be understood as an exchange of speech acts with its rules and constraints, with the main objective being communication. From pragmatic theory, dialogue could also be defined as a game where the participants try to maximize the possibilities of success in their argumentation in order to achieve their own goal.

Any contribution to the study of dialogue is in debt with the theory of speech acts, introduced by Austin (1962) and Searle (1969), that has become one of the central issues of pragmatics and human communication traditionally tackled by artificial intelligence.

The theory of dialogue acts has made it possible to establish units in dialogue and has allowed the start of the dialogue grammars approach (Sinclair & Coulthard 1975) as well as establishing several taxonomies of units (Sinclair & Coulthard 1975; Traum & Hinkelman 1992).

Computer science has been more interested in the structure and the interaction of agents in conversation (Litman & Allen 1990) rather than in single utterances. From that perspective, some authors (Sinclair & Coulthard 1975; Coulthard *et al.* 1981) have distinguished different levels inside the dialogue: *act*, *move*, *exchange* and *transaction*. Such classification has become classical, especially referring to moves (Kowto *et al.* 1993; Traum & Larsson 2003).

Traum and Hinkelman (1992) give a new perspective in the topic gathering different types of acts in four groups: *turn-taking*, *grounding*, *core speech acts* and *argumentation*. One of the novelties of this taxonomy consists in the inclusion of turn-taking into such categories.

A similar idea can be found in Bunt (2005), who defends the existence of *task-oriented acts* and *dialogue control acts*. Both types modify the linguistic and cognitive context. However, task-oriented acts only change the semantic context and dialogue control acts mainly affect the social or physical context. He considers turn taking to be included in *interaction management functions*, which belong to *dialogue control functions*.

By means of Grice's maxims, participants are required to be cooperative and they have to follow a behavior that is related more to politeness than to linguistics. But many times, contra to Grice's claims, participants have secret purposes that are not known by the other agents. In this sense, Reed and Long (1997) make an interesting

distinction between cooperation and collaboration. For a dialogue to be brought about, cooperation is necessary, but collaboration not always exists.

For us, a crucial and non-static element in dialogue is context, understood as the environmental and personal states and circumstances that can affect the development of the dialogue. This context is in constant evolution, not only because of external factors, but also because of the speech acts performed by the participants. Therefore, like Bunt (1995), we think that the configuration of the dialogue is directly related to the intentions of the speakers/hearers and to the context.

In what refers to the types of dialogues according to human argumentation, Walton and Krabbe (1995) introduced a taxonomy that has become classical. They distinguish between *information seeking*, *inquiry*, *persuasion*, *negotiation*, *deliberation* and *eristic* dialogues. Our work is mainly focused in deliberation, a kind of dialogue in which participants have to reach an agreement and make a decision.

We approach deliberation from the perspective of *dialogue games* following the research line started by Carlson (1983). Many authors have tackled dialogue as a game (McBurney & Parsons 2002a, 2002b; Prakken 2006), although most of them have focused on persuasion (Hitchcock *et al.* 2001; Glazer & Rubinstein 2001, 2005). Glazer and Rubinstein introduce an interesting variant, which they name *debate*, based on game theory. In their model, two opponents have to convince a third person, which is the one deciding.

This paper is an attempt to start an approach for deliberation dialogue games accounting for argumentation, using some tools provided by mathematics, theoretical computer science and game theory. The definition of deliberation is derived from the general definition of dialogue, with the important restriction of the number of agents A , that in this case is given by $A=2$. In what refers to game theory, we use the extensive form of games representation because we assume the participation of the speakers is sequential and they alternate in turn. In this simple model, then, turn taking is already established, given by the number of agents.

In deliberation, agents interact to decide what action or course of actions should be adopted in some situation. Grice (1975) claims that cooperation is basic for the correct development of conversation from the pragmatic perspective. However, our work is based on the ignorance of agents' real attitude. We assume they could not follow Grice's principles. Therefore, participants in the system have one of the following configurations:

- a) participants have secret intentions, and
- b) participants are neutral.

In this research, we are mainly interested in defining games where the participants in the deliberation have secret intentions. In the sequel, the term dialogue refers to "deliberation dialogue".

Summing up, we are interested in the formalization of deliberation with two agents that have secret goals, and in the analysis and optimization of their moves, tak-

ing some methods from game theory.

In Section 2 we introduce the main definitions of dialogue and deliberation. Section 3 shows an example. In Section 4 some strategies for improving the possibilities of success are discussed. Finally, Section 5 provides some discussion and future lines of work within this framework.

2. Definitions

2.1 Dialogue

First, we introduce a general definition for a formal dialogue, that must be adapted in order to account for deliberation. The main features of the definition below are: a) the number of agents A is, by default, $A > 2$; b) the sets of stores are selected for approaching spontaneous, non task-oriented conversations; c) turn taking is not established; d) during the conversation, agents can become disconnected, participants can leave the scene, and new ones can enter.

The formal framework for dealing with this type of conversations would be the following:

Definition 1: Dialogue systems can be defined as a 4-tuple (A, Θ, Σ, G) , where:

- $A = \{A_1, A_2, \dots, A_n\}$ is the multi-agent structure, where every one of the agents has a configuration $A_i = (R_i, C_i)$, being:
 - R_i the set of rules. Every one has:
 - At the left side turn-taking for the rule to be applied.
 - At the right side:
 - a) the rule of generation, and
 - b) the agent whom the speech act is addressed to, if it exists.
 - C_i is the state of the communication channels. Every agent has bi-directional (input/output) channels with others, which can be set either as open or closed. For the communication to be possible between two given agents A_n and A_i , the channel has to be open in both directions. For the other combinations (open-closed, closed-open, closed-closed) communication is not possible.
- $\Theta = \{\kappa, \alpha, \gamma, \phi, \pi, \varepsilon, \sigma\}$ is the set of stores of core speech acts, being their configuration as follows: $\kappa = \{k_1, k_2, \dots, k_n\}$, query; $\alpha = \{a_1, a_2, \dots, a_n\}$, answer; $\gamma = \{g_1, g_2, \dots, g_n\}$, agree; $\phi = \{f_1, f_2, \dots, f_n\}$, reject; $\pi = \{p_1, p_2, \dots, p_n\}$, prescription; $\varepsilon = \{e_1, e_2, \dots, e_n\}$, clarify; $\sigma = \{s_1, s_2, \dots, s_n\}$, assert.
- $\Sigma = \{K \text{ (Query)}, A \text{ (Answer)}, G \text{ (Agree)}, F \text{ (Reject)}, P \text{ (Prescription)}, E \text{ (Clarify)}, S \text{ (assert)}\}$ is the set of turn-taking dialogue acts.
- $G = \{G_1, G_2, \dots, G_n\}$ is the set of registers of the system, the place where the dialogue games are stored. There is a different generation register for every conversation started by the system.

2.2 Deliberation

Bearing in mind the general formalization of dialogue, now a formal description of deliberation has to be given, by constraining and adapting some of the elements of the previous definition.

First of all, in order to approach deliberation, we establish the existence of only two agents A_1, A_2 which are the only participants. This is a methodological option to simplify the description of the system, but the formalization can be extended to n participants, only by adding the configuration of A in the definition we will introduce in this section.

The existence of only two agents implies that the turn taking is previously established as an alternance of A_1 and A_2 , in a way that no other protocol is needed. Therefore, Σ and the transitions and rules it implies are not necessary for this simple case. When the number of agents is $A > 2$, then Σ must be included again in the definition of deliberation.

Each one of the agents has a set of dialogue acts $\Theta(A_1), \Theta(A_2)$. Each one of these sets is part of an acts store $\Theta = \{p, r, s, a, q, x\}$. Such a store is different from the one of the general case of dialogue, as the acts are especially selected to fit an argumentative exchange. In Θ , p and s are two different types of arguments, r is a counter-argument rejection, a is acceptance, q is a question and x indicates that an agent is quitting the dialogue. We also establish that r and a , cannot be initial productions of the dialogue because they are only valid as a counter-argument.

R is a set of combinations of argumentation-counter argumentation that relates elements from the set $\Theta(A_1)$ to acts belonging to the set $\Theta(A_2)$, or vice versa. These rules are different for each one of the agents or participants, and they have the form $p \rightarrow q$. Every agent has its own set of rules, R_1 for A_1 , R_2 for A_2 , R_n for A_n . If single elements are found in the sets of rules of the agents, they can be used only as a "starting production". They are, then, the starting symbols of the system. If both agents have starting acts, only A_1 will be able to use them, since this is the agent, which, by definition, starts the debate, if it has arguments to do that. The participant that starts the dialogue is A_1 , if it has some argument that is not generated by another argument, i.e. some single symbol in R_1 .

We denote a production w of an agent A_n in a given state as $A_n(w)$, and the set of possible productions for an agent A_n in a given state as $\theta(A_1)$.

The possible outcomes of the deliberation are represented with upper-case roman letters. They are part of the set O , such that $O = \{A, B, C, \dots\}$.

Some of the elements of Θ are associated to elements of O by an application F . Such elements are named terminal acts.

Definition 2: Having two speakers A_1 and A_2 , a deliberation game G between them is defined as a 4-tuple:

$$G = (\Theta, R, O, F)$$

where:

- Θ is an acts store;
- $R = R_1 \cup R_2, \dots \cup R_n$ is the set of argumentation rules for each agent;
- O is the set of possible outcomes of the deliberation;
- F is an application relating elements of Θ to elements of O . Such application is denoted by the symbol ' \rightarrow '. If there is not an O element for a sign belonging to Θ , then the result is *Ind*, which means that the outcome is undecidable and the deliberation has to go on.

The graphic representation of the deliberation game can be seen by means of a tree-diagram. For this we follow the regular elements and terminology. Using the tree graphic and the concepts that have been defined, we introduce several statements for the description and study of the properties of a deliberation dialogue.

Description 1: Tree-Diagram

The tree-diagram will show all the possible productions of the game, where the nodes are the agents speaking and the edges denote dialogue acts. Every different branch in the tree determines a possible trajectory.

Description 2: Terminal nodes

Terminal refers to the nodes that cannot be developed any more at the end of the debate, which corresponds to the classical definition of "terminal".

Description 3: Final nodes

Final nodes are terminal nodes after a given move, that is, the nodes that, after the application of F are not labelled with *Ind*. Nodes *Ind* are final but non terminal nodes.

Description 4: Trajectories

A trajectory of dialogue is every lineal path of the tree starting at the initial node. A complete trajectory is every path from the starting utterance to a terminal symbol. There are as many trajectories in a dialogue as the final nodes it has. There are as many complete trajectories in a dialogue as terminal nodes it has. There are as many possible trajectories in a given move as the new nodes it produces.

Description 5: Trajectories in deliberation

Being G a deliberation game for agents A_1 and A_2 , and $\Theta = \{w\}$ the acts store, we denote a trajectory of this game with the form $G(w_1, w_2, \dots, w_n)$, being w_1, w_2, \dots, w_n the utterances generated to reach the final agreement in order of generation. Since a dialogue has as many trajectories as final results, then we say that a $G = \{G_1, G_2, \dots, G_n\}$.

Description 6: Width

The width of a dialogue $w(G)$ is the maximal number of trajectories it has. The trajectories are ordered starting with the leftmost and finishing by the rightmost.

Description 7: Paired trajectories

We call paired trajectories those that have an even number of edges and unpaired trajectories those that have an odd number of edges.

Description 8: Move

We define a move M as an adjacency pair that consists of argument and counterargument. A sequence is a set of moves M_m, M_n, \dots, M_i . A debate can have one or more moves. As in real life, some debates stop after a number of productions that has been determined before, and others can be calculated after all possibilities have been explored.

Description 9: Move productions

The productions generated after a move M_n are $\theta(M_n)$. In $\theta(M_n)$ two types of acts can be distinguished: final $f(M_n)$ and terminal $\tau(M_n)$. The state of the dialogue after M_n , denoted $\Theta(M_n)$, includes $\theta(M_n)$ and all the terminal acts before M_n , denoted by $T(M_n)$. Being M_m, M_n the first and second moves in a debate, it is clear that in M_m , $\Theta(M_m) = \theta(M_m)$, while in M_n , $\Theta(M_n) = \tau(M_m) \cup \theta(M_n)$. Being $M = \{M_m, M_n, \dots, M_i\}$, $\Theta(M_i) = \tau(M_m) \cup \tau(M_n) \dots \cup \dots \theta(M_i)$. If in a given move M_n , $\theta(M_n) = \tau(M_n)$, then the debate is complete.

The results of the productions in a move M_n are designed by $g(M_n)$, and they are obtained by applying $F(\theta(M_n) \Rightarrow O)$. The results of the debate after the move M_n are denoted by $G(M_n)$, and they are obtained by applying $F(\Theta(M_n) \Rightarrow O)$.

Description 10: Final Generation

A generation is a final generation if it is the last generation that has been stipulated for a debate. A generation is a terminal generation if it produces an agreement between agents. Terminal generations produce complete nodes because, after the agreement, the dialogue does not develop any more.

Description 11: Finished and complete dialogues

We say a dialogue is finished, when the number of moves that have been assigned to it, have been performed. We consider a dialogue to be complete when every one of the acts generated in a production has an outcome in O .

Description 12: Finite and infinite deliberation games

We name finite dialogues those, which can be completed in n number of moves. For example a finite 2-complete dialogue is the one that can be completed performing two moves. An infinite dialogue is the one that cannot be completed. For debates that last until they have found an agreement for every possibility, a finished debate is a complete debate. This is only possible for finite dialogues.

Description 13: Degree of a deliberation game

Degree of a dialogue $\text{deg}(G)$ is the length of the shortest trajectory to reach an agreement.

Description 14: Depth of a deliberation game

Depth of a dialogue $\text{depth}(G)$ is the length of the largest trajectory to reach an agreement. For infinite dialogues the depth of the dialogue is ∞ .

Description 15: Monotonous / non-monotonous / undecidable deliberation dialogues

If there is a debate where the $\text{deg}(G) = \text{depth}(G)$ then such debate is called monotonous. When $\text{deg}(G) \neq \text{depth}(G)$ then the debate is non-monotonous. A debate where $\text{deg}(G) = \text{depth}(G) = \infty$ is an undecidable debate.

3. Example

In this section, we introduce an example of debate. We do not establish a number of moves to compute, in a way that the dialogue will continue if there is any undefined result after every move.

We will study the basic features of the dialogue taking into account the concepts introduced above.

Example 1: Let's take $G = (\Theta, R, O, F)$, with:

- $\Theta (= \Theta(A_1) = \Theta(A_2)) = \{p, s, r, a, x\}$;
- $O = \{A, B, C\}$;
- $F = \{A_1(x) \Rightarrow A, A_2(x) \Rightarrow B, a \Rightarrow C\}$;
- $R = R_1 \cup R_2$ being:
 - $R(A_1) = \{p, s, r \rightarrow s, r \rightarrow x, p \rightarrow x\}$,
 - $R(A_2) = \{p \rightarrow x, p \rightarrow r, p \rightarrow a, s \rightarrow a, s \rightarrow p\}$.

The deliberation game resulting from this formalization is shown in Figure 1.




Figure 1: Tree-diagram

It is easy to see, observing the rules, that for A_1 , the secret goal is B, and for A_2 , the secret goal is A, since when A_1 quits the deliberation the result is A, and when A_2 quits the game the outcome is B.

Looking at the diagram we can say that this is a finite 3-complete dialogue. The debate consists of two paired moves and one unpaired move: $\text{deg}(G) = 2$ and $\text{depth}(G) = 5$. This is, then, a non-monotonous debate. The width of the dialogue, $\text{width}(G)$, is 7, being the trajectories G_1 (px), G_2 (prsa), G_3 (prsp), G_4 (prx), G_5 (pa), G_6 (sa), G_7 (spx). G_1, G_2, G_5, G_6 are paired trajectories, whereas G_3, G_4, G_7 are unpaired trajectories.

The productions generated after the first move are $\theta(M_1) = \{x, r, a, a, p\}$. $\Theta(M_1) = \theta(M_1)$. Applying F to this outcome we obtain the result of the deliberation after the first move, which is $g(M_1) = \{B, \text{Ind}, C, C, \text{Ind}\}$.

By means of the second move we obtain $\theta(M_2) = \{a, p, x, x\}$. $\Theta(M_2) = \tau(M_1) \cup \theta(M_2)$, being $g(M_2) = \{C, \text{Ind}, A, A\}$ and $G(M_2) = \{B, C, \text{Ind}, A, C, C, A\}$.

The third move is an unpaired one, because there is only one *Ind* node, and it is complete after one generation. Therefore $\theta(M_3) = \{x\}$. $\Theta(M_3) = \tau(M_1) \cup \tau(M_2) \cup \theta(M_3)$, being $g(M_3) = \{A\}$ and $G(M_3) = \{B, C, A, A, C, C, A\}$.

4. Optimization Strategies

The analysis of the formal properties of a dialogue must help the agents to calculate their possibilities to reach a good agreement. The example introduced in the last section can be a tool for introducing simple calculus of the probabilities of success.

As it has been already said, the secret goal of A_1 is B and the secret goal of A_2 is A. Even if both of the agents want to reach an agreement, they both have a clear order of preferences. For both agents, the first option is their preference, and the second the neutral agreement C. Finally, the last option is the preference of the opponent. Since the debate is complete, there is not the possibility of leaving the dialogue without a result. There are three possible results, $O = \{A, B, C\}$. Let's give a score for each one of them: 3 for the best option, 2 for the second, 1 for the worst. Table I shows the scores for agents A_1 and A_2 .

	A	B	C
A_1	1	3	2
A_2	3	1	2

Table I: Scores

Formally, it can be said that $O(A_1)=\{B, C, A\}$, $O(A_2)=\{A, C, B\}$

With these scores for every result, two techniques can be implemented: horizontal scoring and branching scoring.

Description 16: Horizontal scoring

Horizontal scoring is the calculation of the possibilities of success for every agent by uttering each one of the possible speech acts in a given move.

Description 17: Branching scoring

Branching scoring is the calculation of the possibilities of final success in a trajectory of a deliberation game for every agent.

Let's take the perspective of A_1 . After M_1 , $g(M_1) = \{B, \text{Ind}, C, C, \text{Ind}\}$. Applying the scores of Table 1, we obtain $g(M_1) = \{3, 2, 2\}$. After M_2 $g(M_2) = \{C, \text{Ind}, A, A\}$, therefore $g(M_2) = \{2, 1, 1\}$. Finally, after M_3 we obtain $g(M_3) = \{A\}$ and $g(M_3) = \{1\}$. From these scores, and in a scale from 1 to 3, the average score for A_1 if the dialogue finishes in the first move is 2,3. The average score if the dialogue does not finish in the first move and a second move is necessary, 1,3. Finally, if the debate does not finish with two moves and a third move is necessary, the score for A_2 will be just 1, this is, the minimal.

Let's take the perspective of A_2 . If the debate finishes in the first move, then the average score for this agent will be $g(M_1) = \{1, 2, 2\}$, which is 1.6. However, if the debate goes on, then we get $g(M_2) = \{C, \text{Ind}, A, A\}$, which is $g(M_2) = \{2, 3, 3\}$, this is an average of 2,6. Finally, if the game needs a third move, then the average for A_2 is the

best, because $g(M_3) = \{A\}$, and the score for A is 3 in A_2 .

The outcome obtained by scoring the results in each move is shown in Table II.

	M_1	M_2	M_3
A_1	2,3	1,3	1
A_2	1,6	2,6	3

Table II: Scores by moves

Table II shows how, for A_1 the best option is to try to finish as soon as possible. However, the possibilities of obtaining a good agreement increase for A_2 when the debate lasts for more than one move.

It seems, then, that its first act should be s, because the shortest trajectories come from the right. However, this is not accurate. In the first move, A_1 has the possibility of finishing with a good result 2/3 on the left and 1/2 on the right. On the other hand, the only possibility to reach its secret goal is playing on the left.

In general A_1 has a 50% possibility of getting a good result starting on the right and 60% if starting on the left. A_1 has to try to start on the left and finish at the first move.

A_2 cannot choose the starting symbol, and it has to wait for A_1 in order to give its counter-arguments. If A_1 starts on the right, A_2 has an 83% possibility of success, whereas the percentage is 73% if A_1 starts with p.

Broadly speaking, A_1 prefers trajectories starting with p and A_2 prefers trajectories starting with s. But in all cases, it seems A_2 has more possibilities to “win” the debate.

The best trajectory for an agent is the shortest one with score 3. For A_1 the best trajectory is G_1 . For A_2 the best ones are G_4 and G_7 , but it has to prefer G_7 because starting with s it always achieves a good score.

But if we examine the trajectories and their possible accomplishments, we have the following: $G_1 = 1/6$, $G_2 = 1/24$, $G_3 = 1/24$, $G_4 = 1/12$, $G_5 = 1/6$, $G_6 = 1/4$, $G_7 = 1/4$.

5. Discussion

By means of the method introduced in this paper we intend to explore some mathematical properties of deliberation dialogues, and the possibilities that the agents have to achieve a good agreement.

By introducing this approach, we try to tackle dialogue, and especially deliberation, from a perspective that can help to:

- simulate argumentative processes in/with computers,
- explore some mathematical properties of argumentation and,
- introduce a method for the formalization of some problems in pragmatics of dialogue.

The system we present in this paper allows us to relate the behavior of the participants to pragmatics, especially to the context, to the behavior of the other agents, to the content of the utterances and to the secret intentions of the speakers. We think this method can be very useful to achieve an optimization of the arguments and counter-arguments produced in deliberation dialogues.

Since this is a first approach to the topic from the formal-computational perspective, the method is not very realistic, mainly because of three reasons: a) agents know everything about the other agents, they see all the time the general acts store, b) agents can change the strategy, but they cannot add new arguments to their stores, c) the final result of the dialogue can be calculated from the first move; it is deterministic. Therefore, in order to research this area more, we suggest performing the following improvements: a) the number of agents can be $A > 2$, b) the agents can change strategies, add new acts to the stores and make new rules, c) agents can be blind, this is, they do not see the other agents' stores. With these new features, the method can make a small contribution to achieving real micro spaces of artificial intelligence, being more realistic and human inspired.

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DIRE SENZA DIRE, ARGUMENTARE SENZA ARGOMENTI

ADELINO CATTANI

L'intervento tratterà dei significati e dei discorsi implicitamente argomentativi e si concentrerà sul valore persuasivo dei discorsi narrativi in apparenza non argomentativi.

Descrivere e argomentare sono due atti molto diversi; e costituiscono una cosiddetta coppia filosofica. Vorrei qui, in primo luogo, mostrare che non si tratta di una coppia di nozioni esclusive, né semplicemente di una coppia di azioni complementari; in secondo luogo, intendo esaminare la questione di quando e come un testo descrittivo diventa un testo argomentativo. In altri termini e più precisamente, mi propongo di vedere quando e come una descrizione non è puramente la componente di un argomento (in quanto premessa esplicitamente esibita) o un'asserzione a sostegno di una tesi (è naturale che una narrazione o una descrizione vivide conferiscano forza al discorso), ma quando è essa stessa un argomento. Il presente saggio concerne pertanto la valenza argomentativa e persuasiva delle nostre descrizioni e narrazioni, che diventano quindi delle pseudo-esposizioni fattuali o pseudo-rappresentazioni, degli pseudo-rendiconti o pseudo-classificazioni. Prendi due e paghi uno, potrebbe essere lo slogan.

C'è chi non ha nulla da dire. C'è chi non ha argomenti di conversazione. Chi, in mancanza di argomenti, ricorre all'insulto. C'è persino un sito web intitolato "parlare senza argomenti".

C'è viceversa chi dice senza dirlo. C'è chi ragiona facendo finta di raccontarci fatti. Cioè: chi dice (implicitamente) senza dirlo (esplicitamente) e chi argomenta raccontando.

L'informazione e la formazione si attuano di norma su testi che possono essere di natura narrativa o di natura argomentativa. Narrare e argomentare costituiscono anche le due funzioni principali del linguaggio. Tra il narrare e l'argomentare sussiste una naturale opposizione, tale da rendere la coppia una polarità esemplare.

Le narrazioni sono esposizioni di dati acquisiti, di fatti, di emozioni; dovrebbero consistere in una trasmissione di dati già *condivisi* da tutti o dai più o dai "migliori", secondo la nota gerarchia aristotelica, e che basta assimilare, fare propri. Ciò che conta è il dato.

Le argomentazioni invece sono proposte di ragionamenti da valutare o di tesi controverse, sostenute da ragioni più o meno buone, che vanno *giudicate*. Ciò che conta è il nesso tra i dati.

Si tratta di due modalità discorsive diverse, ma accomunate da una ricerca di efficacia comunicativa. Essendo diverse, la loro analisi e valutazione richiedono criteri e strumenti diversi. Avendo uno scopo comune, vi sono però delle sovrapposizioni di standard d'analisi e di valutazione.

Un esempio di narrazione pura è certamente il *romanzo*.

Uno *spot pubblicitario* è altrettanto chiaramente e banalmente un caso lampante di discorso che mira non a descrivere, bensì a far fare (indurre all'acquisto, modificare le opinioni o i comportamenti del destinatario del messaggio).

Capita però che testi in apparenza narrativi ed espositivi abbiano una valenza surrettiziamente persuasiva. Anzi, molto spesso l'esposizione risulta il migliore argomento. Disporre di qualche strumento di analisi e di valutazione che consenta di individuare questa duplice natura è utile, se non indispensabile.

La domanda è: come si può fare un discorso argomentativo-persuasivo esponendo o raccontando (o facendo finta di esporre e di raccontare)? Che cosa conferisce natura inferenziale ad un enunciato-resoconto?

Teniamo presente che un argomento è un ragionamento e un ragionamento deve avere per forza almeno tre componenti, quelle classiche del sillogismo: una premessa maggiore, una premessa minore ed una conclusione.

Al fine che un testo espositivo diventi argomentativo si richiede che:

- vi sia un'intenzione argomentativa
- che viene espressa implicitamente da chi parla
- e che viene colta espressamente da chi ascolta
- sulla base di regole invalse di interpretazione.

È chiaro ed innegabile che alcune affermazioni hanno un'inerente dimensione argomentativa: ad esempio, una biografia può essere letta come un'autocelebrazione o un'autodifesa. Ma non è questo senso intrinseco che vogliamo attribuire all'espressione "valore argomentativo". La teoria degli atti linguistici ci aiuta a chiarire questo punto: ciò che si fa *nel* dire qualcosa è diverso da ciò che si fa *col* dire qualcosa. Dicendo (*nel* dire) "Ti avverto che piove", sicuramente metto in guardia, in maniera convenzionale e automatica. Dicendo (*col* dire) "Ti avverto che piove" ti induco a non uscire, a prendere l'ombrello, a rammaricarti o a rallegrarti se la pioggia picchia argentina sui tetti dopo tre mesi di siccità. A differenza del primo caso, l'effetto del nostro dire richiede un'elaborazione diversa e non è garantito, in quanto non è determinato in maniera automatica e convenzionale, ma deve essere inferito. La cosa notevole è che l'inferenza riesce al destinatario più facile di quanto si penserebbe.

Argomentare descrivendo e narrando

Esempio 1a: "Milioni di persone hanno già comprato il telefono Nokia."
(Campagna pubblicitaria Nokia del 1994.)

Esempio 1b: "Oltre due milioni di viaggiatori hanno già prenotato il volo online con Easy-Flight."
(Da un pagina web di una agenzia di prenotazioni online.)

Paiono delle constatazioni, delle informazioni documentabili rese pubbliche, resoconti di fatti obiettivi, dati numerici offerti alla pubblica opinione. In realtà 1a e 1b sono

evidentemente un'operazione, neanche troppo nascostamente persuasiva, degli argomenti forniti per promuovere l'acquisto d'un prodotto o per valorizzare un servizio.

Esplicitata la "forma ragionamento" sottostante è qualcosa come: Se milioni di persone acquistano un prodotto x, il prodotto x merita d'essere acquistato. Perché? Perché vale. E perché vale? Perché in milioni l'hanno comprato. Una mirabile petizione di principio e una premessa alquanto discutibile. Vi troviamo l'intenzione espressa implicitamente da chi parla e colta da chi ascolta, al quale rischia però di sfuggire la (inaccettabile) premessa che la regge.

Esempio 2: "Anche ieri quindici milioni di telespettatori hanno visto *Striscia la notizia*", ripetuto ogni sera dai conduttori della trasmissione, non è evidentemente un dato Auditel fornito in quanto dato, ma è destinato a suscitare la *standing ovation* e con essa l'autopromozione quotidiana del programma.

Esempio 3: "È scozzese". Significa che viene dalla Scozia, notazione etnica, oppure che è tirchio, notazione comportamentale, che si comprende solo grazie ad una implicita inferenza?

Anche questo è un caso di discorso intermedio che rientra al tempo stesso nella categoria del narrativo e dell'argomentativo. Scritto su una lavagna, senza altre informazioni, un lettore non potrebbe disambiguare il significato inteso. A questo provvede solitamente il contesto, così com'è il provvidenziale contesto a decidere se "gabinetto" è un "Ministorum consilium" o una "Vespasiana latrina". Ma anche il benedetto contesto e la pragmatica spiegano solo in parte perché la comunicazione sia felice quando potrebbe facilmente non funzionare.

Esempio 4. Un quarto esempio è dato da un articolo di giornale. Un articolo de *Il Giorno* o de *La Notte* sulla legge finanziaria può sembrare espositivo, ma essere in realtà volto a convincere il lettore dell'opportunità o dell'iniquità di una data manovra economica e quindi essere di natura prettamente argomentativa sotto le mentite spoglie di un resoconto. Ribadiamo che molto spesso l'esposizione risulta il migliore argomento. La natura persuasiva dei fatti si desume anche dal loro essere considerati il linguaggio più efficace, intesi cioè come esempi offerti da individui credibili e coerenti. Questo dal punto di vista *pedagogico*. Dal punto *comunicativo*, si ricorda la raccomandazione che un capopartito rivolgeva ai suoi giornalisti: "fate parlare i fatti" - con l'ovvia intesa che i fatti sono manipolabili (Parlato 2006: 6).

Esempio 5. Infine ricordiamo il famigerato "Pampers, i pannolini più usati nei reparti di maternità". Perché sono i migliori oppure perché, ai tempi della propaganda in oggetto, erano distribuiti gratuitamente in tutti i reparti di maternità? Questo è un bell'esempio di come dire il falso dicendo il vero e testimonia l'importanza del rendere esplicite le premesse inesprese: in questo caso l'affermazione era effettivamente vera, com'era vero che negli anni Ottanta l'IBM era il computer più diffuso nelle scuole, ma solo in quanto ceduto gratuitamente alle istituzioni dalla stessa casa produttrice. Affermazione veritiera, pubblicità ingannevole.

Come si può chiedere od ordinare semplicemente asserendolo? O zittire una classe proferendo solo un “pss, pps”? O addirittura far scoppiare una guerra semplicemente dicendo “guerra”? Anche in questo caso, John Austin ci offre una parziale indicazione di risposta. Aveva ragione il teorico dei cosiddetti *atti linguistici*: enunciato constataativo ed enunciato performativo si compenetrano. Il nostro dire è un fare.

E viceversa, il nostro fare è sempre un dire. Facendo domande uno si racconta; chiedendo, ordinando, pregando otteniamo forse qualcosa, ma diamo sicuramente anche informazioni precise, a volte non volute, su di noi. Non solo nel senso, ovvio e banale, che se ordino un triplo whisky mi rappresento come un buon bevitore, ma soprattutto nel senso che in quello che diciamo c'è sempre molto, molto di più di quello che diciamo letteralmente.

La nostra comunicazione è un iceberg, in cui la parte più consistente e più importante, quella che vogliamo trasmettere e anche quella che non vogliamo trasmettere, sta sotto il pelo dell'acqua. Eppure, pur essendo sotto traccia, viene colta di norma senza eccessiva difficoltà dal destinatario. La cosa sorprendente è che noi ci capiamo pur dicendo quasi sempre meno di quanto serve, mentre, si sa, fu la parte sommersa ed invisibile di un iceberg a far colare a picco il Titanic.

Un buon insegnante per accertarsi se ciò che ha detto è stato inteso dalla classe può porre la domanda almeno in due modi: “Mi sono spiegato?” oppure “Avete capito?”. Le due modalità di interpellare gli alunni non sono affatto equivalenti. Se ricorre all'intercalare “Mi sono spiegato?” il docente mette in gioco anche se stesso e lascia aperta la possibilità che l'eventuale mancata comprensione da parte dell'uditorio sia determinata da una non perfetta spiegazione. La formula “avete capito?” invece scarica l'intera responsabilità della mancata ricezione sui poveri studenti. Anche questo è un modo di dire senza dire. Per non scoprire troppo quale sia il proprio modo di porsi nei confronti dell'uditorio, un relatore ha diverse opzioni alternative e asettiche rispetto all'ammissione o meno di responsabilità, quali “Chiaro?”, “Ci siamo?” o “Possiamo andare avanti?”

Un uomo senza argomenti è il titolo di un saggio di Bjørn Ramberg (2000) su Richard Rorty e gli strumenti della filosofia. Diremmo noi, con un aforisma alla Nietzsche-Musil: un “uomo senza argomenti” non è un “uomo senza qualità” argomentativa.

Già ne *La filosofia come genere di scrittura*, Richard Rorty afferma che “filosofi non kantiani come Heidegger e Derrida sono figure emblematiche di pensatori che non risolvono problemi, ma non hanno neppure argomenti o tesi da proporre” (Rorty 1986a: 109). Ma non è un rimprovero, anche se, a partire da Platone, “*Lógoi dè toutou málista órganon*” (*Repubblica*, IX, 582d), ovvero, “la ragione, l'argomentare è per eccellenza lo strumento del filosofo”. Se si identifica la capacità filosofica con l'abilità argomentativa, non v'è nulla che si possa considerare un argomento filosofico nel fiume di parole di Heidegger e di Foucault. I filosofi analitici li ritengono persone che hanno tentato di essere filosofi senza riuscirvi, filosofi falliti, filosofi incompetenti. Ma “questo è tanto stupido quanto affermare che Platone era un sofista incompetente o che un riccio è una volpe incompetente” (Rorty 1986b: 223). In realtà “lo strumento del filosofo, l'argo-

mentare, è, come la filosofia, un'impresa dialogica" (Rorty 1986b: 55). "La concezione dialogica dell'argomentazione ci permette di consegnare al passato l'opposizione fuorviante tra argomentazione razionale e riflessione creativa, innovatrice di vocabolari" (Rorty 1986b: 69).

Ci sono stili filosofici diversi. Lo stile logico, razionalista di Cartesio e di Kant, i quali propongono catene inferenziali di ragionamenti. E lo stile aforistico, predicatorio di Nietzsche e Derrida, i quali enunciano e proclamano. *Logos* e *pathos*, direbbero i retori: ragionamento e illuminazione, convinzione e persuasione. L'importante è che ci sia almeno un rivolo di *ethos* che scaturisce dalla terza delle fonti aristoteliche della persuasione.

Ci sono quindi modelli alternativi di argomentazione filosofica: quello *sistematico* (che può essere di stampo geometrico-deduttivo o di stampo scientifico-sperimentale) e quello *oratorio* (che può essere di stampo giurisprudenziale o di stampo prettamente retorico). I due stili convergono in quello che potremmo chiamare modello della *finesse*. La *finesse* non è solo una categoria estetica, ma anche logico-argomentativa: combina ordine e genio, rigore disciplinare e creatività inventiva. L'arte pascaliana dell'"*user de finesse*" consiste sì nella sottigliezza di ingegno ma anche nel giocare d'astuzia.

In un saggio dedicato al ruolo della retorica nell'argomentazione razionale, Nicholas Rescher distingue due modi di fare filosofia, che chiama *discorsivo* ed *evocativo*. La filosofia di tipo discorsivo è imperniata su ragionamenti e caratterizzata dalla presenza di connettivi inferenziali. La filosofia di tipo evocativo è imperniata sulla retorica della persuasione e caratterizzata dalla presenza di espressioni di approvazione e di biasimo. La prima cerca di garantirsi l'assenso mediante giudizi argomentati, l'altra facendo appello a giudizi di valore. La filosofia della *finesse* e dell'indirettezza fonde in uno i due moduli stilistici.

Rescher mette a confronto due passi, uno di Nietzsche, tratto dalla sua *Genealogia della morale* (II, 6) ed uno di Hume, tratto dal suo *Trattato sulla natura umana* (III, I, 2) facendo rilevare come in Nietzsche vi sia totale assenza di espressioni inferenziali. "Noi siamo chiaramente *indotti* a trarre certe conclusioni inesprese su base essenzialmente valutativa. Ma l'inferenza... è lasciata del tutto implicita come esercizio per chi legge. Questa conclusione non dichiarata alla quale mira la discussione è sottintesa ma mai affermata, implicata ma mai sostenuta" (Rescher 1998: 19). In questo modo Nietzsche "si sottrae alla fatica dell'argomentare e al fastidio delle obiezioni. Non curandosi di formulare esplicitamente la sua posizione, egli non sente il bisogno di darle un *fondamento*; si limita alla semplice *insinuazione*" (*Ibidem*).

Facciamo un'operazione analoga, mettendo a confronto un passo di Cartesio ed uno di Nietzsche.

...siccome i nostri sensi qualche volta ci ingannano, volli *supporre* che non vi fosse cosa alcuna che fosse tale e quale ce la fanno immaginare. E poiché ci sono uomini che *si ingannano ragionando*, anche intorno alle più semplici materie di geometria vi fanno dei *paralogismi*, giudicando che io ero soggetto a fallire al pari di chiunque altro, rigettai come *false* tutte le *ragioni*, che prima avevo preso per *dimostrazioni*. E, finalmente, conside-

rando che tutti i medesimi pensieri, che abbiamo da svegli, ci possono venire anche quando dormiamo, senza che ve ne sia, allora, alcuno che sia vero, risolvetti di fingere che tutte le cose che mi erano mai entrate nella mente non fossero più *vere* delle illusioni dei miei sogni.

Ma, subito dopo, posi mente che, mentre in tal modo volevo pensare che tutto fosse falso, *bisognava necessariamente* che io, che lo pensavo, fossi qualche cosa. E notando che questa *verità: io penso, dunque sono*, era così *fërma* e così *sicura* che tutte le più stravaganti supposizioni degli scettici erano incapaci di scuoterla, *giudicai* che potevo riceverla senza scrupolo come il *principio* della filosofia che io cercavo.

(Cartesio, *Discorso sul metodo*, parte IV, trad. di G. Bontadini)

Che cosa è buono? – Tutto ciò che nell'uomo accresce il senso di potenza, la volontà di potenza, la potenza stessa.

Che cos'è cattivo? – Tutto ciò che discende dalla debolezza.

Che cos'è felicità? – La sensazione del fatto che la potenza *crebbe*, che una resistenza viene vinta.

Non appagamento, ma più potenza; non pace in assoluto, ma guerra; *non* virtù, ma valentia (*virtù* nello stile del Rinascimento, virtù scevra da ipocrisia morale).

Primo principio del *nostro* amore per gli uomini: i deboli e i malriusciti debbono soccombere. E bisogna anche dar loro una mano in tal senso.

Che cos'è più nocivo di qualunque vizio? La compassione attiva verso tutti i malriusciti e i deboli – il cristianesimo...

(Nietzsche, *L'anticristo*, § 2)

In breve, diremmo che i due stili filosofici, come gran parte delle coppie chiamate filosofiche, non sono in opposizione, né si escludono, ma sono più che complementari: una componente chiama e vuole l'altra. In una prospettiva 'sistematica' diremmo che non si tratta di due insiemi esclusivi. Con delle immagini 'evocative' diremmo che non sono come l'olio e l'acqua, o come il sole e la luna: se c'è l'uno non c'è l'altra. Quale delle due formule esplicative è migliore? Quella logica o quella oratoria? Al dilemma "Me ne vado o me ne vo?" il venerando filologo ricordò ai suoi fedeli discepoli riuniti al suo capezzale che "Ambedue dir si può".

Non farà scandalo quindi un Cartesio nietzscheano o un Nietzsche cartesiano e un Kant heideggeriano. Del resto i filosofi cosiddetti sistematici, alla Spinoza o alla Hegel, privilegiano la costruzione teorica, seguendo un movimento di pensiero dall'alto al basso: offrono cioè ragioni teoriche a giustificazione di fatti e preferiscono la pulizia teorica rispetto all'adeguamento ai fatti. Viceversa i filosofi evocativi, come Wittgenstein, partono dai fatti per risalire ai principi ed utilizzano i dati per coglierne le ragioni filosofiche, seguendo un movimento inverso dal basso verso l'alto. Quest'ultimo tipo di filosofo ama più del primo il dibattito e l'argomentare (cfr. Tomasini Bassols 1999: 242 e Dascal 1998: 19).

Se può essere naturale l'impiego della narrazione nell'ambito quotidiano (cfr. Lundquist 1991) o nel contesto giuridico-processuale, in cui la sovrapposizione di storia e argomento è una regola e in cui il 'fatto' raccontato diventa un eccellente strumen-

to di convinzione (cfr. Bennett 1978 e 1979, Bennet & Feldman 1981); se inoltre in molti si stanno occupando di “argomenti visuali” (altro modo specialissimo di argomentare senza argomenti), merita segnalare che c'è un recente interesse per il ruolo che la narrazione svolge in contesti impensati, come quello medico e quello matematico¹.

In conclusione, si può argomentare senza argomenti, come si può filosofare senza filosofia (nel senso classico del termine). L'indirettezza e la “finesse” non solo sono di fatto utilizzate, ma sono utilizzabili (cfr. Mason 1989, Warner 1989). Il ragionare semplice e chiaro, franco e diretto è una condizione ideale, ma sicuramente non reale. Anzi, in molti casi l'esplicito e il diretto non sono nemmeno il tipo di discorso ideale né ai fini estetici né ai fini della persuasione e della convinzione.

C'è pure una finalità educativa della auspicata implicitezza, che è connessa alla varietà, alla versatilità, a quella che Quintiliano ed Erasmo da Rotterdam chiamavano *copia*; è, diciamo così, una finalità maieutica: “Non si deve scrivere in modo che tutti capiscano tutto, ma in modo da indurre uno a ricercare e a imparare per proprio conto” avverte Erasmo alla fine del capitolo diciottesimo del suo *De Copia* (Erasmo 1512). La *copia* quindi non è una mera regola estetica, ma altresì un mezzo funzionale: sfruttare la plasticità e la flessibilità del linguaggio dovrebbe diventare un'arte e un'abitudine in un quadro formativo.

Proferiamo tante parole per nulla, direbbe l'aedo Shakespeare. Se ne dicono di parole, tante che ne può buttare, direbbe il vate-cantore d'oggi, all'insegna del risparmiato motto mercantile e cognitivo “due operazioni al prezzo di una”. Mostra e dimostra: esponi argomentando e ragiona facendo mostra di esporre, perché l'esposizione è il migliore argomento. È questo l'esito teorico-pragmatico di queste riflessioni. Ma attenzione a cosa c'è sotto quando si profitta dei saldi e quando si spacciano presunti fatti per argomenti e si fanno passare sottobanco premesse tutte da esplicitare e da soppesare. C'è il rischio Titanic di impattare contro la parte nascosta sott'acqua dell'iceberg e di affondare.

¹ Un Convegno internazionale su “*Le illness narratives* nella professione infermieristica” si è svolto a Padova il 20-21 settembre 2005, a cura della Società Italiana di Sociologia della salute e del Dipartimento di Sociologia dell'Università di Padova, all'insegna della “narrazione come paradigma di cura”. Un convegno sul tema “*Mathematics and Narrative*” si è svolto nel 2005 a Mykonos, con interventi, tra gli altri, di Karine Chelma, David Corfield, Apostolos Doxiadis e Timothy Gowers (cfr. www.thalesandfriends.org). Sul rapporto tra prova matematica e narrazione si può vedere Doxiadis 2005 e Thomas 2007.

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DISCURSIVE PERSPECTIVE AND ARGUMENTATION IN THE ROMANIAN PARLIAMENTARY DISCOURSE. A CASE STUDY

LILIANA IONESCU-RUXĂNDOIU

1. *Preliminary remarks*

On the 19th of April 2007, the two Chambers of the Romanian Parliament gathered in a joint session with a unique point on its agenda: to debate the proposal of President Traian Băsescu's suspension from office. This debate was the result of an ambiguous decision of the Constitutional Court (CC), which admitted the infringement of the Constitution by the President, but declared his unconstitutional deeds as minor with regard to both their content and their consequences. Accordingly, the decision was transferred to the Parliament. As the great majority of the MPs voted in favour of the suspension (322 vs. 108), the President was suspended from office for 30 days and the president of the Senate was appointed to carry out his charges. The referendum organized on the 19th of May brought the President back to office, in spite of a high rate of absenteeism (participation of less than 45%) and of the fact that 25% of the participants were against.

This paper has in view the intervention of a prominent member of the social democratic parliamentary group, the president of the Social Democratic Party (SDP), Mircea Geoană, in the above mentioned debate. The social democrats, the most important opposition party, were the authors of the suspension proposal, signed by 200 MPs.

The speech under consideration has a very complex and elaborated structure. At the macro-discursive level, one can identify three basic units. The first, a long introduction defining the main goal of the parliamentary session, involves a sub-textual criticism directed towards the hesitating attitude of the CC. This institution considered that the notoriety of the facts invoked in the proposal of suspension from office could not offer a solid basis for a peremptory verdict and asked the Parliament to prove these facts. The speaker's starting point is the axiom "The infringement of the Constitution by Traian Băsescu is a political reality". The gravity of the President's deeds is not proved, but only asserted in an insistent manner and in very general and abstract terms. The conclusion is that the existing system has reached its limits and that Traian Băsescu is "a failed political project". His suspension from office would close a tragic chapter in our history: the reign of a leader's subjective will and the myth of the providential leader. Our analysis will focus on this unit.

The second unit lists the President's major abuses. To his cynical formula "it will do", the rhetor answers "it won't do any more", and concludes that this is "a worn-out

way of making politics”.

The third unit presents the consequence of President's behaviour, who continuously claimed his intention to be a “President-player”: Romania of the “President-player” is a country deeply affected by a profound crisis. The normal conclusion is: “Traian Băsescu is a closed chapter”; by voting in favour of his suspension from office, the MPs would offer the people the chance of a fresh start.

Our analysis will focus on the first unit, setting out several basic argumentation strategies and techniques identified in the text. We shall try to bring forward – in a pragma-semantic analytical framework – the effects of some grammatical and lexical choices made by the speaker upon the argumentation processes.

2. *The source of argumentation. The source-audience relationship. The discursive perspective*

As a component of the communicative activity, argumentation involves a source, an object (the target the arguments are focused on) and an audience that receives and evaluates the arguments.

Two classes of personal forms, whose distribution is strongly unbalanced, make reference to the source of argumentation: the 1st person singular (A) and the quantitatively prevalent 1st person plural forms (B) of the personal and possessive pronouns, as well as of the verbs.

A(a) The 1st pers. sg. appears mostly in meta-communicative utterances, which have a parenthetic use. They motivate some particular features of the discourse organization:

- (1) “I felt the need of an introduction – which you might find too long – in order to ensure a better understanding of our role today”,

express or evaluate speaker's own attitude in a certain moment of his performance:

- (2) “I can tell you, in front of God and of my own conscience that...”;
“I am saying that in a very responsible way”,

or express predictions about the attitude of the audience:

- (3) “Dear colleagues and citizens who are watching – I am convinced – with great anxiety this important session...”.

In example (2), the presence of the 1st person sg. seems to mark a self-disclosing attitude, but in fact speaker's sincerity is part of the performance he is staging (see Goffman 1959: 17-18).

(b) There is also an I marking the opposition and delimiting two polar points of view:

- (4) “Traian Băsescu says that only thieves need peace in order to better steal. I tell **him** that Romanians need peace because only in peace can they raise their children [...]. And I also tell **Mister Băsescu** that thieves hide better and steal undisturbed when the riot is loud, as loud as possible.”

Repetition and parallelism amplify the antithesis.

(c) A stronger expression of the speaker's goals appears when urging the audience to adhere to his evaluation of President's actions, in a formula with an explicit performative verb:

- (5) "Today **I am solemnly asking you** to show President **Băsescu** that this is a worn out manner of making politics".

(B) Except for the above mentioned situations, the source of argumentation is ambiguously defined by the use of the 1st person pl. The inclusive meaning of this person creates a "useful ambivalence" (Wales 1996: 58), currently exploited in the political discourse. "We is one of the most political of all pronouns", as T.A. van Dijk (2004: 360) puts it; it offers the speaker the advantage of disguising his subjectivity. **We** "is a shifting signifier" (Wales 1996: 62), placing the **ego** in various combinations (for their inventory functions, Wales 1996: 58-68), which sometimes are explicitly described by the speaker. In the case under consideration, there are several meanings covered by the 1st pers. pl. forms.

(a) The speaker and the group of insiders from the audience (the other MPs). This meaning results from the reference to different actions involving only this part of the audience:

- (6) "What **we** are going to decide **within this supreme forum of the Romanian democracy** today is how serious the deeds of the Romanian President are".

Still, from the very beginning, one can notice a strategic ambiguity introduced by the double opening formula of address: "Honorable colleagues, Dear Romanians", which brings together insiders (MPs) and outsiders (ordinary citizens), as equally ratified participants in the debate. What follows is exclusively directed towards the MPs.

One may wonder why the speaker explains in detail the aims and tasks of the parliamentary session, fixing an agenda to the MPs, when usually this is the obligation of the chairman of the session. This happens because – as already mentioned – his parliamentary group initiated the proposal of President's suspension from office. The rhetor does not speak for himself, but in the name of the political group whose mandatory he is. His status of spokesperson of a certain group is strategically extended, tacitly including all the groups of MPs; the existence of largely shared views is consequently insinuated. This is a perverse persuasive strategy. One of its technical instruments is a repeated parallel between the unfulfilled mission of the CC and the mission of the Parliament, considered as a block. The formula repeated unchanged four times is:

- (7) "Legally, the Court did not have the possibility to evaluate the prejudices caused to Romania by [x]. Today we need to say that [y] is an extremely serious deed / is extremely serious."

(where x and y are various labels used to classify different actions of the president, often in a metonymic cause – effect relationship. For example: x = "continuous attacks directed towards the main institutions of the state"; y = "blocking these institutions,

dragging them into a pointless war”).

(b) The speaker and the political class in general. If in the case (a) there is no explicit reference to the MPs, in this case political class is explicitly mentioned, appositive constructions defining the speaker as one of its members:

- (8) “It is **our** collective fault, the fault **of the whole political class...**”;
 “The time has come for **us, the Romanian political class,** [...] to propose a great national project to Romania”.

One can notice the same strategic tendency towards leveling the differences between the political parties.

In spite of the objective semantic differences, the names **political class** and **politicians** are contextually used as quasi-synonyms of MPs, as it results from the following example:

- (9) “It is our duty as **politicians** towards the **citizens** who have **elected us** and who still have some hope from **the Romanian parliament...**”.

In comparison with the groups designated by different forms of the 1st pers. pl., the citizens or the Romanians – even if invoked as equally involved in the debate in the beginning (see above) – appear in fact not as outsiders, but rather as aliens (“not like us” – Wales 1996: 60). See the preceding example, as well as the following one:

- (10) “**We** should honestly tell **Romanians** what to expect in the future, and especially what we can and are trying to do for **them.**”

These examples fully reflect an elitist attitude of the politicians who consider themselves as a different community, in a superior position, in charge with the destiny of the whole nation, conceived as a passive mass of people. Accordingly, in this text, the distinction we/they does not concern different political parties (for a discussion about “them” and “us” attitudes, Wales 1996: 58-63), but politicians vs. citizens (or MPs vs. voters). This distinction is preserved in a more analytic review of those who could express an opinion:

- (11) “**The Social Democratic Party** and even **I** and maybe **all of us** and maybe **the citizens of Romania** hoped that at least at the 13th hour, Traian Băsescu would eventually adjust his behavior”.

(c) Beside the above described cases of specific reference of the 1st pers. pl. forms (a and b), there are cases of generalized reference (for the distinction between specific exophoric reference and generalized homophoric reference, Wales 1996: 58-59). Sometimes the 1st pers. pl. forms express impersonal meanings:

- (12) “... **we** cannot speak about prosperity, equity, solidarity, justice or democracy in Romania” (=one cannot speak)

or indefinite meanings, with generic connotations (the Romanians):

- (13) “**Our** start in Europe risks being a failure”;
 “Unfortunately for him and for **us**, Traian Băsescu is...”
 “It is better to build (literal translation: that we build) a new Romania”.

Only in these situations, is the polarization politicians/citizens suspended in favour of the common national identity. What is sometimes suggested is the isolation of the President, who appears as the only person acting contrary to the general aspirations. Reinforcing the team views and extending them to the whole nation is another variant of the persuasive strategy of ignoring the differences, which we have already discussed.

Speaker’s strategy of overlooking the politically heterogeneous structure of the Parliament and presenting the MP status as a unifying factor is determined by the basic goal of this speech: to get a vote in favor of President’s suspension from office. It has a strong impact on the general organization of the discourse as well as on the choices at the argumentative level (the nature and disposition of arguments, the means of argumentation). The speaker does not engage in polemics with other political groups. It is only an implicit criticism directed towards the CC, whose ambiguous decision was supposedly a result of the intimidating actions of the President.

3. *The target of argumentation. Argumentative strategies and techniques*

The main target of an explicit sharp criticism is Traian Băsescu, pictured as an embodiment of a principle of evil. *Ad personam* sophisms, in their abusive variant (see van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004: 177), aiming at discrediting the President, represent an important component of the argumentation system displayed by the text. This is a basic strategy in the process of motivating the proposal of the SDP parliamentary group.

Closely connected with it is another type of strategic sophistic argumentation characteristic of the text: *petitio principii*. In the beginning, where the speaker was supposed to prove that president’s deeds are “extremely serious”, as repeatedly asserted, the whole presentation creates the impression of reminding facts which are very well known by everybody. In other words, the “facts” selected by the SDP spokesperson appear as part of the doxa. The doxa delimits a space which strongly determines the discourse situation where argumentation takes place (for the strategic functioning of the doxa in argumentation, see Amossy 2006: 99-125). In the case under consideration, it represents another strategic means of inducing the idea of a consensus between the MPs: no demonstration is necessary and, at the same time, being taken for granted, these facts cannot be contested. At a closer examination, the so-called “facts” are, actually, either too abstract, or subjectively interpreted. They are presented in a patterned sentential form, as possible definitions of some general terms, like *deed* or *fact*:

- (14) “Today, we need to say that [x] is an extremely serious *deed* / *fact*.”

We can add that the facts are named using infinitives with a nominal value (which can also be translated in English by *-ing* forms), whose meaning is abstract by definition

(to *block* the main institutions of the state; to *drag* them into a pointless war; to *denigrate* the magistrates and the law courts; to *denigrate* the Parliament, a fundamental institution of any democracy). As a matter of fact, all these are classificatory terms, involving generalizations. But as no mention appears about particular deeds of the incriminated President in order to ground such classifications, these terms reflect a rather subjective analysis of the facts.

The key word of the introductory part of the speech is the adjective *serious*, which carries an intrinsic axiological (negative) meaning. It is the label applied to President's deeds, getting an important argumentative function by its rhetoric repetition. There is a long chain of negative terms which strengthen each other: *abuses, excesses, blackmail, intimidation, prejudices, refuse, denigration, attacks*; the above mentioned nominal infinitives can be added too. They form an isotopic discourse core, boosting the evaluation expressed by the adjective more efficiently than the arguments themselves and accordingly assigning a certain argumentative orientation to the discourse (Amossy 2006: 160-162). At the same time, the isotopic series provides strong reasons to consider President's behavior as non-democratic and to associate it with a detested past. Traian Băsescu is finally declared "the last President of the old system". This creates the possibility to introduce another dichotomy: old/new, and to offer an optimistic prospective view based on the use of the met-aphoric cliché of building a house:

- (15) "It is better to build a new Romania on a new foundation, on a sound foundation, than to build it on a shaking, rotten and dangerous one, and to find, after several years, that the whole edifice collapses with the Romanian citizens inside."

The antithesis is another means of indirectly arguing for the President's suspension from office. The whole utterance carries an exhortative implicature: the MPs are indirectly urged (notice the impersonal construction) to make the right choice. They play the core participative role of decision-making Agents, whereas the citizens are mere Patients (Ilie 2005: 191-198).

4. *Final remarks*

Our case study attempted to bring forward the impact of the discursive perspective adopted by the speaker on the structure, functioning and efficiency of the parliamentary discourse.

In a parliamentary debate, an MP can speak for himself – as a rational being –, as a representative of a political group whose mandatory he is, or by virtue of his institutional role. Each of these perspectives has some advantages, but also some drawbacks, depending – among other factors – on the object and the main goals of the debate. At the same time, each perspective defines a specific type of ethos (for a possible typology, see Charaudeau 2005: 85-128).

In the case under consideration, the last variant has been chosen. It enables the speaker to resort to an integrating strategy, using an ambiguous *we*, which has the advantage of apparently maximizing the agreement and minimizing the possibility of disagreement. The inclusive *we* creates the impression of a merger between the audience and the speaker, who accordingly avoids being perceived as a representative of an opposition group. As an effect, polemic forms of expression directed towards other MPs are excluded. Emphasizing the common ground – especially, the common goals of protecting the citizens and securing their welfare –, the speaker can focus his attacks on a target presented, with sophistic arguments, as the unique obstacle in MPs' fight to fulfill their goals. The ethos projected by the speaker is that of a reasonable, unbiased person.

If the strategies of argumentation could be more efficient in disguising speaker's true intentions, lexical selections are more transparent for his / her subjectivity, as usually they include words with axiological (positive or negative) meanings, linked in complex chains.

To conclude, one can admit that the choices made in a political institutional speech are hierarchically structured and the discursive perspective adopted by the speaker is placed at the highest level, determining all the other choices.

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THE DIALECTICAL-DIALOGICAL DEFINITION

FABRIZIO MACAGNO

The notion of “dialogical definition” seems to be in sharp conflict with the traditional views on definition. Definition for a long time was regarded as the expression of the immutable essence of the things. This traditional view was that the quest to put forward an acceptable definition requires finding the essential characteristic of the thing to be defined. However, the determination of what is essential has always been highly controversial in philosophy and in science (Walton 2005: 169-171). The conflicts of opinion on such matters tended to persuade philosophers and the general public that there is not such thing as “essence”, or, if there is, it cannot be known (Sager 2000: 217; Walton 2005: 169-173). This position led to the shared view that the distinction between essential and unessential characteristics is invalid (Sager 2000: 216-217). For this reason, the most important recent studies on definition tended to regard it in relativistic terms (see for instance Schiappa 2003). In fact, if the essence cannot be known or does not exist, any definition advanced can be good, as it cannot be verified or falsified. Any discussion about the definition of a thing seemed for this reason to be trivial, or outside the boundaries of scientific interests. The advent of the new approach to argumentation has changed this by seeing definitions as arguments that can be put forward and supported by good reasons or not (see Walton 2005: 179-184; Kienpointner 1992: 259).

In argumentation, definitions are regarded as instruments for classifying¹, or rather naming, a fragment of reality. The acceptance of the use of a particular name (or, rather, a predicate) to denote a fragment of reality requires accepting the object's possession of certain properties presupposed or implied by the name itself. For instance, the same aspect of reality (X) can be labeled as “monopoly” or “strong company”. However, whereas the concept of “monopoly” commonly implies “absence of the free market” or “destruction of the free-market economy”, a “strong company” usually implies that “the company is solid and defeats the concurrence”. Therefore, accepting the attribution of a predicate means accepting other properties that can be used to warrant the acceptance of a conclusion. The uses of the predicates “monopoly” or “strong company” in the propositions “X is a monopoly” or “X is a strong company” elicit arguments leading to different conclusions, for example “X is contemptible” or “X is laudable”. Schiappa (2003: 131) and Zarefsky (2006: 404) call this strategy *argument by definition* (Zarefsky uses also the name “persuasive definition”) and represent it as a kind of inference having the following structure: x is P (therefore, x is good/bad).

¹ For the notion of classification as the attribution of a predicate to a subject, see Mill 1959: 76-77.

This type of argument can be analyzed by distinguishing the two distinct aspects of the process of attribution of a predicate to a subject, and the reasoning stemming from the predication and leading to an evaluation. The first process can be examined using the ancient concept of *locus a definitione*, namely the maxims describing the reasoning from definition. Definition is the (often implicit) semantic link between a factual premise, like “X controls the manufacture of ping-pong balls” and a classificatory conclusion, like “X is a ping-pong ball monopoly” (Windes – Hastings 1965: 160). The whole classification is grounded on the implicit definition of “monopoly”. The same aspect of reality (X) can be labeled as “monopoly” or “strong company” according to the definition of “monopoly” the speaker uses. The second part of the reasoning stemming from naming reality can be described using the concept of values and the link between the decision-making and the values. For example, it is commonly shared that “what damages the free-market is bad” and “the winner is laudable”. In this type of reasoning, the argumentation based on shared values and leading to an evaluative conclusion is dependent on the adopted definitions. The choice of a definition can be a powerful argumentative instrument, aimed at altering the evaluation of a state of affairs. Definitions, therefore, can be chosen to support a viewpoint; however, the choice of a definition is not arbitrary in argumentation. By interpreting the ancient concept of dialectical definition developed in Aristotle’s *Topics* (Giuliani 1972: 130), definitions can be conceived as *endoxa*, namely commonly accepted opinions. On this view, definitions are matter of commitment, that is, they depend on what is shared between the interlocutors. Definitions can be therefore the standpoint of an argumentative discussion, in which the controversial definition is assessed.

The purpose of this paper is to show the argumentative structure of the reasoning from definition, and the criteria for the evaluation of a definition. Different types of definition will be analyzed, showing how different types of definition (for instance essential definition, definition by parts, or definition by etymology) trigger different types of inference (see Victorini *Liber de Definitionibus*).

1. *The argumentative structure of reasoning from definition*

The most common use of definition is naming a fragment of reality. A being can be called a stone, an animal, or a man on the ground of the definitions of “stone”, “animal” and “man”. However, in argumentation naming often is not a standpoint in itself, but a premise for a consequent conclusion. Classifying a fragment of reality as “a non-human being” or as “a man” can be used to support contrary positions, like “It can be killed” or “It must not be killed”.

In law, the importance of definition was highlighted by Cicero. He showed how the same action, stealing a sacred vase from a private house, could be punished as theft or as sacrilege according to the possible definitions of the latter term. If “stealing something sacred from a private place” was the definition of “sacrilege”, the action would fall into that category; on the contrary, if “sacrilege” was defined as “stealing something

from a sacred place”, the defendant would be punished for theft².

The relation between definition and consequences of attributing the defined term to a fragment of reality is the ground for another definitional argumentative move, namely the redefinition. The first uses of this argumentative move are again attested in Cicero. Redefining the concept of “personal enemy” (*inimicus*), he was able to classify Verres as a public enemy (Ciceronis *In Verrem*, II, 3, § 6):

‘Fidem sanctissimam in vita qui putat, religionem qui colendam esse existimat, is sine dubio *inimicus* est ei qui fana spoliavit, omnia templa violavit, delubra polluit’: hic etiam iam Verris idem factum, id de quo specialiter quaeritur, ita continetur et includitur, ut simul cum approbatione et deductione definitionis in speciem clausum teneatur.

Here the concept of *inimicus* is redefined by Cicero as the enemy of any good citizen.

Definitions, at last, can be used as strategies for altering the evaluation of the thing defined. For instance, wisdom can be defined as the “ability of making money”, whereas foolishness “excessive desire of glory” (Ciceronis *De Inventione*, I, 49):

‘Sapientia est pecuniae quaerendae intelligentia’: [...] ‘Stultitia est inmensa gloriae cupiditas’.

These strategies can be analyzed distinguishing between two argumentative processes. The argumentative uses of definition are based on a reasoning aimed at attributing a property to a fragment of reality, and a process of assessment grounded on how the attributed properties are commonly evaluated.

1.1 Reasoning from endoxical definitions

Reasoning by definition has been often regarded as an indefeasible type of reasoning. Mill describes it in the following fashion (Mill 1959: 539):

Some particular properties of a thing are selected, more or less arbitrarily, to be termed its nature or essence; and when this has been done, these properties are supposed to be invested with a kind of indefeasibility, to have become paramount to all the other properties of the thing, and incapable of being prevailed over or counteracted by them.

For example, we can consider the following piece of reasoning. A body was defined as “what can move up and down”; in the void a body cannot move up and down; therefore, by definition, in the void a body is not a body anymore (Mill 1959: 539). This argument was used to disprove the existence of void, and was wholly grounded on the “nature” of the bodies. Similarly, by the definition of “man” a Negro was classified as a chattel (*Dred Scott V. Sandford*, 60 U.S. 393, (1856) at 404-405). In these arguments,

² “Quare in eiusmodi generibus definienda res erit verbis et breviter describenda, ut, si quis sacrum ex privato subripuerit, utrum fur an sacrilegus sit iudicandus; nam id cum quaeritur, necesse erit definire utrumque, quid sit fur, quid sacrilegus, et sua descriptione ostendere alio nomine illam rem, de qua agitur, appellare oportere atque adversarii dicunt.” (Ciceronis *De Inventione*: I, xii).

the conclusion seems to logically proceed from the premises; however, despite the soundness of the reasoning, the conclusion cannot be acceptable. The critical aspect of these arguments lies in what is labeled as “the nature”, or “the” definition of something. In order to understand why a piece of reasoning from definition can be strong, weak, or simply unacceptable, it is useful to inquire into the structure of this type of argument.

In argumentation theory, the type of reasoning from a definition to the attribution of the *definiendum* to a fragment of reality has been described by Hastings (Hastings 1963: 36-52) as Argument from Criteria to Verbal Classification. This pattern of argument has been later elaborated by Walton (Walton 2006: 129), who maintained Hastings’ argument structure:

Hastings’ Argument from Criteria to Verbal Classification	Walton’s Argument from Verbal Classification	
Event or object X has characteristics A, B, C...	INDIVIDUAL PREMISE:	<i>a</i> has property <i>F</i> .
If <i>x</i> has characteristics A, B, C... then <i>x</i> is Q	CLASSIFICATION PREMISE:	For all <i>x</i> , if <i>x</i> has property <i>F</i> , then <i>x</i> can be classified as having property <i>G</i> .
Therefore, event or object X is Q.	CONCLUSION:	<i>a</i> has property <i>G</i> .

Table I: Arguments from classification

Argument schemes from verbal classification seem to broadly represent the nature of the conditional premise “If *p* then *q*”. However, the notion of classification is in these patterns unclear. If a predicate is attributed to a subject on the grounds of one or more predicates, it remains unclear why should a predication imply another predication. According to these schemes, the conclusion “*a* is a cat” can logically follow from premises like “*a* is a dog” or “*a* is black”. These argument schemes do not specify the nature of the relation between the predications, and do not explain the reason why a property, or a classification, implies another property or classification. Walton’s argument scheme was further developed in (Walton, Reed & Macagno 2008). In the new formulation of the scheme, this semantic relation was made explicit in the classification premise:

CLASSIFICATION PREMISE: *For all x, if a fits definition D, then x can be classified as having property G.* (Walton, Reed & Macagno, 2008: 68).

In this latter argument scheme, however, the relation between the definition and the thing defined is not clear, as well as the role definition plays in an argument. A better understanding of the reasoning process grounded on definition comes from the an-

cient *loci*³. In the ancient tradition, the rule of consequence that we represent nowadays as “*p*, if *p* then *q*, therefore *q*” was applied to the possible semantic relations. The *p*’s and *q*’s, in other words, were in the topical system predicates, and the maxims represented the acceptable semantic links, like “what the definition is said of, the *definitum* is said of as well”. The maxims were an abstraction of the possible reasonable (or semantic) relations that can be used in argumentation. The mechanism of the topics highlights the strict connection between the abstract rule of inference (the maxim), and the common knowledge. We represent the topical inferential structure of the argument:

X exclusively controls the manufacture of ping-pong balls. Therefore *X* is a *monopoly*.

as below (see Rigotti & Greco 2006; Rigotti 2006; Rigotti 2007):

MAXIM	ENDOXON
What the definition is predicated of, also the <i>definiendum</i> is predicated of	
	<i>Exclusive control of the market is the definition of monopoly</i>
PRELIMINARY CONCLUSION What “exclusive control of the market” is predicated of, also “monopoly” is predicated of	
The <i>definiendum</i> is predicated of <i>X</i>	<i>X exclusively controls</i> the market of the manufacture of ping-pong balls
Therefore the definition is predicated of <i>X</i>	<i>X is a monopoly</i>

Table II: Reasoning from definition

From this diagram, the relation between the common knowledge, namely the *endoxa*, and the inferential rule called maxim is made clear. The definition of monopoly as “Exclusive control of the market” is a commonly accepted proposition, on which the acceptability of the conclusion depends. If the definition were different, the plausibility of the conclusion would be different, even though the inferential mechanism and the inferential rule applied were the same. For instance, we consider the following argument:

X is the biggest industry in the manufacture of ping-pong balls.
Therefore *X* is a *monopoly*.

Here the conclusion is grounded on the endoxical premise “Monopoly is excellence in an economic field”. Anyone who knows the laws of a free-market economy would hardly accept this definition of monopoly, and would judge the argument as unreasonable or fallacious. However, the strength of reasoning from definitions depends on

³ The most extensive account of arguments schemes from classification is given in Kienpointner (1992). In *Alltagslogik* four schemes from definition are identified and the classifications by means of genus, and whole and parts are analyzed (Kienpointner 1992: 250-252).

what is actually shared by the interlocutor. If the concepts of monopoly, free-market economy, and competition are not clear to the hearer, he can easily accommodate his implicit knowledge to the unshared definition. His lack of knowledge makes it possible for him to accept as shared a definition that would be commonly judged as wrong. The acceptability of a definitional argument depends on what is commonly shared by the interlocutor, and on his knowledge. When definitions are not shared, detecting unacceptable or fallacious definitions becomes much harder. For this reason, the failure in providing a unique definition of some crucial political concepts, such as “terrorism”, “torture”, or (as analyzed in Schiappa 2003) “wetland” can be considered a real manipulative strategy.

1.2 Definitions and values

As mentioned above, definitions are instruments of naming reality. However, the naming of reality is often an argumentative move aimed at supporting a standpoint. For instance, as seen above, characterizing an action as “a theft” or as “a sacrilege” implies different consequences. From a legal point of view, the types of punishment provided for the two crime types are different; from a social point of view, a man who committed sacrilege is usually regarded as worse than a simple thief. Naming reality can be an argumentative strategy for influencing the process of decision-making or the evaluation of the denoted fragment of reality. For this reason, definitions are regarded as “political” strategies, namely moves aimed at altering the interlocutor’s or the audience’s choices and assessments (Schiappa 1998: 3; Schiappa 1993: 404). In particular, on Schiappa’s view, defining and naming always express an attitude, orientating the interlocutor towards a certain conclusion.

The relation between words and evaluations has been pointed out in argumentation theory in particular by Stevenson, Hare, and Halldén. Stevenson (1937; 1944) inquired into the nature of the ethical terms, that is, words that change the interlocutor’s attitude. Words like “culture” or “blackguard”, on Stevenson’s view, enhance an emotive reaction in the interlocutor, like admiration or contempt. Stevenson analyzed these “ethical” words using the categories of descriptive and emotive meaning. Whereas the descriptive meaning was identified by Stevenson with a cognitive reaction, because it was aimed at altering the knowledge of the world of the interlocutor, the emotive meaning was identified with the change of attitude a word can provoke in the hearer. The emotive meaning was described as the component of a sign that was intended to alter the emotions and the behaviour of the interlocutor. Hare (1952: chap. 7), following Toulmin (1950), examined the nature of the emotive meaning of ethical words, and pointed out how they can lead to action on the basis of shared principles of behaviour. For instance, the argument “Do your homework; do your duty” is grounded on the shared principle that “You should do your duty”. Similarly, the following argument, grounded on the qualities “sweet and juicy”, presupposes an implicit relation between evaluation and action:

This strawberry is sweet and juicy. You should eat it.

In this example we can identify two types of shared premises, namely the evaluation premise (“What is sweet and juicy is good”) and the behaviour premise (“You should eat what is good”). The directive effect of emotive meaning of words can be therefore analyzed in terms of reasoning grounded on implicit norms of conduct.

Halldén (1960: 73) focussed his inquiry on the nature of the reasoning from evaluation. He distinguished the descriptive criteria, used to describe the meaning of a word, from the evaluative criteria. These latter criteria can be interpreted as the shared propositions at the basis of the reasoning grounding the evaluation of an aspect of reality. For instance, “love” is positively evaluated in our culture because it is a morally noble feeling, and what is morally noble is considered to be good.

Stevenson, Hare, and Halldén highlight two crucial aspects of the argumentative use of a name. A name can be used to influence the interlocutor’s emotions and choices, and this reaction can be analyzed in relation to the shared system of values, or “evaluative criteria”. However, in these authors the relation between evaluation and action is not clear. The argumentative link between assessment and decisions can be found in the ancient tradition, and in particular in Aristotle’s action theory. In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle showed how a decision is always directed to a goal, and the goal can be what is good, or what appears to be good (III, 4, 1113a15); in fact, “everything aims at the good” (*Topics* III, 1, 116a 18). The emotive meaning can be explained in terms of reasons to act: the agent aims at obtaining what is good for him, and therefore his choices will be determined by what appears to be desirable to him. The agent’s “emotive reaction”, which can be identified with a decision to act, or with a behaviour of praise or contempt, is in this perspective the conclusion of a reasoning based on values, for instance, “Money is good. Therefore I should get it”, or “Violence is bad. Therefore I should despise it”⁴. If we apply the Aristotelian view on action and values to the argumentation theory, we can represent the reasoning grounded on emotive words using the argument scheme from values (see Bench-Capon 2003a; 2003b). In argumentation, value can be described as what makes something desirable, and can be conceived as the reason leading somebody to desire something. Values are, in other words, reasons to act (Miano 1952: 657). The process of reasoning from values leads from a characterization of a fragment of reality to a decision about how to act. We can explain the complex argumentation as follows: x (an entity or a state of affairs) is characterized as P (for instance, x is a monopoly); P can be positively or negatively judged

⁴ Values can be different according to the culture and the people. What is good to somebody can not be good for somebody else. Aristotle tackles this problem distinguishing in the *Ethics* the absolute good from the relative or apparent good. In his *Topics*, he develops criteria for the choice between two things that appear to be desirable, like in the topics below (*Topics*, III 1, 28-34): “That which is desired for itself is more desirable than that which is desired for something else; e.g. health is more desirable than gymnastics: for the former is desired for itself, the latter for something else. Also, that which is desirable in itself is more desirable than what is desirable per accidens; e.g. justice in our friends than justice in our enemies: for the former is desirable in itself, the latter per accidens: for we desire that our enemies should be just per accidens, in order that they may do us no harm”.

according to a value V (monopoly is bad); according to the desirability of x , x can become a goal (or object of praise or condemn) for the agent. Using Walton and Krabbe's terminology (see Walton & Krabbe 1995), we can say that the agent commits himself to an action (which can be a simple behaviour of praise or contempt) on the grounds of the desirability of x . Values are therefore the reasons of an action's desirability, and the grounds of the agent's commitments.

We can represent the abstract pattern of inference as follows (Walton, Reed & Macagno 2008: 321):

Argument from Positive Value

PREMISE 1:	Value V is <i>positive</i> as judged by agent A (judgment value)
PREMISE 2:	The fact that value V is <i>positive</i> affects the interpretation and therefore the evaluation of goal G of agent A (If value V is <i>good</i> , it supports commitment to goal G).
CONCLUSION:	V is a reason for retaining commitment to goal G

Table III: Positive values

Argument from Negative Value

PREMISE 1:	Value V is <i>negative</i> as judged by agent A (judgment value)
PREMISE 2:	The fact that value V is <i>negative</i> affects the interpretation and therefore the evaluation of goal G of agent A (If value V is <i>bad</i> , it goes against commitment to goal G).
CONCLUSION:	V is a reason for retracting commitment to goal G

Table IV: Negative values

In order to show how reasoning from definitions works, we can apply these argument schemes to the following simple arguments:

1. Pop Cola is a monopoly. It controls the market of soft-drinks.
2. Pop Cola is a monopoly. It is the strongest company in the market of soft drinks.

We can represent the underlying reasoning as follows:




Figure 1: Structure of the argumentative use of definition

In this scheme the argumentative move (the value judgment expressed on the entity “Pop Cola”) is grounded on the definition of “monopoly”. By redefining a predicate it is possible to change the assessment of a fragment of reality. For instance, in case Pop Cola were the strongest company in the market of soft-drinks, a negative assessment of it could be drawn from redefining “monopoly” as “the strongest company”. Leaving implicit the definitional premise and the evaluative premise, the same conclusion would follow from a different factual premise.

An argumentation from values can follow directly from a definition, which can be used to alter our evaluation of its denotation. For instance we can consider the following cases (Naess 1966: 92-93):

- 1) Democracy is the policy of government that tries to bring morality and politics closer to one another until they coincide;
- 2) Democracy is the form of government which gives, or tries to give, the people the illusion of their own sovereignty.

In both cases definitions are used to alter the evaluation of the concept of democracy. In the first case, the positive assessment of the *definiens* affects the evaluation of the *definiendum*, whereas in the second case the negative value associated to *deception* alters the evaluation of *democracy*. This kind of reasoning from definition can be represented in the following fashion:




Figure 2: Altering evaluations through definitions

Arguments from values and classification represent abstract patterns of reasoning showing the argumentative structure of the most important argumentative strategies grounded on definition. However, in order to inquire into how definitions are used to persuade the interlocutor, it is useful to analyze the generic concept of definition in its specific types, namely the different types of definition.

2. Types of definitions and inferences from definition

As seen above, the choice of a definition can influence the whole assessment of a fragment of reality. The same concept can be defined in different ways. For example, the concept of monopoly can be defined as “Exclusive control of the market”, or “Exclusive sale” (from the Greek *μόνος*, alone or single, and *πρᾶν*, to sell), or “Companies like

Standard Oil, American Telephone and Telegraph, British East India Company...” The structures of these definitions are different: whereas in the first case the predicates of the definition are the genus and the difference of the *definitum*, in the second case the definition represents its etymology, and in the third case its parts. These definitions are, however, argumentatively different. The fact that the same thing can be defined in different ways does not imply that all definitions are equal from an argumentative point of view. In other words, even though there can be different definitions of the same concept, the reasonableness and the force of the arguments grounded on them is noticeably different. Definitions, in fact, are *endoxa*, and the strength of the reasoning based on them depends on their acceptability. Moreover, the structure of the definition determines which inferences are possible, and their strength.

The first type of definition we will consider is the essential definition, or the definition by genus and difference, for instance, “man is a rational animal” or “monopoly is the exclusive control of the market”. In the ancient tradition, this type of definition was considered to be the most complete (Victorini *Liber de Definitionibus*, 7, 10-16), because it wholly represented the concept defined, namely the core *endoxa* relative to the characteristics of the *definitum*. The essential definition is characterized by the genus, that is, a predicate expressing what a thing is in a generic fashion. For instance, the genus of man is animal; the genus of house is building. The genus represents the generic fundamental (or most shared) properties of the *definitum* (Stebbing 1933: 429). For instance, it would be unreasonable to say “It is a man, but he is not an animate being”, or “This is a house, but it is not a building”. Moreover, the genus explains the possible attributes which can be predicated of the *definitum*. For instance, a man *moves, swims, eats, breathes...* because only animate beings can do it (the predicate “to eat” presupposes the fact that the subject is animate: it would be meaningless to say “This table eats a lot”)⁵. The difference distinguishes the thing defined from all the other concepts belonging to the genus expressed, and must justify the attribution of some predicates that can be predicated only of the *definitum*. For instance, only the man can *laugh, talk, or deny*, because he is *reasonable*, and these predicates presuppose a reasonable being (it would be meaningless to say “This cat talks pretty well”).

The argumentative strength of essential definition lies in the fact that it represents the deepest level of shared proposition. Essential definitions can be considered a form of semantic analysis, and semantics is the deepest level of *endoxa* (or shared commitments): if the most basic semantic characteristics are not accepted, a communicative failure can easily occur.

The essential definition is argumentatively powerful also because of the inferences it can trigger. For instance, we can examine some of the possible inferences based on the definition of “monopoly” as “exclusive control of the whole market”:

⁵ It is interesting to notice (see Rigotti 1997) that a man can be sitting or standing, or he can be stretched out, but he must be in a position. Similarly, a stone can be green or grey, but cannot jump. Accident is related to the possibility of predication, to the semantic genera of the predicates, the ten categories.

What the definition is said of, the <i>definitum</i> is said of as well.	Pop Cola exclusively controls the market of soft drinks. Therefore it is a monopoly
What the <i>definitum</i> is said of, the definition is said of as well.	Pop Cola is a monopoly. Therefore it exclusively controls the market.
What is denied of the genus is denied of the species.	Free market is not a form of control of the market. Therefore it cannot be a monopoly.
What the species is said of, the genus is said of as well.	Pop Cola is monopolizing the market. Therefore it controls it.
What is said of the species, it is said of the genus as well.	Monopolies are bad. Therefore some forms of control are bad.
What is said of the whole genus is said of one of its species.	Any form of control is bad. Therefore monopolies are bad.

Table V: Topics of definition

These inferences are all grounded on an essential definition (that is, definition by genus and difference) of “monopoly”. The structure of the definition allows the convertibility of *definiens* and *definiendum*, and the relation between species and genus allows the application of the inference rules of the genus (see Aristotle, *Topics*: book IV).

In the definition by parts the *definitum* is defined by its constituent or essential parts. For instance, a house can be defined as “walls, foundation, and roof” (definition by constituents), or as “apartment, villa, country-house, terraced house, cottage...” (essential parts). The possible inferences that can be triggered by these definitions are the following:

Definitions	Inferences
<i>By constituent parts:</i> A house is walls, the foundation, and a roof.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There are walls, the foundation, and a roof. Therefore there is a house (there might not be). • A house is destroyed. Therefore walls, the foundation, a roof are destroyed (they might not be destroyed). • The walls, the foundation, the roof are solid. Therefore the house is solid (it can be weak anyway). • This house is nice. Therefore its roof is nice (it can be ugly).
<i>By essential parts:</i> A monopoly can be a legal monopoly, a natural monopoly, a vertically integrated monopoly...	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • This company is a legal monopoly. Therefore it is a monopoly. • This company is not a legal monopoly, nor a natural monopoly, nor...Therefore it is not a monopoly • Pop Cola is a monopoly. Therefore it is either a legal monopoly, or a natural monopoly, or... • Natural monopolies are good. Therefore monopolies can be good

Table VI: Definitions and inferences

The definition by constituent parts is extremely weak from an argumentative point of view. In fact, it is not convertible with the *definitum*, because the integral parts and the whole are not equivalent. On the contrary, the definition by enumeration of the species (essential parts) is argumentatively powerful, because it is convertible and it allows the inferences from genus and species. However, from a communicative point of view, the definition by essential parts is useless. This type of definition does not show what the thing is, but the knowledge of the *definitum* is presupposed by the definition. Moreover, definition by essential parts must list all the possible species of the *definitum* in order to be acceptable and convertible.

A concept can be also defined by looking at the etymology of its significant. For instance, counselor, namely a lawyer who defends cases in court, can be defined by etymology as “he who gives counsels (from *consulere*)”. Even though the etymology is correct, like in this example, the definition can be wrong or unacceptable. From an argumentative point of view, definitions by etymology are not necessarily convertible, but trigger inferences based on the *coniugates*, namely the processes of lexical derivation. For instance, we can consider the following cases:

He is a counselor, and therefore he should give counsels, and not decide.
He is a teacher. He should teach, and not be in politics.

The argument based on definition by etymology is quite used in politics, as Mill (1959: 531) reports: “Perhaps no example of this can be found that is more extensively and mischievously employed than in the case of the word representative: assuming that its right meaning must correspond exactly with the strict and original sense of the verb ‘represent’, the sophist persuades the multitude that a member of the House of Commons is bound to be guided in all points by the opinion of his constituents; and, in short, to be merely their spokesman”.

At last, some definitions are not aimed at showing what a thing is, but just at describing the thing defined. For instance, we can define “man” as “the being subject to sin” or as “the being that can pity the Gods”⁶. These definitions are used to describe the man through non-essential characteristics, which are useful to support a value judgment on the defined thing. For instance, we can use the first description to support the evaluation of man as an evil being, whereas the second to praise him. These descriptions, we can notice, are both convertible with the *definitum*, but they do not show what it is. The concepts of “vice” and “pity” presuppose a previous knowledge of what a rational being is. These predicates can only be attributed to a rational being (it would make no sense to say “this mouse is greedy” or “my cat prays a lot”). Definite descriptions are not necessarily convertible with the thing defined. For instance, if we define “man” as “the being that can laugh (or talk)”, we distinguish him from all the entities; however, we can describe him also as “the biped animal” to differentiate him from quadrupeds.

⁶ Victorinus defines man as “ubi rursus malitia versutia ceteraque vitia versantur” (Victorini *Liber de Definitionibus*, 18, 19-20) or as “ubi pietas est, ubi aequitas continentia” (*ibidem*).

The same concept, to conclude, can be defined in different ways. However, definitions are different in structure and acceptability. Some definitions are stronger than others because they represent the core *endoxa* relative to a concept, and trigger particular types of inference. In particular, the definition by genus and difference can be interpreted as a type of definition showing the fundamental semantic properties of the concept defined. It can be conceived as an instrument of semantic analysis.

3. *The Dialogical Definition*

Definitions, from an argumentative point of view, are commonly known propositions, or implicit commitments of the interlocutors, that can be more or less shared. The strength of a definition depends on its acceptability and structure. The existence of several definitions does not lead to a definitional relativism, but to conflicts of definitions, that is, to dialogues grounded on different definitions about the same concept. Dialogues on definition can be divided into two broad categories: dialogues on descriptive definitions, and dialogues on normative definitions. Whereas in the first case the dialogue is aimed at establishing what the shared definition is, in the second case the interlocutors are engaged in a discussion on which definition should be adopted.

3.1 Conflicting definitions: Defining “Ambassador”

Dialogues on definition show how deep the relation between definition and implicit commitments or shared knowledge (see Walton & Macagno 2007) is. In particular, conflicts of opinion are sometimes based on different categorizations of reality, which in their turn are grounded on conflicting definitions. For example, we can analyze the following case, drawn from Manzoni’s *I Promessi Sposi* (Ch. 4). The interlocutors, Count Attilio and the Podestà, are discussing about the rightfulness or wrongfulness of a cavalier’s offence to a messenger. A Spanish cavalier sent a challenge to a Milanese cavalier; however, the messenger, not finding him at home, delivered the summons to his brother, who, after reading it, beat him. On Count Attilio’s opinion, the cavalier’s deed was right, whereas on the Podestà’s view the action was mean. The conflict of opinions can be represented as follows (Manzoni 2001: 209-246):

Podestà: [...] an ambassador is, in his nature, inviolable by the law of nations, *jure gentium*. But, without seeking so far, the proverb says, *Ambasciator non porta pena*; and proverbs, you know, contain the wisdom of the human race. Besides, the messenger having uttered nothing in his own name, but only presented the challenge in writing...

Count Attilio: But when will you understand that this messenger was an inconsiderate ass, who didn’t know the first?...

Count Attilio: [...] What puzzles me is why you think so much of the shoulders of a mean scoundrel.

Podestà: Who said anything about his shoulders, Signor Count? You would make out I had talked nonsense such as never entered my mind. I

spoke of his office, not of his shoulders; and am now considering the laws of *chivalry*.

Count Attilio: [...] according to the laws of modern chivalry, which are the only right ones, I affirm and maintain that a messenger who dared to place a challenge in the hand of a knight without having asked his permission, is an incautious fool, who may be beaten, and who richly deserves it.

This controversy is based on the classification of the messenger as an ambassador. Whereas the Podestà maintains that he actually was an ambassador, and therefore he couldn't be beaten, Count Attilio does not acknowledge the status of representative to the messenger, and refuses to admit that the latter could benefit of the diplomatic privileges. The Podestà's position is grounded on the definition of "ambassador" as "a messenger acting as a representative": as the messenger presented the challenge in writing, his role in that situation was that of an ambassador. Count Attilio, on the contrary, considers an ambassador a person who knows and follows the rules of chivalry, in addition to act as a representative. The definition of "ambassador", according to Count Attilio, encompasses not only the role of "acting as a representative", but also the messenger's behaviour and personal qualities. We can represent how the difference of opinions is grounded on a conflict of definitions as follows⁷:




Figure 3: Conflicting Definitions

⁷ In this diagram, the premises in white boxes are the explicit premises of the arguments, which are quoted from Manzoni (2001: 209-246). The grey boxes represent the implicit premises.

In Count Attilio's view, an ambassador is not a role (to act as), but a person characterized by certain qualities and a particular behaviour. On the contrary, the Podestà considers the ambassador a role, comporting only the requirements of "to be a messenger" and "to be a representative". If we compare the two definitions, and analyze them as instruments of semantic analysis, we notice that only the Podestà's definition explains the semantic characteristics of the predicate "to be an ambassador":

TOPICS	AMBASSADOR IS A ROLE	AMBASSADOR IS A PERSON
<i>What the definitum is said of, the definition is said of as well.</i>	This man came as an ambassador. This man came as a messenger acting on my behalf.	This man came as an ambassador. (?) This man came as an educated person entitled to act on my behalf.
<i>What is said of the definitum is said of the definition as well.</i>	This is a good ambassador. This messenger <i>represents me well</i> .	This is a good ambassador. This educated person is <i>well entitled</i> to act on my behalf (follows well the rules of chivalry...)

Table VII: Conflict of definitions

The application of the topics of definition to the two definitions highlights how the semantic features of the predicate are better represented in the Podestà's definition. Defining the definition as an instrument of semantic analysis allows one to compare definitions and choose between them.

3.2 Modifying a definition: Redefining "Virus"

Some dialogues on definition, as seen above, can be resolved analyzing the shared meaning of the *definienda*. These types of conflicts of opinion are based on the interlocutors' presuppositions. The proponent and the opponent take for granted definitions that in fact are not shared by the other party. These types of conflicts of opinion can be resolved through clarification dialogues, in which topics of definition are used to establish which definition is the best one.

A different type of definitional conflict of opinion emerges when a shared definition is countered with a proposed redefinition. In this case the interlocutor advances his proposal of how the concept should be defined.

A clear example of a debate on how to define a concept can be found in the discussion on the redefinition of "virus" after the discovery of a new giant virus, the Mimivirus (*New Scientist*, 25 March 2006: 37-39). In biology, viruses are placed outside the "tree of life", being microorganisms smaller than bacteria, which cannot grow or reproduce apart from a living cell (*New Scientist*, 3 September 2005: 26). However in 2002 a virus was discovered that was bacterium-sized, and presented an unusual number of genes, some of which are involved in the first process that makes proteins from genes. The complexity of this virus and its likeness to cellular life was the ground

for the proposal of redefining the concept of “virus”. On the shared view, Mimivirus would be classified as a virus, as it “is still dependent on its host for basic metabolic processes such as protein synthesis and energy production. And it lacks protein-building ribosomes, one of the fundamental features of life. So it is still a virus. [...] And virus is a virus” (*New Scientist*, 25 March 2006: 41). This definition was countered by some scientists, who maintained that “a term broad enough to include everything from the minuscule hepatitis D to the giant Mimivirus is useless”, and that the same concept of life should be redefined, encompassing the Mimivirus. This virus is commonly considered alive by virologists, and its DNA contains an impressive number of genes.

The conflict of definitions can be represented as follows:




Figure 4: Dialogue on definition

The arrows between the argumentations supporting the two conflicting arguments represent the conflict of definitions. The interlocutor uses an argument from consequences, namely a pattern of reasoning leading from the premise “A’s consequences are bad” to the conclusion “A should be avoided (not be chosen...)”. The traditional definition of life is shared among the scientists, and the interlocutor cannot deny the shared commitments. However, he advances a pragmatic argument to support his redefinition of “life” and “virus” in virology. He argues that by redefining these concepts a better explanation of the evolution of life could be possible. This debate shows how deeply connected definitions are with theoretical issues such as the origin of life, which constitute the cultural background of a community.

Redefinitions, as shown in the example of the definition of “ambassador”, are often implicit and are used to manipulate. If undetected, the redefinition can lead the interlocutor to fallacious conclusions. However, when detected, redefinitions can be

countered and proved to be wrong by confronting them with the implicit shared commitments. Redefinitions, however, are not always manipulative strategies. They can be supported by arguments aimed at attacking or countering the presuppositions the shared definitions are grounded on. In these cases, redefinitions, and dialogues on definition, become dialogues on the *endoxa* of a community.

4. Conclusions

Definitions from an argumentative point of view can be analyzed as *endoxa*, namely commonly accepted propositions. Definitional *endoxa* represent the deepest commitments of a community, as they are the basis of the mutual understanding. Definitions become argumentative strategies when they are used as premises in patterns of inference that are commonly called “argument from classification” or “*loci a definitione*”. In these types of reasoning, the definition is used to name reality, that is, to classify it. Different classifications of the same fragment of reality can lead to noticeably different conclusions, or influence the interlocutor’s process of decision-making. For this reason, conflicts of classifications are often based on conflicting definitions. This type of conflict can be resolved only by establishing first what a definition is, and what the criteria are to assess a definition. In the ancient tradition, the best definition was the definition that could license the strongest inferences, and it coincided with a semantic analysis of the *definiendum*. The essential definition can be therefore considered from an argumentative point of view the criterion to assess dialogues on definitions.

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THE CONJUNCTION 'AND': LITERAL MEANING AND DISCOURSE VALUES

ALDO FRIGERIO & MARCO PASSAROTTI & SAVINA RAYNAUD

The present paper faces two basic challenges and aims at overcoming them while showing how to deal with one word, the conjunction 'and'.

What are the challenges? On the one hand, the claim that natural languages are imperfect, ambiguous, vague tools, so that to avoid misunderstandings we must regiment them by translating them into formalized languages. On the other hand, the opposite claim that natural languages are so rich, *nuancées*, full of *ad hoc* values in discourse, that no pretense of objective and rigorous treatment of the meaning of their constituents can be put forward.

Let us see what happens in the case of 'and'.

The conjunction 'and' is formalized in first order logic by the connective \wedge . The interpretation of such a connective is a function from truth values to other truth values: \wedge takes as arguments the truth values of the sentences it joins and results in the truth value of the whole sentence. The customary truth tables describe the functions attached to the logical connectives:

p	q	$p \wedge q$
V	V	V
V	F	F
F	V	F
F	F	F

The formalization of the natural language word 'and' with the logical connective \wedge raises at least two problems:

- a) From the syntactic point of view, 'and' joins not only sentences but almost every part of speech and every phrase: nouns (B03 781 'She has worked extensively at Ronnie Scotts in London *and* Birmingham', B29 1584 'The club holds regular social functions including wine *and* cheese parties *and* receptions for visiting companies which give members an opportunity to meet the actors *and* actresses'¹), NPs (B1H 2090 'It was a fortress town *and* a trading centre, as it had been for the Romans 800 years earlier'), VPs (A7A 1292

¹ The examples are taken from the British National Corpus (<http://www.natcorp.ox.ac.uk/>), which gathers 100 million of tokens in written and spoken English from a wide range of sources. The first three characters of the code denote the text from which the sentence is taken, the following numerals indicate the sentence number within that text.

‘Bodo put out a large hand *and* pulled the door to’), adverbs (ECD 508 ‘While market forces may undoubtedly bring many positive benefits, both socially *and* politically, there are many occasions when it is legitimate to subject them to regulation in order to secure confidence and fairness in the operation of the financial markets’), adjectives (KIR 3789 ‘On the second day of the Macari trial at Winchester Crown Court, Swindon players past *and* present have been giving evidence’) and even prepositions (ABU 1764 ‘But a range of people inside *and* outside the House of Commons, deliver’) and conjunctions (AD0 1270 ‘If your weight has gone up and down over the last year (or ten years!) try to remember when *and* why it was up or down’). Our aim in this paper is to show that: (i) the occurrences of ‘and’ that do not conjunct sentences can be rendered by \wedge only at the cost of distorting the syntactic structures of the sentences; (ii) some occurrences of ‘and’ cannot be formalized by \wedge . So, \wedge is not a good formalization of ‘and’.

- b) From the pragmatic point of view, ‘and’ seems to take other meanings in addition to the one expressed by \wedge : e.g. temporal order (FSE 676 ‘He stepped away from the command console *and* bowed’), cause-effect (4KT 4859 ‘Lawrence was unhappy over the outspoken challenge to his authority *and* axed Slaven from his Tranmere squad’), opposition to and disappointment with an expectation (KC3 235 He is ‘unemployed *and* receiving state benefit as employed’). Besides, the conjunction of NPs seems sometimes to indicate that the predicate has to be separately assigned to both conjuncts (CH8 1428 ‘Now my mum *and* dad come to just about every concert’), sometimes to indicate that the it has to be collectively assigned to the conjuncts (CAR 1718 ‘Friends *and* well-wishers gather at Kirkwall Airport to await the return of the children to Orkney’), sometimes it is ambiguous between these two readings (A0N 1958 ‘Alex McLaggan *and* Mary have their own roof at Grandtully’, which can mean either that Alex McLaggan has a roof at Grandtully and Mary has a *different* roof in the same place or that Alex and Mary have a roof *together* at Grandtully). We’ll show that ‘and’ has not so many meanings (it is not semantically ambiguous), and that the further meanings it seems to have (the distinction distributive/collective included) are indeed pragmatic enrichments due to inferences drawn from the text.

Finally we shall sketch a positive theory of the meaning of ‘and’.

1. \wedge is not a good formalization of every occurrence of ‘and’

The formalization of (1) in first order logic is (2):

- (1) KDM 5350 Paul and Cathy are going
- (2) $\text{Go}(\text{Paul}) \wedge \text{Go}(\text{Mary})$

So a conjunction of proper names is turned into a conjunction of sentences. (1) is considered as equivalent to:

- (3) Paul is going and Mary is going

Indeed some syntacticians claimed that (3) is the deep structure of (1) and that (1) is the outcome of a syntactic transformation (cf. for example Gleitman 1965).

While (1) and (3) have the same truth conditions, a conjunction of VPs often cannot be transformed into a conjunction of sentences. This happens when the NP which is the argument of that conjunction is indefinite:

- (4) FT9 151 Former England opener Geoff Boycott chased and caught a thief
 (5) Former England opener Geoff Boycott chased a thief and Former England opener Geoff Boycott caught a thief

(4) means that Geoff Boycott chased a thief and caught him while (5) could mean that he chased a thief and caught a *different* one.

We face the same problem when a conjunction of adjectives is involved:

- (6) AYM 1288 You'll always receive a warm and friendly welcome
 (7) You'll always receive a warm welcome and you'll always receive a friendly welcome


These facts seem to prove that there exists no deep structure in which two different sentences occur.

However, first order logic possesses the formal resources to express (4) and (6), although a price must be paid: the syntactic structure of natural language sentences is completely distorted. Indefinite NPs are expressed by the existential quantifier, which can take large scope and bound every open variable in the whole formula. (4) can be formalized by (4') and (6) by (6'):

- (4') $\exists x (\text{Thief}(x) \wedge \text{Chased}(\text{Geoff Boycott}, x) \wedge \text{Caught}(\text{Geoff Boycott}, x))$


- (6') Always $(\exists x (\text{Warm}(x) \wedge \text{Friendly}(x) \wedge \text{Welcome}(x) \wedge \text{Receive}(\text{you}, x)))$

From the syntactic point of view, in (4) firstly the verbs are conjoined and then this conjunction takes its arguments. We give a very rough and simplified representation of the syntactic structure of (4):



Such a structure is not mirrored in (4'), where the noun 'thief' and the verbs 'chased' and 'caught' are on the same level and their variables are all bounded by the quantifier expressed by 'a'.

The same holds in (6): firstly the adjectives are conjoined, then they modify the noun 'welcome' and finally the verb takes as argument the resulting construction:



This is lost in (6') where the verb, the noun and the adjectives are on the same level and their variables are bounded by the quantifiers expressed by 'a'.

However, when conjunctions of nouns are considered instead of conjunctions of adjectives or verbs, not only do the first order logic formalizations not mirror the syntactic structure of the sentences, they also give incorrect results. For example:

(8) There were ten friends and colleagues of Paul's at the party

(8') $\exists_{10x} (\text{Colleague-of-Paul}(x) \wedge \text{Friend-of-Paul}(x) \wedge \text{To-be-at-the-party}(x))^2$

(9) There were ten friends of Paul's at the party and there were ten colleagues of Paul's at the party

Clearly (8) is not equivalent to (9); furthermore (8') not only distorts the syntactic structure of (8)³, but its formalization (8') is not suitable to express (8) either: (8') is true when ten people who are both friends and colleagues of Paul attended the party. But (8) can be true also when five friends (who are not colleagues) and five colleagues (who are not friends) attended the party; or it can be true when there were two people who are both friends and colleagues of Paul, two friends who are not colleagues and six colleagues who are not friends at the party. These possibilities are excluded by (8'). Things are even worse with regard to (10):

(10) CJN 35 116 young men and women, between the ages of 17 and 22, took part in the research between January and December 1992

(10') $\exists_{116x} (\text{Young-man-between-17-22}(x) \wedge \text{Young-woman-between-17-22}(x) \wedge \text{Took-part-in-the-research}(x))$

The formula (10') is true when 116 people who are both men and women took part in the research. Since no people who are both men and women do exist, (10') cannot be true in any context; but clearly this is not true with regard to (10).

In the same way, \wedge cannot formalize conjunctions of NPs that are arguments of a collective verb:

(11) JT4 152 The vocalist and the guitarist met in a chip shop

(11') $\text{Met-in-a-chip-shop}(\textit{the vocalist}) \wedge \text{Met-in-a-chip-shop}(\textit{the guitarist})$

(11') is true when the vocalist met in a chip shop and the same thing is true of the guitarist. Indeed it is hard even to figure out what a sentence like that could mean.

Finally, as \wedge is a function from truth values to other truth values, it is thought of as a formal device to render the conjunction of constative sentences to which a truth value can be assigned: so \wedge cannot formalize performative sentences which have no truth value.

² As usually, ' $\exists_n x P(x)$ ' is the abbreviation of: $\exists x_1 \dots \exists x_n (x_1 \neq x_2 \wedge \dots \wedge x_{n-1} \neq x_n \wedge P(x_1) \wedge \dots \wedge P(x_n))$

³ In the syntactic tree firstly the nouns are conjoined, then they are modified by the PP 'of Paul's' and then determined by the determiner 'ten'; finally the DP built in this way becomes an argument of the verb. All this structure is clearly lost in (8').

To sum up, in this first section, we have shown that \wedge cannot formalize every use of ‘and’ in natural language. In addition to \wedge , the symbol of the intersection between sets \cap , has also been used in order to formalize the conjunction ‘and’, for example by Partee & Rooths (1983). We could demonstrate that this formalization runs into problems similar to those in the case of \wedge , but we will do not so for lack of space.

2. *Discursive meanings*

As mentioned above, ‘and’ can carry many different meanings according to the discursive contexts where it is used. There are at least two possible positions regarding this: (a) firstly, ‘and’ is an ambiguous word with many possible meanings, one of which is selected by the context of use; (b) secondly, ‘and’ carries only one, very poor, meaning, while all the other meanings which seem to be possible are, in fact, the results of pragmatic implicatures bound to specific discursive contexts.

In what follows, we defend the second position given above, starting with the argument about the alleged collective and distributive meanings.

2.1 The distinction collective/distributive is not a semantic one

There are many different reasons in favour of a pragmatic solution.

First of all, according to Winter (1996), if the meaning of ‘and’ were ambiguous between a collective and a distributive one, it should not be hard to find out languages where these two meanings are expressed through two different words. For instance, the Italian word ‘riso’ is ambiguous, since its meaning can be “laugh” (noun) or “rice”: in other languages, the two meanings of ‘riso’ are expressed through two different words, such as ‘Lachen’ and ‘Reis’ in German, or ‘rire’ and ‘riz’ in French. The same should also hold true for ‘and’: but this is not the case. In fact, as Payne shows in his comparative study (Payne 1985), there is no language which expresses the distributive and the collective meanings of ‘and’ through two different words. The fact that even very different languages systematically convey these two meanings using always just one word is a strong argument in favour of the conclusion that these two meanings do not really exist and that ‘and’ has just one meaning.

Secondly, reasons of economy are involved. Claiming that the conjunction ‘and’ is ambiguous implies claiming that the ambiguity of ‘and’ is not among a limited number of meanings, but among an open, indefinite, and hardly manageable, set of meanings. As a demonstration of this, we come back to the distinction distributive/collective: some scholars, like Partee & Roth (1983), or Hoeksema (1988), agree that ‘and’ has two different meanings, namely a distributive and a collective one. But, let us consider the following sentence:

- (12) Students and professors wrote a manifesto

This sentence has at least three possible readings: (a) a collective one: all the students and professors have taken part in the writing of one common manifesto; (b) a distributive one: each student and each professor has written one single manifesto; (c) an intermediate one: all the students together have written one manifesto, while all the professors together have written another one. Claiming that 'and' carries an ambiguous meaning implies that the ambiguity of 'and' is at least in three senses, since there are at least three possible readings of 'and' (collective, distributive, intermediate).

But there is more to it than this. Let us consider the following sentence (taken from Gillon 1987):

(13) Rodgers, Hammerstein and Hart wrote musicals

Gillon makes it clear that Rodgers collaborated both with Hammerstein and Hart in writing musicals, while Hammerstein and Hart never worked together.

Among the many readings of (13), the right one cannot be the distributive, since Rodgers, Hammerstein and Hart never wrote a song on their own, but always through some kind of collaboration; but the same holds also for the collective reading, since all the three songwriters never worked together. The predicate "writing musicals" neither has to be individually (i.e. distributively) attributed to Rodgers, Hammerstein, or Hart, nor collectively to all of them, but it should be attributed to two overlapping subsets of the set formed by the three songwriters.

Thus, a further reading must be added to the distributive, the collective and the intermediate ones: in this fourth reading, the predicate is neither attributed to the single elements nor to the full set of the referents, nor to some partition of it, but to some overlapping subsets of it (technically, to a cover of it).

The process of recognizing further readings does not stop here. For instance, arguing about an intermediate reading between the collective and the distributive ones, we should consider more than just one intermediate reading. In fact, a set can be subdivided in many different ways and the predicate can be attributed to the cells resulting from these different subdivisions. This implies an explosion of the number of possible readings which becomes difficult to manage since 'and' would be a word with really many different possible meanings.

A final reason against the ambiguity of 'and' is that the collective/distributive difference holds when using plurals without the presence of 'and':

(14) The four hundred firemen have put out fifteen fires

Two of the possible meanings of (14) are that the four hundred firemen have together put out the fifteen fires, or that everyone of the four hundred firemen have put out fifteen fires (which is pragmatically an improbable reading, even though semantically still possible). This is the same difference in reading we have noted for NPs which are joined through 'and'. Claiming that 'and' plays a role in making the distinction collective/distributive leaves no way to explain all the different readings of sentences such as (14). Or, maybe, a different explanation must be taken into account: but giving

two different explanations for what seems to be just one phenomenon is just uneconomic.

2.2 Temporal, causal and opposition meanings are not semantic ones

Although we have argued that the meaning of 'and' is not ambiguous between a collective and a distributive sense, it could still remain true that 'and' has other different meanings, such as temporal, causal, etc.

According to the theory of the ambiguity of 'and', this word shows many possible meanings within the linguistic system and each specific context of use selects one of them. There are many arguments against such a theory. For instance, given that one of the possible meanings of 'and' is temporal order, this meaning would be selected by contexts such as the following:

(15) He woke up and brushed his teeth

Now removing 'and' from (15), the result is:

(16) He woke up. He brushed his teeth

The meaning of temporal order of the two events seems not to be lost.

But, if in (15) the meaning of temporal order is attained through 'and', why does this meaning still remain, when 'and' is removed? The Maxim of Manner by Grice requires the speaker to be orderly, i.e. expressing the contents of his talk with regard to their temporal order. Thus, unless further clarifications by the speaker or the context make the inference false, the addressee's inference from (15) and (16) is that the speaker's purpose is that the agent has performed the actions in the same (temporal) order of the clauses in the sentence. Another argument in favour of considering the meaning of temporal order as a pragmatic inference is the possibility of removing the implicature, without resulting in a contradiction:

(17) He woke up and brushed his teeth, but not in this order

(17) is a non contradictory sentence. It would be such, if the temporal order was included in the semantic meaning of 'and': that things happened in a specific temporal order would be, in fact, stated and, later on, denied. The above remarks about translation are still worthwhile: if 'and' had two meanings (one including and one not including the temporal order), there could be languages where these two meanings are expressed through two different words. But this is not the case.

The same holds good also for the alleged causal meaning of 'and':

(18) He turned the key and the car started

Again, the causal relation between the two events is still expressed even if 'and' is removed:

(19) He turned the key. The car started

Our claim here is that there is nothing in (18) and (19) which semantically conveys that the key-turning has caused the starting of the car. A possible reading of (18) and (19) is that the car starting has not been caused by the key-turning, but by something else⁴.

But such a reading is easily rejected, since key-turning usually causes the cars to start and speakers know it thanks to their encyclopaedic knowledge. Now, (18) and (19) report that the key has been turned and the car started: there is no reason to argue that the key-turning has not been the cause of the car's starting. The speaker in (18) and in (19) does not say anything to deny this natural hypothesis: he knows that the addressee will guess this and does not act in any way to prevent it. The addressee has the right to make this inference and the speaker knows that the addressee has got this right. So, if the speaker is cooperative, he has used (18) and (19) in order to make the addressee understand that the key-turning has been the cause of the car's starting. But that this causal relation between the two events exists is just a pragmatic inference derived from the context and our encyclopaedic knowledge about how cars work; it is not semantically conveyed by 'and'.

Levinson (2000), reforming Grice's thought, suggests the following conversational maxim (here reported in a shortened form):

The I[nformativeness]-Principle.

Speaker's maxim: "say as little as necessary", i.e. produce minimal linguistic information sufficient to achieve your communicational ends

Recipient's corollary: amplify the informational content of the speaker's utterance, by finding the most specific information, up to what you judge to be the speaker's intended point. Specifically:

- i. assume that stereotypical relations obtain between referents or events, unless: (1) that is inconsistent with what is taken for granted; (2) the speaker has broken the maxim by choosing a prolix expression;
- ii. assume the existence or actuality of what a sentence is "about";
- iii. avoid interpretations that multiply the entities referred to (assume referential parsimony).

If the [I] principle by Levinson is indeed a maxim followed by speakers in their productive and interpretative strategies, this explains why from (18) and (19) the implicature that there is a causal relation between the two involved events can be easily drawn.

In particular, the maxim requires that the addressee assumes the stereotypical relations among the events referred to by the speaker, unless there are contrary specifications. The addressee has to enlarge the informational content of the sentence, assuming

⁴ There are, in fact, contexts where the implicature is removed: "He turned the key and the car started. But he had not started the car: the battery cables had been unplugged. The car has been started through a remote control just in the moment when he had turned the key". All this is not contradictory, as it would be if a semantic meaning of 'and' were here involved.

that these relations are verified although the speaker has not explicitly said so. Assuming that cars stereotypically start through key-turning, this is the most natural interpretation of (18) and (19).

Another supposed meaning of 'and' would be to express the opposition between two conjuncts: in this case, the meaning of 'and' would be very close to that of 'but':

(20) It is a beautiful day. Everyone is enjoying it outdoors and Paul is studying indoors

(21) It was a very interesting proposal and you have rejected it

In (20) and (21), the first conjunct establishes an expectation which is denied by the second. Here we have to wonder if the opposition between the two conjuncts is embedded in the meaning of 'and', or if it is inferred from the fact that what is expressed by the two conjuncts is itself in opposition (although not contradictory).

An argument in favour of this second hypothesis is that it is possible to use 'and' instead of 'but' only if a clear and explicit opposition between the two conjuncts actually exists. When the opposition between the two conjuncts can be unclear to the addressee and must be explicitly expressed by the speaker, the use of 'but' is mandatory:

(22) She is beautiful and clever

(23) She is beautiful but clever

That an opposition really exists between beauty and cleverness is a disputable matter: if the speaker claims that the two properties are in some way in opposition to each other, he must be explicit on this, since the opposition cannot be inferred merely from the meaning of the two conjuncts. Thus, he has to use 'but', as shown in (23); while in (22) the use of 'and' makes the opposition disappear.

The alleged opposition meaning of 'and' would exist only in those cases where the opposition between the two conjuncts is clear: so, in the light of this, it is more economic to claim that the role of 'and' is just to join the two clauses, while the opposition between them is due to their own meanings and not to the meaning of 'and'.

Again, the opposition between the two clauses still holds good even without 'and': this shows furthermore that the opposition is due not to 'and', but to the meanings of the clauses themselves:

(24) It is a beautiful day. Everyone is enjoying it outdoors. Paul is studying indoors

(25) It was a very interesting proposal. You have rejected it

To highlight the disappointment of what we would have expected, the final clauses of (24) and (25) are often uttered in a descending intonation and a lower tone.

3. *Towards a minimalist theory of the meaning of 'and'*

We have excluded that the conjunction 'and' might be formalised with \wedge ; we have also excluded that it might have a rich and complex meaning or that it might be ambiguous

among various meanings. What has to be done then is to find a positive meaning of 'and', which does not coincide with the usual formalizations, but is minimal, i.e. which can be the semantic basis of all its syntactic occurrences and of all its uses. Our claim is quite simple: the function of 'and' is that of conjoining the semantic value of the second conjunct to the semantic value of the first conjunct in order to produce a structure which has the semantic values of both. In other words, taking two elements X and Y of the same syntactic kind, and assuming that the semantic value of X is α and that of Y is β , the structure 'X and Y' will have as its semantic value the result of the conjunction of β and α . The claim has obviously to be specified according to the elements joined by 'and', that is to say, according to the syntactic kind of X and Y: if X and Y are two declarative sentences, then 'X and Y' will be a structure such that both X and Y are asserted. If on the contrary the two sentences are directives, then the conjunction 'and' will establish a structure where both the orders are given. Otherwise if X and Y are two directive sentences, the conjunction will produce a structure where both the orders are given. If X and Y are predicates, then 'X and Y' will predicate both X and Y of the subject of the sentence; if X and Y are NPs, and if therefore their function is to refer to objects, then 'X and Y' will have as its semantic value the result of the sum of the references of Y to those of X, so that such a structure will refer to the objects to which X refers as well as to those to which Y refers. If X and Y are adjectives and if therefore their function is to ascribe properties to the objects to which a noun refers, then 'X and Y' will ascribe both the properties expressed by X and Y to the objects to which the noun refers. If X and Y are nouns and if their function is to refer to objects⁵, once more 'X and Y' will refer to the objects to which X refers as well as to those to which Y refers. Eventually, if X and Y are adverbs and therefore their task is to modify and to specify an event, the state or the action expressed by the verb, or the property expressed by an adjective, then 'X and Y' will attribute to the verb or to the adjective both the modifications. We don't think that a further meaning has to be attributed to the conjunction 'and'. Obviously what is here outlined is just the draft of a theory: technical details depend on the adopted formalism. In any case we affirm that, whatever the formal theory adopted, if it aims to express the meaning of 'and' in natural languages, it has to equip itself with resources apt to add the referents of a noun to those of another one, to add the attribution of a property to that of another one, to add the modification of a verb to that of another one, etc. \wedge and \cap can play this role with at least some of the syntactic types which 'and' joins, but not with all of them: they are more apt when it is a matter of adding the attribution of an adjective to that of another adjective, or the predication of a verb to that of another verb, or the modification of an adverb to that of another adverb, but in many cases they fail, when NPs and nouns are taken into account and what becomes necessary is to add referents to refer-

⁵ If the function of both nouns and noun phrases is to refer to objects, what is their semantic difference? We think that nouns have only a potential reference which is actualized or filtered by (possible) determinants of NPs. Yet, nothing in our claim about the meaning of 'and' depends on this particular theory.

ents. Two choices are possible, then: either to express the conjunction with different formal resources, using for instance \cap for predicates, adjectives or adverbs and another sign for NPs and nouns, or to look for an alternative and more univocal formalization. In this second case, it would be a question of radically reforming our present formalizations.

We do not think there can be anything to add to the semantic meaning of 'and'. Our thesis is therefore a very weak one. Its strength is in stating that any stronger thesis either loses in generality or it attributes to the semantics of 'and' what is just a pragmatic inference.

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L'ENGAGEMENT COMME NOTION COGNITIVE ASSOCIÉE AU DESTINATAIRE

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Introduction

La notion d'*engagement du locuteur* et la question de son utilité pour l'étude de l'argumentation concerne différents niveaux d'analyse, notamment l'identification des forces illocutoires et celle des propositions qui peuvent légitimement être tenues pour assumées, ou vraies, par l'un des participants d'une conversation. En d'autres termes, la question de l'engagement – *commitment* – concerne à la fois la force illocutoire (sur quel type d'acte de langage le locuteur s'engage-t-il – et sur quoi d'autre doit-il s'engager pour pouvoir s'engager sur un acte de langage déterminé –?) et le contenu lui-même. Nous nous concentrerons ici sur le deuxième aspect, en abordant la question de savoir à quelles conditions un destinataire peut tenir un locuteur pour responsable de, ou considérer que ce dernier s'engage sur, l'assertion d'un ensemble de propositions déterminées, dans un contexte donné.

L'objectif de cet article est de proposer une approche psychologique de la notion d'*engagement du locuteur* vis-à-vis de l'énoncé qu'il produit, en suggérant l'hypothèse que plus un contenu est pertinent dans les circonstances, plus il est plausible que le destinataire considère que le locuteur s'engage sur ce contenu.

Généralement, la notion d'*engagement du locuteur* fait référence au système de croyances du locuteur: ainsi, proférant un contenu véridictionnel (une ou plusieurs propositions), le locuteur signifierait qu'il adhère à, ou s'engage sur, la vérité des faits couverts par cette (ou ces) proposition(s). Par sa nature, une assertion associée au contenu véridictionnel a une valeur de vérité positive: les conditions de vérité sont réputées vraies, et, ainsi, les propositions sont comprises comme décrivant des *faits entretenus comme vrais par le locuteur*. Pourtant, traiter des «croyances» entretenues comme vraies par un locuteur ne peut reposer que sur l'identification des contenus que le locuteur s'engage à communiquer par son énoncé¹. Or pour le destinataire, déterminer les contenus effectivement intentionnés par le locuteur, sur la base des formes linguistiques en contexte, n'est pas une opération transparente. Elle mobilise au contraire des processus sophistiqués qui impliquent une marge d'incertitude ou de risque.

L'un des procédés d'argumentation fallacieuse qui montre de la manière la plus évidente l'importance d'identifier des contenus dont la communication est effectivement voulue par le locuteur est celui de l'homme de paille (*strawman fallacy*) qui con-

¹ D'autre part les croyances individuelles sont privées et inscrutables. Seuls les indices de ces croyances sont publics et scrutables. Voir également à ce sujet Papafragou (2006: 1698).

siste à attribuer à autrui une position, généralement facilement réfutable, sur laquelle, en fait, il ne s'est pas engagé. Or si une telle fallacie peut éventuellement fonctionner et convaincre, c'est probablement, pensons-nous, parce que *les croyances sur lesquelles le locuteur s'engage* ne constituent pas des faits objectivement scrutables, et que la plupart des formes linguistiques sont intrinsèquement ambiguës.

Les théories de l'argumentation convergent pour considérer que l'une des clés de l'analyse des mouvements argumentatifs réside dans l'observation des considérations ou propositions qui peuvent *raisonnablement* (notre soulignement) être considérées (par un observateur externe) comme assumées par le locuteur, comme le pose Hamblin (1970). Hamblin considère l'existence de «stocks d'engagements» (*commitment stores*) produits par un locuteur au cours d'une argumentation, sans la connaissance desquels l'interlocuteur – ou l'analyste – ne peut identifier un sophisme comme celui de l'homme de paille.

Ce ne sont pas tant les croyances d'un individu locuteur qui comptent, mais, dirions-nous, *ce qui est tenu pour avoir été dit*. Or il faut bien que quelqu'un *tienne* ce qui *est tenu*, et ce quelqu'un ne peut être que le destinataire, réel ou idéal. Ce que le destinataire tient pour avoir été dit correspond donc au stock des prises de position que Hamblin nomme *stocks d'engagements*. La définition que propose Walton (1993: 93), selon laquelle l'engagement est «une inférence tirée sur la base de ce que vous dites et comment vous agissez lorsque vous interagissez avec un autre participant (notre traduction)» exprime après tout la même chose: les engagements sont des inférences. Toutefois, plutôt que de placer au niveau du locuteur (comme le fait encore Walton ici), nous insistons sur le fait que ces inférences sont *tirées par un destinataire* et sont *destinées à être tirées par un destinataire*. Ainsi, toute verbalisation poursuit l'objectif de donner lieu à des inférences prévues par le locuteur, qui connaît intuitivement les mécanismes pragmatiques qui président à l'inférence, sur la base de sa psychologie intuitive ou théorie de l'esprit. Pour que le destinataire émette l'hypothèse que le locuteur s'engage sur le fait de communiquer *P* (et par conséquent, éventuellement, de croire *P*), il faut qu'il ait à sa disposition des éléments qui le conduisent à considérer que le locuteur s'engage, par son énoncé, à rendre manifeste le fait qu'il entretient la pensée *P*. La question qui surgit donc, et qui nous amènera vers la distinction entre les contenus explicites et implicites, est celle de l'identification des engagements du locuteur par le destinataire.

Quant à savoir quelles sont les bases sur lesquelles un contenu peut être attribué à un locuteur en tant qu'engagement, la proposition de Hamblin (1970) reste évasive: les engagements, explique-t-il en substance, sont des faits observables de l'extérieur (par l'analyste, par exemple), qui peuvent être normativement évalués par un regard attentif sur ce qui est dit (*what is said*, dans la tradition gricéenne) et ce qui est fait (*what is done*, dans la tradition des actes de langage) par le locuteur considéré. La proposition de Katriel & Dascal (1989) est plus sophistiquée: les engagements sont, pour eux, constitués par ce que le locuteur peut être tenu pour avoir pris pour acquis en produisant son énoncé. Mais, c'est la position que nous voulons défendre dans cet article,

l'établissement de ce qui peut être tenu comme engagement d'un locuteur par un interlocuteur est un processus complexe, tout simplement parce qu'évaluer *ce qui est dit* par un locuteur requiert un niveau de contextualisation des énoncés, contrairement à la simplification opérée par Grice dans sa dichotomie *dit – implicite*. Cela est requis non seulement pour la saturation référentielle, mais aussi pour la désambiguïsation et différentes sortes d'enrichissements pragmatiques qui concernent bel et bien le niveau explicite du sens, c'est-à-dire celui qu'évoque Hamblin quand il parle de *ce qui est dit*, et qui, nous le répétons, n'est pas transparent. Qui plus est, la recherche actuelle insiste pour considérer qu'un locuteur peut être lié non pas uniquement par ce qu'il a dit, mais également par ce qu'il a communiqué implicitement, au moins à certaines conditions (Burton-Roberts 2006, Capone à paraître, Morency, Oswald & Saussure à paraître). Quant à *ce qui est fait*, nous considérons qu'il s'agit-là d'un problème encore supplémentaire, qui ne peut être considéré qu'en ayant déjà résolu la question de savoir ce que le locuteur peut être tenu pour avoir dit. Ces opérations de découverte des engagements du locuteur requièrent donc un modèle de la compréhension; nous proposons ici quelques pistes, en exploitant l'approche de Sperber & Wilson (1995), pour les considérer.

1. *Engagement et types de contenus*

Depuis Grice, identifier les contenus pragmatiques implicites repose sur deux critères essentiels (nous laisserons le troisième, à savoir la détachabilité, de côté dans cet article). Le premier critère est la *non-redondance* de la verbalisation des contenus implicites. En effet, verbaliser le contenu implicite produit par un énoncé ajoute du sens à cet énoncé (contrairement aux implications). Ainsi, on ne peut considérer que l'information implicite serait contenue dans l'énoncé lui-même; dès lors, on est tenté de considérer qu'un locuteur ne peut communiquer qu'il s'est engagé sur son adhésion à ce contenu. La même conclusion vaut également, et de manière encore plus frappante, avec l'autre critère, à savoir celui de la défaisabilité: un contenu implicite peut toujours être défait, logiquement parlant, typiquement par une structure introduite par *mais* (ou d'autres marques de révision), sans produire de contradiction. De ce fait, la question de l'engagement du locuteur est au centre de la question théorique de l'interface entre sémantique et pragmatique: si on ne peut se rétracter sans produire une contradiction, alors on est engagé par ses paroles.

Parmi les problèmes soulevés par cette conception se trouve le suivant: beaucoup de contenus que Grice disait implicites, et qui sont toujours considérés comme tels par de nombreux chercheurs, relèvent en fait beaucoup plus probablement du contenu explicite, tant la rétractabilité sur de tels contenus semble pratiquement impossible. Ainsi, considérer que l'énoncé *Anne a quatre enfants* ne communique *exactement quatre* que par implicature (tirée par la maxime de quantité) est très difficile à tenir, si l'on admet une notion plus intuitive de la rétractabilité, c'est-à-dire de l'engagement du locuteur. On imagine très mal un locuteur ayant produit cet énoncé déclarer ultérieu-

rement qu'il voulait communiquer qu'Anne a quatre enfants ou davantage (dans un contexte neutre). A cet égard, l'introduction, par Sperber & Wilson (1986 / 1995) notamment, d'autres critères, comme le fait qu'un contenu développe ou non la forme logique de l'énoncé, en vue de statuer sur son caractère implicite, a été salutaire. En effet, au seul critère de l'engagement du locuteur, *Anne a quatre enfants* communique bien *explicitement* qu'Anne a exactement quatre enfants, et il n'est pas plausible que le locuteur ni l'interlocuteur puissent faire une autre hypothèse, hormis dans des contextes très inhabituels. Ceci ouvre une piste d'investigation supplémentaire: même les contenus explicites, produits par un énoncé, et sur lesquels un locuteur s'engage, sont obtenus de manière inférentielle. De la sorte, les contenus explicites dépendent également du contexte (cf. la notion d'*expliciture* dans la théorie de la pertinence de Sperber & Wilson, et les notions apparentées dans d'autres traditions qui traitent de ce contenu pragmatique primaire qui est formé par les contenus explicites, comme la notion d'*impliciture* chez Kent Bach (1994)). La pragmatique s'accorde aujourd'hui à les nommer *contenus pragmatiques primaires* (*primary pragmatic meaning*), bien qu'elle diverge quant à leur nature. L'hypothèse que nous défendons est que la meilleure manière de discriminer ces types de contenus est de considérer le point de vue du destinataire.

Il y a donc maintenant deux problèmes interreliés à considérer.

Premièrement, la fiabilité 'objective' de la communication – et donc de l'évaluation d'un engagement du locuteur – dépend d'une tripartition, qui sépare trois types d'information en fonction de son degré de publicité (*overtiness*): le *contenu effectivement verbalisé*, le *contenu pragmatique primaire* et le *contenu implicite*. Par *contenu pragmatique primaire*, nous entendons la catégorie que la théorie de la pertinence de Sperber & Wilson (1995) nomme les *explicitures*: ce sont des développements de la forme logique sous-jacente à la forme effectivement verbalisée. Ces explicitures produisent différents contenus, mais surtout, c'est ce qui nous intéresse ici, la *forme propositionnelle*, que le destinataire identifie comme ce que le locuteur communique *explicitement* (et qui auparavant était traité comme le *dit* de Grice, ou le contenu vériconditionnel de la sémantique, qui ne s'envisageait que par deux opérations simples, la saturation et la désambiguïsation).

Il serait tentant de bâtir sur l'approche classique et de l'étendre avec une notion de gradation: le locuteur sera considéré comme s'engageant fortement sur des contenus verbalisés, moins fortement sur des explicitures, et faiblement (ou pas du tout) sur les contenus implicites. Toutefois, cette hypothèse est trop forte. Tout d'abord, parce que le contenu verbalisé n'est pas nécessairement propositionnel, et la notion d'engagement n'a de raison d'être qu'au sujet de contenus d'allure propositionnelle. Ainsi, un énoncé comme *La pizzeria* n'est pas une proposition, mais une verbalisation elliptique à laquelle des composants doivent être rajoutés pour déterminer si la forme propositionnelle explicite ressemble plutôt à *Regarde la pizzeria s'il te plaît* ou à *La pizzeria conviendra pour le déjeuner*, par exemple. Ainsi, le locuteur ne peut pas s'engager à propos d'un contenu verbalisé s'il n'est pas propositionnel (sauf sur le fait qu'il l'a prononcé); s'il s'engage sur quelque chose, ce sera sur le fait que le reste de la communication est

inférable à partir de la forme effectivement verbalisée. On objectera peut-être que cet exemple devrait être éliminé des observables, car typique de l'oral, la proposition sous-jacente étant réputée saillante dans le contexte. Mais il s'agit là du cas le plus standard des stimuli linguistiques réels, et la saillance des informations contextuelles n'est pas radicalement différente selon qu'il faille ajouter des constituants inarticulés (Perry 1986, Carston 2004, Récanati 2002) pour une forme explicite ou qu'il faille recourir à une prémisses contextuelle pour tirer une implicature, puisque certaines implicatures sont très évidentes et que certaines explicatures sont au contraire peu évidentes. La forme propositionnelle, qui constitue ce qui sera évalué comme forme développée *explicite*, repose non seulement sur la saturation et la désambiguïsation², mais aussi sur la récupération de constituants inarticulés et la détermination conceptuelle. Ces deux derniers mécanismes supposent pour nous des opérations cognitives orientées vers la recherche de pertinence dans le cadre de la reconstruction d'un contenu explicite propositionnel 'de premier degré' que la tradition récente nomme l'*enrichissement pragmatique* (Carston 2004, Récanati 2002 par exemple)³. Restent donc comme contenus susceptibles de produire une hypothèse sur l'engagement du locuteur la *forme propositionnelle* contextuellement dérivée et qui tiendra comme contenu *explicite*, c'est-à-dire réputé ouvertement communiqué par le locuteur, et les implicatures, qui sont d'autres propositions (certaines implicatures au sens gricéen se trouvant ramenées à des explicatures quand elles développent la forme logique, comme dans *Anne a quatre enfants*). Tout le problème réside donc en ceci que contrairement à ce qu'on suppose dans la tradition gricéenne, la plupart des contenus réputés explicites sont construits contextuellement sur la base d'indices incertains, tout comme les implicatures; ils ne sont donc pas donnés *a priori*. Quant aux implicatures, elles peuvent être tellement saillantes qu'il en devient implausible qu'elles n'engagent pas le locuteur, dans un sens intuitif qu'il importe de traiter. Qui plus est encore, plusieurs chercheurs admettent, bien qu'avec timidité parfois, que la perspective de donner un sens à un énoncé par une implicature détermine la sélection d'un développement propositionnel explicite adéquat; en d'autres termes, il arrive que la perspective d'un contenu implicite très pertinent détermine le choix d'un enrichissement particulier pour fournir le bon matériau explicite à partir d'un matériau verbalisé informationnellement incomplet. Il en va ainsi dans les exemples de causalité inverse implicite traités dans Saussure (2003 et 2005), où la référence temporelle des propositions – explicite – dépend d'une implicature causale (voir encore Carston (2004) sur la nécessité d'un principe de «*mutual adjustment*» entre explicatures et implicatures qui pourrait devoir, d'ailleurs, être généralisé à tout traitement cognitif de l'information linguistique).

² Cf. Carston (2004) pour une argumentation contre la thèse codique d'une indexicalité généralisée des expressions ambiguës et de la saturation.

³ Cet enrichissement, pour Carston (2004), est soit contraint par la sémantique (c'est le cas de l'ellipse déterminée par un constituant linguistiquement requis mais manquant) soit opéré sur des bases purement pragmatiques (c'est l'enrichissement *libre*).

2. *Engagement, sens littéral et sens explicite*

Pour ce qui concerne l'ajout de précisions ou de constituants non requis par le code, c'est-à-dire pour des raisons de pertinence, il est crucial de noter que le locuteur a proféré dans les cas évoqués ci-dessus une proposition qui pourtant ne sera pas retenue comme la proposition explicitement voulue par le locuteur. C'est là que la distinction entre le contenu *littéral*, qui correspond à la proposition encodée, et le contenu *explicite*, qui sera le fondement d'une hypothèse sur l'engagement du locuteur, se trouvent disjoints. Ainsi, ce sur quoi le locuteur peut être considéré comme engagé n'est pas la proposition qu'il a proférée, mais une proposition plus complexe ou plus précise. Considérons les exemples suivants, avec leurs commentaires.

(1) Ça prendra du temps pour guérir ces blessures.

Ici, l'interprétation produit, sauf contexte marqué, quelque chose comme (1'):

(1') Ça prendra *un temps considérable* pour guérir ces blessures.

Il semble évident pour l'intuition que le destinataire ne fera pas l'hypothèse que le locuteur s'engage sur (1), très sous-informatif (puisque tout prend «du temps»), mais bien sur (1'), informatif: la pertinence de mentionner le temps se trouve atteinte par une majoration de l'importance ou de la quantité de temps en jeu. Pour se convaincre qu'il ne s'agit pas là de processus purement conventionnels, comme on peut être tenté de le croire, il suffit de rappeler que les mêmes processus sont en jeu dans des situations dans lesquelles la désambiguïsation joue au sujet de spécifications possibles du contenu conceptuel, lesquels sont purement contextuels et non conventionnels. Ainsi de (2), interprété comme (2') ou comme (2'') selon le contexte:

(2) La pizzeria est ouverte.

(2') La pizzeria est ouverte *à cette heure-ci*.

(2'') La pizzeria est ouverte *désormais* (p.ex. après une fermeture pour travaux).

En (2'), le locuteur s'engage sur le fait qu'au moment de la parole, la pizzeria est ouverte, ce qui autorise d'autres implicatures, par exemple concernant la possibilité d'aller y déjeuner. En (2''), le locuteur s'engage sur un état permanent d'ouverture de la pizzeria, mais qui n'implique aucunement que la pizzeria soit ouverte aux clients au moment de la parole.

Les cas de discours rapporté présentent une difficulté supplémentaire en ce qui concerne l'engagement du locuteur, à cause de la remontée des informations attribuées à un locuteur source vers ce qui peut être attribué au locuteur lui-même (cf. à ce sujet Morency, Oswald & Saussure à paraître). Proférant (3), le locuteur peut être considéré comme s'engageant ou non sur (3') en fonction d'indications contextuelles multiples et indécidables *a priori*:

(3) Paul dit qu'il est temps de partir.

(3') Il est temps de partir.

Enfin, les cas d'ironie et de métaphore demanderaient d'autres développements pour être traités, mais on peut déjà remarquer que le locuteur de (4) dans une version ironique s'engage sur à la fois (4') et (4''), de même pour respectivement (5), (5') et (5''), et, pour la métaphore, il reste mutuellement manifeste que (6) est littéralement faux et doit être compris comme engageant le locuteur sur un contenu différent, par exemple que Paul est organisé à l'extrême (exemples (4) et (5) adaptés de Sperber & Wilson).

- (4) Il pleut quelques gouttes.
- (4') Il pleut très fort.
- (4'') Celui qui pense qu'il ne pleut que quelques gouttes est ridicule.
- (5) Beau temps pour un pique-nique !
- (5') Le temps est mauvais et inapproprié pour un pique-nique.
- (5'') Celui qui pensait qu'il ferait beau est ridicule.
- (6) Paul est un classeur.

La même analyse, finalement, tiendrait pour des questions plus complexes: ce que Grice appelle le *dit* se ramène parfois au contenu littéral, et certains de ses implicites ne sont que des explicites. Ainsi, dans *Anne a quatre enfants*, on peut admettre, conformément à l'intuition, qu'en contexte neutre le locuteur s'engage sur le nombre exact d'enfants (contenu explicite) alors que le contenu littéral, non enrichi et généralement sous-informatif, est *Anne a quatre enfants ou plus*.

D'autres cas mériteraient encore de retenir notre attention.

Dans un célèbre article de 1971, Geis & Zwicky signalent que l'interprétation la plus naturelle de (7) est (7') alors que l'interprétation littérale attendue devrait être (7''), si l'expression *si* du langage naturel correspond, comme ils s'y attendent, à l'implication logique:

- (7) Si tu tonds la pelouse, je te donnerai dix dollars.
- (7') Si et seulement si tu tonds la pelouse, je te donnerai dix dollars.
- (7'') Si tu tonds la pelouse, ou dans une autre situation possible, je te donnerai dix dollars.

A tout le moins, l'intuition insiste pour que le destinataire attribue (7') comme engagement du locuteur de (7), et non (7''), malgré le caractère plus littéralement conforme de (7''). En réalité, il est bien loin d'être clair que le *si* de la langue correspond sémantiquement à une implication plutôt qu'à une biconditionnelle. La spécification de *si* vers l'une ou l'autre de ces valeurs semble très dépendante de facteurs pragmatiques; (8) reçoit ainsi soit l'une soit l'autre lecture, selon que l'une ou l'autre est plus propice à satisfaire la demande du destinataire en informativité, puisque (8) n'implique pas nécessairement que le locuteur communique que Marie ne sera pas contente si on ne va pas à la mer (mais à la montagne par exemple):

- (8) Si nous allons en vacances à la mer, Marie sera contente.

Dans tous ces cas, bien entendu, la difficulté consiste à établir ce qui tiendra pour communication explicite, ouvertement admise et prévisible par les deux parties comme engageant le locuteur, à partir d'une forme littérale soit elliptique soit sous-déterminée. Comme cet engagement ne s'attribue que i) par le recours au contexte et ii) comme le fruit d'un processus d'attribution de pertinence aux énoncés produits⁴, l'attribution d'un engagement à un locuteur est de nature contextuelle, pragmatique, automatique, et intuitive. A ce titre, le fait qu'un locuteur s'engage sur un contenu n'est pas prévisible sur la seule base du code. Ainsi, l'engagement n'est pas un fait objectif, c'est un fait éminemment psychologique et intersubjectif. Ce qui n'implique pas, nous insistons là-dessus, que l'analyste ne soit pas capable, par ses compétences de sujet parlant et la connaissance qu'il peut avoir au sujet du contexte, de poser une hypothèse fiable sur ces *commitment stores* qui assurent la discrimination entre des positions argumentatives ouvertes à la discussion, et d'autres qui y sont fermées puisque le locuteur ne s'engage pas à leur sujet. Pourtant, qu'elles soient ouvertes ou fermées dépend d'un degré de fiabilité de l'hypothèse au sujet de l'engagement du locuteur. Il faut donc un instrument de mesure de cette fiabilité. Notre hypothèse est que cet instrument de fiabilité s'applique non seulement aux contenus explicites mais aussi aux contenus implicites.

3. *Engagement et implicatures*

L'une des manières traditionnelles de distinguer les contenus explicites et implicites est de considérer que les explicatures sont des contenus à propos desquels le locuteur ne peut pas se rétracter sans produire une contradiction. Cela correspond à l'idée que les contenus explicites ou *explicatures* engagent *davantage* le locuteur que les implicatures. Toutefois, il ne s'agit là que d'une intuition, une conséquence, qui provient d'un principe plus fondamental: pour qu'une implicature soit considérée comme plausible par le destinataire, il est en effet nécessaire qu'elle s'accorde avec au moins une explicature préexistante logiquement (mais pas nécessairement temporellement, cf. Saussure (2005)). En cela, une implicature est une conséquence dépendant du contexte (puisqu'elle requiert l'importation d'une prémisse non dite) d'une explicature.

L'important est que si une implicature se perçoit comme *engageant le locuteur*, alors il existe une explicature, qui la précède logiquement, qui est en tant que telle perçue comme engageant le locuteur également, tandis que l'inverse n'est pas vrai. Toutefois, et c'est le deuxième point qui nous semble crucial, comme dans un tel cas l'implicature constitue l'objectif de la communication, et qu'elle est considérée par le destinataire comme prévisible par le locuteur (sans quoi le destinataire ne la dériverait pas), alors il est plus important pour le destinataire de considérer l'engagement du locuteur sur l'implicature, l'explicature n'étant que secondaire, en tant que simple instrument de

⁴ Rappelons que pour Sperber & Wilson, tout énoncé communique la présomption de sa pertinence optimale, laquelle consiste en un équilibre entre les effets informatifs dérivables lors de sa compréhension, et l'effort impliqué par la reconstruction de ces effets informatifs.

déclenchement du travail inférentiel. Cependant, et c'est là une nuance nécessaire, attribuer un engagement du locuteur à une implicature est une hypothèse plus risquée pour le destinataire que de l'attribuer à une explicature. Ce fait a donné lieu à la position classique, mais par erreur, car il n'implique pas que nous n'attribuions jamais d'engagement à un locuteur à propos d'une implicature. Il suffit pour s'en convaincre d'observer le simple fait qu'une rétractation sur certaines implicatures est interprétée comme relevant de la mauvaise foi la plus criante, et son auteur, s'il peut échapper à la preuve de son inconsistance, suscitera néanmoins la conviction de son insincérité. Il nous faut donc admettre que le critère de l'engagement reste celui du coût de la rétractabilité: inconsistance logique, ou inconsistance pragmatique, ainsi que nous souhaitons la nommer, celle-là même qui déclenche la conviction de la mauvaise foi. A nouveau, prenons un exemple. Prenons l'énoncé (9) dans le contexte où il est accessible au destinataire que le locuteur, son père, a des raisons de se plaindre des dépenses engendrées par son mariage:

(9) Il y a beaucoup de monde à ton mariage.

L'implicature (9') est alors anticipable:

(9') Il y a trop de monde à ton mariage.

Il s'agit bien d'une implicature, puisque (9') transforme et ne développe pas l'explicature (9) (qui se trouve en l'occurrence identique à la forme littérale). Or, dans le cas où le contexte favorisant une plainte au sujet des dépenses est très accessible, le destinataire ne peut que supposer que le locuteur s'attend à ce que (9') soit tirée, et il est ainsi amené à considérer que son père s'engage sur la plainte.

Que cette plainte soit rétractable formellement, puisque située en dehors d'un développement de la forme logique verbalisée, n'implique pas que le locuteur ne s'est pas engagé sur cette implicature. Ce sur quoi il ne s'est pas engagé, c'est sur sa volonté de confrontation directe: procéder avec un énoncé comme (9) pour entamer une discussion sur (9') permet, comme avec les actes de langage indirects et de nombreuses implicatures, de sonder l'acceptation par le destinataire d'un topique conversationnel qui pourrait menacer sa face. Si le fils se fâche et répond à son père qu'il ne devrait pas se plaindre pour des questions d'argent, le père pourra s'autoriser à se rétracter, mais cette rétractation n'en sera pas moins perçue comme étant de mauvaise foi. Le fait qu'elle soit ainsi perçue provient, suggérons-nous, du fait que *l'explicature sans l'implicature qu'elle a déclenchée se trouve très pauvre sur le plan de la pertinence*, se réduisant à une exclamation sur un fait plutôt banal, à savoir qu'il y a beaucoup de monde à une fête de mariage.

Au niveau des implicites, nous assistons ici à l'émergence d'une inconsistance pragmatique: le destinataire n'a pas de raisons de penser que le locuteur de (9) puisse entretenir (9) mais pas (9') dans les circonstances mutuellement manifestes, et surtout, il n'a pas de raisons de penser que, proférant (9) dans ces circonstances, il n'allait pas rendre (9') manifeste au destinataire. Ainsi, quelque chose comme [(9) et non-(9')] est

pragmatiquement, bien que non logiquement, inconsistant, car (9) sans (9') est dépourvu de pertinence et l'hypothèse que le locuteur s'engage sur (9) sans s'engager sur (9') est implausible. Le sentiment de mauvaise foi réside sur ce type d'inconsistances. Toutefois, l'hypothèse sur cet engagement est néanmoins pourvue d'un risque interprétatif, car il existe un risque d'erreur sur la sélection des prémisses, et (9) peut donner lieu à d'autres implicatures dans d'autres contextes, par exemple le contentement face à un grand nombre d'invités.

Il semble inutile de multiplier les exemples. Une réponse comme *j'ai mangé* en réponse à une invitation à dîner, sans que le locuteur annule explicitement l'implicature du refus de l'invitation (basée sur l'explicature *le locuteur a mangé récemment*), assortie de l'hypothèse très fortement entretenue que le locuteur a conscience dans les circonstances de la dérivation de cette implicature, amène inévitablement le destinataire à considérer que le locuteur s'engage sur le refus de l'invitation, pourtant implicite. Bien sûr il pourrait s'agir d'un cas de communication non coopérative: le locuteur pourrait faire de l'humour, mentir, être ironique; mais ces cas de figure jouent *précisément sur le fait que le destinataire attribuera de manière prévisible un engagement du locuteur sur l'implicature*. Nous devons encore mentionner deux types de problèmes.

Tout d'abord, il n'est pas toujours évident pour l'analyste de déterminer si les contenus qu'il observe sont du ressort de l'explicature (auquel cas leur dénégation entraînerait une inconsistance logique) ou de l'implicature (auquel cas leur dénégation entraînerait une inconsistance pragmatique, pour autant qu'elle ait un fort degré de saillance dans le contexte considéré). Les critères de développement de la forme logique ou d'indépendance propositionnelle de l'implicature ne sont pas systématiquement fiables, et c'est sans doute le plus gros problème de l'interface sémantique-pragmatique. Mais il existe des critères psychologiques expérimentaux qui montrent que certains contenus pragmatiques ne sont dérivables qu'à partir d'un certain seuil de développement; ce point est certainement le meilleur critère pour distinguer les contenus implicites des contenus explicites mais déjà pragmatiques (ceux dont la forme propositionnelle diffère du contenu verbalisé même lorsque celui-ci a une forme littérale). Nous pouvons les appeler *implicatures de haut niveau*: l'ironie ou la métaphore en font partie, mais aussi certaines formes de discours rapporté ou de pensée attribuée comme le style indirect libre (sans verbe introducteur). Les travaux de Noveck (2001) ou de Breheny, Katzos & Williams (2005), entre autres, le montrent (bien qu'ils produisent des explications sensiblement différentes des processus en jeu). On sait par exemple (Noveck 2001) qu'il faut qu'un enfant ait atteint l'âge de 6 à 8 ans pour dériver *pas tous* à partir du quantificateur *quelques*, alors qu'il semblerait *a priori* complètement automatique de dériver *quelques étudiants (ou un étudiant) ne sont pas venus à la soirée* à partir de *quelques étudiants sont venus à la soirée*. Mais une fois la compétence pragmatique acquise, et c'est cela qui nous importe, le contenu *pas tous* – qui sera donc une implicature – sera, en circonstances normales, une dérivation tellement attendue à partir de *quelques* qu'il est prédictible que le destinataire considérera que le locuteur de *quelques* s'engage sur *pas tous*.

4. Perspectives: l'analyste, le destinataire et le critère de pertinence

Le critère de non-rétractabilité ne peut être réduit à un critère uniquement logique mais doit être considéré du point de vue psychologique également. Pour ce qui concerne la rétractation sur des contenus explicites, elle entraîne une inconsistance logique, mais même ceci devrait, idéalement, être nuancé, puisqu'il existe des explicatures très dépendantes du contexte. Même les cas où une rétractation est contradictoire de manière logiquement dure, à savoir ceux où le contenu littéral est équivalent à la forme explicite, ne peuvent être considérés qu'en faisant abstraction de la saturation référentielle et d'éventuelles ambiguïtés fortes. Pour ce qui est de la rétractabilité sur les implicatures, réputées depuis Grice défaisables, donc rétractables sans contradiction logique, l'inconsistance sera pragmatique, pour autant qu'elle porte sur une implicature saillante dans les circonstances. L'inconsistance pragmatique procède d'une évaluation: le locuteur opérant une telle rétractation sera considéré comme non-coopératif, ou de mauvaise foi, à moins qu'il ne reconnaisse explicitement qu'il a produit une erreur de formulation, de distraction, etc.

Comme nous défendons un point de vue psychologique – cognitif – sur l'attribution des engagements du locuteur, nous rejetons le point de vue qui voudrait que l'analyste puisse statuer sur ces *stocks d'engagement* sans recours à une dimension psychologique. Ainsi, il nous semble qu'une machine purement sémantique ne serait pas même capable d'attribuer des engagements avec fiabilité aux contenus dont la forme littérale équivaut à la forme propositionnelle explicite: il est en effet impératif que le traitement de l'information soit capable d'évaluer si cette forme littérale est susceptible d'atteindre les objectifs d'informativité requis dans un échange donné, selon un contexte spécifiable (sinon, que faire de l'ironie, des métaphores, et des innombrables cas de tautologie enrichie?). Or l'analyste n'est pas une machine sémantique, c'est un organisme à compétence pragmatique. Faisant œuvre de cette compétence – qui consiste à opérer les contextualisations nécessaires à la dérivation d'un sens dont il est plausible qu'il corresponde à l'intention informative du locuteur, l'analyste agit comme un destinataire générique. La formation d'une hypothèse sur l'intention informative du locuteur est réglée, selon Sperber & Wilson (1995), par un principe d'équilibre entre le caractère informatif de l'information obtenue et l'effort mental requis pour l'obtenir (*principe de pertinence*), l'échelle d'accessibilité de telles hypothèses étant à son tour guidée par une aptitude mentale humaine métareprésentationnelle (Sperber 2000). Cette aptitude nous permet de nous représenter les hypothèses et processus mentaux accomplis par d'autres, et repose sur la psychologie intuitive (théorie de l'esprit, empathie ou *mind-reading module* selon les traditions). Cette aptitude permet à l'analyste de se mettre à la place du destinataire pour dériver les différents engagements raisonnablement, ou naturellement, attribuables au locuteur. L'analyste est un destinataire qui peut être handicapé lorsque l'échange implique des contextes *ad hoc*, connus et partagés par une partie des seuls interlocuteurs. Mais à l'inverse, l'analyste dispose du temps nécessaire à une évaluation *offline*, et d'un savoir spécifique. Ainsi, son évaluation ne concernera pas des

stocks d'engagement objectifs mais psychologiques.

Nous voudrions maintenant formuler une hypothèse centrale en suggérant que plus un contenu est pertinent, plus il est raisonnable d'attribuer ce contenu comme engageant le locuteur. Un contenu optimalement pertinent a plus de chances d'être celui intentionné par le locuteur et donc est plus susceptible d'être considéré par le destinataire comme une position engageant le locuteur, qu'un contenu moins pertinent. Une telle attribution d'engagement repose également, bien entendu, sur le caractère plausible⁵ de l'engagement du locuteur sur le contenu considéré. Nous suggérons, ainsi:

Plus une information P obtenue sur la base de l'énoncé U est optimalement pertinente, et plus le destinataire a de raisons de penser que le locuteur pouvait s'attendre à ce que P soit dérivée de U, et plus l'attribution par le destinataire d'un engagement sur P au locuteur est motivée.

Il reste à dire un mot des implicatures douteuses, celles pour lesquelles on ne dispose pas de suffisamment d'éléments pour décider si elles sont intentionnées ou non: elles sont inférables, mais elles ne satisfont pas aux exigences que nous avons évoquées, puisque le destinataire n'est pas en mesure d'assurer que le locuteur s'attend à ce qu'elles soient dérivées. Ce cas n'est pas, à notre avis, le cas naturel de l'interaction communicative, puisque le locuteur ne produit pas là de garanties formelles suffisantes pour assurer la communication de ces informations dans le contexte. Des menaces voilées, des incitations subtiles, peuvent ainsi se produire, mais elles ne peuvent que laisser place au doute et donc exclure l'engagement du locuteur. Ainsi, seules les implicatures claires, du type de celles qui impliquent une perte significative de pertinence si elles ne sont pas tirées, tout en étant plausibles, entreront parmi celles qui donnent lieu à l'attribution d'un engagement du locuteur.

Il y a d'autres cas épineux, qui concernent i) l'enchâssement d'engagements dans le discours rapporté, et ii) les expressifs; nous avons abordé spécifiquement ces questions ailleurs (Morency, Oswald & Saussure à paraître). Nous laissons ici de côté le cas des implicatures dites «faiblement communiquées» (Sperber & Wilson 1995) car elles ne sont pas comptabilisées comme intentionnées par le locuteur.

De cet article, il ressort aussi que l'identification d'arguments sophistiques comme celui de l'homme de paille, ainsi que l'explication des mécanismes qui président à son existence même, doit pouvoir reposer sur la prise en compte des procédures pragmatiques qui conduisent à la genèse, chez le destinataire, d'hypothèses au sujet des contenus sur lesquels un locuteur s'engage. L'étude des mécanismes de construction du sens doit, de manière générale, occuper une place significative dans l'étude de l'argumentation.

⁵ La plausibilité est une question que nous ne pouvons traiter ici, faute d'espace. Nous postulons toutefois qu'elle est une condition de la pertinence.

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RASSEGNA DI LINGUISTICA GENERALE

A CURA DI MARIO BAGGIO E MARIA CRISTINA GATTI

FRANS H. VAN EEMEREN ed., *Važnejšie koncepcii teorii argumentacii/Crucial Concepts in Argumentation Theory*, Filologičeskij Fakultet Sankt-Peterburskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta, Sankt-Peterburg 2006, pp. 296

Dopo la pubblicazione nel 1992 di *Argumentacija, komunikacija i ošibki*, traduzione dell'opera di Frans van Eemeren e Rob Grootendorst *Argumentation, Communication and Fallacies: a Pragma-dialectical Perspective*, seguita nel 1994 da *Rečevye akty v argumentativnych diskussjach* e nel 2002 da *Argumentacija: analiz, proverka, predstavlenie* – rese traduttive rispettivamente dell'opera di van Eemeren e Grootendorst *Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions: a Theoretical Model for the Analysis of Discussions towards Solving Conflicts of Opinion* nonché del manuale di van Eemeren, Grootendorst e Snoeck Henkemans *Argumentation. Analysis, Evaluation, Presentation* – è possibile accostarsi in lingua russa a un ulteriore segmento della produzione scientifica degli studiosi di argomentazione della Scuola di Amsterdam.

La teoria dell'argomentazione in Russia è una scienza relativamente recente. Attraverso una serie di contributi a più voci, gli studiosi di argomentazione del *Department of Speech Communication, Argumentation Theory and Rhetoric* dell'Università di Amsterdam presentano al lettore russo le tematiche più rilevanti al centro della teoria dell'argomentazione e i principali approcci avanzati in proposito.

Aprè il volume il contributo di Frans van Eemeren *Sovremennoe sostojanie teorii argumentacii* (pp. 14-33) sullo stato attuale della teoria dell'argomentazione. Qui l'Autore prende le mosse da una sintetica ma esaustiva presentazione di alcuni dei principali orientamenti teorici che si sono susseguiti nella

storia di questa disciplina, dal modello di Toulmin, sviluppato negli anni '50, ai movimenti dell'informal logic' o dell'argumentativisme radical' di Ducrot e Anscombe degli anni '70, fino agli orientamenti dialettici e retorici contemporanei, come ad esempio l'approccio di van Eemeren e Grootendorst alla 'critical discussion', nel quale la dimensione pragma-dialettica trova una feconda integrazione con quella retorica, grazie al processo dello 'strategic manoeuvring'.

L'Autore procede poi alla presentazione di alcune nozioni chiave al centro del dibattito contemporaneo, prese in esame in ciascuno dei capitoli successivi. Dalla caratterizzazione del concetto di punto di vista, preso in esame da Peter Houtlosser nel secondo capitolo (*Točki srenija*, pp. 34-63), si passa a una analisi delle premesse inesprese, svolta da Susanne Gerritsen nel terzo capitolo (*Nevyražennye posylki*, pp. 64-98), seguita dalla caratterizzazione delle nozioni di schema argomentativo, da parte di Bart Garsen nel quarto capitolo (*Schemy argumentacii*, pp. 99-122) e di struttura argomentativa nel quinto capitolo (*Strukury argumentacii*, pp. 123-161), ad opera di Franciska Snoeck Henkemans.

Un ricco *status quaestionis* della riflessione sulle fallacie dall'antichità ai giorni nostri viene proposto da van Eemeren nel sesto capitolo (*Ošibki v argumentacii*, pp. 162-197). Alla attività di interpretazione e ricostruzione degli argomenti è dedicato il capitolo settimo (*Interpretacija i rekonstrukcija argumentacii*, pp. 198-238), redatto da Agnès van Rees. Segue, infine, nell'ottavo e ultimo capitolo (*Argumentacija v oblasti prava*, pp. 239-268) una accurata ricostruzione degli innumerevoli studi sull'argomentazione in ambito giuridico, ad opera di Eveline Feteris.

Non si possono non menzionare i prezio-

si apparati bibliografici a chiusura di ciascun capitolo, con l'indicazione delle più importanti fonti per un ulteriore approfondimento delle tematiche trattate.

Chiude il volume un prezioso *Ukazatel' terminov* (pp. 276-293), contenente la terminologia russa utilizzata nel volume, seguita da quella originale in inglese. Questo ricco apparato terminologico documenta l'intensa attività lessicologica svolta dai traduttori, che si sono trovati a dover creare gran parte della categorialità linguistica necessaria per la traduzione in russo del lessico dell'argomentazione.

Maria Cristina Gatti

KONSTANZE JUNGBLUTH, *Pragmatik der Demonstrativpronomina in den iberoromanischen Sprachen*, Max Niemeyer, Tübingen 2005 (Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für Romanische Philologie, 329), pp. 256

La monografia, ampia per la documentazione e caratterizzata da saldo impianto metodologico, presenta una teoria generale della deissi, che viene applicata nella descrizione dei pronomi dimostrativi usati per riferirsi alla persona. Le lingue considerate sono lo spagnolo, il catalano e il portoghese brasiliano. Nella parte teorica, esposta nel capitolo primo, il fenomeno della deissi è considerato alla luce della tradizione di studi avviati da Karl Bühler e sviluppati da Konrad Ehlich. Peraltro, l'Autrice è attenta alle implicanze che la diversità del genere testuale può avere per il funzionamento dei deittici. A questo proposito, ella riprende la tematica delle *Diskursstraditionen* cara a Eugenio Coseriu.

Per l'aspetto applicativo, si considerano i tre pronomi dimostrativi *este/esta/esto, ese/esa/eso* e *aque/aquella/aquello* dello spagnolo (cap. 2), *aquest/aquesta, aixó, aquell/aquella/alló* del catalano (cap. 3), *este/esta/isto, esse/essa/isso, aquele/aquela/aquilo* del portoghese brasiliano (capitolo 4). Dopo un'analisi formale, attenta alle variazioni diatopiche e diastratiche, si considera l'uso dei pronomi nella deissi spaziale e temporale sia nella comunicazione *face-to-face* sia in altre situazioni

comunicative, nei quali emerge il ruolo della deissi testuale e della *Deixis am Phantasma*. Un aspetto innovativo dell'analisi consiste nel rilievo dato alla *Hörer-Deixis* ("deixis de l'allocutaire" nella terminologia francese).

Termina la monografia un saggio di analisi comparativa delle descrizioni svolte per le tre lingue iberoromanze. Al termine, si tenta una prima, provvisoria comparazione con i sistemi del finnico e del giapponese, caratterizzati anch'essi da tre pronomi dimostrativi. Forse un confronto con l'italiano, lingua romanza dotata di sistema tripolare, sarebbe stato più pertinente. Per la rilevanza scientifica della ricerca sarebbe opportuno integrare la descrizione con i dati del portoghese lusitano e, per l'aspetto storico-linguistico, con i documenti ladini delle comunità sefardite.

Giovanni Gobber

CLAUDIA CAFFI, *Mitigation*, Elsevier, Amsterdam 2007, (Studies in Pragmatics 4), pp. 342

In questo bel volume Claudia Caffi riprende approfondendolo il suo ricco contributo sul tema della mitigazione pubblicato nel 2001 (*La mitigazione. Un approccio pragmatico alla comunicazione nei contesti terapeutici*, LIT, Münster).

In particolare, l'Autrice si impegna a ricostruire un dialogo molto ampio con le tradizioni di studio pertinenti per lo studio dei fenomeni linguistici connessi alla mitigazione: a tale obiettivo sono dedicati i primi due capitoli dell'opera. Viene studiato pertanto il tema del "soggetto" e della "soggettività", partendo da Benveniste, ma tornando poi a Bühler per allargare la prospettiva alla lettura psico-pedagogica di Piaget. A ritmo serrato, vengono passati in rassegna numerosi studiosi di diverso orientamento, da Lyons ad Auer passando per Gumperz, Sbisà e molti altri, per approdare a una prima definizione del fenomeno in oggetto: *mitigation* è, sulla scorta della tradizione retorica classica della *mitigatio* (*deminutio* o *imminutio*), "understatement", "Abschwächung", "downgrading". Il secondo capitolo esamina la prospettiva

pragmatica a partire da Austin fino ai suoi sviluppi più recenti, per individuare i contributi relativi ai fenomeni linguistici che manifestano la modulazione mitigata: l'Autrice circoscrive attraverso tale percorso la scoperta degli indicatori "di sistema" che gestiscono (anche) la *politeness*. Emergono dunque le "siepi" con Brown e Levinson e poi con Lakoff, l'indirettezza (a partire da Fraser, ma poi Leech ecc.) e gli "schermi" (di nuovo Brown e Levinson). Caffi ricostruisce inoltre lo studio del fenomeno dell'*intensità* espressiva, anch'essa collegata con il tema della mitigazione. Conclude questo secondo capitolo una descrizione assai ampliata del fenomeno, che tiene conto della "naturalità" della modulazione e pertanto di una oggettiva difficoltà a cogliere, nella realtà dell'osservazione, ciò che riguarda l'illocuzione da ciò che dipende da effetti di mitigazione o ancora da scelte stilistiche o ancora dal contenuto stesso del messaggio. Una posizione dunque più sfumata rispetto a quella del 2001.

A partire da questa base storico-critica la Caffi sviluppa, nei quattro capitoli successivi, le sue osservazioni sulle strategie linguistiche della mitigazione, mettendole in rapporto con gli studi relativi al coinvolgimento emotivo. L'applicazione delle osservazioni svolte in sede teorica a un considerevole *corpus* di interazioni medico-paziente permette all'autrice di analizzare una cospicua quantità di dati empirici, dando un contributo importante alla conoscenza delle specificità verbali che caratterizzano i contesti "mitigati".

Sara Cigada

VALERIA DELLA VALLE – PIETRO TRIFONE ed., *Studi linguistici per Luca Serianni*, Salerno Editrice, Roma 2007, pp. 665

Valeria Della Valle e Pietro Trifone sono i curatori di questa miscellanea che raccoglie gli studi offerti a Luca Serianni dai suoi allievi per il suo sessantesimo compleanno. Il volume si apre con la bibliografia delle opere di Serianni dal 1972 al 2007 e con l'elenco degli studenti laureati con lui dal 1982 a oggi: sin dalle prime pagine risulta così evidente come l'imponente produzione scienti-

fica dello studioso – la cui rilevanza è universalmente nota – e il suo costante impegno didattico siano caratterizzati da una notevole ampiezza di interessi di ricerca.

La vastità e la ricchezza degli interessi scientifici dello studioso si riflette poi nella varietà di temi e di approcci metodologici dei 45 saggi raccolti nel volume, che investono numerosi campi di ricerca, come la filologia italiana, la storia della lingua italiana, la linguistica italiana e la didattica dell'italiano.

In questa sede dobbiamo limitarci a rendere conto soltanto degli interventi di carattere specificamente linguistico, che trattano argomenti di linguistica italiana o di storia della lingua, pur sapendo di tralasciare dalla menzione numerosi lavori altrettanto degni di interesse e affidando dunque al lettore il compito di colmare questa lacuna.

Alcuni studi linguistici si collocano in una prospettiva diacronica. Ne diamo una sintetica presentazione seguendo un criterio di ordine alfabetico, diversamente dall'ordine cronologico, secondo la data di laurea di ogni allievo, adottato nella miscellanea: Giuseppe Patota analizza gli usi della preposizione *per* considerandone la funzione agentiva attestata nell'italiano antico; Giancarlo Schirru, esaminando un fenomeno di mutamento fonologico, quale il dileguo di consonante in contesto vocalico, discute la classificazione delle proprietà distintive di vocali e consonanti dell'italiano; Francesco Sestito ripercorre la storia delle forme verbali *tollere* e *vollere* come varianti di *togliere* e *volgere*; Stefano Telve indaga la possibile alternanza degli ausiliari *essere* e *avere* con i verbi modali *potere* e *volere* seguiti da infiniti di verbi inacusativi, sottoponendo le osservazioni dei grammatici a un riscontro con le occorrenze d'uso rilevate in un *corpus* di testi che coprono cronologicamente la storia dell'italiano dal periodo due-trecentesco al Novecento.

Segnaliamo poi una serie di contributi che affrontano tematiche linguistiche di varia natura:

Gianluca Biasci analizza il trattamento dei problemi di pronuncia in manuali operativi per logopedisti, focalizzando l'attenzione su

due opposizioni fonologiche “critiche” del sistema italiano, l’opposizione tra la costrittiva alveolare sorda e sonora (/s/ e /z/) e l’opposizione tra l’affricata alveolare corrispondente sorda e sonora (/ts/ e /dz/); Rosarita Digregorio esamina la terminologia della biblioteconomia, segnalando l’ingresso di numerosi neologismi in questo settore; Cristina Faloci propone alcune considerazioni sulla terminologia della psicoanalisi, riflettendo sui problemi traduttivi emersi nella recente revisione della traduzione italiana del *Freud* di Stefan Zweig; Vincenzo Faraoni presenta un’analisi a livello linguistico e testuale di un *corpus* di messaggi tratti da un forum interattivo presente nel sito web del partito di Alleanza Nazionale; Riccardo Gualdo prende in esame il fenomeno dell’interferenza lessicale, considerando l’influsso angloamericano sull’uso dell’aggettivo *ironico*, appartenente al lessico comune, e sull’uso scientifico-giuridico degli aggettivi *sensibile* e *ragionevole*; Marco Lanzarone analizza la terminologia della pianificazione pubblicitaria, in cui rileva la forte presenza di prestiti non adattati e un generale atteggiamento di freno nei confronti del processo di adattamento, volto a evitare l’uso di possibili tradimenti, che risulterebbero di uso troppo comune, e a mantenere così l’alto tasso di tecnicismo del settore; Lucilla Pizzoli delinea il percorso storico intrapreso dalla legislazione in materia linguistica per gli italiani all’estero dalla fine dell’Ottocento a oggi; Danilo Poggioli, a partire dall’analisi di un *corpus* di testi di critica letteraria, esamina le diverse soluzioni adottate nello scritto dell’italiano contemporaneo in relazione a due tipi di accordo dell’aggettivo, l’accordo con nomi coordinati e quello con uno o più nomi in presenza di composti aggettivali; Lucia Raffaelli propone alcune riflessioni sul linguaggio giornalistico contemporaneo, considerando l’uso dell’interpunzione e le caratteristiche sintattiche dei titoli dei quotidiani; Alessio Ricci dedica il suo contributo alla scrittura degli studenti universitari, mettendo in luce gli aspetti critici in relazione ai diversi livelli linguistici; Francesco Zardo

documenta la presenza consistente di marchio-nimi nella lingua italiana, offrendo un aggiornamento dello spoglio lessicografico da lui condotto nel ‘94 e ora messo a confronto con dizionari di recente pubblicazione e con dizionari di neologismi.

Silvia Gilardoni

ELISABETTA FAZZINI – ELEONORA CIANCI ed., *I Germani e la scrittura*. Atti del XXXIII Convegno dell’Associazione Italiana di Filologia germanica, Pescara, 7-9 giugno 2006, Edizioni Dell’Orso, Alessandria 2007, pp. 242.

Il volume si apre con un’approfondita presentazione di Fabrizio Raschellà il quale nota che la scrittura rappresenta per vari aspetti un confine e un passaggio tra realtà diverse: essa è strumento primario di trasmissione e di conservazione della memoria; per mezzo della scrittura i popoli possono rendersi consapevoli e diventare protagonisti della propria storia e delle proprie tradizioni. I Germani cominciarono a usare la scrittura agli inizi dell’era cristiana con un alfabeto in origine desunto da popolazioni italiche, stanziato nelle zone alpine di frontiera, e rielaborato in modo originale. Tale alfabeto oggi è chiamato runico o *futhark* (*fupark* nome desunto dalle prime sei lettere); era usato per brevi iscrizioni commemorative o dedicatorie, talora di carattere rituale. Queste iscrizioni spesso presentano solo il nome del committente o dello scrivano e si trovano su oggetti diversi, il cui materiale è osso, metallo, legno, pietra. Poi, in seguito alla conversione al cristianesimo di vari popoli germanici, l’alfabeto runico viene sostituito dagli alfabeti usati dai popoli cristiani; i Visigoti adottarono l’alfabeto greco, gli altri popoli usarono l’alfabeto latino. L’alfabeto runico tuttavia fu ancora usato nella penisola scandinava come scrittura epigrafica, raramente applicata alla pergamena.

Nel volume sono compresi i tredici interventi presentati al Convegno. Nicoletta Francovich Onesti (pp. 1-12) presenta le interferenze latine nella scrittura gotica, fondata sull’alfabeto creato nel IV secolo dal vescovo

visigoto Vulfila guida dei *Gothi minores* della Mesia, che si basò sui modelli greco, latino e runico. La Francovich Onesti cerca di dimostrare come nel VI secolo i contatti col latino scritto e parlato abbiano portato dei mutamenti nell'ortografia gotica; tuttavia secondo la studiosa alcune innovazioni grafiche sono dovute ad evoluzione spontanea della fonologia gotica.

Alessandro Zironi (pp. 13-38) studia lo sviluppo della scrittura gotica in età carolingia, esaminando in particolare il caso dei *Gotica Vindobonensia*, soffermandosi sul ms. 795 della Österreichische Nationalbibliothek di Vienna, che contiene anche lettere di Alcuino inviate a diversi destinatari tra cui Arno arcivescovo di Salisburgo. I ff. 21r-191v presentano scritti esegetici anche sulle lettere di S. Paolo e su scritti di autori del periodo tardo antico (ff. 21r-148v); si trovano anche alcuni commenti di Alcuino (ff. 148v-150v.) e lettere di Alcuino a vari destinatari (ff. 150v-183v). I ff. 192r-205r furono uniti più tardi al ms. e presentano lettere di Alcuino ad Arno (ff. 192r-197v), lettere di Angiberto abate di Saint-Riquier ad Arno (ff. 197v-199r), un frammento poetico di Alcuino diretto al discepolo Candidus (ff. 199r-199v), una lettera di Carlo Magno ad Alcuino databile al marzo 790 (ff. 200r-203v). Molto importanti dal punto di vista della storia della scrittura sono i fogli 1r-20v, ff. 5r-18v Alcuino, *Ortographia*, ff. 19r-19v alfabeto greco con pronuncia; f 20r alfabeto runico con valore fonetico, 16 lettere dell'alfabeto gotico, una lettera gotica isolata. Il *folio 20v* presenta due alfabeti gotici con i nomi delle lettere, brevi testi gotici, regole di pronuncia del gotico. Il ms. *Vindobonensis 795* si inserisce in una poliedrica attività che dà origine alla rinascenza carolingia aperta a vari orizzonti: gusto alfabetico, studi grammaticali, istanze politiche. Secondo Zironi, l'interesse per il gotico nel periodo carolingio potrebbe essere dovuto all'opera del grammatico Smaragdo e al poeta teologo Teodolfo d'Orleans.

Elvira Glaser (pp. 39-50) analizza la prassi glossografica altotedesca antica, presentando una sintesi delle cosiddette "glosse a sec-

co" (cioè glosse incise sulla pergamena con la punta dello stilo priva d'inchiostro) frequenti nella glossografia tedesca medievale, di cui sono il nucleo più antico (metà VIII secolo). L'Autrice mette anche in evidenza la connessione tra glosse a secco e glosse crittografiche, eseguite dando alle lettere valori diversi da quelli tradizionali. Eleonora Cianci (pp. 51-67) si occupa delle modalità di annotazione degli incantesimi nei mss. medievali di area tedesca e cerca di spiegare la collocazione (spesso problematica) all'interno dei mss. in cui si trovano. In genere questi mss. sono miscellanei e si possono suddividere in raccolte di scritti religiosi e in raccolte di argomento medico. L'analisi della studiosa si basa sullo studio di 32 mss. esaminati con profonda competenza. Simona Leonardi (pp. 69-94) studia il verbo *scriban-schriben* dalle origini alla prima età moderna. Il tema studiato riguarda il fenomeno della scrittura in prospettiva pragmatica e contrastiva: latino volgare e tedesco in fase evolutiva a confronto. La studiosa rileva che *scriban* riguardava l'insieme globale attinente alla scrittura, nel periodo tardomedievale e protomoderno *scriben* riguarda l'azione materiale dello scrivere, mentre *tichten* indica l'azione intellettuale del comporre. Concetta Sipione (pp. 95-112) studia i problemi della *lingua theodisca* in rapporto a Otfrid di Weissenburg che condusse uno dei primi tentativi di normalizzazione ortografica della lingua tedesca. Sono riflessioni del monaco e poeta francone Otfrid, presenti nella lettera con cui Otfrid presenta la sua versione dei Vangeli in versi tedeschi a Liutberto arcivescovo di Magonza. L'Autrice studia in particolare i passi in cui alcuni suoni della lingua materna di Otfrid sono resi in alfabeto latino. Valeria Di Clemente (pp. 113-125) studia il *Prüller Kräuterbuch*, esaminando gli aspetti paleografici e grafemati nel ms. Clm 536 della Bayerische Staatsbibliothek di Monaco di Baviera, formato da vari fascicoli rilegati insieme del periodo compreso tra la fine dell'XI secolo e la seconda metà del XII secolo con inserti del XIII secolo. Il ms. era in origine conservato nel monastero di Prüll presso Ratisbona. I

testi perlopiù latini ma anche tedeschi sono vari: teologici, naturalistici, sapienziali; alcuni presentano *visiones* e scongiuri. Il testo esaminato dalla studiosa è un erbario latino-bavarese dell'XI-XII secolo. Sono messe in evidenza le due mani a cui si deve la stesura del testo, il cui sistema fonologico è reso da un'evidente instabilità grafica dovuta anche al periodo di transizione dalla fase antica alla fase media dell'altotedesco. Maria Giovanna Arcamone (pp. 127-139) presenta le problematiche delle iscrizioni runiche d'Italia, studiando le iscrizioni runiche trovate nel santuario di San Michele a Monte Sant'Angelo sul Gargano e in alcune catacombe romane: si tratta di otto testi, dal punto di vista linguistico di area anglosassone (VII-VIII secolo). La studiosa presenta qualche rettifica ai testi, esaminandone i problemi linguistici e onomastici. Seguono le riproduzioni delle iscrizioni (pp. 140-149). Giulio Garuti Simone (pp. 151-160) analizza l'alfabeto runico di Modena, approfondendo le equivalenze alfabetiche runico-latine che si trovano nel ms. O.1.11 dell'Archivio Capitolare di Modena (inizi IX secolo). L'alfabeto runico è preceduto dalla presentazione dell'alfabeto greco. Carla Del Zotto (pp. 161-186) studia le rune fra magia e scrittura nella letteratura medievale. L'Autrice percorre il cammino della scrittura runica dalle più antiche iscrizioni, alcune delle quali si riferiscono a pratiche magiche, ai poemetti runici del tardo medioevo nordico, poemetti nei quali sono usate anche le rune come grafemi integranti l'alfabeto latino. La studiosa evidenzia anche l'uso di alfabeti runici in mss. latini medievali. Marco Battaglia (pp. 187-208) studia la scrittura come mezzo di appartenenza a una comunità etnica, soffermandosi in particolare su iscrizioni votive contenenti nomi di divinità pagane, trovate in luoghi di insediamento romano-barbarico nei primi tre secoli del periodo cristiano. Antonietta Amati e Lucia Sinisi (pp. 209-227) si occupano dell'identità culturale latino-longobarda in Puglia e in particolare in Terra di Bari (VIII-XII secolo), identità evidenziata anche mediante la scrittura "langobardisca" o beneven-

tana nella variante nota come "Bari type".

Il volume si chiude con un contributo di Fabrizio Raschellà (pp. 229-240), il quale rileva che manca un approccio comparativo nell'analisi dei sistemi di scrittura usati nelle lingue germaniche.

Il problema resta aperto. Nell'insieme dei lavori raccolti nel volume è evidenziata la funzione storica e culturale della scrittura nel complesso contesto delle manifestazioni della creatività umana che, come rileva F. Raschellà, "concorrono a definire l'identità dei popoli e il suo mutare nel tempo e nello spazio".

Celestina Milani

SIMONA MESSINA, *Between the real and the unreal. The mimesis of Italian speech in TV series*, "Linguisticae Investigationes", 30, 2007, 2, pp. 261-290

L'Autrice elabora uno studio su alcuni aspetti dell'italiano basandosi sul linguaggio "trasmesso" delle serie televisive. A tal fine, l'Autrice prende in considerazione la *family fiction*, ossia quei cicli di episodi che narrano la vita quotidiana di una famiglia o di un gruppo di famiglie alle prese con avvenimenti più o meno significativi. Questo tipo di prodotto attinge per lo più al repertorio dell'italiano colloquiale, nel tentativo di ricreare per imitazione un certo contesto linguistico.

Il corpus SLFF (*spoken language in family fiction*), analizzato nella ricerca, è tratto da due serie prodotte dalla RAI rispettivamente nel 1968 e nel 1988: *La famiglia Benvenuti* e *Un medico in famiglia*. Oggetto dell'analisi è l'imitazione della lingua parlata nel processo globale di messa in scena di uno stralcio di vita quotidiana.

Per dare corso alla ricerca, l'Autrice individua alcuni fenomeni linguistici particolarmente significativi nel discorso spontaneo in italiano, quali il registro, le espressioni idiomatiche, l'uso polivalente del *che*, i meccanismi di focalizzazione, e ne analizza le occorrenze nei copioni delle serie considerate. Risultati differenti quanto a incidenza, distribuzione e morfologia dei suddetti meccanismi linguistici paiono suggerire che la serie televisiva del 1968 mostri una maggiore at-

tenzione all'appropriatezza del linguaggio, tanto da proporre non di rado nei dialoghi note metalinguistiche – talvolta anche a carattere prescrittivo –, a scapito dell'efficacia mimetica. La serie più recente mostra invece un'attitudine realista più spiccata; in essa l'uso di un registro informale medio-basso, che spesso indulge in espressioni volgari, produce un'imitazione più fedele del discorso colloquiale.

Al di là degli esiti raggiunti la ricerca pare particolarmente interessante in quanto rappresenta un tentativo di legittimazione e promozione del mezzo televisivo come fonte di materiale linguistico da analizzare. L'Autrice considera i prodotti televisivi come una risorsa di primaria importanza per lo studio del linguaggio, in quanto essi forniscono esempi di lingua parlata in una cornice temporale definita e rendono possibile, attraverso l'archiviazione digitale e cartacea, l'accesso ricorsivo ai dati, consentendo allo studioso anche la possibilità di istituire confronti dia-cronici tra stati successivi di una lingua.

In questa cornice di studio va tuttavia tenuto in considerazione lo *status* particolare dei copioni di serie televisive come quelle oggetto della ricerca descritta, che non sono esempi di lingua "viva", bensì tentativi di imitazione del parlato reale, in forma scritta.

Chiara Beccalossi

SILVIA DAL NEGRO – WILCO LENSINK – CHRISTIAN UPMEIER – PAOLO VOLONTÉ, *Visual communication in a multilingual context*, "Zeitschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Linguistik", 148, 2007, pp. 113-131

L'articolo presenta i primi risultati di un *work in progress* a carattere interdisciplinare condotto da un team dell'università di Bolzano. Argomento della ricerca è la comunicazione visuale, intesa come processo di trasmissione di messaggi mediante l'interazione di elementi iconici e simbolici, e il suo ruolo di modificatore dello spazio urbano. Attingendo alla cornice teorica dei modelli inferenziali della comunicazione, e, soprattutto, agli sviluppi apportati dalla teoria della pertinen-

za, gli Autori sottolineano come i supporti di messaggi a carattere visuale (quali segnali, manifesti, ecc.) non si traducano sempre e comunque in atti comunicativi. Comunicare, infatti, non significa trasmettere un messaggio, bensì trasformare la realtà per far sì che altri producano atti significativi conformi alle nostre aspettative.

La ricerca sul campo ha luogo – in questo caso – all'autostazione di Bolzano, un contesto multilingue che presenta un elevato livello di complessità. I ricercatori prendono in particolare considerazione gli avvisi a carattere pubblico-istituzionale, redatti nella maggioranza dei casi, secondo le norme vigenti, parallelamente in italiano e in tedesco, ove, peraltro, l'impiego di elementi iconici (disegni esplicativi e ausili grafici in genere) pare scarso (un caso, sugli otto analizzati). A questo proposito, essi notano come la leggibilità dei messaggi bilingui venga significativamente compromessa dalla scarsa distinzione tra le lingue impiegate, quanto a impostazione fisica dei messaggi e agli accorgimenti tipografici in essi adottati. Gli Autori propongono esempi di come la differenziazione tipografica può favorire in misura considerevole la comunicazione, ma si spingono oltre, proponendo un maggiore ricorso a una seconda modalità di realizzazione di messaggi destinati a un pubblico multilingue, ottenibile con un maggiore e più consapevole impiego contestuale di strumenti iconici e tipografici.

Chiara Beccalossi

PAOLA PIETRANDREA, *The grammatical nature of some epistemic-evidential adverbs in spoken Italian*, "Italian Journal of Linguistics", XIX, 2007, 1, pp. 39-63.

L'articolo è contenuto in un numero monografico della rivista, curato da M. Squartini, dedicato al concetto di evidenzialità, ovvero a quella categoria che permette al parlante di segnalare la fonte dell'informazione o il modo in cui è venuto a conoscenza del contenuto proposizionale. In termini più generali, la categoria dell'evidenzialità rientra tra gli strumenti linguistici che permettono al par-

lante di indicare l'evidenza di cui dispone (inferenza, discorso altrui, percezione sensoriale) per asserire la verità di una proposizione.

Il crescente interesse intorno a questa nozione e alle marche che la manifestano ha reso centrale il dibattito sulla natura grammaticale o lessicale di tali marche evidenziali, individuando a questo riguardo lingue a base grammaticale e lingue a base lessicale.

L'interazione tra evidenziale ed epistemico e tra grammaticale e lessicale è analizzata da Pietrandrea che rivisita il sistema epistemico-evidenziale dell'italiano integrando la categoria grammaticale dei verbi epistemici (*futuro epistemico, dovere e potere*) con quella lessicale degli avverbi (*forse, magari*) e delle costruzioni avverbiali modalizzanti (*secondo me, si vede, dice che* contrapposta a *dice*).

Sulla base dell'analisi condotta l'Autrice conclude che in italiano gli evidenziali lessicali e quelli grammaticali non costituiscono due paradigmi in opposizione bensì in stretta relazione, tanto che gli avverbi epistemici analizzati potrebbero essere considerati come forme debolmente grammaticalizzate, piuttosto che come forme totalmente lessicali, poiché formano una classe chiusa di opzioni omogenee e complementari e mostrano una ridotta mobilità sintattica associata a particolari configurazioni discorsive.

Maria Paola Tenchini

RASSEGNA DI GLOTTODIDATTICA

A CURA DI BONA CAMBIAGHI

CLARA MONTELLA – GIANCARLO MARCHESINI ed., *I saperi del tradurre*, Franco Angeli, Milano 2007, pp. 281

Sulla “traduzione” luogo di riflessione per eccellenza negli studi di linguistica, quinta abilità in quelli di glottodidattica, è apparso questo volume che si deve all'École de Translation et d'Interprétation dell'Université de Genève, e all'Università degli Studi di Napoli, “L'Orientale”.

Diamo conto brevemente di tutti i contributi ivi contenuti.

Clara Montella, *Le nozioni di significato e di senso in traduttologia tra storia, teorie e applicazioni* pp. 11-44. Le nozioni di “significato” e di “senso” si possono far risalire a Schleiermacher, che fonda, secondo l'A., una ermeneutica della traduzione. Il teorico più citato nel saggio è Coseriu, cui l'A. collega il pensiero di Hagège presentato nella “teoria dei tre punti di vista”, a) cioè la zona del “senso come rappresentazione-descrizione”, b) cioè la zona del “senso come effetto” e c) cioè la zona “delle significanze inconscie”. Il paragrafo 2, relativo a significato e senso come “termini” nella didattica della traduzione, mostra la complessità dell'argomento e quindi la difficoltà alla riduzione dei 1419 termini raccolti, relativi a 838 nozioni in un apparato utile ad una disciplina che ha nel suo statuto epistemologico il concetto di “non ridondanza” qual è appunto lo statuto della “glottodidattica”. Complicazioni che hanno un riscontro, se possibile ancora maggiore, nella presa in conto del concetto di “traduzione” del processo studiato da Muntadas, il quale “analizza nelle forme consone all'arte multimediale virtuale la problematica della comunicazione, che egli identifica nella traduzione, nella misura in cui il *net* mette in contatto parlanti di lingue e culture differenti” (p. 37).

Giancarlo Marchesini, *Teorie della traduzione e strategie traduttive*, pp. 45-69. L'A., richiamandosi al saggio di Jiri Levì, *La traduzione come processo decisionale*, affronta il problema della traduzione come interpretazione e insiste sulla necessità di compiere comunque sempre una scelta nel momento traduttivo. Il movimento *target oriented* vs. *source oriented* permette di parlare di traduzione “libera” come dotata unicamente di una “libertà vigilata” e di “interpretazione” come manipolazione testuale vs. “interpretazione” come manipolazione concettuale.

Laura Salmon, *Sulla gestione inconscia del processo traduttivo: cosa sappiamo fare senza sapere come*, pp. 71-99. Partendo dalla distinzione tra traduzione come “processo” e come “prodotto”, la Salmon propone una didattica della traduzione che sappia sfruttare le neuroscienze, cioè il funzionamento del cervello che, grazie ai neuroni specchio, mette in azione una memoria procedurale, legata e dipendente da una componente motoria del linguaggio umano. L'educazione e quindi l'avvio al “flusso coerente della comunicazione” (p. 90) tra una LP ed una LA mediante esercizi di imitazione, ripetizione e rinforzo, ispirano dunque una didattica atta a preparare buoni professionisti interpreti e traduttori piuttosto che grammatologi. Tali professionisti devono essere avviati al “frequente passaggio dall'automatismo alla coscienza e dalla coscienza all'automatismo” (p. 93). Una grammatica delle opzioni, collegata con l'enciclopedia del traduttore a sua volta connessa a una rete ipertestuale enorme e molto ramificata, deve sostituire una grammatica delle regole, nella convinzione che – ed è questa la conclusione della Salmon – “ogni volta che ci limitiamo a insegnare una regola esplicita, stiamo al contempo inibendo una procedura implicita” (p. 96).

Erika Salsnik, *Dagli universali traduttivi*

all'italiano delle traduzioni, pp. 101-131. Partendo dalla presentazione di alcuni concetti-chiave negli studi traduttologici (relativi ad esplicitazione, semplificazione e normalizzazione) nei testi tradotti rispetto ai testi originali, l'A. presenta la "fragilità" del concetto di universale traduttivo, soprattutto in riferimento all'"italiano delle traduzioni", ne esamina alcuni casi e ne mette in luce incongruenze e possibili, facili interferenze.

Patrizia Mazzotta, *Riflessioni glottodidattiche sulla traduzione delle microlingue*, pp. 133-145. Il processo traduttivo è visto come un processo duplice endo- ed eso-linguistico di comprensione del testo di partenza e di riformulazione nel testo d'arrivo. Il primo momento implica conoscenze tecniche, settoriali, culturali, implicite e di convenzionalità che la didattica ha sempre sottovalutato; il secondo implica intuito, interpretazione e capacità di mediazione rapida, cioè "ricerca di un punto di incontro che riduca la distanza tra sensibilità, interessi, mondi diversi" (p.136). Sempre da un punto di vista didattico, non si dimentichi poi che la traduzione "costituisce uno straordinario strumento di riflessione metalinguistica" (p.143), per cui il suo uso in classe è di altissimo valore durante tutto l'iter apprenditivo.

Enrico Borello, *La traduzione nella storia della glottodidattica*, pp.147-172. *Excursus* storico sui problemi della traduzione nella proto-glottodidattica e nella glottodidattica vera e propria. La traduzione nell'Antichità, nel Medioevo e nella Scuola di Toledo precede alcune considerazioni sulla traduzione nel 1600 e nel 1700, secoli in cui essa comincia ad essere considerata in chiave apprenditiva. Nel XVIII secolo la traduzione interlineare diventa "metodo" per la didattica linguistica, sfocia nella sua messa al bando nei metodi diretti e nelle teorie dei fonetisti del primo Novecento. Più interessante la seconda parte del saggio sul punto di vista degli strutturalisti, e quindi sulle sette categorie di relazioni tra parole di lingue diverse (R. Lado), sui tre tipi di traduzione endolingua, interlinguistica e intersemiotica (R. Jakobson), cioè su linguistica e traduzione, fino

all'elencazione delle sette operazioni traduttologiche della "stilistica comparata" di Vinay e Darbelnet. Newmark è ricordato come colui che distingue una traduzione semantica (più adatta ai testi letterari) da una traduzione comunicativa (meglio adatta a cronaca, saggistica, avvisi). Il "saper tradurre" è valutato secondo la scala di competenza traduttiva adattata da Munby.

Johanna Monti, *Localizzazione: il ruolo e i saperi della traduzione*, pp. 173-197. Dopo aver definito il concetto di "localizzazione", l'A. ne analizza il processo e ne traccia i contorni in una visione industriale, che considera il localizzatore come un nuovo profilo professionale, che si distingue dal traduttore tecnico per "le ulteriori competenze informatiche e gestionali richieste dal mercato e dal processo stesso" (p. 194).

Véronique Sauron, *Les outils d'aide à la traduction: ennemis ou alliés du traducteur?*, pp. 199-226. Testo molto problematico, che mette a confronto i traduttori di un tempo, veri mediatori fra due lingue-culture e i traduttori moderni, che, avvalendosi delle tecnologie continuamente in evoluzione, disintegrano il processo del tradurre e trasformano il traduttore in un assistente di sistemi informatici, cui sono delegati quasi tutti i compiti sottesi alla complessa operazione del tradurre.

Olivier Demissy Cazeilles, *Traduction littéraire et langues vernaculaires: l'Ecosse, pour une éthique de la différence*, pp. 227-243. L'A., dopo aver presentato il "caso" della Scozia, dove coesistono almeno tre lingue ufficiali e sei lingue regionali, mostra l'insufficienza della dicotomia, che circola in traduttologia, tra traduzione *source-oriented* e traduzione *target oriented*, e, attraverso numerosi esempi tratti da testi letterari e dalle rispettive traduzioni o dai tentativi di traduzione, ci dice come "la traduction est dans la culture, la traduction est culture" (p. 242).

Antonella De Laurentis, *Il compito del traduttore secondo Borges*, pp. 245-262. "[...] l'idea che una traduzione non sia per forza di cose inferiore all'originale" (p. 246) sembra essere la "teoria" della traduzione per Borges,

che l'A. di questo saggio indica come colui che traccia in negativo una teoria dell'enunciazione, fino all'affermazione che "tutto è transitorio e niente è per sempre" (p. 258). A tale giudizio arriva l'A. attraverso citazioni di Eco, Steiner, Derrida ed altri studiosi di traduzione-interpretazione.

Mauro Ferraresi, *Perduto nella traduzione*, pp. 263-278. Testo di sintesi finale in partenza dalla disciplina semiotica, valuta come deve essere tradotto l'errore, che è di volta in volta di diversa natura.

Ai tre ormai classici tipi di traduzione teorizzati da Jakobson (1959): la traduzione endolinguistica o riformulazione, la traduzione interlinguistica o traduzione propriamente detta e la traduzione intersemiotica o trasmutazione, l'A. ne aggiunge un quarto, la traduzione transemiotica o "sinestesizzazione", "che consiste nella interpretazione di sistemi di segni non linguistici con sistemi di segni non linguistici" (p. 273), in tal modo allargando ulteriormente il concetto di traduzione, e apparentandolo a quello di interpretazione, ma tenendolo dallo stesso ben distinto. "Traduzione partecipata" sarebbe la proposta nuova, in cui "negoiazione", da intendersi come negoziazione esplicita con l'autore del testo di partenza, costituirebbe la parola-chiave.

Bona Cambiaghi

RASSEGNA DI LINGUISTICA FRANCESE

A CURA DI ENRICA GALAZZI E CHIARA MOLINARI

ALAIN REY – FRÉDÉRIC DUVAL – GILLES SIOUFFI, *Mille ans de langue française. Histoire d'une passion*, Honoré Perrin, Paris 2007, pp. 1465.

Ce gros volume, fruit de la collaboration de trois éminents spécialistes, se signale tant par l'effort de synthèse que par la prise en compte des acquis les plus récents sans que soient négligées les études "classiques" dans le domaine de l'histoire de la langue. Les parties qui le composent (*Le Moyen Âge*, au sens le plus large du mot, puisque cette section englobe ancien et moyen français, jusqu'en 1530, par F. Duval; *De la Renaissance à la Révolution* par G. Siouffi; *Du Premier Empire au XXI^e siècle*, par A. Rey), au-delà de l'autonomie de traitement qu'imposent la diversité des époques et l'évolution linguistique, abordent des thématiques récurrentes: on signalera notamment la coprésence de l'histoire interne de la langue (où, très grossièrement, l'accent porte plus sur la graphie, le lexique, la syntaxe, que sur la phonétique et la morphologie) et de l'histoire externe (notamment la question ancienne des contacts entre le français et d'autres langues, classiques ou modernes, et les polémiques liées aux emprunts et à la suprématie du français). Si une lecture suivie peut être conseillée aux étudiants et aux amateurs, les spécialistes pourront déceler des parcours de lecture privilégiés: la question du rapport entre latin et français, actuel jusqu'à la Révolution au moins; les variétés linguistiques (au sein même de l'Hexagone et à plus forte raison dans la francophonie); le long parcours qui mène à l'"institutionnalisation" du français et à sa normalisation; la "passion" des Français pour leur langue, thème de grande actualité mis en exergue dans l'intitulé même de cet ouvrage, mais dont les racines remontent bien loin dans l'Histoire; et encore – et c'est

un aspect qui démarque ce livre de bien d'autres – la dimension littéraire, réintégré ici de façon consciente et voulue à côté de bien d'autres domaines d'emploi (pour les périodes les plus récentes: la chanson, le téléphone, les nouveaux médias, et jusqu'aux téléphones portables, le courrier électronique...). Un regret: les *Notes* sont réunies aux pp. 1321-1400, ce qui impose un mouvement de va-et-vient pas toujours commode; et une question concernant la *Bibliographie* (pp. 1401-27): pourquoi avoir marqué d'un astérisque, dans la section consacrée aux XIX^e et XX^e siècles justement, les ouvrages "publiés au XIX^e siècle et au début du XX^e" (marque qui n'est d'ailleurs pas toujours présente: cf. le *Dictionnaire* de Littré)? Signalons enfin les *Cartes* (1429-37), et les *Indices*: l'*Index sélectif des noms propres* (1439-48), *Noms de langues et dialectes* (1449-51), *Domaines du français* (1453-55), *Quelques thèmes* (1457-58), index qui réunit tant des intitulés généraux (*Phonétique* ou *Norme*, par ex.) que des sujets très précis (*Clavier d'ordinateur* ou *Médias en Afrique*): admettons toutefois qu'un tel tri n'était pas facile.

Maria Colombo Timelli

JEAN-PHILIPPE DALBERA, *Des dialectes au langage. Une archéologie du sens*, Champion, Paris 2007, pp. 464

Il saggio rende noti i risultati di una ricerca etimologica centrata sulle lingue romanze, ivi compresi i dialettismi, e si compone di una serie di schede lessicali – la cui area semantica è relativa per lo più agli zoonimi – redatte secondo i principi dell'analisi linguistica di tipo motivazionale: anche se, come osserva l'A., non sappiamo più perché il *gatto* sia denominato *gatto*, siamo ancora in grado di comprendere che il *martinet* probabilmente trae il suo nome dal martello, per metonimia.

L'analisi etimologica considera in particolare le denominazioni di animali quali la *belette*, il *martinet*, il *rouge-gorge*, la *chouette*, la *grenouille*, il *renard*. Quest'ultimo termine merita una citazione. È noto che in francese *renard* ha sostituito la precedente denominazione *goupil* (< lt. *vulpiculus*) e questo fatto è abitualmente attribuito all'influsso di un antropónimo *Renard*, tramite il *Roman de Renart*. L'A. cerca al contrario di giustificare etimologicamente il termine in questione partendo dal femminile *renarde*, e ipotizzando una forma originaria **rag-na* ('regina, madre nutrice'). Si tratta dunque di un lavoro approfondito ed erudito, che non esita ad avanzare ipotesi che pongono in discussione alcuni dei luoghi comuni più diffusi.

Anna Slerca

FRANCK FLORICIC ed., *La négation dans les langues romanes*, John Benjamins, Amsterdam/Philadelphia 2007 (Linguisticae investigationes. Supplementa, 26), pp. 229

Ce volume est à la fois une contribution au renouveau des études romanes, moins pratiquées en France que dans d'autres pays européens, et au riche domaine de la négation, qui se prête à l'analyse tant sur le plan de la morphologie que de la pragmatique, de la syntaxe que de la sémantique. Les études rassemblées ici témoignent de diverses approches méthodologiques, en diachronie ou en synchronie, sans privilégier aucune orientation théorique particulière. À côté de contributions centrées sur le latin et l'italien, le catalan et l'espagnol, l'occitan, le roumain, relevons, pour le français: Franck Floricic, Françoise Mignon, *Négation et reduplication intensive en français et en italien* (pp. 117-136), discutent la relation entre propriétés syntaxiques et sémantiques; Tine Van Hecke, *La négation de la modalité déontique. Divergences et convergences entre français, italien et roumain* (pp. 161-176), traite du problème de la négation des modaux du type 'falloir', 'devoir'; Hélène Huot, *La préfixation négative en français moderne* (pp. 177-203), étudie les unités lexicales contenant le préfixe -in,

en particulier les dérivés d'adjectifs; G. Dal et alii, *Les adjectifs en in-X-able en français* (pp. 205-223), avancent l'hypothèse que le préfixe -in est l'exposant d'une règle de construction des lexèmes qui est exposée ici. Un index des formes linguistiques et des termes techniques clôturé le volume.

Anne Schoysman

OLIVIER BERTRAND – HILTRUD GERNER – BÉATRICE STUMPF ed., *Lexiques scientifiques et techniques. Constitution et approche historique*, Les Éditions de l'École Polytechnique, Palaiseau 2007, pp. 269

Comme le soulignent tant Olivier Bertrand dans son avant-propos que Joëlle Ducos dans les pages conclusives, l'émergence d'un lexique va nécessairement de pair avec la construction d'une science, et la constitution d'un lexique scientifique, dans n'importe quel domaine, dépasse largement la simple question de l'emprunt translinguistique ou du néologisme. Après une réflexion théorique et méthodologique due à Robert Martin (*Le traitement lexicographique des mots scientifiques et techniques*), rapportée aux bases de données DMF, DMF2 et DMF3, les contributions réunies dans ce beau volume se rapportent à des domaines précis voire à des cas d'espèces: Thomas Städtler revient sur les traductions de Nicole Oresme; trois articles concernent le lexique de la médecine en ancien et moyen français: Isabelle Vedrenne-Fajolles (tradition hippocratique), Annelies Bloem et Michèle Goyens (traduction des *Problèmes* d'Aristote), Sylvie Bazin-Tacchella (lexique de l'anatomie); trois autres se concentrent sur la botanique au XVI^e siècle: Éva Buchi (lexique pharmacologique chez Baptiste Cavigioles, 1541), Philippe Selosse (expression de la diversité végétale), Françoise Henry (vocabulaire viti-vinicole); d'autres domaines sont abordés dans les études de Stephen Dörr (astronomie en ancien français), Silvia Toniato (mathématiques au Moyen Âge), An Smets (fauconnerie en a. et m. fr.), Trung Tran (architecture dans le *Songé de Poliphile*, 1546), Franz Rainer

(comptabilité aux XVI^e-XVII^e ss.), Elisabetta Deriu (art équestre aux XVI^e-XVII^e ss.); une deuxième contribution de Philippe Selosse concerne les dénominations des savoirs en français préclassique. On signalera aussi l'intérêt de la bibliographie et sitographie générale (pp. 255-258), et surtout de l'index des mots et des concepts, outil indispensable pour une consultation ciblée de cet ouvrage.

Maria Colombo Timelli

GILLES ROQUES, *Les régionalismes dans le fabliau de 'Barat et Haimet'*, in SARAH BAUDELLE-MICHELIS – MARIE-MADELEINE CASTELLANI – PHILIPPE LOGIÉ – EMMAUELLE POULAIN-GAUTRET ed., *Romans d'Antiquité et littérature du Nord. Mélanges offerts à Aimé Petit*, Honoré Champion, Paris 2007, pp. 719-727

L'étude des picardismes dans ce fabliau attribué à Jehan Bodel (*bauc, bracon, cenaille, enclignier, esclignie, esquire, estel, garraz, laiszon, en maison, mont, orseille, faire la siue, sole, tempre, toitel, tremelerres*) confirme la qualité du ms. D (BnF fr. 19152), qui conserve la quasi-totalité de ces mots régionaux et qui semble ainsi refléter au mieux le lexique de l'auteur.

Maria Colombo Timelli

"L'Information grammaticale", 110, 2006

Dans le cadre du dossier consacré à "Le personnel sujet", Danielle Leeman rend compte du traitement des cas d'omission du sujet dans quelques grammaires de référence du français et dans la grammaire chomskyenne; ce phénomène est ensuite analysé dans deux corpus de français parlé établis par Claire Blanche-Benveniste en 1990 et en 2002, ce qui permet à l'auteur d'avancer l'hypothèse que l'effacement du sujet grammatical manifeste le non-engagement, ou le désengagement, du locuteur (pp. 23-30). Dans une perspective cognitive, Aliyah Morgenstern étudie l'acquisition du processus d'auto-désignation avec le pronom *je* chez les petits enfants, à travers des corpus d'enfants franco-

phones et anglophones enregistrés en milieu naturel (pp. 31-37). Nous signalons également, en dehors du dossier, l'article de Béatrice Fracchiolla, qui s'interroge sur le sémantisme des pronoms français dans une perspective à la fois énonciative, interactionniste et pragmatique, afin de montrer comment leurs emplois sont liés à la relation d'interlocution (pp. 43-48).

Cristina Brancaclion

MURIEL BARBAZAN, *Le temps verbal. Dimensions linguistiques et psycholinguistiques*, Presses Universitaires du Mirail, Toulouse 2006, pp. 470.

L'ouvrage de M. Barbazan propose une description sémantique du système verbal du français, et notamment des temps du passé, selon une approche multidisciplinaire qui se nourrit de l'apport de la linguistique, de la psycholinguistique et de la méthode comparative. L'objectif est de parvenir à une définition des signifiés rendant compte des différentes valeurs contextuelles des tiroirs verbaux, en vue d'une application en didactique du FLE.

Après un aperçu théorique et méthodologique sur le temps et sur l'aspect (ch. 1 et 2), l'auteur s'attache à examiner les valeurs contextuelles du passé simple et du passé composé (ch. 3), de l'imparfait (ch. 4) et de l'imparfait articulé au présent (ch. 5); l'analyse linguistique de ces tiroirs verbaux lui permet ainsi de parvenir à une nouvelle définition convoquant différents traits définitoires: les traits [-allocutif] et [autonome] pour le passé simple; les traits [+allocutif] et [accompli] pour le passé composé; les traits [anaphorique] et [inactuel] pour l'imparfait. L'activation de ces traits fondamentaux est liée à la prise en compte de trois dimensions distinctes: la dimension référentielle, la dimension énonciative, envisagée dans un cadre dialogique et une dimension conceptuelle de traitement textuel qui attribue aux morphèmes verbaux une valeur de marquage de macro-unités textuelles.

Elisa Ravazzolo

BJÖRG LARSSON, *Le sens commun ou la sémantique comme science de l'intersubjectivité humaine*, "Langages", 170, 2008, pp. 28-40

Dans cet article sur le discours et le sens commun, Larsson s'interroge sur la signification du terme éponyme (sens), et affirme que les locuteurs font appel à des catégorisations sémantiques différentes en fonction des domaines de sens. Pour lui, le sens n'est donc pas une propriété du monde mais est une unité mentale intersubjective qui doit être codifiée en signes. Il en découle que le terme 'sens' désigne un phénomène ayant une identité et un mode d'existence propre: il repose sur une asymétrie, une dynamique et une mémorisation, qui se découvrent dans les corpus authentiques et les interactions, beaucoup plus que dans les spéculations sur le système linguistique.

Jean-Paul Dufiet

PIERRE CADIOT, *Proverbes, sens commun et communauté de langage*, "Langages", 170, 2008, pp. 79-91

Selon l'auteur, le sens commun propre au proverbe passe par un ensemble de techniques de discours qui se comprennent d'abord à partir d'une conception de la signification. Celle-ci repose sur deux versants: le premier, perceptuel, va du sensible au figural; le second, doxal, se déploie entre l'opinion et la croyance. Cadiot explique ensuite que la ritualisation formulaire du proverbe ne s'assimile pas à celles du cliché et du stéréotype. Son approche génétique remet donc en cause une explication fondée sur le principe du figement, et défend une conception qui repose sur trois notions: la communauté (qui est à la fois affaire de perception, d'éthique et d'esthétique), la modalisation-normativité (qui est le produit d'une diversité d'habitus), les genres (le sens commun se manifeste par sa conformité aux lois des genres).

Jean-Paul Dufiet

MICHELE DE GIOIA, *Carrément. Lexique bilingue français-italien des adverbies figés*, Aracne, Roma 2008, pp. 466

Se ci si sveglia *al canto del gallo*, si può tradurre letteralmente in francese *au chant du coq*? Sì, perché le due lingue hanno lo stesso avverbio idiomatico (o fisso), come dimostra la puntuale indagine condotta da Michele De Gioia su oltre 6000 espressioni avverbiali francesi e italiane. Un avverbio fisso francese privo di corrispondente diretto italiano è proprio quello del titolo, *carrément*, i cui equivalenti semantici sono *decisamente*, *senza esitare*, ecc. I risultati dello studio di De Gioia costituiscono un valido argomento contro lo stereotipo dell'intraducibilità delle forme idiomatiche che non solo sono traducibili, ma lo sono anche con equivalenti semantici aventi stessa funzione grammaticale e stesso carattere di fissità; partendo dal francese, ciò si verifica per l'italiano in 3 casi su 5. Lo studio tassonomico oggetto del volume è un lessico-grammatica comparato. Sia la metodologia sia il corpus francese di partenza sono stati definiti da Maurice Gross. De Gioia riprende la propria classificazione degli avverbi fissi italiani, approfondendo l'aspetto comparatistico in questo lessico bilingue che può essere gestito per il trattamento automatico con i programmi del lessico-grammatica. Interessante ipotesi, l'applicazione glottodidattica per l'apprendimento di espressioni idiomatiche divertenti: *essere alto come un soldo di cacio* / *être haut comme 3 pommes*. Per ricerche su questa categoria grammaticale, De Gioia propone uno strumento utilizzabile *tous azimuts, a 360 gradi*.

Mirella Conenna

MARIA COLOMBO – MONICA BARSÌ ed., *Lexicographie et lexicologie historiques du français. Bilan et perspectives*, Polimetrica, Milano 2008, pp. 290

Les articles réunis dans le présent volume éclairent divers aspects du lexique français en privilégiant, notamment, les perspectives lexicographique et lexicologique. Deux axes

de recherche y sont privilégiés: l'axe diachronique et l'axe diatopique. Les deux premières contributions de Gilles Roques reflètent ce choix: la première aborde la problématique des régionalismes lexicaux du français, tandis que la deuxième explore les principaux outils lexicographiques pour l'étude du français médiéval. Ensuite, Jean Pruvost parcourt l'histoire personnelle de Littré et de Larousse et prouve à quel point l'atmosphère de l'époque a influencé leurs ouvrages. La perspective diachronique est aussi à la base de trois contributions qui focalisent notamment la lexicographie bilingue italien-français: Nadia Minerva étudie le premier repertoire lexicographique français-italien et italien-français (Lyon, Rigaud, 1583); Nicole Maroger réfléchit aux critiques apportées au dictionnaire bilingue de Veneroni; Jacqueline Lillo explore les multiples éditions du dictionnaire d'Alberti de Villeneuve. Claudio Vinti préfère une démarche lexicologique pour analyser la relation entre le théâtre forain et le patois rustique. En revanche, André Thibault et Paola Puccini privilégient l'axe diatopique: le premier illustre les outils lexicographiques élaborés pour chaque zone de l'espace francophone; la deuxième, à travers l'ouvrage *Profession lexicographe* de Marie-Eva de Villers, esquisse le portrait du lexicographe dans une perspective anthropologique. Un autre groupe d'articles focalise la relation de la lexicographie et de la lexicologie aux nouvelles technologies: Annick Farina étudie les CD de trois dictionnaires bilingues italien-français et souhaite une meilleure exploitation de cet outil; Antonino Velez présente les principaux sites internet où l'on peut consulter dictionnaires, glossaires, banques de données; Geneviève Henrot-Sostero étudie une unité lexicale dans les contextes relevés grâce à internet. De son côté, Marie-Pierre Escoubas-Benveniste décrit les emplois prédictifs des verbes de mouvement orienté, ce qui pourrait aider à leur traitement lexicographique.

Chiara Molinari

L'implicite et les écrits de l'entreprise, "Les Cahiers de l'ILCEA", 9, Grenoble 2007, pp. 221

Questo numero dei "Cahiers de l'ILCEA" pubblicato sotto l'egida del GREMUTS (Groupe de recherche multilingue en traduction spécialisée) all'Università Stendhal di Grenoble, sintetizza i contributi di una giornata seminariale dedicata a "Langues et cultures de spécialité". Le aree geografico-culturali interessate sono, oltre alla Francia, gli Stati Uniti, l'Italia, la Germania, la Russia. In un'epoca dominata dalle TIC, la comunicazione che emana dalle imprese si moltiplica e si diversifica. I generi professionali oggetto di analisi vanno da quelli formali classici (rapporto annuale di attività, comunicato stampa) a quelli promozionali (campagne promozionali, pubblicità) ad altri più nuovi (*mission statement, code of commitment*) o presi dalla letteratura e messi al servizio dell'impresa (*publifiction, autobiografia*). Benché i settori dell'attività economica osservati coprano ambiti molto diversi (l'automobile, la finanza, lo sport, le banche, l'agro-alimentare ecc.), la coerenza epistemologica si costruisce attorno allo studio dell'implicito nella varietà degli scritti analizzati tramite approcci riconducibili all'analisi del discorso, alla pragmatica, all'analisi dei generi.

Emerge l'interesse epistemologico e pedagogico degli autori, ricercatori-insegnanti in curricula professionalizzanti, come pure l'interesse metodologico di un approccio interdisciplinare e interculturale che si colloca all'intersezione tra due vasti ambiti di ricerca: le lingue e culture di specialità da un lato e, dall'altro, le scienze sociali.

Enrica Galazzi

ISABEL DESMET, *Terminologie, culture et société. Éléments pour une théorie variationniste de la terminologie et des langues de spécialité*, "Cahiers du Rifal", 26, 2007, pp. 3-13

Dopo aver considerato i caratteri degli approcci tradizionali – monosemia, univocità, opposizione terminologia/lessicologia –, moderni (analisi del testo di specialità, del contesto e della fraseologia) e contemporanei

(aspetti sociolinguistici, culturali, pragmatici), l'A. propone per la descrizione della terminologia e delle lingue di specialità un quadro teorico che integri la variazione in tutte le sue dimensioni linguistiche ed extralinguistiche. Principio basilare è la presa in considerazione della varietà dei discorsi di specialità, dei generi testuali e del contesto. L'analisi terminologica deve fondarsi sui livelli dell'analisi linguistica, di cui la pragmatica costituisce la base in quanto il ruolo degli interlocutori, del contesto e dell'ambiente spazio-temporale sono determinanti per la variazione.

Pierangelo Bulgari

MICHÈLE LENOBLE-PINSON, *Traits communs et traits particuliers de deux banques terminologiques, l'une à Paris, l'autre à Bruxelles*, "Cahiers du Rifal", 26, 2007, pp. 36-47

L'A. presenta i tratti comuni e le peculiarità degli organismi terminologici francesi e belgi. La politica linguistica francese si organizza su tre livelli: le commissioni ministeriali per i lessici specialistici, la Commissione generale di terminologia e neologia, l'Académie française. La Comunità francese belga si avvale di una commissione di terminologia e di reti di esperti. L'A. sottolinea alcune procedure di creazione lessicale rilevate dall'analisi del corpus dei termini ufficiali: neologia semantica (*bloc-notes, avant-première*), neologia morfologica (francesizzazioni: *bogue, hétérolyse*; composti: *banque à domicile, banque de données*; formazioni neologiche scientifiche), morfologia lessicale (suffissazione).

Pierangelo Bulgari

LOUIS-JEAN ROUSSEAU, *Élaboration et mise en œuvre des politiques linguistiques*, "Cahiers du Rifal", 26, 2007, pp. 58-71

L'articolo definisce i concetti di "politica linguistica" e di "aménagement linguistico", delinea le componenti relative allo statuto ed al codice delle lingue, traccia una tassonomia ed i fondamenti politici e giuridici, descrive le esigenze metodologiche, i limiti e gli ostacoli, ne considera la valutazione ed i necessari continui aggiustamenti, traendo esempi dal-

l'area francofona (in particolare riferendosi alla riforma dell'ortografia, a lavori terminologici e di modernizzazione del lessico). Il contributo solleva il problema della rilevanza del prestito terminologico (perdita di campi per una lingua causata dall'assenza di sviluppo terminologico, ricorso all'*orientation de l'usage*), la questione dell'*implantation* e dell'utilizzo dei nuovi termini (con la nascita della *terminométrie*).

Pierangelo Bulgari

BÉATRICE FRAENKEL, *Comment tenir un registre?*, "Langage et société", 124, 2008, pp. 59-71.

À travers l'analyse de déclarations de naissance, B. Fraenkel se demande en quoi de tels écrits contribuent à la mise en œuvre d'un genre discursif et s'il est possible de séparer l'élaboration d'un objet (le registre d'État civil) de son énonciation. L'auteure remarque que ces écrits extrêmement formalisés peuvent être caractérisés comme "genres professionnels", mais qu'ils ne s'expliquent historiquement qu'en tant qu'enjeux politiques. Ainsi, la rédaction d'un registre correspond-elle autant à la création d'un objet qu'au maintien d'une institution de la République et des normes graphiques qui l'accompagnent. Au-delà de l'acte de naissance, l'auteure s'interroge sur le statut des objets écrits en général.

Françoise Favart

MARIE-NOËLLE GUILLOT, *Oral et illusion d'oral: indices d'oralité dans les sous-titres de dialogues de film*, "Meta", LII, 2007, 2 pp. 239-259

Dans son article, Marie-Noëlle Guillot analyse les dialogues et sous-titres correspondants du film *37°2 le matin* (Beineix 1986) par rapport à l'oral spontané et souligne à quel point les contraintes du sous-titrage stimulent le potentiel à produire l'expérience de l'oralité. En se basant sur la théorie du mode de Fowler, et sans nier les dangers de l'économie des sous-titres, elle démontre que la "perte" est relative et que, pour ce qui concerne la production de l'expérience de l'oralité en soi, "le moins ne paraît pas nécessairement l'ennemi du bien".

Yannick Preumont

RASSEGNA DI LINGUISTICA INGLESE

A CURA DI MARGHERITA ULRYCH

JUCKER ANDREAS H. – IRMA TAAVITSAINEN (ed.), *Speech Acts in the History of English*, John Benjamins, Amsterdam/Philadelphia 2008, pp. 318

The aim of this volume is to sketch a speech act history of the English language. The volume contains a series of innovative studies which are divided into three different sections and provides accounts of specific speech acts at particular stages in the development of English.

Part One contains significant contributions on directives and commissives (speech acts such as requests, commands and promises). Recent research has shown that older stages of English used different strategies for polite directives. Directives that would appear impolite or even rude today seem to have been common in the past. Kohnen's paper focuses on typical manifestations of directive speech acts in Old English (his data are taken from the Helsinki Corpus – the first electronic corpus on historical principles – and the Dictionary of Old English Corpus). Pakkala-Weckström explores the speech act of promising in Middle English and in particular the different kinds of promises in their varying contexts in Chaucer's *Canterbury Tales*. Archer develops a scale of directness for "Early Modern English" requests, considering variation across a range of social parameters, and comparing the results with research on present-day English. Busse first compiles an inventory of linguistic forms which were available to Shakespeare and his contemporaries to carry out directive speech acts and then assesses their precise discourse function in terms of their coercive force and their politeness, while Del Lungo analyses requests and commitments, frequently performed by nineteenth century commercial letter writers.

Part Two deals with speech acts such as greetings, compliments and apologies. Grzega shows that in Old English attention getters and wishes for good health were particularly common while in Middle English they were replaced by inquiries about the health of the addressee and wishes for a good time. Taavitsainen and Jucker outline the history of compliments in English while the last paper deals with apologies.

The last section, Part Three, focuses on research techniques that are used to extract speech acts from computer-readable corpora. This part has been added in the hope that other scholars may profit from the problems encountered by the authors of these papers in the process of carrying out further corpus-linguistic speech act research in historical corpora.

Erica Doppiati

VICTORINA GONZÁLEZ-DÍAZ, *Recent Developments in English Intensifiers: The case of 'very much'*, "English Language and Linguistics", 12, 2008, 2, pp. 221-243

L'articolo prende in esame la semantica degli avverbi complessi e composti come *very much*, *heretofore*, *anyway*. Partendo dalla constatazione che tali costrutti avverbiali non hanno ricevuto sufficiente attenzione nella letteratura più recente, l'Autrice si concentra in particolar modo sulla semantica di *very much*. Mentre alcuni studi recenti lo descrivono come un avverbio *clause-internal* che modifica costituenti del sintagma, la letteratura precedente attribuiva agli avverbi nella lingua inglese uno scope più ampio. Attraverso l'analisi diacronica di un corpus contenente testi dal 1500 ai giorni nostri, González-Díaz mostra alcuni contesti nei quali il comportamento di *very much* contraddice le descrizioni più recenti. Le conclusioni dello studio

suggeriscono come, a partire dall'ottocento circa, questo avverbio abbia sviluppato funzioni di modificatore di enunciato, collocandosi così sul *continuum* descritto da Traugott (1995): Internal Adverb > Sentence Adverb > Discourse Particle.

Sarah Bigi

BELÉN MÉNDEZ-NAYA, *On the History of 'downright'*, "English Language and Linguistics", 2008, 12, 2008, 2 pp. 267-287

Basandosi su una varietà di corpora e sul database di citazioni dell'OED, lo studio presenta un'analisi diacronica sull'origine e l'evoluzione della funzione di modificazione dell'intensificatore *downright*, sia esso in funzione di avverbio (*it's downright rude*) che di aggettivo (*downright nonsense*). L'evoluzione di *downright* diventa anche un chiaro esempio dell'interazione tra processi di lessicalizzazione e di grammaticalizzazione nell'evoluzione di un singolo elemento. L'articolo sottolinea inoltre il ruolo del contesto e dell'inferenza che si rivelano determinanti nel processo di cambiamento semantico. Infine vengono messe in luce due diverse linee lungo le quali si sviluppano gli intensificatori: da una parte si osserva il passaggio da *adjuncts a degree modifiers*, dall'altra quello da *descriptive adjective*, ad *affective adjective a intensifier*.

Sarah Bigi

MARIA-JOSEP CUENCA, *Pragmatic markers in contrast: The case of well*, "Journal of Pragmatics", 40, 2008, pp. 1373-1391.

L'articolo prende in oggetto il discourse marker *well*, abbondantemente studiato, ma il cui significato a volte rimane ancora vago. La domanda posta dalla presente ricerca è quanto l'analisi contrastiva di un pragmatic marker può contribuire a metterne in luce il significato e le funzioni. Per rispondere a questa domanda, l'Autrice analizza le occorrenze di *well* nel film *Four weddings and a funeral* paragonate con i loro corrispondenti nelle versioni doppiate in spagnolo e in catalano. I risultati dell'analisi mostrano che i

pragmatic markers come *well* differiscono chiaramente nel significato dai logical markers come *but*. In altre parole, il loro significato è interamente pragmatico, poiché non si riferiscono a contenuti proposizionali ma a funzioni modali del discorso.

Sarah Bigi

ANNE-MARIE SIMON-VANDENBERGEN, *Almost certainly and most definitely: degree modifiers and epistemic stance*, "Journal of Pragmatics", 40, 2008, pp. 1521-1542

La ricerca presentata in questo articolo prende in esame gli avverbi *certainly* e *definitely*. La loro somiglianza semantico-pragmatica, già descritta da dizionari, dati provenienti dai corpora e da questionari, costituisce il punto di partenza dal quale l'Autrice muove per sviluppare alcune considerazioni volte a precisare ulteriormente la descrizione di questi avverbi. In particolare, è posta attenzione alla preferenzialità degli avverbi considerati rispetto ai loro intensificatori di grado. Basandosi sul British National Corpus, l'Autrice mostra che mentre *almost* e *most* sono utilizzati per modificare entrambi gli avverbi, esiste una netta prevalenza delle combinazioni *almost certainly* e *most definitely*. L'articolo sostiene che tale preferenzialità è spiegabile a partire dalle caratteristiche semantico-pragmatiche dei due avverbi.

Sarah Bigi

ULLA CONNOR, – ED NAGELHOUT – WILLIAM ROZYCKI ed., *Contrastive Rhetoric Reaching to intercultural rhetoric*, John Benjamins, Amsterdam 2008, pp. 324

The volume deals with variations in the style and rhetorical structure of texts by non-native speakers of English and is divided into four sections comprising 14 chapters.

In section I, "Current state of contrastive rhetoric", Xiaoming Li (Chapter 1) focuses on the insights offered by the discipline to the teaching of L2 writing, while Ana I. Moreno (Chapter 2) highlights the importance of fully comparable corpora, which should

be similar in all contextual factors and serve the purpose of carrying out reliable cross-cultural research.

Section II, "Contrastive corpus studies in specific genres" (Chapters 3-8), with contributions by Annelie Ädel, Haiyeng Feng, Maria Loukianenko Wolfe, Chin-Sook Pak and Rebecca Acevedo, Lorena Suárez and Ana Moreno, Wei Wang, deals with student essays, grant proposals, sales/product promotion letters, newspaper editorials, academic book reviews of literature and newspaper commentaries. Diverse features such as metadiscourse, rhetorical moves, linguistic devices linked to Hofstede's cultural dimensions, sentence and paragraph length and complexity, attribution to sources and personal voice are investigated in a variety of languages (American, British, Australian and non-native English, Chinese, Russian, Spanish) using both quantitative and qualitative methods.

Section III, "Contrastive rhetoric and the teaching of ESL/EFL writing", comprising Chapters 9 to 12, written respectively by Virginia Lo Castro, Kara McBride, Xiaoye You and Joel Bloch, investigates Mexican students' writing practices in Spanish and in English, problems by Chilean university students when reading English websites, theme treatment in Chinese school essay writing and conceptions of plagiarism. The studies also show how methods such as questionnaires, participant observation, surveys, interviews and think-aloud protocols may be used in research in contrastive rhetoric.

Section IV, "Future Directions", consists of Chapter 13, by Paul K. Matsuda and Dwight Atkinson, and Chapter 14, by Ulla Connor. Chapter 13 reports a conversation in which the authors discuss the future of intercultural rhetoric, while Chapter 14 outlines the history of the discipline and argues for the need to encompass the study of the writing contexts and the social practices connected to writing. To respond to these broader aims the term "intercultural rhetoric" is suggested.

Costanza Cucchi

ALISON IRVINE, *Contrast and convergence in Standard Jamaican English: the phonological architecture of the standard in an ideologically bidialectal community*, "World Englishes", 27, 2008, 1, pp. 9-25

L'articolo indaga l'intersezione tra Creolo e Standard Jamaican English (SJE) ed in particolare esamina gli aspetti fonologici che caratterizzano e limitano i confini tra le due varietà. Nel contesto sociale giamaicano, il bilinguismo è visto come segnale di prestigio sociale. L'analisi, condotta intervistando soggetti che utilizzano regolarmente sul luogo di lavoro SJE, dimostra come fenomeni quali h-dropping, voiceless th-stopping ed uso di /ɔ/, siano percepiti come tipicamente creoli e come tali stigmatizzati dai parlanti; allo stesso tempo si dimostra come esistano elementi creoli in SJE che sono stati assimilati e resi accettabili anche in un ambito formale; è il caso di /kja:/ in posizione iniziale al posto di /ka/, della dittongazione di /o/ ed /e/, della variabilità nella resa di <-nt> con valore morfologico (per esempio in *can't*, *don't*). I dati raccolti evidenziano come nel 'continuum' linguistico jamaicano una definizione di standard dipenda dall'atteggiamento psicologico dei singoli parlanti e dal condizionamento sociale che ad esso si accompagna: i dati sembrano non permettere una distinzione netta e definita almeno nell'ambito del campione esaminato.

Silvia Pireddu

XIAOYE YOU, *Rhetorical strategies, electronic media, and China English*, "World Englishes", 27, 2008, 2, pp. 233-249

To date an inference model has been adopted to carry out research on rhetorical strategies employed in China English. Yet such a model assumes that China English presents linguistic and rhetorical features which exclusively originate from Chinese strategies and does not shed light on the growing semiotic potential of this new emerging variety of English. Therefore the author of the present article suggests an alternative model, a con-

text-centred model (based on Halliday's systemic linguistics) and starts to examine China English as it is used in particular contexts and for particular audiences. In his study on how Chinese youths use English in a bulletin board forum to foster an online community, You divides the discussion threads into four sets of contexts and analyses the rhetorical strategies that the forum members use in each set of contexts. The author maintains that Chinese youths develop different rhetorical strategies according to different contexts of situation and these strategies are somewhat different from those identified in other contexts by previous scholars. Context should therefore be the main variable in verifying the rhetorical potential of China English.

Erica Doppiati

AMPARO ALCINA, *Translation technologies. Scope, tools and resources*, "Target", 20, 2008, 1, pp. 79-102

Alcina's paper discusses translation technologies as a new field of interdisciplinary study that deals with the investigation of "the design and adaptation of strategies, tools and technological resources" (Alcina 2008: 90) that facilitate the translator's job.

Drawing on her review of existing literature as well as on her own experience in researching and teaching translation technologies, she illustrates her own proposal for a coherent internal structuring of the subject. She envisages this as consisting of five blocs: the translator's computer equipment; communication and documentation tools; text edition and desktop publishing; language tools and resources; translation tools.

Although a number of questions remain to be defined, Alcina's analysis is a welcome contribution to the "disciplinary, academic and professional consolidation and development" (Alcina 2008: 99) of the emerging discipline of translation technologies.

Monica Pedrola

JEREMY MUNDAY ed., *Translation as Intervention*, Continuum International Publishing Group, London/New York 2007, pp. 165

This book is a collection of papers exploring a number of aspects related to the notion of translation as intervention. Translation is envisaged as a politically and socially active phenomenon which impacts in a dynamic way on a variety of communicative events. A range of situations and case studies are taken into consideration, including the European Union, translated literature in India and China, Arabic historical texts and court interpreting in multilingual South Africa.

The result is a comprehensive analysis of the "intervenience" power of translators at different levels: their identity as mediating beings; their interpretation of the text; their intervention at the level of text, discourse and language functions; the role of technology and the management of related work practices and finally, the intervention in the translation process of participants other than the translators themselves.

The contributions included in the book come from a range of cultures and disciplines, which reflects the way in which the whole field of Translation Studies has recently expanded, interfacing with other disciplines and broadening its horizons to embrace non-Western traditions. This and the quality of the contributions included make "Translation as Intervention" an engaging collection of great interest to students and academics researching in this area.

Monica Pedrola

JULIA HÜTTNER, *The genre(s) of student writing: developing writing models*, "International Journal of Applied Linguistics", 18, 2008, 2, pp. 146-165

L'articolo discute dell'utilità didattica dei modelli di analisi e di valutazione dell'EAP (English for Academic Purposes), evidenziando l'opportunità di utilizzare modelli diversi da quelli attualmente considerati. In altre parole le esigenze degli studenti chiama-

ti a produrre testi scritti in ambito accademico non coincidono esattamente con i dati e le tipologie indagate dalla comunità scientifica a partire dagli studi di Swales. Occorre piuttosto distinguere tra l'inglese accademico inteso come lingua franca a livello scientifico e nell'ambito delle varie comunità di ricerca e gli obiettivi linguistici, i bisogni e gli scopi degli studenti. L'autrice, pensando alla situazione europea e svolgendo la propria indagine con un gruppo di studenti dell'Università di Vienna, considera i seguenti elementi: l'inglese può essere un mezzo didattico e venire utilizzato per prendere appunti o scrivere saggi ma la tipologia e la forma di questi è diversa da quella in uso nelle università anglosassoni e non coincide con le strategie retoriche dell'*academic paper*. La funzione didattica del saggio o meglio della dissertazione pone problemi di eterogeneità stilistica, linguistica e testuale che necessitano di un controllo da parte dei docenti. Siamo infatti in contesto L2 dove i modelli testuali della L1 interagiscono con gli usi linguistici EAP. Partendo dunque dai saggi prodotti dagli studenti si propone un modello d'analisi degli stessi che possa evidenziarne le caratteristiche comuni fornendo una base per lo sviluppo di materiale didattico che aiuti gli studenti ad esprimere i propri obiettivi comunicativi. L'articolo evidenzia inoltre i punti di contatto e le principali differenze tra *academic papers* e gli *student's essays* sia a livello di intenzione comunicativa sia a livello lessico-grammaticale e delle strutture testuali.

Silvia Pireddu

“Studi Italiani di Linguistica Teorica e Applicata”, XXXVII, 1, 2008

Il numero monografico della rivista prende in esame i più recenti sviluppi della Linguistica Inglese in ogni suo ramo. Secondo le parole usate dal curatore, Giovanni Iamartino, nell'Introduzione, questo numero si propone “al lettore come una bussola per orientarsi nel *mare magnum* della recente produzione bibliografica in linguistica inglese” (p. 3). Il volume si apre con il contributo di

Cesare Gagliardi su fonetica e fonologia; prosegue poi con le voci di Antonio Bertacca sulla morfologia, Cristiano Moccias sulla sintassi e Stefania Nuccorini che insieme a Laura Pinnavaia affrontano la produzione bibliografica relativa al lessico. Marcella Bertuccelli Papi e Annalisa Baicchi collaborano nella presentazione degli sviluppi nel campo della semantica e della pragmatica, mentre Silvia Bruti e Lavinia Merlini Barbaresi danno il loro contributo sulla linguistica del testo e l'analisi del discorso. Maria Luisa Maggioni e Paola Tornaghi, a partire dalle radici storiche dei diversi *Englishes* offrono una panoramica sulle varietà dell'inglese nel mondo, con uno sguardo verso il suo sviluppo futuro. Giuseppina Cortese e Martin Solly pongono l'attenzione sull'inglese per scopi professionali e accademici mentre Marina Dossena e Richard Dury forniscono un'ampia descrizione di studi di linguistica diacronica. La *corpus linguistics* con i suoi metodi innovativi è trattata da Elena Tognini-Bonelli, Silvia Cacchiani e Giuliana Diani, mentre i *translation studies*, visti anche nella loro interazione con la *corpus linguistics*, sono presentati e descritti da Margherita Ulrych e Simona Anselmi. L'ultimo contributo è quello di Luciana Pedrazzini, che riprende gli sviluppi della didattica della lingua inglese. Tutti i capitoli presentano la stessa organizzazione: una introduzione contenente i riferimenti concettuali e bibliografici imprescindibili per ciascun ambito di ricerca; segue un'analisi critico-bibliografica della produzione scientifica anglosassone, che però non trascura i contributi dal mondo italiano. La sezione conclusiva si articola in una utile rassegna delle principali riviste e conferenze del settore, seguita da un paragrafo finale dedicato alle problematiche aperte e a possibili linee di ricerca futura.

Sarah Bigi

RASSEGNA DI LINGUISTICA RUSSA

A CURA DI ANNA BONOLA

AA.VV., *Sovremennyyj russkij jazyk. Aktivnye processy na rubeže XX-XXI vekov* [Il russo contemporaneo. Processi attivi a cavallo tra il XX e il XXI secolo], L.P. KRYSIN ed., Jazyki slavjanskich kul'tur, Moskva 2008, pp. 709

O.P. Ermakova, R.I. Rozina, M.Ja. Glovinskaja, L.L. Kasatkin, R.F. Kasatkina, S.M. Kuz'mina, E.I. Golanova, E.V. Kakorina, E.A. Zemskaja: sono i nomi degli autori di questo volume, insigni studiosi che negli ultimi '20-'30 anni si sono distinti per aver monitorato i numerosi cambiamenti avvenuti nella lingua russa e che, a distanza di poco più di un decennio dal noto *Russkij jazyk konca XX stoletija (1985-1995)*, curato da E.A. Zemskaja, ripropongono un corposo aggiornamento sullo stato del russo contemporaneo a partire dalla metà degli anni Novanta.

Le prime quattro parti del volume indagano i processi semantico-lessicali, grammaticali, fonetico-ortografici e comunicativi attualmente attivi nella lingua russa; la quinta parte si concentra invece sul russo della diaspora.

Si rilevano i seguenti fenomeni: ingresso dei gerghi nel russo standard e allentamento della norma, diffusione di elementi linguistici marcati dal punto di vista sociale e professionale (i plurali in *-á*, l'ampio uso della preposizione *po*). Se negli anni '50-'60 tra le lingue professionali dominava quella dei fisici, soprattutto nucleari, ora prevale l'informatica, oggetto della creatività linguistica dei parlanti russi anche al di fuori del settore (*Emelja* invece di *emajl*, *Trupopaskal'* per *Turbo Pascal...*). Attraverso processi di metaforizzazione si realizza un intenso passaggio di termini informatici nella lingua standard e viceversa (*komp'juter zavisjaet, otkazyvaet...*).

Nelle varietà territoriali e regionali della lingua russa si registra la diminuzione dei

dialettismi e l'ingresso di elementi della lingua standard, conseguenza della diversificazione sociale che si sta accentuando anche nelle campagne in seguito ai maggiori contatti con il mondo urbano.

Nelle parlate urbane, accanto al 'vecchio' *prostoreč'e* - ricco di dialettismi, parlato dalle persone anziane con basso livello di istruzione - si sta diffondendo una forma "giovane", con parlanti di età inferiore ai sessant'anni, di istruzione medio-bassa e senza padronanza delle norme della lingua standard; a differenza della vecchia forma, è privo di dialettismi e ricco, invece, di termini gergali. Infine, si sta formando un gergo di uso comune basato sui gerghi dei lager e delle prigioni, già sviluppatosi in epoca sovietica.

Nella morfologia si nota la tendenza alla semplificazione del sistema dei casi e all'analitismo. Numerosi anche i cambiamenti nella semantica, soprattutto nei rapporti lessicali paradigmatici (creazione di nuove coppie di antonimi e sinonimi). In questo clima di rinnovamento cresce infine sempre più la coscienza linguistica dei parlanti e la loro partecipazione al dibattito pubblico sui cambiamenti in corso nella lingua russa contemporanea.

Anna Bonola

AA.VV. *Nacional'nyj corpus russkogo jazyka i problemy gumanitarnogo obrazovanija* [Corpus Nazionale della lingua russa e problemi della formazione umanistica], N.R. DOBRUŠINA ed., Gosudarstvennyj universitet – Vyssšaja škola ekonomiki, Moskva 2007, pp. 237.

A due anni dall'inaugurazione del libero accesso al Corpus Nazionale della lingua russa, escono gli atti della conferenza in cui, nell'aprile del 2007, si è voluto riflettere sulle applicazioni didattiche di questo nuovo strumento. La prima parte illustra l'utilità

metodologica del corpus, che permette di modellizzare i processi di ricerca e rende l'apprendimento un cammino euristico più personale. Nello studio del russo come lingua straniera il corpus facilita la creazione di esercizi orientati ai testi, permette di chiarire le condizioni d'uso di forme linguistiche concorrenti (*bit' v – bit' po; začem – počemu*) e, più in generale, di avere contatto con l'uso linguistico contemporaneo. Tre gli interventi di studiosi dall'Italia: F. Fici tratta l'uso del corpus per la didattica della traduzione del gerundio russo in italiano; S. Slavkova scrive sull'apprendimento dei verbi di supporto appoggiandosi al concetto di funzione lessicale; F. Biagini fornisce un apparato di esercizi costruito con il corpus nazionale e riguardante la concorrenza fra *zачem* e *почему*.

Nell'insegnamento del russo come prima lingua il corpus è stato utilizzato per la didattica di diversi aspetti del sistema linguistico: la derivazione lessicale, le categorie del lessico, i linguaggi di specialità, e l'analisi testuale.

Anna Bonola

E. FORTEJN, *Polisemia imperativa v russkom jazyke* [La polisemia dell'imperativo nella lingua russa], in "Voprosy jazykoznanija", I, 2008, pp. 23-45

Il saggio analizza la semantica dell'imperativo nella lingua russa per mostrare la complessa polisemia che si cela dietro alla medesima veste morfologica. Accanto al valore proprio dell'imperativo (*direktivnyj imperativ*), usato per esortare l'interlocutore a compiere l'azione espressa dal verbo, E. Fortejn individua: l'imperativo necessitativo (*dolženstvovatel'nyj*), narrativo (*povestvovatel'nyj*), ottativo (*želatel'nyj*), condizionale (*uslovnyj*) e concessivo (*ustupitel'nyj imperativ*).

Si evidenziano anche le caratteristiche morfosintattiche di ciascun tipo di imperativo (la disposizione del soggetto e del predicato nella frase, la persona, l'aspetto verbale e il tempo, la presenza dei suffissi – *ka* o – *te*) e le particolarità stilistiche (il *povestvovatel'nyj imperativ* è tipico del folklore e della lingua parlata, mentre l'*optativnyj imperativ*, produt-

tivo fino al XIX secolo, è vivo oggi solo nelle frasi idiomatiche).

L'invariante semantica che accomuna i sei tipi di imperativo è il tratto dell'impulso a compiere l'azione o a rappresentarla, esortando l'interlocutore a parteciparvi. Nell'imperativo direttivo tale impulso è diretto ed esplicito; negli usi indiretti, invece, dominano altri tratti semantici specifici (le sfumature 'soggettivo-modali'). Gli usi indiretti dell'imperativo vengono illustrati con numerosi esempi tratti da opere letterarie dell'Ottocento come dalla stampa degli ultimi anni.

Maria Versace

T.M. NIKOLAEVA, *Neparadigmatičeskaja lingvistika (istoria "bluždajuščich častic")* [Linguistica non paradigmatica (storia delle "particelle erranti")], *Jazyki slavjanskich kul'tur*, Moskva 2008, pp. 375.

Le particelle con valore deittico-comunicativo sono patrimonio comune di tutte le lingue slave e fenomeno imponente, ma spesso ignorato dai linguisti. Si tratta di una strana asimmetria fra lingua e linguistica i cui motivi sono spiegati da T.M. Nikolaeva nel primo capitolo della sua monografia (le premesse teoriche). Le particelle - negli studi diacronici considerate resti di una classe antica e poco nota - nelle tassonomie vengono accomunate a congiunzioni, pronomi o alle parole discorsive ecc. T.M. Nikolaeva per esse sceglie il termine *partikuly*, evitando così una troppo stretta identificazione con le *časticy*.

Nel secondo capitolo le particelle vengono confrontate con diverse parti del discorso e con i clitici; l'autrice si concentra sugli elementi *-s e *-t, centrali per la formazione dei paradigmi nelle lingue indoeuropee. La semantica delle particelle slave varia notevolmente a seconda che siano usate come elementi singoli (primarie: *a, i, no, že, li*), o combinate fra di loro (*li*, per esempio, indica l'interrogativa indiretta, ma dà luogo a composti come *libo, ali, toli, uželi* ecc. che hanno tutt'altro significato).

Delle particelle primarie e dei *cluster* che esse formano, dando luogo al processo di

grammaticalizzazione, si occupa il terzo capitolo. Il patrimonio iniziale delle particelle slave, ristretto e con semantica indefinita, ma sempre riferita all'opposizione determinato-indeterminato, creerebbe, grazie a un metodo caleidoscopico (prima metafora di Nikolaeva), una elevata quantità di combinazioni dalla semantica più precisa. Le particelle originarie sono dunque un meccano primordiale (seconda metafora) delle lingue slave, attivo all'incirca fino al XVI secolo. L'agglutinazione (una sorta di 'minisintassi') sarebbe così il principio costruttivo dei paradigmi antico slavi, sorti dalla combinazione delle particelle con gli elementi più vari (è questo per l'autrice il senso dell'aggettivo "errante" riferito alle particelle).

La monografia si conclude con utili appendici: l'elenco delle particelle primarie comuni a tutte le lingue slave e di quelle proprie di ciascuna lingua slava; l'elenco dei pronomi slavi composti da particelle, dei *cluster* di 10 particelle russe; infine un glossario delle particelle slave.

Anna Bonola

A.A. ZALIZNJAK, *Drevnerusskie enklitiki* [Enclitici antico russi], Jazyki slavjanskich kul'tur, Moskva 2008, pp. 276

Prestigiosa premessa e insieme complemento al volume di T.M. Nikolaeva sopra presentato è questa monografia del grande filologo russo che lamenta la scarsità degli studi sugli enclitici, forse dovuta al fatto che del ricco apparato di enclitici antico slavi non è quasi rimasta traccia nelle lingue slave orientali, a differenza di quelle occidentali e meridionali (in particolare il serbo e il croato). Ma la scoperta delle *gramoty* su corteccia di Novgorod ha dato nuovo impulso alla ricerca su questo tema e dalla loro analisi, come di altri numerosi documenti antico russi, Zaliznjak giunge a una serie di importanti conclusioni che confermano le intuizioni contenute nel pionieristico intervento di R. Jakobson alla conferenza dei linguisti del 1933 *Les enclitiques slaves* (1935).

Gli enclitici antico russi comprendono le particelle *že, li, bo, ti, by*, i pronomi al caso dativo *mi, ti, si, mja, tja, sja, ny, vy* (successivamente anche le rispettive forme accusative), e le forme verbali *Esm', esi* (che assumeranno poi la funzione di copula). La loro disposizione avviene secondo la seguente gerarchia di ranghi: 1. *že* 2. *li* 3. *bo* 4. *ti* 5. *by, bych', bychom', byša* 6. pronomi in caso dativo 7. pronomi in caso accusativo 8. *Esm', esi*.

La ricostruzione del preciso meccanismo degli enclitici antico russi, la cui posizione rispetta la legge di Wackernagel, si oppone alla tesi finora accettata che l'ordine delle parole in russo sarebbe sempre stato libero, e permette di correggere numerosi errori interpretativi dei documenti antico russi. Rilevante è il concetto di "barriera ritmico-sintattica", un confine che distingue l'inizio della frase dalla parte rimanente e che permette di riconfermare la validità della legge di Wackernagel anche là dove sembrava essere contraddetta.

L'autore segue l'evoluzione degli enclitici dal XI al XVI secolo, durante la quale essi sono lentamente scomparsi ad eccezione di *-sja*, diventato parola autonoma e suffisso verbale. Nel russo moderno restano solo *že, li* e *by*, che per posizione nella frase rispettano in parte ancora le antiche leggi.

Anna Bonola

RASSEGNA DI LINGUISTICA TEDESCA

A CURA DI GIOVANNI GOBBER E FEDERICA MISSAGLIA

HILTRAUD CASPER-HEHNE, *Deutsch-amerikanische Alltagskommunikation. Zur Beziehungsarbeit in interkulturellen Gesprächen*, Niemeyer, Tübingen 2006 (Reihe Germanistische Linguistik, 265), pp. XIV+542

In dieser Monographie wird das interkulturelle Gespräch als ein kommunikatives Ereignis verstanden, das neues Verhalten außerhalb der Ausgangskulturen der Gesprächsteilnehmer schafft.

Interkulturelle Unterschiede werden vor allem dort erkannt, wo Missverständnisse entstehen, die auf unterschiedliche Kulturen der Gesprächspartner zurückgeführt werden können. Auf der Basis eines reichen empirischen Materials untersucht die Autorin die Beziehungsarbeit in interkulturellen Gesprächen zwischen deutschen Muttersprachlern und US/amerikanischen Fremdsprachenlernern. Im Brennpunkt der Analyse stehen drei Gesprächssorten: Erstkontaktgespräche, Gespräche mit Anweisungsscharakter und schließlich die sog. interkulturellen diskursiven Gespräche, in denen Geltungen und Normen thematisiert und problematisiert werden. Bei Erstkontaktgesprächen geht es um Herstellung, Aufrechterhaltung und Stabilisierung bzw. Veränderung von sozialen Beziehungen in Form von Kontakten. In solchen Gesprächen erscheint oft die narrative Dimension, die für sich keine Gesichtsbedrohung impliziert. Gespräche mit Anweisungsscharakter und interkulturelle diskursive Gespräche sind durch direktive Handlungen gekennzeichnet, die gesichtsbedrohend wirken. Erstere bedrohen das *positive face*, da sie den Freiraum einer Person einschränken. Das *negative face* wird durch letztere insofern bedroht, als die Wertschätzung einer Person betroffen wird.

Aus der Untersuchung geht hervor, dass US-amerikanische Fremdsprachenler-

sowohl das *positive* als auch das *negative face* ihrer Gesprächspartner unterstützen und schützen. Deutsche Muttersprachler dagegen zeigen eine Tendenz zur Verletzung sowohl des *positive* als auch des *negative face*. Die Kommunikationskultur der anglophonen US-amerikanischen Studierenden wird somit als eine "Kultur der Wertschätzung" bezeichnet.

'Kultur' wird hier von einem soziologischen Standpunkt betrachtet, wobei Goffmans Erklärungsmodell eine bedeutende Rolle zugeordnet wird. Darüber hinaus wird die Ansicht vertreten, wonach Werte an Kulturen gebunden sind und als Ergebnis vom Diskurs über die Erfahrung aufgefasst werden. Erst im Diskurs, d.h. in der Kultur würden Werte entstehen. Die Grundfragen menschlicher Existenz, die in den Philosophien thematisiert werden, wären folglich als kulturelle Artefakte anzusehen (wären Menschenrechte selbst kulturell bedingt?). Damit ist keine anthropologische Fundierung des Kulturbegriffs möglich, die zum Verständnis und zur Beurteilung einer echten interkulturellen Kommunikation beitragen könnte.

Giovanni Gobber

CARSTEN REINEMANN – JANA HUISMANN, *Beziehen sich Medien immer mehr auf Medien? – Dimensionen, Belege, Erklärungen*, „Publizistik“, LII, 2007/4, pp. 465-484

Die These der wachsenden Selbstbezüglichkeit der Medien gilt in der Kommunikationswissenschaft weitgehend als akzeptiert. Reinemann und Huismann gehen der Frage nach, ob sie sich wissenschaftlich belegen lässt. Dabei stellen die Autoren ein Defizit an empirischen Längsschnittstudien fest sowie eine unzureichende theoretische Durchdringung des Konzepts der Selbst- bzw. Medienreferentialität. Sie skizzieren die verschiede-

nen Dimensionen des Phänomens und grenzen aneinander orientierte Handlungen der Medienakteure von aufeinander bezogenen Medieninhalten und explizite (z.B. Medienzitate) von impliziten Bezügen (z.B. Agenda-Setting) ab.

Nach dem strukturell-individualistischen Ansatz begründet sich eine stärkere Medienreferentialität in der aktuellen Berichterstattung mit dem Wandel der Rahmenbedingungen journalistischen Handelns (Expansion des Medienangebots, Beschleunigung der Nachrichtenzyklen etc.). Zeit-, Kosten- und Rechtfertigungsdruck bei Publikationsentscheidungen führten zur Reduzierung eigener Recherche und zur Orientierung an anderen Medien. Der Handlungsalltag der Journalisten sollte daher empirisch untersucht und anschließend die Folgen der zunehmenden journalistischen Koorientierung (z.B. Mainstreaming) analysiert werden.

Jan Henschel

PHILOMEN SCHÖNHAGEN, *Ko-Evolution von Public Relations und Journalismus: Ein erster Beitrag zu ihrer systematischen Aufarbeitung*, „Publizistik“, LIII, 2008/1, pp. 9-24

Das Verhältnis von Public Relations (PR) und Journalismus wird in der Kommunikationswissenschaft meist als Zusammenspiel zweier interdependenter Systeme dargestellt. Unter historischer Perspektive beleuchtet der Beitrag, welche Wechselwirkungen sich dabei im deutschsprachigen Raum bei der Entstehung von PR skizzieren lassen. Schönha-gen sieht deren Genese in engem Kontext mit der Geschichte des Journalismus und weist an historischen Beispielen nach, dass PR als Gegenreaktion auf die Entwicklung der „autonomen Nachrichtenproduktion“ der Massenmedien verstanden werden kann. Auf die Blütezeit der Persönlichkeits- bzw. Meinungspresse im 19. Jh. antworteten demnach Staat, Wirtschaftsunternehmen etc. mit PR, um der fehlenden oder aus ihrer Sicht verfälschten Berichterstattung entgegenzuwirken. Unter Beachtung der sozialen Entwicklung und des zunehmenden Legiti-

mationsbedarfs der eigenen Handlungen erkannten die Organisationen zudem, dass große Zielgruppen bzw. die Gesamtöffentlichkeit nur noch über Massenmedien erreichbar waren. Dies hatte wiederum Folgen für den Journalismus, der z.B. aufgrund vermehrter Stoffzulieferung mit einer Ausdifferenzierung der redaktionellen Strukturen reagierte und sich – bedingt auch durch technische Neuerungen – zu einer modernen Massenpresse entwickelte.

Jan Henschel

BERTRAM SCHEUFELE, *Die These der Negativitätsumkehrung – Ein Experiment zur Wirkung von Negativität in den Politiker- und Problemdarstellungen von Printmedien*, „Publizistik“, LIII, 2008/1, pp. 48-64

Welche Wirkung hat die immer negativere Politikberichterstattung auf die Rezipienten? Dies untersucht Scheufele auf der Basis kognitiver, emotionaler und konativer Einstellungseffekte und entwirft seine „These der Negativitätsumkehrung“. Die These besagt, dass Negativität in den Politikberichten nicht zwingend zu ablehnenden Meinungen oder gar zu Politikverdrossenheit führen muss, sondern in konkreten Urteils-situationen auch positive Effekte in Form von Zustimmung mit sich bringen kann.

Dies wird an Hand eines Zwei-Faktoren-Experiments belegt, bei dem Probanden zuerst ein negativer (Artikel A1) oder positiver (A2) Zeitungsartikel über die Problemlösungsfähigkeit deutscher Politiker vorgelegt wurde, bevor sie dann einen Text erhielten, der sich mit einem konkreten landespolitischen Problem auseinandersetzte, was dramatisiert (Artikel B1) oder sachlich (B2) dargestellt wurde. Ergebnis war, dass die A1-Leser durch die neuerliche Medienkritik einen permanent verfügbaren Bezugsrahmen („ungelöste Probleme“) aktivierten, der zu einem größeren Problembewusstsein führte und eine Kontrastfolie bildete, von der sich die konkrete landespolitische (Problemlösungs-) Entscheidung abhob. Folge war ein überwiegend positives Urteil, das sich im Falle der

Lektüre des dramatisierten Textes B1 noch verstärkte.

Jan Henschel

INGA HUCK – HANS-BERND BROSIUS, *Der Third-Person-Effekt – Über den vermuteten Einfluss der Massenmedien*, „Publizistik“, LII, 2007/3, pp. 355-374

Warum neigen Menschen dazu, den Einfluss der Massenmedien auf andere zu überschätzen, während sie eine Wirkung auf sich selbst weitgehend zurückweisen? Das von W. Phillips Davison unter dem Namen „Third-Person-Effekt“ (TPE) beschriebene Phänomen wird in dem Beitrag von Huck und Brosius auf der Basis knapp 100 veröffentlichter Studien weitreichend analysiert, indem ein allgemeiner Forschungsüberblick der empirischen Befunde, der verstärkenden und abschwächenden Faktoren sowie der theoretischen Erklärungsmodelle gegeben wird.

Dabei entwerfen die Autoren ihr integratives Modell unterschiedlicher Wahrnehmungsphänomene. Für den TPE sehen sie die Ursachen besonders in der Angst, dass Medien manipulieren sowie der generellen Kontrollillusion der Menschen. Diese glauben, ihre Umwelt zu kontrollieren, auch wenn sie es – objektiv betrachtet – nicht tun, gestehen anderen Personen aber nicht die gleiche Fähigkeit zu, wenn sie sich einer sozialen, psychologischen oder politischen Distanz zu ihnen befinden. Zur weiteren Forschung über mögliche Verhaltenskonsequenzen der Menschen auf Grund des TPE lädt die ausgiebige Bibliographie im Anhang ein.

Jan Henschel

ROSMARIE ZELLER, *Bemerkungen zur Geschichte der Gattungsbezeichnung „Schelmenroman“*, „Simpliciana“, XXIX, 2007, pp. 393-396

Der Beitrag befasst sich mit der Geschichte der Gattungsbezeichnung „Schelmenroman“ und zwar mit der Frage, wie das negativ besetzte Wort „Schelm“ Bestandteil einer Gat-

tungsbezeichnung werden konnte. Ursprünglich bedeutete es nämlich „Kadaver“, „Leichnam“, „totes Vieh“ und im Wörterbuch von Adelung treten auch die Bedeutungen „tödliche Seuche“ und „ehrloser Mensch“ auf. Die zeitgenössische Übersetzung für „pikaro“ war „Landstörtzer“ und auf keinen Fall „Schelm“. Die Abschwächung dieser negativen Bedeutung ist die Voraussetzung dafür, dass das Wort als Gattungsbezeichnung fungieren konnte. Am Anfang des XIX. Jahrhunderts findet man den frühesten Beleg dafür, dass der Pikaro-Roman als „Schelmenroman“ bezeichnet wird, obwohl die Erklärung in Klammern – d.h. „Schelmenromane (*del gusto picaresco*)“ – darauf hindeutet, dass der Ausdruck noch unüblich war. In den achtziger Jahren desselben Jahrhunderts gibt es Belege von der generalisierten Verwendung des Begriffs und sie beweisen, dass die ursprüngliche negative Bedeutung des Wortes „Schelm“ für den Pikaro abgeschwächt worden war.

Alessandra Monti

HEIDEMARIA ABFALTERER, *Der Südtiroler Sonderwortschatz aus plurizentrischer Sicht. Lexikalisch-semantische Besonderheiten im Standarddeutsch Südtirols*, Innsbruck University Press, Innsbruck 2007, 286 pp.

2004 erschien das erste plurizentrische Wörterbuch auf der Welt. Herausgegeben wurde es unter dem Titel *Variantenwörterbuch des Deutschen. Die Standardsprache in Österreich, der Schweiz und Deutschland sowie in Liechtenstein, Luxemburg, Ostbelgien und Südtirol* (Berlin et al.: de Gruyter) von dem Duisburger Germanisten und Initiator des Projekts Ulrich Ammon in Zusammenarbeit mit österreichischen und schweizerischen Kollegen. Heidemaria Abfaltrer hatte im Rahmen dieses Projekts die Datenbank für den Südtiroler Raum betreut. Jetzt hat sie das Quellenkorpus des Südtiroler Sonderwortschatzes erweitert und ein eigenes Wörterbuch herausgegeben, das die Südtiroler Varianten der deutschen Standardsprache aus plurizentrischer Sicht systematischer und

umfassender darstellt. Damit hat sie ein Nachschlagewerk vorgelegt, das sich von der editorischen Anlage her sehr gut benutzen, in der alphabetischen Anordnung der Stichwörter leicht überblicken und dank der selbstständigen, inhaltlich fundierten, detaillierten und schematisch ausgeführten Wörterbuchartikel gewinnbringend lesen lässt. Mehrere dem Wörterbuch vorangestellte kurze und prägnante Abhandlungen führen in das Thema ein und eignen sich als Einstieg für eine breite, sprachlich interessierte Leserschaft. Neben der Einführung in die pluri-zentrische Auffassung von der deutschen Sprache wird auch die Sprachsituation in Südtirol ab 1920 behandelt, als Südtirol Teil des italienischen Staatsgebietes wurde. In einem dritten Kapitel gibt sie einen Einblick in ihre methodische Vorgehensweise, in der auch der Aufbau der *Datenbank zum Südtiroler Deutsch* und ihre statistische Auswertung zur Sprache kommen. Schließlich hat sie in einem vierten Kapitel von A (Abänderungsantrag) bis Z (Zweitsprachunterricht) insgesamt 621 Lemmata zusammengetragen, die als „eigenständige, in sich geschlossene lexikographische Arbeit zum Sonderwortschatz in Südtirol“ (71) gelten kann.

Sandro M. Moraldo

MARC RATHMANN, *Anglicisms in the German Business Press. A Corpus-Based Study*, VDM, Saarbrücken 2007, 135 pp.

Rathmann untersucht anhand einer Korpusanalyse der *Wirtschaftswoche* (1973-2003) den Gebrauch von Anglizismen in der deutschen Wirtschaftssprache. Nach einem Überblick über den Stand der Anglizismenforschung und der Klärung terminologischer Aspekte geht Rathmann den Fragen nach, ob die Anzahl der Anglizismen in der Wirtschaftssprache steigt und von der Textsorte abhängt. In der *Wirtschaftswoche* stammt der größte Anteil von Anglizismen aus dem Allgemeinwortschatz (67,35%) gefolgt von spezifischen Wirtschaftsanglizismen (25,97%), während aus anderen fachsprachlichen Domänen nur wenige Anglizismen vertreten

sind. Die Zahl der Anglizismen hängt von der jeweiligen Textsorte ab. In Titelgeschichten ist im Vergleich zu Leitartikeln und Leserbriefen die Anzahl von Anglizismen am höchsten und steigt am schnellsten an. Eine mögliche Erklärung ist, dass Journalisten bei der Berichterstattung aus dem Ausland englische Wörter übernehmen oder aber auch aus Prestige Gründen verwenden. Da Leitartikel zur Beeinflussung der Lesermeinung beitragen und damit möglichst verständlich sein sollen, treten dort weniger Anglizismen auf. Aus den Leserbriefen ergibt sich, dass Leser deutlich seltener Anglizismen benutzen als Journalisten.

Stefanie Vogler

CORDULA MEISSNER, *Eine gebrauchsbienorientierte Beschreibung des Sprachsystems mit Hilfe der Korpuslinguistik – das Beispiel der Synonyme ewig und unendlich*, „Deutsch als Fremdsprache“ 2008/1, pp. 8-13

Auf der Grundlage der generativen Grammatik Chomskyscher Prägung und der davon berührten angewandten Linguistik zeigt die Autorin den relevanten Blick der Korpuslinguistik auf das Sprachsystem. Im Mittelpunkt steht die reale Sprachverwendung, die auch im Fremdsprachenunterricht eine besondere Relevanz hat. Ziel des Artikels ist es daher zu zeigen, wie die traditionelle Sprachbeschreibung mit korpuslinguistischen Mitteln präzisiert und ergänzt werden kann. Dies wird durch ein Beispiel auf lexikalischer Ebene durchgeführt, nämlich auf der Ebene der Synonymiebeziehung der Adjektive *ewig* und *unendlich*, wofür zwei Korpora konsultiert werden.

Mit der Untersuchung wird gezeigt, dass die Bedeutungsbeschreibungen beider Adjektive in traditionell erstellten Wörterbüchern des Deutschen nicht immer ihre reale Verwendung in der Gegenwartssprache zeigen: Die am häufigsten verwendeten Bedeutungen seien nicht immer adäquat dargestellt und die Reihenfolge der Bedeutungsvarianten entspreche nicht immer der Häufigkeit

ihres tatsächlichen Auftretens in der Sprache. Und da sich die Darstellung als unvollständig erweise, wünscht sich die Autorin eine empirisch fundierte Überarbeitung der Wörterbuchdarstellungen. Als Hilfsmittel brauche man dazu Korpusanalysen, Korpusbelege und Korpora, deren Einsatz im Fremdsprachenunterricht eine neue Möglichkeit darstelle, Lerner die reale Verwendung der Zielsprache entdecken zu lassen.

Lucia Salvato

MAGDALENA SZULC-BRZOZOWSKA, *Über die Bedeutung von aus und von – kontrastiv*, “Deutsch als Fremdsprache”, 2008/1, pp. 46-50.

Gegenstand der Untersuchung ist die Semantik des Präpositionspaars *aus* und *von*, dessen naheliegende Bedeutung oft von (polnischen) Deutschlernenden verwechselt wird. Problematisch hat sich in diesem Sinne die Frage nach den kontextuellen Bedingungen zu der richtigen Verwendung beider Präpositionen erwiesen. Ziel des Beitrags ist es darum, eine abstrakte, möglichst einheitliche bzw. nichtvariable Bedeutung beider Präpositionen zu präsentieren.

Die Analyse konzentriert sich auf den Gebrauch von *aus* und *von* in der Präpositionalphrase mit dem syntaktischen Wert einer Adverbialbestimmung. Mittels einer kontrastiven Analyse werden die semantischen Merkmale beider Präpositionen in den Vordergrund gestellt. Da der Kontext dafür ein Unterscheidungsfaktor ist, wird die Untersuchung innerhalb des lokalen, temporalen, modalen und kausalen Kontextes, sowie bei der Präpositionalrektion von Verben durchgeführt. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die semantischen Überschneidungen bei polnischen Lernenden auch wegen der irreführenden Äquivalenz in ihrer Muttersprache noch problematischer sind: Sie können kontextuell nur dann erfasst werden, wenn klare Unterscheidungsmerkmale vorliegen. Bei dem Fremdspracherwerb wäre darum das Ziel zu verfolgen, eine möglichst nichtvariable Bedeutung beider Präpositionen zu er-

reichen, um eine möglichst unterschiedliche Verwendung zu rechtfertigen und zu begründen.

Lucia Salvato

ULRIKE A. KAUNZNER, *Grenzen überschreiten – Grenzen überwinden. Neue Herausforderungen an den DaF-Unterricht*, in Ulrike A. Kaunzner (Hrsg.): *Der Fall der Kulturmauer. Wie kann Sprachunterricht interkulturell sein?*, Waxmann Verlag, Münster/New York/München/Berlin, 2008, pp. 1-26

In diesem Beitrag geht Kaunzner auf unterschiedliche Aspekte des Faches „Interkulturelle Kommunikation“ ein. Neben der Darstellung von Lehrinhalten und der Umsetzung des Faches im DaF-Unterricht ist vor allem ein Überblick über die Vermittlungsformen aufschlussreich. Die Lehrenden sollen so dazu angeregt werden, sich mit der Förderung von Selbstreflexion und Fremdverstehenstraining eingehend zu beschäftigen, um dann später die Schüler bzw. Studierenden zur Überwindung von Sprach- und Kulturgrenzen zu befähigen.

Christine Arendt



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